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ABSTRACT1 – Aesthetic Separation and the Reflection of Life in Art 
  
This thesis aims to define the practice of art, which is understood as the creation and 
appreciation of artworks, in terms of separation. It further attempts to determine how the 
concept of separation can be used to relate biological and cognitive aspects of human life with 
the aesthetic experience and understanding of artworks. It accomplishes this by establishing 
correlations between biological and artistic functionality, while showing how separation 
limits a purely biological conception of artistic practice. The theoretical research focuses on 
important aesthetic theories of the past two centuries, and recent studies into human 
cognition. The practical research incorporates two postconceptual social art projects that 
implicate the theoretical research. The results demonstrate two principal separations that 
define artworks and people in relation to tradition and society respectively. The first involves 
an internal division of object and subject, or material and form. The second distinguishes 
internal from external, integral from relational, or the individual from the group. The 
oppositions that are generated by these separations play vital roles in the reflexive 
identification of self—the foundation of aesthetic theory—and the recognition of human 
products as artworks. Nonetheless, this thesis finds that the distinct sources of internal and 
external meaning during aesthetic experience impede a direct correlation between artistic 
cause and biological effect, and vice versa. Artworks do reflect human life, but their capacity 
to produce meaning is influenced by social and conceptual relations that escape biological 
determinism. The practice of art distinguishes its autonomy and tradition on its own terms.  
 
Keywords: aesthetics; art; artwork; biology; cognition; life; postconceptual; separation; 
tradition. 
                                                
1 Ve a APÉNDICE 1 en página 399 para el RESUMEN en castellano. 
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“Separation is the Alpha and Omega of the Spectacle.” 
– Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, Thesis 25. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction to the Introduction 
This thesis employs the concept of separation to determine how the practice of art 
relates to biological and philosophical conceptions of life. It explores the observation and 
function of separation in both artworks and people through an exploration of autopoietic 
theory, human cognition and aesthetic experience. It expands upon Jacques Rancière’s 
conception of ‘aesthetic separation,’ which involves two distinct divisions that consider 
artworks in relation to sensory interaction leading to signification, and cultural tradition in 
relation to social transformation. Artworks are thus contemplated in my research in terms of 
artistic practice—the creation and appreciation of art—and in relation to collective systems of 
cultural communication and preservation.  
This thesis explores the practice of art from many angles, providing a holistic 
approach to understanding the creation of artworks and their reception through aesthetic 
experience at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In order to better understand the 
connection between art and life, the practice of art is considered in terms of a systems-
theoretical approach to biological operation, and a cognitive embodiment approach of human 
thought. To better understand the relationship between singular artworks and the general 
concept of art—as well as the social tradition through which art exists—the theory of art is 
considered in relation to its ontological and art historical roots. For my practical research, the 
ideas encountered in the scientific and philosophical research are integrated into an social 
artwork that explores how context influences artistic significance, and how spectators 
participate to help create artworks.  
My research questions the procedure of identifying contemporary artworks given that 
they are unlimited in terms of their material composition and subject matter, and increasingly 
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moving into non-art territories. My belief is that artworks are distinguished from non-natural 
materials and non-art products based on the observation of their compositions and contextual 
states, which must incorporate some artistic convention that will distinguish them as art. This 
research also questions the ways that artworks affect observers, and how the practice of art 
can have a political effect. This relates to Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation, which he 
uses to explore the potential and limits of the political efficacy of aesthetic experience. 
This thesis finds that the concept of separation is a valuable way to appreciate the 
practice of art and relate it to human life. Our biological state of being separated in terms of 
physiological lack and psychological ipseity can be recognized as an impetus for the acts of 
communication and connection that artistic practice implies. The observational act of 
distinction, which is required during aesthetic experience, is also an act of separation in which 
the transformations inherent in artistic composition are internalized and understood in relation 
to preconceptions of the concept and tradition of art. In the end, there are numerous 
separations that are shared by both human beings and artworks, which makes the practice of 
art an excellent opportunity to reflect upon the capacities and limits that we inherently have. 
 
1.2. Thesis Topic and Intentions 
The main topic of this thesis is the aesthetic experience of artworks, which is 
facilitated by the cognitive and experiential abilities of human beings within a context of 
social tradition. While a biological approach to understanding the practice of art is based upon 
the sensory and cognitive requisites for recognizing and appreciating artworks, the social and 
cultural traditions upon which we base our concept of art escape the reach of biological 
validity. One of the aims of this thesis is to better appreciate the separation between the fields 
of science and philosophy that influence the practice of art. While biology is understood as 
the scientific study of life, our philosophical understanding of life in existential terms is 
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equally essential to determine the true significance of artistic practice. This thesis attempts to 
establish how the practice of art is just as important for understanding and appreciating life by 
providing individuals with unique opportunities and perspectives to realize the conditions and 
contradictions that naturally constitute their lives.  
 This research into aesthetic experience focuses on the state and act of separation as a 
principal theme. As a concept that is applicable to scientific, philosophic and artistic realms of 
thought, my intention is to use separation in order to define artistic practice in association 
with and distinction from science and philosophy. As an autonomous field that utilizes 
scientific and philosophic truths in order to function, the autonomy of art will be further 
reflected in the autonomy of the artwork, which must be distinguished from other beings in 
order to function as art. Separation thus becomes a key concept in helping to establish the 
nature of artworks and the nature of our observation, both of which are constituted in terms of 
form. Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation establishes two instances of separation at the 
heart of contemporary art practices. One is the cognitive division between physical sensation 
and the conceptual or metaphoric meaning that it invokes. Another is the division of artworks 
from the society and tradition that establish them. These two distinct separations—one based 
within subjective aesthetic experience and the other based on objective social conceptions—
unite this thesis as the practice of art is explored in relation to life. 
 With this theoretical research in mind, one final aim of this thesis is to explore how 
the creation of contemporary artworks can help to identify the ontological and operational 
boundaries that define aesthetic experience. Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation was 
developed in relation to the political ambitions of contemporary artists who are increasingly 
escaping institutional contexts and operating within non-art practices, utilizing ‘everyday life’ 
as a context and raw material for their artworks.2 As an artist who fits within this 
                                                
2 Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, (London, UK: Verso, 2011), 53. 
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methodological description, my practical research for this thesis focuses on the development 
of a socially engaged art project. Both the subject matter of the project and its procedure 
reflect the theoretical research into aesthetic separation and the reflection of life in art. 
 
1.3. Literature Review 
 The three main books that have influenced this thesis focus on the theory of art. The 
unifying theme of the thesis comes from Rancière’s article “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic 
Community,” which was published in The Emancipated Spectator. In addition to considering 
the cognitive and social conditions of contemporary artistic practice, it establishes a space for 
the practical research of this thesis to explore the political efficacy of artworks. The second 
book, Alva Nöe’s Strange Tools, develops an organizational theory of art that considers 
biological and evolutionary approaches to the practice of art while criticizing the legitimacy 
of current research in neuroaesthetics. His organizational theory of art functions remarkably 
well in relation to the themes of autopoiesis, context, language and technology, all of which 
play an important part of this thesis. The third book is Peter Osborne’s Anywhere or Not at 
All, which ontologically positions contemporary art practices as ‘postconceptual’ in relation to 
a broad consideration of post-enlightenment artistic and philosophical traditions. Aside from 
providing a thorough overview of the cultural period that is the focus of Rancière’s 
research—‘the aesthetic regime’—Osborne also analyses the contemporary art scene with 
noteworthy clarity while carefully distinguishing art from aesthetics. These three books 
represent the three relational pillars at the heart of this thesis: art and sociology, art and 
science, and art and philosophy.  
 To more fully explore the relationship between art and sociology, there are several 
other key books to note. Niklas Luhmann’s Art as a Social System places the practice of art 
within a systems-theoretical approach to communication theory, and is useful in considering 
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the observation of artworks and the autopoietic functioning of art. Two other important 
sources of inspiration are Jacques Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I am and Giorgio 
Agamben’s The Open, both of which consider the relationship between human beings and 
other animals, and greatly deepened my understanding of reflexive thought. By showing how 
human beings are distinct, or at least how we think we are distinct, our use of language and 
technology become important factors in considering our use of art to define ourselves as a 
species. 
 From a scientific perspective, Humberto Maturana & Antonio Varela’s concept of 
autopoiesis is perhaps the most important influence on this thesis. Establishing a systems-
theoretical approach to understanding all forms of life, autopoiesis provides a model for 
determining an operational approach to artistic practice—the creation of artworks and their 
aesthetic experience—and the various conditions, considerations and complications that such 
an approach might entail. This is accompanied by Antonio Damasio’s book Descartes’ Error, 
which is a neurological guide to human thought and the intrinsic connection between body 
and mind. Providing an accessible conception of how ‘self’ is formed within individuals, and 
how human consciousness might function, Damasio’s book is complimentary to 
understanding Gabrielle Starr’s Feeling Beauty, which is a neurological approach to the 
functioning of aesthetic thought, and an introduction to the complex interconnectivity that the 
human nervous system is capable of.   
 Finally, better understanding the relationship between art and philosophy is perhaps 
the most important personal development that this thesis has permitted. To begin, Immanuel 
Kant’s The Critique of Judgement was explored in great depth, establishing a firm foundation 
from which the practice of art can be considered as a philosophical practice. The legacy of 
Kant’s conception of aesthetic thought can be found in all of the books mentioned above, but 
the three other main sources of inspiration were Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic 
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Education of Man, which beautifully considers the political potential of artistic practice; John 
Dewey’s Art as Experience, which eloquently explores the cognitive and social nuances of the 
experience of artworks; and finally, Martin Heidegger’s The Origin of the Work of Art, which 
innovatively considers the ways in which artworks function as part of our individual and 
collective thought. From this diverse group of books, my research into a holistic 
understanding of aesthetic experience and aesthetic separation has largely developed.  
 
1.4. Terms and Scope of the Thesis Topic 
The topic of this thesis, aesthetic separation, implicates a broad range of relevant 
fields of study, from art to philosophy to science. There are many relevant terms that form the 
foundation of this thesis. Since its main theme is the aesthetic experience of artworks, I will 
begin by clarifying what I consider aesthetics to mean by using a definition of Rancière’s: 
I do not consider aesthetics to be the name of the science or discipline that 
deals with art. In my view it designates a mode of thought that develops 
with respect to things of art and that is concerned to show them to be 
things of thought. More fundamentally, aesthetics is a particular historical 
regime of thinking about art and an idea of thought according to which 
things or art are things of thought.3  
 
A number of terms that are used in this description beg further definition. ‘Art’, for example, 
is a universal term used to describe artworks in general and the human culture and tradition 
within which artworks are created and appreciated. An ‘artwork’ is a specific, singular 
exemplification of art, while ‘art’ is a concept that places artworks in reference to a culture 
and tradition that is defined by artistic conventions and practice. The terms ‘art’ and ‘artwork’ 
are co-dependent, and while I have explored the cluster-criteria definition of art in my 
                                                
3 Jacques Rancière, The Aesthetic Unconscious, (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009), p. 5. 
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previous work in search of the limits of artworks4, the state of reciprocal dependency of ‘art’ 
and ‘artwork’ will be further explored in this thesis. 
 In the quote above, Rancière describes aesthetics as a particular historical regime of 
thinking about art, and the aesthetic regime needs to be clarified. The term, in general, refers 
to the post-enlightenment practice of art, which can be considered to have begun in the late 
18th Century with the publication of Kant’s The Critique of Judgement, in which our current 
conception of ‘aesthetics’ originates, and continues to this day in the early 21st Century.5 In 
his article “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” Rancière distinguishes the aesthetic 
regime from its predecessor, which he calls the “mimetic regime”, or the “regime of 
representation.” The aesthetic regime exemplifies the reason and freedom of thought that the 
Enlightenment advocated for. In the aesthetic regime of art, the subjective interpretation and 
understanding of artworks takes priority over predetermined notions of their significance, 
which will be further explored in the thesis. For a visualization of the periodizaiton of the 
aesthetic regime in relation to relevant artistic movements and the principal source material of 
this thesis, please consult Appendix 2. 
A more specific ideology that needs to be defined within the aesthetic regime of art is 
‘postconceptual art’, which Peter Osborne uses to replace the temporally ambiguous term 
‘contemporary art.’6 One of the problems Osborne has with the Modern/Post-modern 
opposition is that he doesn’t consider Modernism to be over. Osborne positions 
postconceptual art as continuing movement of the Modern epoch of art, which can be 
subdivided into various kinds of modernisms. More importantly, the term postconceptual 
recognizes the important influence that conceptual art of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s has 
                                                
4 Robert Waters, “Sweat, Feel, Think, Art: Investigating The Biological Foundation and 
Cognitive Conditions of Aesthetic Experience and Art,” abstract (Master's thesis, 
University of the Basque Country, 2012), 98-107. 
5 Joseph J. Tanke, “What is the Aesthetic Regime?”, PARRHESIA, No. 12 (2011): 72. 
6 Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, (London, UK: Verso, 2013), 37. 
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had on current art practices, which will be further explored in the thesis. As a practicing artist 
who employs conceptual strategies in the production of my artworks, the term postconceptual 
effectively contextualizes my multi-faceted art practice, and the two artworks that are 
included as practical research for this thesis. 
Rancière uses the term aesthetic separation, in his text “Aesthetic Separation, 
Aesthetic Community” to describe two distinct processes of separation at the heart of 
aesthetic experience. The first relates to the biology and psychology of aesthetic experience, 
describing the separation that occurs when an external source of sensory data—an artwork, 
for example—is internalized and transformed into conceptual and/or metaphoric meaning by 
the observer. Rancière describes this separation as the transformation of ‘sense to sense’, 
taking advantage of the ambiguity of meaning that ‘sense’ has as both a physical sensation 
achieved through the five senses, and a feeling of reason or logic that a thought evokes.7 From 
this second meaning of sense we derive the term ‘common sense.’ The second instance of 
separation at the heart of aesthetic separation is the division implied in the transformation of 
artistic practice and tradition as human cultural changes over time. This leaves artworks 
perpetually out of context, and has implications on their interpretation in relation to social 
influence, which is perpetually changing.  
 When I speak of ‘the practice of art’ I am referring to the creation and the appreciation 
of artworks. These two specific practices can be understood in a very broad way, with the 
creation of artworks being associated with their production, and their appreciation being 
associated with their aesthetic experience and their integration within larger institutional and 
economic systems of art. As an artist, it is important to point out that the appreciation of an 
artwork is implicit in its process of creation. One of the important things that I have learned 
                                                
7 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 57-58. 
 17 
during my research is that the opposite is also true; that the aesthetic judgement of an artwork 
implies its creation by the observing subject, at least in terms of generating significance. 
 Another phrase that I repeatedly refer to in this thesis is the state of ‘being apart 
together’, which Rancière uses in “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community” as a 
foundation for explaining our social relations and the condition of aesthetic separation. The 
phrase is taken from a Mallarme poem titled “The White Water Lily,” and describes a 
situation where a potential suitor on a river boat silently approaches the woman he desires. As 
he hears her footsteps on the land, he prefers to remain undisclosed behind the flora in her 
assumed presence. “Apart, we are together,”8 is the direct quote that Rancière uses, but I have 
shortened it for practical purposes, and use it repeatedly to refer to the paradoxical and 
metaphorical situation of being simultaneously separated and connected.  
 These are the main terms that are used within this thesis and form the structure upon 
which the concept of aesthetic separation will be investigated, associated and expanded. There 
are many other important terms that will be defined as they appear in the thesis. 
 
1.5. Thesis Positioning and Literature Evaluation 
 Rancière is a very well known and respected philosopher of art and aesthetics, and 
there are numerous books and articles written about his work in relation with art theory, art 
history and the philosophy of art. This thesis is distinctive in that positions the work of 
Rancière in relation to a biological conception of artistic practice, and more fully develops the 
ways in which separation defines the aesthetic experience of artworks and the transformative 
tradition that establishes it. Furthermore, it relates the work of Rancière to two postconceptual 
art projects in an attempt to elucidate his theoretical proposals in practical terms and 
processes. The focus of my research has primarily been on the philosophy and psychology of 
                                                
8 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 51. 
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aesthetics, which relate the experience of artworks with the functioning of human thought. 
The cognitive operation that is implicitly involved points towards the biology of aesthetic 
experience and the more specific field of neuroaesthetics, which is a relatively young area of 
research within the field of psychology. Nonetheless, I am a visual artist and my primary 
concern is to better comprehend my artistic practice in terms of the social and historical 
context within which I am working. The field of aesthetics, which relies heavily upon 
artworks, has few practicing artists who contribute to the literature on the subject. Within the 
field of neuroaesthetics, very few visual artists would be qualified to engage in conversations 
on the topic, I suspect, let alone contribute to the research. I consider this to be one of 
neuraesthetic research’s principal weaknesses, and I have conceived of this thesis as a point of 
connection between biological, psychological, and philosophical practices related to art. 
 During my research, a book was published that played an influential role in diverting 
the focus of my study from the psychological to the philosophical aspects of the practice of 
art. Alva Nöe’s Strange Tools: Art and Human Nature is a great combination of art, 
philosophy and science that positions the practice of art in relation to our organizational 
disposition and evolution as humans. While being adept at navigating the psychology of 
neuroaesthetics, Nöe is critical of its shortcomings while trying to remain positive in his 
attempt to relate the practice of art with biological and evolutionary theories. Nöe’s approach 
to the practice of art and aesthetics is holistic, accessible and generous in its consideration of 
various influences and perspectives. 
 Two articles that relate conceptual art with neuroaesthetics were also inspirational in 
my research. Gregory Minisalle’s “Conceptual Art: A Blind Spot for Neuroaesthetics?”, 
which was published in Leonardo magazine in 2012, and Alexander Kranjec’s “Conceptual 
art made simple for neuroaesthetics.”, published in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience in 
2015, are both very articulate examples of the work that remains to be done in the field of 
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neuroaesthetics in order to become more valid and relevant to the practice of art. There is a lot 
of work to be done in order to properly conceive of art and the experience of artworks in the 
laboratory setting, and this thesis attempts to make the conditions of artistic practice more 
clear so that art can be more easily studied and appreciated from a scientific perspective. 
 
1.6. Importance and Contribution of the Thesis 
 As a mid-career artist, I am somewhat ashamed to admit that my understanding and 
use of the word ‘aesthetic’ has been remarkably underdeveloped for the majority of my 
professional life. This research is important to me because I can now fully appreciate the 
processes involved in aesthetic experience, which still connotes the idea of beauty that I 
originally associated to it, although it’s much more complicated than that in its cognitive and 
philosophical functioning. I hope this thesis will contribute to the education of other artists 
who are interested in appreciating the philosophical and biological implications that aesthetic 
experience brings to the practice of art. Using Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation is a 
perfect way to incorporate these often-disparate fields of study. By demonstrating the 
compatibility of his work with biological research I hope to extend its relevance for use in 
future philosophical, psychology or neuroaesthetic research. 
 The problem with most neuroaesthetic research is its inability to properly conceive of 
the relational factors that influence our understanding of art and our appreciation of artworks. 
The aesthetic experience of digital images of artworks is not the same as interacting with the 
actual artworks, and the current conception of art moves well beyond the constraints of two-
dimensional media. Context has far more influence on the production of aesthetic meaning 
than is being considered in neuroaesthetic research, both in relation to the situation in which 
artworks are displayed and the tradition of art within which they are being evaluated. There 
are countless processes that happen during aesthetic experience, and my research shows how 
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the human body in movement and thought facilitates these operations over time in relation to 
external and internal sensory input. My research demonstrates how the scope of sensation is 
related to the idea of self and the subjectivity of the observer, and results in an aesthetic 
judgement that disrupts the foundation upon which our subjectivity is established. While our 
human consciousness enables powerful cognitive capacities, it is shown in this thesis to be 
fallible and limited as well, which has implications on our relationship with artworks. 
Autopoietic theory supports the notion that our human cognition is constrained and guided by 
a persistent condition of lack. What my research shows, in the end, is that the practice of art 
allows us to perceive and appreciate our situation as biological organisms with free will and 
unlimited imagination in combination with a constrained existence and explicit imperfections. 
As beings with infinite potential within finite bodies, artworks mirror our paradoxical nature 
by showing us the pleasure and strife that human life implies. 
 
1.7. Epistemological and Ontological Position 
 My epistemological position is that of a constructivist. Aesthetics is an 
epistemologically subjective field of study since it requires human consciousness in order to 
exist, as will be further studied in Chapter 2.2.2.2. To Respond. An aesthetic judgement is a 
subjective claim that is not objective because it is based on the feelings and thought of an 
individual subject.  
 My ontological position is that of a materialist. The reality of the world that we know 
is a human dependent reality, as will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 3.4.2. Umwelt. 
Aesthetic experience is ontologically subjective because it is unique to human beings as a 
result of our species-specific cognitive abilities and the culture within which we develop as 
subjective individuals. While art objects do exist as ontologically objective objects, their 
value as art is purely ontologically subjective. 
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1.8. Research Questions  
The research questions I’m addressing with this thesis are as follows: 
1. How is the practice of art connected to life, and is the practice of art biologically 
determined? Life in this question should be understood as both the general condition 
that distinguishes living beings from non-living matter, and the specific existence of 
an individual living being. I am interested to connect the practice of art with both life 
as a biological operation, and life as a subjective existential conception.   
2. How does separation influence the operation and functionality of life, cognition, 
aesthetic experience, and artworks? Can the concept of separation demonstrate the 
ways that art reflects life? I want to find out if the separation that is inherent to the 
functioning of biological and cognitive life can be understood as a foundation for the 
separations or distinctions that make art function. 
3. How does human thought facilitate aesthetic thought, and how is it separate or distinct 
from other thought? Why are human beings the only animal species that practices art? 
I would like to explore how the cognitive capacities that make us unique influence the 
functioning of artistic practice. This is the topic of aesthetics, and this thesis is largely 
an exploration of the functioning of human thought in relation to the practice of art.  
4. What is an artwork? How are artworks distinct from other human products? The 
answer to this question is largely based upon the findings of the last question, although 
it does introduce the existence of the physical art object as a problem in relation to 
function, use-value and intentionality. 
5. How do artworks exist in relation to concepts and traditions of art, and to what extent 
are artworks autonomous from the artistic tradition? This question brings us back to 
aesthetic theory and capacities of human beings to transform particular thought into 
universal thought, and relate subjective thought with objective thought. Furthermore, it 
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places the artworks within a temporal logic of social practice and tradition, and raises 
questions about the importance of the contextualization and accessibility of artworks. 
 
1.9. Hypothesis  
 My hypothesis is that the practice of art can be defined in terms of separation, which 
directly relates art to human life in terms of biological function and existential conception. 
The requisite components that define the practice of art—artworks, people and contexts—all 
demonstrate inherent separations that can be traced to human action and thought, which are 
bound by the conditions of life. Nonetheless, I anticipate that the separations inherent in the 
practice of art negate its possibility of being determined in purely biological ways due to the 
important influence of social factors on the function and significance of artistic practice. 
 
1.10. Thesis Limitations  
This thesis is very large in scope—perhaps too large—and each research question or 
theoretical chapter could easily become its own separate thesis. Nonetheless, my goal is to 
achieve a comprehensive, holistic understanding of the functioning of artistic practice in 
relation to human life. One limitation of this thesis is that I am not an expert in the fields that I 
am researching. I am an artist with an interest in philosophy and biology, but I am not a 
philosopher or biologist. Nonetheless, I intend to bring my philosophical and biological 
research into the realm of art in an attempt to create a point of entry for better collaboration 
between these separate fields of study. 
Before reading Rancière’s “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” I was 
already compiling various instances of separation that I encountered during my research into 
the biological and philosophical conceptions of aesthetic experience. The concept of aesthetic 
separation thus became a catalyst to expand upon the far-reaching social and psychological 
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research that Rancière had begun into the political implications of artistic practice as it moves 
into the sphere of everyday life. Several parallels became apparent as I began to compare the 
various divisions in my research. The separation of the concept of life into physical and 
experiential notions parallels the separation of artworks in terms of form and content, and the 
separation of human life in terms of body and mind. These separations are all related, and the 
result is a thesis with a very broad perspective that calls for further examination in detail.  
 
1.11. Methodology 
 My methodological approach is largely based upon Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s 
article “What is Philosophy?” which Rancière references in his text “Aesthetic Separation, 
Aesthetic Community,” to describe acts of artistic creation. In the original article, Deleuze 
and Guattari separate human thought into its three great forms—art, science and philosophy—
and describe them in terms of sensations, functions and concepts, respectively. This 
combination of ways of thinking perfectly reflects my research into aesthetic experience, 
acknowledging the separation of the distinct forms and processes of human thought while 
recognizing the interactivity and interdependence between them.  
The three thoughts intersect and intertwine but without synthesis or identification. 
With its concepts, philosophy brings forth events. Art erects monuments with its 
sensations. Science constructs states of affairs with its functions. A rich tissue of 
correspondences can be established between the planes. But the network has its 
culminating points, where sensation itself becomes sensation of concept or 
function, where the concept becomes concept of function or of sensation, and 
where the function becomes function of sensation or concept. And none of these 
elements can appear without the other being still to come, still indeterminate or 
unknown.9  
 
My methodology implements scientific and philosophic thought to help define the practice of 
art and the aesthetic experience of artworks. The separations I am dealing with are as much 
                                                
9 Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, (New York, USA, Columbia 
University Press, 1996), 199. 
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external as they are internal. My research methodology was largely qualitative and primarily 
involved a lot of reading of scientific and philosophic texts related to art theory and aesthetics. 
This was accompanied by practical research in the form of artistic creation, where various art 
projects were developed in tandem with my research in order to help interpret, contextualize 
and integrate the scientific functions and philosophic concepts that inform my thesis.   
 My primary research consisted in reading existing published material with aesthetic 
thought as the overarching focus of my source material selection. The sources of my research 
into the theory of contemporary art were informed by my professional art practice, with a 
focus on conceptual art, the avant-garde, and socially engaged art practices. This was 
supported by research into the philosophy of aesthetics, which began with a combination of 
classic texts (Kant, Schiller), modern texts (Dewey, Heidegger) and contemporary texts 
(Derrida, Rancière). This was related with scientific texts related to neuroaesthetics, 
cognition, autopoiesis, embodiment, and technology. As I read all of these varied texts, my 
focus was to identify the ways in which separation is involved in the practice of art, aesthetic 
experience and human biology and cognition.  
 My theoretical research was accompanied by practical experimentation in the 
development of artworks, which were designed as a progression of my art practice in relation 
to the four chapters of my theoretical research. While originally consisting of two new art 
projects and two new series, I have revised the practical research of this thesis to more 
accurately reflect the kind of socially engaged artworks that Rancière speaks of in “Aesthetic 
Separation, Aesthetic Community.” One of these projects, “uncover RECOVER,” was already 
completed when I began my research, but I have revisited this project in relation to Rancière’s 
concept of aesthetic separation in order to explore the political efficacy of artworks. The 
second project, Cover Your Tracks, which was created specifically for this thesis, further 
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explores the conditions of aesthetic experience and the relation of human observation, action 
and thought with artworks. 
 As an artist, my research into the philosophy and science of aesthetics was largely an 
effort to increase my knowledge base in tangential fields of study. My intended result is to 
establish a firm foundation upon which I can develop my teaching methodologies and artistic 
production in line with the topic of aesthetic separation and the reflection of life in art. While 
it is difficult to translate theoretical information into the creation of an artwork, it is equally as 
difficult to convey theoretical information through the experience of an artwork. Furthermore, 
creating artworks to convey theoretical intention is a way of predetermining artistic limitation, 
which is antithetical to artistic integrity in my opinion. Nonetheless, I believe that my 
methodology and contribution are appropriate. While there are obvious limitations to my 
capacity to provide expert knowledge in fields of study where I am not an expert (i.e. 
philosophy and science), I do believe that I have established key arguments through my 
organization and comparisons that should be taken into account and further explored in 
artistic, scientific and philosophic fields of study. I also think that my integration of 
philosophic and scientific information into the realm of art and aesthetic experience will be 
very beneficial to artists who are interested in understanding the practice of art from beyond 
the confines of the field of art.  
 
1.12. Main Findings 
This thesis finds that the concept of separation is a valuable way to define and 
consider the practice of art in relation to human cognition and experience. Two key 
separations inform artworks and people; an internal division (between subject/object or 
matter/form), and an external division that defines individuality in relation to a group. 
Artworks embody the material/form opposition, but are further defined by a distinction 
 26 
between their fundamental composition and the context in which they are evaluated. Artworks 
are inevitably related to the tradition and concept of art that is applied to them during their 
evaluation, and the artistic conventions that this tradition and concept entail, which implies 
that the distinction of artworks is socially influenced. People, on the other hand, demonstrate 
an internal modality of object and subject, which is reflected in the distinction of molecular 
function (physiology) and molar perception (psychology), respectively. We are further 
defined in relation to nature and culture, and the separation between an individual person and 
society reflects the distinction between subjective and objective determinations. There are 
many other separations that influence aesthetic experience, but these two separations establish 
the foundation upon which correlations can be made between art, philosophy and science.  
My most important findings in relation to artworks relate to the vital influence of 
external contextual relations. Artworks are recognized through a subjective association with 
the concept of art, which places artworks in perpetual relation with artistic tradition. Artworks 
are recognized through their incorporation and use of artistic conventions, which adhere to 
that tradition while also challenging it. Artworks are formally differentiated from other human 
products through their subversive application of intentionality, functionality, and use-value. 
As such, the evaluation of artworks involves aesthetic and conceptual considerations, 
demonstrating an influence of external contextual reference on the meaning associated to the 
integral forms that artworks embody.  
Another important finding relates to the motivation for artistic originality. Novelty not 
only establishes the individuality of an artwork but it also enables it to produce meaning, 
which is generated through the recognition of difference. The distinction of an artwork as a 
particular being allows it to become a proxy for a subject—the Other—and opens the door for 
aesthetic interpretation. As such, artistic originality helps to ensure the contemplative use-
value that is associated with artistic practice. The perpetual innovation of artistic creation, 
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nonetheless, inevitably transforms the practice and conception of art. Artistic experimentation 
moves into non-art realms by crossing boundaries, surpassing limits, and engaging with the 
unknown in a tireless effort to sustain the capacity to produce meaning. 
One final finding is the vulnerability that artworks reflect through their inherent states 
of lack and incompleteness, which reflects our human condition. Our individual survival 
largely depends on our abilities to integrate aspects of the world and contribute to society, 
which are actions that involve internal and external necessities and are as relevant to artworks 
as they are to humans. Artworks require humans to validate them, which they achieve through 
the production of significance that they evoke through their singularity. Human perception is 
incomplete and supported by consciousness, which itself functions transparently and evades 
showing its supplementary manipulations. Artworks demonstrate lack through their reliance 
on parerga, which supplement them structurally and aesthetically. The correspondence 
between human and artistic weakness supports the existence of an empathic connection 
during aesthetic experience, and consolidates the notion that artworks function as subjects.  
 
1.13. Thesis Layout  
 This thesis is organized according to a simple collage (Appendix 3) that I made in an 
attempt to separate the various essential elements of aesthetic experience; artwork, context, 
subject, thought, and art. The result is four chapters that explore the ways in which contexts, 
people, thought and artworks function in relation to aesthetic experience with the intention of 
better understanding the notion of aesthetic separation and the practice of art in the early 21st 
Century. These theoretical chapters are accompanied by a chapter of practical research that 
considers two art projects in relation to the conditions of aesthetic experience.  
 Chapter 2. Life / Context focuses on the theory of autopoiesis and the ways in which 
living organisms fundamentally separate themselves from non-organic matter in order to live. 
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A secondary separation of autopoiesis involves the distinction between the molecular level of 
structural function of living organisms and the molar level of cognitive function within an 
environment. These two separations inform the intentionality of living beings and the 
observational capacities that enable aesthetic experience in humans. They are compared with 
Rancière’s notions of ‘being apart together’ and aesthetic separation in order to describe the 
basic functioning of aesthetic experience, and to establish a point of connection between the 
practice of art and the functioning of human life. 
 Chapter 3. Thought / Self looks at the various cognitive functions that facilitate 
aesthetic experience. It begins by demonstrating how the body and mind work together to 
determine the conception of self in human subjects, before moving on to examine the ways in 
which our perception and action enable our ability to experience the world. This is followed 
by an exploration of how human consciousness forms our distinct understanding of reality. 
All of these ideas are related back to the theory of autopoiesis to examine how our perceived 
separation of external and internal being determines the thought processes that facilitate 
aesthetic experience. 
 Chapter 4. The Human / Intention explores the topics of language and technology 
as the two main characteristics and methods that we use to separate our species from other 
animals. Both language and technology are explored in relation to the construction of human 
thought and the practice of art. While language is examined in terms of establishing the 
human subject and our capacity for symbolic thought, which are essential for aesthetic 
experience, technology is explored in terms of function and intentionality in order to provide 
a counterpoint to the indetermination of artworks. 
 Chapter 5. Artworks / Art focuses on two concepts that inform the process of 
contextualizing artworks. The parergon is a concept that Derrida isolates from Kant’s 
aesthetic theory in order to explore the limits between artwork and context, while 
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deconstructing the formal imposition of aesthetic theory on the experience of works of art. 
The second idea, ‘the fragment,’ is a philosophical form that Osborne locates in the work of 
Friedrich Schlegel and the Jena Romantics, and utilizes to explore aesthetic experience and 
the ontology of postconceptual art practices. ‘The fragment’ further helps to consider 
artworks as autonomous beings in relation to artistic tradition, which positions artworks in 
relation to historical and social influence. 
 Chapter 6. Practical Research presents my art practice through two art projects; 
uncover RECOVER, and Cover Your Tracks. The former project is explored in relation to the 
concept of aesthetic separation as proposed by Rancière, and the organizational theory of art 
as proposed by Nöe. For the project, I cultivated medicinal plants using soil obtained from 
recently exhumed mass graves of the Spanish Civil War. Aside from showcasing the diverse 
ways in which I develop my art projects in relation to materials, meaning, people and 
transformation, the exploration of the artwork provides a practical introduction to Rancière’s 
work and, in particular, his affirmation of the political potential of experiencing artworks. The 
second project, Cover Your Tracks, was developed in relation to my theoretical research into 
aesthetic separation and the reflection of life in art. The project began development in 2017 
and was exhibited in 2018 in the Botanical Gardens of Barcelona. The artwork was comprised 
of three Japanese karesansui (dry mountain) gardens located on walking paths throughout the 
grounds of the gardens. Visitors were invited to participate in the symbolic creation and 
erasure of marks, providing an unexpected encounter that highlighted the cognitive capacities 
that distinguish human beings from other animals.  
Chapter 7. Conclusion closes the thesis by looking at the answers to my main 
research questions, recommendations for future research, and demonstrating the knowledge 
that I have contributed in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2. LIFE / CONTEXT 
 
2.1.1. Introduction to Life / Context  
Rancière’s notion of aesthetic separation proposes that two principal divisions define 
aesthetic experience. One is a division inherent in the process of aesthetic evaluation, where 
an external stimulus is translated into internal thought. The other is a practical separation 
within the social tradition of art that informs our understanding of artworks—what Rancière 
calls the aesthetic break—where transformations of artistic practice have resulted in our 
current artistic cultures, which exists in constant relation to precedent artistic traditions. These 
two distinct yet united separations are the foundation that Rancière uses to base his claim that 
artworks are capable of affecting people subjectively, which makes the practice of art 
inherently political. To properly explore this proposal we need to better understand how 
artworks, art, people and society are interrelated. This points towards an operational 
exploration of aesthetic experience, which is conditional on biological organisms—
specifically speaking, human beings—with cognitive abilities in specific situations. If this 
premise is true, then the practice of art is defined by capacities and limitations that are 
determined in biological, cognitive and contextual terms. All of these fields imply that 
aesthetic experience can be distinguished, or separated, from other types of human 
experience, just as artistic products are distinguished from other kinds of human goods.  
To explore the foundation of the biological, cognitive and contextual capacities that 
we as human beings possess, the theory of autopoiesis is remarkably useful. The words auto 
and poiesis are Greek in origin and combined mean “self-producing” or “self-creation.”10 It 
illuminates the basic processes and conditions that all life entails, and its implications in terms 
of reflexivity, human cognition and the generation of significance can help us to understand 
                                                
10 Merriam-Webster, “Autopoiesis | Definition of Autopoiesis by Merriam-Webster,” Miriam-
Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autopoiesis (accessed 
September 10, 2019). 
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how separation is a basic condition of both the processes of life and aesthetic experience. 
While I have previously explored autopoiesis, my intention here is to review the most 
important aspects of autopoietic theory in order to distinguish the principal processes that 
relate the functioning of life to the practice of art. If you are already familiar with autopoietic 
theory, I suggest moving directly to Chapter 2.3. Autopoietic and Aesthetic Operation, where 
I will compare the processes involved in the autopoietic operation of life to various aspects of 
aesthetic experience, using Rancière’s notion of aesthetic separation as a guiding concept 
throughout the comparative endeavour. It becomes obvious through the various processes and 
concepts explored that the biological foundation and operation of human life is the basis of 
aesthetic experience and the practice of art. While there are many human capacities that the 
practice of art demonstrates, autopoiesis also helps to demonstrate how human imperfection is 
reflected in artworks and the paradoxes that they evoke during aesthetic experience. 
 
2.2. Autopoiesis  
2.2.1. Introduction to Autopoiesis  
Since autopoiesis proposes to define the basic operational nature of all living systems, 
it is an important theory to help consider how art is connected to life. The word autopoiesis 
was originally used in 1972 by the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela to establish a theory that defines the basic nature of all living systems.11 Their theory 
attempts to explain a bio-logic12 of life and thus the fundamental conditions and processes of 
the field of biology, the scientific study of life. Their approach relates biological function to 
systems theory and often sounds more philosophical or computational than biological. 
                                                
11 Merriam-Webster, “Autopoiesis | Definition of Autopoiesis by Merriam-Webster.” 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/autopoiesis (accessed Sept. 10, 2019). 
12 Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and a Biology of Intentionality, PDF document, (Paris, 
France: CREA, CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, 1991), 2, 
ftp://ftp.eeng.dcu.ie/pub/autonomy/bmcm9401/varela.ps.Z (accessed May 28, 2012). 
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Nonetheless, it is a versatile tool for exploring how art functions, especially in relation to 
human thought and context, since the main operational concepts that autopoiesis utilizes can 
be applied to other fields of study. The two main principles of autopoiesis demonstrate 
reflexivity as a fundamental process of life that allows biological organisms to conserve and 
adapt themselves within their environments. Reflexivity enables subjectivity, which is 
necessary to make aesthetic judgements, so considering its biological foundation can help to 
broaden our perspectives of aesthetic experience. In terms of Rancière’s theory of aesthetic 
separation, autopoietic reflexivity positions the social condition of ‘being apart together’ as a 
fundamentally biological state. The theory of autopoiesis also describes the basis of cognition 
in living beings, which gives rise to perceptual capacities as organisms connect with their 
surroundings. To explain the importance of cognition and sensation in aesthetic experience is 
redundant, but autopoiesis offers a fresh perspective by distinguishing between the operation 
of life on the molecular level and the observation of life on the molar level. This separation 
between levels of operation and observation has many significant implications that affect our 
understanding of the processes of interpretation that observation enables. The explanatory 
notions of time and intentionality are of particular importance as we deal with expanding our 
grasp of aesthetic separation. Finally, autopoiesis helps us to see how organisms generate 
significance through their constant negotiation with their immediate environment. Difference 
and lack are two instances that facilitate the production of meaning as organisms relate to 
their environments, pointing towards the foundation of desire, which is a key concept to 
understanding aesthetic experience. Knowing how and why significance is produced is 
paramount to understanding the practice of art, especially to ascertain the limits between 
normal products and artistic products. Despite of its scientific origin, the theory of autopoiesis 
provides a new understanding of human life and thus has implications external to scientific 
study. In addition to helping to consider our thought and behaviour, the theory of autopoiesis 
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is utilized as a model for autonomous systems in other fields of study, including an 
autopoietic system of art, which will be explored more profoundly in Chapter 5.3.3. 
Autonomy. For now, though, let’s begin by examining the processes of autopoietic theory. 
 
2.2.2. The Two Laws of Autopoiesis  
Autopoiesis is essentially concerned with the biological functioning of living beings 
so that they can perpetuate their own lives. Autopoiesis, as such, looks at separate parts in 
relation to a whole organism and implies various possible operational perspectives. The 
theory of autopoiesis is quite simple in principle; it has two laws and two operational 
conditions. The results of these laws and conditions together, however, are quite complicated 
and lead to concepts that can be difficult to grasp because they go against our observational 
conception of our selves and the world in which we live. The goal of autopoiesis is ambitious, 
though, as it tries to settle the way in which non-living molecules combine to form life. 
Various individual concepts and processes of autopoiesis are relevant to the practice of art in 
some way or another, but as a whole, autopoiesis inspires new perspectives from which we 
can think about art and understand aesthetic experience in terms of systems theory. I will 
begin by looking at the rules and considerations that make autopoiesis work so that they can 
be later compared with the practice of art and aesthetics.  
There are two fundamental processes that all living beings must constantly perform in 
order to live, both of which have to do with systems of organization. They are the law of 
conservation of autopoiesis, and the law of adaptation of autopoiesis. Varela’s definition of an 
autopoietic system puts these two basic regulatory rules into context: 
An autopoietic system—the minimal living organization—is one that 
continuously produces the components that specify it, while at the same time 
realizing it (the system) as a concrete unity in space and time, which makes the 
network of production of components possible. More precisely defined: An 
autopoietic system is organized (defined as unity) as a network of processes of 
production (synthesis and destruction) of components such that these components: 
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(i) continuously regenerate and realize the network that produces them, and 
(ii) constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the domain in which 
they exist. 
Thus, autopoiesis attempts to capture the mechanism or process that generates the 
identity of the living, and thus to serve as a categorical distinction of living from 
non-living. This identity amounts to self-produced coherence: the autopoietic 
mechanism will maintain itself as a distinct unity as long as its basic 
concatenation of processes is kept intact in the face of perturbations, and will 
disappear when confronted with perturbations that go beyond a certain viable 
range which depends on the specific system considered.13 
 
As Varela describes the two conditions for autopoietic functioning, one of the first things to 
note is his use of the words system and organization as synonyms; two nouns that refer to 
structures that connect separate parts. Regarding the first condition—that a living organism 
produces the components that specify it—it seems obvious that an organism cannot be 
considered living without being capable of producing and maintaining itself physically. Our 
daily routines as humans are full of basic maintenance activities that ensure that our bodies 
get what they need to stay healthy, most notably eating, drinking and breathing. This is what 
Maturana defines as the law of conservation of autopoiesis14, which stipulates that an 
organism must be capable of establishing and conserving itself in its environment. In addition 
to physical maintenance, the first condition insists that an organism create the network that 
produces itself, which implies the communication of separate components within living 
beings. All networks involve some kind of organization that functions beyond a purely 
physical understanding, meaning that a living organism is not simply the sum of its physical 
parts but rather the system of production and communication of its parts. This system of 
production can be thought both in terms of the life of an individual organism (ontogenetic 
development) doing what it must to survive, and a species of organisms (phylogenetic 
                                                
13 Varela, Autopoiesis, 5. 
14 Humberto Maturana Romesin, “Autopoiesis, Structural Coupling and Cognition”, 
Cybernetics & Human Knowing, Vol.9, No.3-4, (2002): 10, 
https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Autopoiesis%2C-Structural-Coupling-and-
Cognition%3A-A-Romes%C3%ADn/7881d48deaffe4c8dc07200b9b5932a7ef74d783 
(accessed May 28, 2012). 
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development) that survives through the reproduction of individual beings. The cyclical nature 
of autopoiesis ensures that the production of the organism is also a reproduction, and its 
maintenance includes processes of destruction and elimination that ensure the separation of 
undesirable or non-essential elements. When an organism’s processes of maintenance and 
reproduction cease, it stops functioning as an autopoietic system. The failure of the first 
condition of autopoiesis thus results in the death of the organism if it is not met.  
The second law, which Varela describes as “constituting the system as a 
distinguishable unity,” refers to the process of a living organism distinguishing itself from its 
non-living environment. This is important as it establishes a boundary—interior/exterior, 
you/not you—that creates an identity for each organism. This unity must be distinguishable, 
which means that the union of the components and systems that constitute the organism is 
discernible in one way or anther; that there is a recognizable difference between the two. 
Maturana defines this as the law of adaptation of autopoiesis,15 drawing attention to the 
fluctuating and malleable relationship that is implicit between an organism and its 
environment. Positioning an autopoietic system in constant relationship with its environment, 
this second condition also places every living organism within a perpetual context, always in 
an exact place at a precise moment. This act of identification is simultaneously an act of 
adjustment, a constant process of separating a living being from its environment. Varela states 
that the identity of the organism is a self-produced coherence, which accentuates the reflexive 
nature of the process of adaptation. It is not the environment that separates the organism, but 
rather the being itself must create its own unity and consistency in relation to its environment. 
The organism must realize itself as separate, as distinct, and this realization is the identity the 
organism creates for itself.  
 
                                                
15 Maturana, “Autopoiesis…”, 10-11. 
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2.2.3. The Two Conditions of Autopoiesis  
The two fundamental laws of autopoiesis establish the processes of conservation and 
adaptation as the imperatives of life, not only in terms of producing and maintaining an 
organism physically, but also with regards to organizing itself in relation to, and distinction 
from, its environment. In order to better conceptualize the nature of this boundary that an 
autopoietic system must maintain between itself and its surroundings, let’s look at two 
important parameters that facilitate understanding of how organisms incorporate their 
environment to maintain themselves. One consideration is that autopoiesis is operational—
that it needs to always be considered in terms of process—and the other is that autopoiesis 
functions at the molecular level. 
Accordingly, and I repeat, living systems are not the molecules that compose and 
realize them moment by moment, they are closed networks of molecular 
productions that exist as singularities in a continuous flow of molecules through 
them. Indeed, the condition of being closed molecular dynamics is what 
constitutes them as separable entities that float in the molecular domain in which 
they exist. It is this manner of constitution of living systems as molecular systems 
that I denote when I say “it is not the molecules that compose a living system that  
make it a living system.”16  
 
The operational and molecular conditions are paramount to understanding the theory of 
autopoiesis, especially when reflecting on the threshold between living and non-living. 
Considered altogether, life at the molecular level is not something that simply is, but rather is 
a network of processes that occur, or molecular interactions that happen. When determining 
the identity of an autopoietic system, or the boundary between an organism and its 
environment, we must do so on a molecular scale in terms of molecular reactions. We are not 
looking at the big picture, but rather the smallest possible picture of how life is structured. 
This is important to remember because the physical structure of all things, living and non-
living, is determined by the stability and instability of bonds between adjacent atoms at the 
molecular level. Maturana states: 
                                                
16 Maturana, “Autopoiesis…”, 7. 
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[A]utopoietic systems exist only in the molecular domain, because the molecular 
domain is the only domain in which the interactions between the elements that 
compose it produce elements of the same kind as a spontaneous result of their 
structural dynamics.17  
 
This molecular level is where biochemical reactions transpire, and there is equity on this level 
where the producer (or components of production) and the products of bio-molecular 
interactions are the same; molecules produce molecules. This equality is important as it 
allows us to understand how any molecule can be incorporated or released from an 
autopoietic system. Furthermore, it lays the foundation of how significance is produced, 
which will be explored more thoroughly in Chapter 2.3.7. Difference. One of the key 
distinctions that Maturana makes here is that “living systems are not the molecules that 
compose and realize them moment by moment,” meaning that autopoietic systems cannot be 
defined by static or purely physical elements. The molecules that constitute an organism come 
and go, but they are never really living by themselves. They can only be considered alive in 
relation to the biological system that they form a part of. The organizational systems of 
conservation and adaptation are what ultimately constitute an organism as living, and if a 
molecule is brought into an autopoietic system it becomes part of a living being in relation to 
biochemical processes. This is the operational and processual condition of autopoiesis. 
Looking more closely at the relationship between a living system and it’s medium, 
Varela speaks of the “intriguing paradoxicality proper to an autonomous identity,” noting that 
“the living system must distinguish itself from its environment, while at the same time 
maintaining its coupling; this linkage cannot be detached since it is against this very 
environment from which the organism arises.”18 Referring to the apparent irrationality of the 
autopoietic system being “closed” while being “open” to the flow of molecules, Keith Ansell 
Pearson states: “[s]uch systems are closed simply in the sense that the product of their 
                                                
17 Maturana, “Autopoiesis…”, 13-14. 
18 VARELA, Autopoiesis, 7.  
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organization is the organization itself.”19 As such, organized and unorganized can be 
understood as a general description of living and non-living respectively, with the caveat that 
the organization of life is a reflective organization. It organizes itself. As we explore the ideas 
of organization and reorganization in relation to art in Chapter 2.3.3. Organization, and 
Chapter 4.2.2. Reorganization, this fundamental processes of life can be easily linked to the 
practice of art. It also helps to appreciate the idea of ‘being apart together’ that Rancière 
establishes as a fundamental condition of aesthetic separation. The incessant negotiation 
between organism and environment on the molecular level, which involves conservation of 
adaptation, ultimately define and delimit an organism as a distinguishable unity. This “closed 
yet open” relationship that describes the threshold between an organism and its environment 
is paradoxical because it insists on a molecular functionality for separating life from non-life 
while denying molecules the possible status of living. An autopoietic system is defined by the 
ways in which it organizes itself in order to maintain itself. The stipulation that these 
autopoietic processes happen on the molecular level, however, complicates our ways of 
thinking about ourselves and other organisms as beings in the world. We as people don’t 
consciously function on this molecular level, so the consequences of autopoiesis on our level 
of understanding need to be further determined.  
 
2.2.4. Molecular and Molar Domains  
Life is far more complicated than we can possibly perceive, especially as we begin to 
understand the difference between our functioning bodies on the molecular level and our 
conscious perception of our selves as individuals. This separation between two distinct 
functional levels is one of the most important innovations of autopoietic theory because it has 
                                                
19 PEARSON, Kieth Ansell. “Viroid Life: On Machines, Technics and Evolution”, Deleuze 
and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 195. 
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many repercussions in terms our basis for understanding our selves and our world. Maturana 
states: 
Systems as composite entities have a dual existence, namely, they exist as 
singularities that operate as simple unities' in the domain in which they arise as 
totalities, and at the same time they exist as composite entities in the domain of 
the operation of their components. The relation between these two domains is not 
causal; these two domains do not intersect, nor do the phenomena which pertain to 
one occur in the other.20  
 
To fully understand autopoiesis, it is important to differentiate between these two parallel 
platforms for understanding biological organisms; as we perceive them as organisms, and as 
they operate on the molecular level. The separation of these concurrent modes of biological 
life differentiates the operation of life from our experience of it, offering the perfect model of 
how our conscious being as people operates in tandem with our unconscious or nonconscious 
being as biological organisms. Our bodies do most of their work to survive without us 
needing to be aware of it, thanks in large part to our autonomic nervous system. The big 
question is not how these micro and macro modes of being are separate, but rather how do 
they connect, and how do they influence each other?  
In mechanics, molar properties are those of a mass of matter as opposed to its parts, 
either atoms or molecules. The French philosopher Giles Deleuze uses this molar/molecular 
opposition in various ways in his writing, with molarity referring to wholes, generalities and 
totalities and molecularity referring to parts, specificities and singularities.21 In relation to 
perception, Deleuze uses molar and molecular to describe: “its range from 'macro' or 
totalising process to 'micro' or keen detection of infinitesimal differences in the physical and 
biological world.”22 In his collaborations with Felix Guattari, the terms molecular and molar 
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are used in their quest to understand sources of human desire and freedom, looking beyond a 
psychology that is determined exclusively on a social level. They refer to the ideas proposed 
by Maturana and Varela to speak of life as both vitalistic and mechanistic, proposing that 
biology be considered in terms of mechanics, with the psychology of desire being rooted in 
molecular functionalism.  
[T]he real difference is not between the living and the machine, vitalism and 
mechanism, but between two states of the machine that are two states of the living 
as well… on the one hand the molar machines—whether social, technical, or 
organic—and on the other the desiring-machines, which are of a molecular 
order.23  
 
This idea will be further explored in Chapter 4.2.3. Progression, where technology is 
considered in relation to the practice of art as a biological principle. For now, it is important 
to appreciate their attempt to connect psychology on the molar level—human desire in 
particular—to biochemical processes of life on the molecular level, which helps to determine 
a “molecular unconscious” of living beings. The question remains, how might a functionalism 
on the molecular level connect to the cognition of an organism on the molar level? As we 
proceed to explore autopoiesis and cognition, I will expand upon these ideas of Deleuze and 
Guattari and the molecular unconscious in Chapter 2.2.8. Lack, Desire & Intentionality.  
 
2.2.5. Cognition 
The idea of cognition is used in autopoiesis to describe an organism’s capacity for 
knowledge in relation to itself and its environment. Cognition functions on both the molecular 
and molar levels of autopoiesis, where organisms operate in terms of molecular biology and 
observe the world as whole beings. To convey the importance of an organism’s coupling with 
its environment on both molecular and molar levels, Maturana further explains his definition 
of cognition:  
                                                
23 Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
(Minneapolis, U.S.A.: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 285-86. 
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That which we human beings call cognition is the capacity that a living system 
exhibits of operating in dynamic structural congruence with the medium in which 
it exists. It does not matter if the living system observed is an insect or a human 
being. We may ask ourselves whether the knowledge that the living system 
exhibits is learned or instinctive, but our assessment is the same: namely, if we see 
a living system behaving according to what we consider is adequate behaviour in 
the circumstances in which we observe it, we claim that it knows.24  
 
Looking at the etymology of the word “cognition”, it refers to the Latin word cognoscere, 
which means “to get to know.”25 Digging deeper, the verb to know is Germanic in origin and 
comes from the Old English word cnāwan, which means “to recognize or to identify.”26 As 
such, knowing something is the ability to recognize or to identify it. We can understand the 
verb “to recognize” as meaning “to cognize again”, which suggests a repeated cognition of 
something, and as we have just seen, identification is the process of differentiation at the 
centre of autopoiesis. After identifying ourselves as distinct from our environment we can 
begin to identify our surroundings, which demonstrates the reflexive nature of cognition. 
Some positive considerations occur as a result of the autopoietic definition of cognition. For 
one, cognition moves from being a purely cerebral activity to a corporal one, which addresses 
Antonio Damasio’s assertion that we think with our bodies, not only our brains.27 Another 
positive point is that cognition becomes something that can be applied to all living organisms, 
not just humans. In this way, single cell organisms and plants have cognition. “To cognite is 
to live, and to live is to cognite. We as observers exist in a domain of descriptions, and this 
domain as a consensual domain is a cognitive domain.”28 As humans we usually use language 
to demonstrate that we know something, but it isn’t the only way and it certainly doesn’t 
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28 Humberto Maturana, “Cognition,” Maturana (1978b): Cognition, PDF document, 10, 
http://www.enolagaia.com/M78bCog.html (accessed May 28, 2012).  
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mean that all living things must demonstrate knowledge in the same way. Plants know how to 
convert sunlight into energy, for example, or we know how to breathe. For autopoieisis, 
cognition and recognition are about knowing the environment, whether it’s conscious or not. 
As we move forward to explore the functioning of thought in Chapter 3.2.3. Thought, this 
autopoietic basis of cognition will become more obviously relevant to aesthetic experience, in 
which a distinction between determinate and reflective thought must be made.  
 
2.2.6. Observation 
The concept of observation is obviously important for understanding the functioning 
of aesthetics, since it is through observation that we connect with works of art. Furthermore, 
we use observation to connect with other people—to communicate—and this social aspect of 
observation is also relevant to our understanding of art and how we relate with artworks. In 
autopoietic terms, observation occurs in the molar domain of life, where organisms live as 
individual entities within their environment. There are as many ways of interacting with the 
environment as there are species, but for most animals this interaction involves connecting 
with their surrounding through sense. Our human senses allow us to observe other people and 
organisms interacting within their environments. This is how Maturana and Varela define 
behaviour, as the observed condition of an organism existing within its environment.  
As a system is constituted as a totality, a new domain arises, the domain in which 
the system exists as that totality. … [T]he behavior [sic] that an observer sees as 
appearing in the relational space in which he or she distinguishes it is not a feature 
of the organism, but a relational dynamics that arises with the participation of the 
medium as the organism interacts in it as a totality: behavior as a relational 
dynamics involves both the organism and the medium in which it exists as a 
totality.29  
 
My previous understanding would have restricted the idea of behaviour to the conscious 
actions of an individual. Maturana, however, highlights the relational dynamics that are 
                                                
29 Maturana, “Autopoiesis…”, 13. 
 44 
inherent in the idea of behaviour, in which an organism is evaluated within a specific 
situation. For example, your behaviour in a museum is probably different from your 
behaviour in a forest, and when you think about people behaving badly or well, there is 
always a context that situates this description. One constant is that behaviour is established 
through the evaluation of one organism in its totality based on the observation of another 
organism in its totality. Understanding behaviour as the relation of an organism and its 
context once again gives us a very broad range for observing and describing the actions of life 
in context. Behaviour is always relational and is dependent on both an organism and its 
environment, and we will explore this concept more in relation to art in Chapter 2.3.4. 
Context.  
Observation always has a specific point of view. Someone or something observes 
from a position within an environment, and this forms an individual’s sense of identity, 
context and reality. Maturana states: “my central theme as a biologist (and philosopher) 
became the explanation of the experience of cognition rather than reality, because reality is an 
explanatory notion invented to explain the experience of cognition.”30 This disavowal of the 
term reality is based upon the conditions and limitations of our biological perception on the 
molar level. The neurologist Antonio Damasio supports this rejection in reference to the 
biological limits of our senses and nervous system: “[w]e do not know, and it is improbable 
that we will ever know, what “absolute” reality is like.”31 What we observe as humans is real 
to us, but we can’t deny that we all have individual perspectives of the world. Our 
observations, though limited, make sense to us because they are consistent to us as individuals 
and amongst society. We can compare our perceptions with previous experience, and we can 
share and compare our perceptions with others through communication. Nonetheless, it’s a 
hard fact to face that our human reality is not absolute; it’s not the only reality. The 
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philosopher John R. Searle contends that this is one of the great challenges of contemporary 
thought: “[to] square this self-conception of ourselves as mindful, meaning-creating, free, 
rational, etc., agents with a universe that consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, unfree, 
nonrational, brute physical particles.”32 As Maturana and Varela contend, our reality is a 
series of explanatory notions that we create to explain our experience.  
One of the most ubiquitous explanatory notions that humans have is time, which is 
especially relevant when thinking about autopoietic systems in operational terms. Process, 
after all, implies the passage of time. Or does it? The concept of time demonstrates yet 
another difference between the two domains of molecular function and molar observation. 
Maturana asserts that on the molecular level: “[b]iological phenomena take place in a 
dynamics that occurs in the present without any operational relation to the past or the future. 
Past and future are explanatory notions introduced by the observer.”33 As observers on the 
molar level we perceive only the results or effects of biochemical reactions on the molecular 
level, and our notion of time is nothing more than an interpretation generated by our ability to 
observe, to think, and then to apply this understanding to perceived phenomenon. Time is 
something that we as humans create on the molar level based on the perceived successions of 
events and our ability to recall (think of the past) and to project (think of the future). 
Molecules don’t do this, can’t do this, and as such the molecular level is only ever operational 
in the present. “A living system as a molecular system is a structure determined system, thus 
everything that happens in it or to it, happens in each moment as determined by its structure at 
that moment.”34 Time only exists for us on the molar level of observation thanks to our 
cognitive capacities as humans to imagine. We will explore the relevance of time to 
contemporary art in chapter 2.3.6. Time. 
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Molar observation is influenced by molecular processes, and to consider this influence 
Maturana gives context to his idea of adaptation, or coupling: “An organism is never outside a 
history, and necessarily always finds itself in a particular state and position as a result of its 
previous states and positions.”35 It sounds obvious, but this idea demonstrates how the 
physical structure of an organism in its context relates directly between molecular and molar 
levels. It also connects the molecular level of operation that only exists in the present to the 
molar level where our perception of time does exist. The negation of an absolute reality and 
the conception of time as a cognitive fabrication were difficult for me to fathom at first, as it 
is requisite to admitting to a perpetually faulty molar perspective of the world. It is especially 
ironic considering that our nervous systems that generate the thought processes of past and 
future are nothing more than networks of biochemical reactions that only occur in the present. 
As it becomes apparent, though, our observation and explanation of the world are not 
necessarily the way in which the universe actually operates.  
When thinking about the shift from molecular operation to molar perspective, there 
remain a lot of questions as to how one might affect the other, especially as we move towards 
understanding how biology relates to art and aesthetics. Varela describes one limitation of 
molar perception, stating that: “The components of any system exist as local entities only in 
relations of contiguity with other components, and any relation of the parts to the whole 
established by the observer as a metaphor for his or her understanding has no operational 
presence.”36 According to Varela, then, parts are only ever operational with other parts—
molecules with molecules, proteins with nucleic acids—and we shouldn’t blindly trust our 
observation or the explanatory notions that result; they are simply perceived conceptions that 
are separate from biological functionalism. Deleuze and Guattari confirm this sentiment: 
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It is only at the submicroscopic level of desiring-machines that there exists a 
functionalism—machinic arrangements, an engineering of desire; for it is only 
there that functioning and formation, use and assembly, product and production 
merge. All molar functionalism is false, since the organic or social machines are 
not formed in the same way they function, and the technical machines are not 
assembled in the same way they are used, but imply precisely the specific 
conditions that separate their own production from their distinct product.37 
 
This reaffirms the importance of having a molecular foundation for autopoiesis, where the 
components of production—molecules—are the same as their products—molecules. The fact 
that this is not the case on the molar level has implications that will be explored in Chapter 
2.3.7. Difference, which focuses on the generation of meaning. In relation to aesthetics, it is 
becoming clear that our capacity to observe needs to be moderated in relation to the inherent 
limits and fabrications of our cognition. 
 
2.2.7. Perspective & Difference 
The distinction between the molecular and molar levels of autopoietic systems 
generates a lot of uncertainty. While our perspective as individuals is stable and consistent on 
the molar level, the sub-levels of biological operation have the majority of influence and 
control over our lives as people. The perspective that we have as observers plays a crucial part 
in creating and understanding our reality of the world, as singular and incomplete as it might 
be. Since autopoietic cognition functions on both levels it can be understood as a bridge 
between the molecular and molar realms. As knowledgeable objects, our bodies know how to 
breath, digest food and heal cuts, for example, while we as knowledgeable subjects know how 
to ride a bike, draw a picture and read English.  
[T]he term cognitive has two constitutive dimensions: first its coupling 
dimension, that is, a link with its environment allowing for its continuity as 
individual entity; second… its imaginary dimension, that is, the surplus of 
significance a physical interaction acquires due to the perspective provided by the 
global action of the organism.38  
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Varela reiterates that while cognition occurs on both levels, adaptation with the environment 
only occurs on the molecular level and observation of our environment only happens on the 
molar level. The latter is the level of thought and imagination, where we observe the world 
around us and reflect on our sensations, connecting concepts to things and actions. According 
to Varela, our ability to think imparts a “surplus of significance” to the actions we witness. 
Deleuze and Guattari reflect the same idea about the surplus of significance, which is 
nonexistent on the molecular level:  
Only what is not produced in the same way it functions has meaning, and also a 
purpose, an intention. The desiring-machines on the contrary represent nothing, 
signify nothing, mean nothing, and are exactly what one makes of them, what is 
made with them, what they make in themselves.39  
 
Understanding “desiring-machines” as our bodies, Deleuze and Guattari affirm the necessity 
of a basic operation on the molecular level, where producer and product are one and the same. 
When molecules make molecules, there is no meaning. It is a simple biochemical reaction on 
the molecular level where significance doesn’t exist. Unless, of course, we observe the 
biochemical reaction from the molar level, think about it and attribute meaning to the 
transformation we have witnessed in the process. Deleuze and Guattari state that something 
only attains meaning when it is produced in a different way than it functions. Since molar 
observation inherently produces difference through thought, observation can be understood as 
a condition of significance. We will explore the relationship between difference and meaning 
more thoroughly in Chapter 2.3.7. Difference, which also has relevance to the mechanism of 
observation, which we will explore in Chapter 2.3.5. Observation. 
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2.2.8. Lack, Desire & Intentionality 
As observers, it is inevitable that we consign meaning to the behaviour and actions of 
other beings. Simply answering why someone or something does anything attributes meaning. 
For example, why are you reading this? Any answer you give is an attribution of significance 
to explain the action of your eyes scanning this sentence and your thought converting letters 
and words into some kind of value. The answer to the question “why?” in relation to human 
action is inevitably concerned with intention. When thinking about justifying our behaviour, 
it’s important to remember that behaviour in autopoiesis is always considered in relation to an 
organism’s environment. Connecting cognition to the idea of purpose or intentionality, Varela 
states: “[c]ognition is action about what is missing, filling the fault from the perspective of a 
cognitive self.”40 As a general default, organisms act to survive, and if nothing is perceived as 
wrong or missing from a molar perspective—if there is no fault—then action is not necessary. 
When action happens and it is observed, purpose or intention can always be attributed in 
relation to what is wrong or missing.  
Maturana and Varela highlight the inseparable link between the specific components 
of an organism and its entity as a whole, stating that significance is determined by an 
organism at the molar level in relation to its organization as a distributed process in a specific 
situation. The coordination between the parts (molecules, cells, organs) and the whole (molar 
observation) assures that an organism can deal with its necessities and emergencies itself.41  
Its control is internal and self-sufficient. For example, you feel hungry. What do you do? You 
eat something. Why? Because you were hungry. You can deal with the situation of lack 
yourself through a series of communications between parts and the whole in your search for 
balance within your environment. Further explaining the impetus of interaction with our 
environment and how it is perceived, Varela continues to describe the attribution of meaning: 
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The constant bringing forth of signification is what we may describe as a 
permanent lack in the living: it is constantly bringing forth a signification that is 
missing, not pre-given or pre-existent. Relevance must be provided ex nihilo… 
There is an inevitable contretemps between an autonomous system and its 
environment: there is always something which the system must furnish from its 
perspective as a functioning whole. In fact, a molecular encounter acquires 
significance in the context of the entire operating system and of many 
simultaneous interactions.42  
 
This permanent lack in the living can be understood as a form of perpetual appetite that 
stimulates action and generates meaning on the molar level of operation of the organism. As 
significance doesn’t exist for molecules, it is brought forth when organisms observe and 
consider themselves as singular beings behaving within their environment. Needless to say 
that as molecular beings, there are countless operations happening within our bodies at one 
particular time, yet we perceive the state of our bodies in context as a whole. Varela 
continues: 
The source for this world-making is always the breakdowns in autopoiesis, be 
they minor, like changes in concentration of some metabolite, or major, like 
disruption of the boundary. Due to the nature of autopoiesis itself… every 
breakdown can be seen as the initiation of an action on what is missing on the part 
of the system so that identity might be maintained… In brief, this permanent, 
relentless action on what is lacking becomes, from the observer side, the ongoing 
cognitive activity of the system, which is the basis for the incommensurable 
difference between the environment within which the system is observed, and the 
world within which the system operates. This cognitive activity is paradoxical at 
the very root. On the one hand the action that brings forth a world is an attempt to 
re-establish a coupling with an environment which defies the internal coherence 
through encounters and perturbations. But such actions, at the same time, 
demarcate and separate the system from that environment, giving rise to a distinct 
world.43 
 
Here Varela returns to muse on the paradox of an organism being distinct yet inseparable 
from its environment, relating cognition to the insistent action to satiate what is lacking in 
order for an organism to maintain its life. Living organisms are in perpetual need of exterior 
elements to continue living, and they engage with their environment through cognition to 
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obtain what they need to survive. To further explore this instinct to survive, let’s look at the 
conatus, a relevant point of reference found in the work of Benedict de Spinoza. 
 
2.2.9. The Conatus 
In 1677, over one hundred years before Kant wrote The Critique of Judgement, and 
ten years before Sir Isaac Newton ‘discovered’ gravity, the philosopher Benedict de Spinoza’s 
described the inherent survival instinct of beings as the conatus, which is Latin for: “striving, 
endeavour and tendency”.44 In Spinoza’s words: “[e]ach thing, as far as it can by its own 
power, strives to persevere in its being.”45 The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio describes the 
conatus as it influences the action of organisms, which are in constant search for balance, 
stating that: “[f]luid life states are naturally preferred by our conatus. We gravitate toward 
them. Strained life states are naturally avoided by our conatus. We stay away.”46 The idea of 
autopoiesis runs parallel with the conatus, despite being written three hundred years 
beforehand. In his book on Spinoza, Deleuze demonstrates the relevance of Spinoza’s ideas to 
those of Maturana and Varela, specifically as they relate with desire and judgement. 
Spinoza sometimes defines desire as ‘appetite together with consciousness of the 
appetite.’ But he specifies that this is only a nominal definition of desire, and that 
consciousness adds nothing to appetite (‘we neither strive for, nor will, neither 
want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we 
judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire 
it’)… [T]he appetite is nothing else but the effort by which each thing strives to 
persevere in its being, each body in extension, each mind or each idea in thought 
(conatus).47 
 
This sounds remarkably similar to the original law of conservation, although by extending it 
to things and to thought, Deleuze proposes it to be an existential inertia of sorts. He also 
shows how desire is related to observation and judgement, demonstrating once again the 
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fallibility of the explanatory notions we attribute to our actions in the world. We consider 
things to be good because we desire them, and not the other way around. Considering the 
foundation of aesthetics as described by Immanuel Kant in The Critique of Judgement, the 
relation of desire and judgement will be more thoroughly explored in Chapter 5.2.2. Summary 
– The Critique of Judgement, Analytic of the Beautiful. The important thing to note at this 
point is how both of these cognitive concepts can be related back to biological functionality, 
which involves a living system’s drive towards balance through its active interaction with its 
environment.  
 One final point of interest to explore is how the idea of the conatus can be used to shift 
the selfish nature of autopoiesis to a more social or ethical ground. As Searle points out, 
human beings and other social animals are capable of a special kind of intentionality that is 
collective and gives rise to cooperation and sharing, which shifts the intent of an individual 
subject to a plural intention or desire.48 Damasio addresses the social extension of the conatus 
by highlighting the way in which Spinoza connects the idea of virtue to the happiness found 
in self-preservation.49 Damasio describes that in Latin, virtue has its common moral meaning, 
but it also refers to power and the ability to act. In his work to determine the fundamental 
truth that is the foundation of humanity, Spinoza relies on biological facts to explain how 
virtue is based on self-concern, which in turn shifts a singular self to a group of selves, to a 
community. Damasio explains further: 
The biological reality of self-preservation leads to virtue because in our 
inalienable need to maintain ourselves we must, of necessity, help preserve other 
selves. If we fail to do so we perish and are thus violating the foundational 
principle, and relinquishing the virtue that lies in self-preservation. The secondary 
foundation of virtue then is the reality of a social structure and the presence of 
other living organisms in a complex system of interdependence with our own 
organism.50  
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Understanding how biological principles play a role in our actions and thought processes is 
essential if we are to determine how artworks are capable of affecting individuals and society. 
The great extent to which our biology influences our actions and behaviour in our 
environment is obvious, and the idea of the conatus affirms the impetus of our behaviour 
while further connecting social well-being with the fulfilment of the self. This will become 
paramount as we explore the social context within which the practice of art operates in 
Chapter 5.3. ‘The Fragment.’ 
 
2.2.10. Conclusion to Autopoiesis 
In conclusion, the molecular theory of autopoiesis demonstrates how life organizes 
itself in order to perpetuate itself in constant negotiation with its environment. The two main 
principles of conservation and adaptation demonstrate reflexivity as a fundamental process of 
life, helping biological organisms to maintain themselves while relating with their 
environments. Autopoiesis shows how life is programmed to separate itself from its 
environment, maintaining a closed-yet-open relationship between an organism and its 
immediate surroundings to ensure the survival of the organism. The threshold created by this 
autopoietic distinction between living and non-living is operational, which means that 
organisms are not defined by what they are made of (molecules) but rather by how they are 
made (systems). Life is a process of reflexive organization in relation to environment. This 
process of organization is structured on the molecular level, which is distinct from the molar 
level of observation of organisms as complete entities. Cognition, which is an organism’s 
ability to know within its environment, occurs on the molecular and molar realms of life. 
Observation only happens on the molar level of the whole organism, and behaviour is the 
perceived relationship of an organism with its immediate environment. Human cognition and 
observation on the molar level enable the generation of explanatory notions to understand the 
 54 
perceived world, although this doesn’t equate to absolute reality on the molecular level. Time, 
for example, doesn’t exist on the molecular level, and the present is the only possible time for 
biochemical reactions to occur. Human cognition on the molar level, on the other hand, 
allows us to remember the past and imagine the future, but these processes only occur in the 
present in operational terms. Explanatory notions are often used to address behaviour, which 
relates intention to an organism’s interaction with its environment by an observer. The result 
of this observation is the generation of significance, which is created through cognition in 
relation to perceived objects or events. Signification is based on difference, which can be seen 
as originating in the distinction between the molecular and molar levels of life. Significance 
doesn’t exist on the molecular level, where the producers and products of interactions are the 
same. On the molar level, however, meaning is cognized through observation where 
differences within the components and functionality of interactions produce significance. 
Lack within organisms is the general catalyst for cognition, which stimulates intentionality 
and interaction with the environment to secure what is needed to survive. The conatus is an 
organism’s drive to maintain a constant movement towards equilibrium, which ensures that an 
organism’s lacks and excesses are managed appropriately. Lack is generally associated with 
signification, especially as it relates with desire, and organisms coordinate from the molecular 
to the molar levels to act in their environment to satiate what is missing or deal with what is 
wrong. This happens within individual organisms but also within species themselves, as the 
conservation of independence is facilitated through interdependence. Collective intentionality 
shows how social species of individual organisms operate as a collective group, which 
demonstrates how autopoiesis can be applied as an operating system for higher-function 
aspects of life. One very big question remains, though. How does this establish or inform the 
operating system for art? 
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 Art functions through human practices, namely the creation and appreciation of 
artworks, which have a broad system of operation that involves processes of transformation, 
communication and evaluation, amongst other things. All of these processes take place within 
specific contexts in relation to people, and the operations that define autopoiesis are reflected 
in the practice of art. Artworks must conserve their distinguishable identity within their 
context to be recognizable by people as artworks, who use perception to evaluate the external 
sensory input that artworks provide. While autopoiesis distinguishes two levels of operation, 
so too does the system of art. This can be found in the separation of the individual (organism 
or artwork) from its environment (surrounding space or context), and in relation to other 
artworks (as a concept), which mirrors the separation of an individual human subject from 
society. These separaitons form the basis of the paradoxical situation of ‘being apart together’ 
that Rancière uses to contextualize aesthetic separation. Just as autopoiesis is broad in its 
operational approach to understanding life, so can it be extended to reflect an operating 
system for art. Context, subjects and thought combine to create a complex system in which 
the practice of art flourishes in human culture. As we explore in the following chapters, the 
system-theoretical operation of autopoiesis provides a solid foundation for understanding 
aesthetic separation and the reflection of life in art. 
 
2.3. Autopoieitic & Aesthetic Operation 
2.3.1. Introduction to Autopoieitic & Aesthetic Operation 
 The processes and conditions that autopoietic theory entails can be used to establish 
connections and comparisons between the functioning of life and the practice of art. A 
system-theoretical approach to understanding life establishes a perfect methodology for 
connecting the experience of artworks with the processes of living since many of the 
operations that are used to define autopoietic systems are equally useful in defining the ways 
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in which the aesthetic experience of artworks functions. Art only works through human 
interaction, and as we explore the practice of art in relation to the autopoietic conceptions of 
transformation, organization, context, observation, time, difference, lack and coordination, the 
interdependence of art and human life becomes clear. Artworks and humans form a mutually 
nourishing relationship in which moments of transformative potential are enabled through 
interaction. At the root of this relationship, however, innate divisions determine aesthetic 
procedure and functionality. Comparing aesthetic separations with autopoietic separations, the 
practice of art can be more easily understood in relation to the functioning of human life. The 
paradoxes that arise in the process are testament to the eternal search for meaning that we 
attribute to individual lives and to artworks, and demonstrate our affinities with the 
multifaceted functionality of art. 
 
2.3.2. Transformation 
The processual stipulation for understanding autopoiesis is a perfect example for the 
understanding of art. It is too easy to think of artworks as static, inert objects that exhibit a 
past metamorphosis, and yet all aspects of recognizing and considering objects as artworks 
entail transformative processes of sensing, feeling and thinking. This is why the philosophy of 
aesthetics is an important tool for unlocking the functioning of artworks. Aesthetics 
recognizes that artworks are always experienced procedurally, over time, which places the 
practice of art—its creation and enjoyment—in constant relation with human activity. 
Rancière elaborates on various aspects of aesthetic experience that demonstrate artistic 
practice as a series of processes. Referencing Deleuze and Guattari, Rancière elaborates on 
the transformation of raw material into art, after which he muses on the transformation of 
‘sense into sense,’ or sensation into reason. While the first process of transformation reflects 
the autopoietic process of identification of an artwork in relation to its environment, the 
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second reflects the shift from physical foundation to cognitive conception. Transformation is 
also explored by Rancière in relation to its connection with the community through ‘the 
sensory fabric,’ and through the alteration of people who participate in aesthetic experience. 
This transformative potential is how the experience of artworks is political in nature, as we 
will see in the coming paragraphs. 
Rancière begins his text “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community” by speaking of 
two important ways in which transformation is inherent to the experience of art: through the 
production of artworks, and through their enjoyment. In reference to contemporary artistic 
strategies, he speaks of the recent trend of artists who are moving from institutional exhibition 
spaces and into the real world in order to transform it and create new relations.51 This 
connotes the process of transformation that is inherent when creating an artwork, but it also 
implies the transformation of artistic practice over time as creative processes and practices 
shift in relation to society and artistic tradition. To expound upon the creation of artworks, 
Rancière refers to Deleuze and Guattari’s text What is Philosophy?, which elaborates upon 
the distinct methodologies of artistic, scientific and philosophic thought. Rancière focuses on 
the verbs that are used by Deleuze and Guattari in order to describe the connections and 
disconnections that result from sensory transformation. 
[W]hat was traditionally described as a ‘modelling’ of raw materials becomes a 
dialectic of ‘seizing’ and ‘rending.’ The result of this dialectic is a ‘vibration’ 
whose power is transmitted to the human community - that is, to a community of 
human beings whose activity is itself defined in terms of seizing and rending: 
suffering, resistance, cries. However, in order for the complex of sensations to 
communicate its vibration, it has to be solidified in the form of a monument. Now, 
the monument in turn assumes the identity of a person who speaks to the ‘ear of 
the future’.52 
 
Rancière describes artworks in relation to their process of creation by establishing that all 
works of art demonstrate a combination of before and after, which includes evidence of their 
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material substance before artistic intervention, and evidence of the intervention of the artist in 
the transformed material. The action of the artist becomes solidified as a trace within the 
material acted upon, the artwork.53 This process of artistic creation and its potential 
recognition relates to the formation of identity in autopoiesis, which involves the 
simultaneous coupling and separation of a being from its surroundings. In autopoiesis this 
being is a living organism, but an artwork equally demonstrates its attachment and distinction 
from its context. In a similar way that organisms are defined by the incorporation of 
molecules into their autopoiestic system, artworks incorporate and transform materials from 
the earth as they are made. As Rancière states: “there is no longer any boundary separating 
what belongs to the realm of art from what belongs to the realm of everyday life.”54 This 
malleable material boundary implies that—similar to autopoietic organisms—artworks are not 
defined by their physical components but rather by the system within which their material and 
form are manifested. The process of identifying an artwork is an act of distinguishing it from 
its context, which includes the distinction of an artwork from the situation in which it is 
experienced (i.e. from its non-art environment) as well as its distinction in relation to social 
context (i.e. through subjective relation to tradition). Artworks, as such, self-identify by 
reflexively incorporating recognizable attributes that are collectively understood as artistic 
conventions.55 The boundary that Rancière speaks of between the realms of art and the 
everyday, then, is a conceptual boundary, and the distinction of an artwork from other types 
of human products must be made through aesthetic processes of evaluation. This means 
connecting, sensing and considering the sensory fabric of the world in relation to our selves. 
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Another main process of transformation that Rancière explores in “Aesthetic 
Separation, Aesthetic Community” is related to perception, which unites an aesthetic 
community as a community of sense. Rancière refers to ‘aesthetic community’ in an effort to 
show the connection, or coupling, that is involved in appreciating artworks, which he divides 
into three steps. The first step involves a basic level of sensory input, or the achievement of a 
“certain combination of sense data.”56 The second step is the transition of this data from 
“sense to sense”, which can be understood as representational recognition, or the 
transformation of a physical sensation (i.e. the vision of an artwork with the sense of sight) 
into a conceptual sense (i.e. as something that makes sense, is reasonable or logical). The third 
and final step is the association of potential meaning (metaphoric, poetic or symbolic) or 
extended significance that results from the conceptualization achieved in step two. Now, as 
we explore the cognitive process of conceptualization in relation to aesthetics, it’s important 
to distinguish between beauty and art, which are not the same thing. As Rancière states: “Art 
entails the employment of a set of concepts, while the beautiful possesses no concepts. What 
is offered to the free play of art is free appearance.”57 While artworks definitely contain 
elements of the unknown, which call upon aesthetic judgement and thought, they also embody 
concepts so we can understand an artwork in terms of materials and traditions, and can 
compare and contrast the unknown of an artwork in relation to the world around us and our 
experience. As we perceptively move from step one to step three in Rancière’s conception of 
aesthetic procedure, it becomes easy to see how collective understanding begins to separate 
amongst individuals as sense data transforms into concepts or metaphors. Arguments about 
sense data—what we see or hear—are far less common and intense as disagreements about 
the meaning and significance of metaphoric sense data. Rancière uses the concept of 
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dissensus (as opposed to consensus) to describe the foundation of aesthetic community.58 As 
he states: “an aesthetic community is a community structured by disconnection.”59 While the 
basic level of sensory input utilizes sensory capacities that are relatively equal amongst 
human beings, the secondary level of conceptual recognition and the potential for extended 
meaning through metaphor exist in relation to both context and a broader community, since 
they are dependent on experience and learned social constructs. As the philosopher Niclas 
Luhmann states:  
The artwork itself engages the observer via the products of perceptions, and these 
are elusive enough to avoid the bifurcation of “yes” or “no.” We see what we see 
and hear what we hear, and when others observe us engaged in perception it 
would be silly to deny that we perceive. In this way, a type of sociability is 
generated that cannot be negated.60  
 
We are united in our sensory and cognitive capacities, yet we are easily divided in terms of 
understanding what the sensations that we feel as individuals signify. This transformation of 
“sense to sense” is the basis of Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation, and while it will be 
explored more thoroughly in relation to human physiology and neurology in Chapter 3. 
Thought / Self, it is important to appreciate how the processes involved in perception connect 
a subjective individual to a community through contextual and social associations. 
 The third process of transformation that Rancière engages with in “Aesthetic 
Separation, Aesthetic Community” is the transformation of individuals that results from 
experiencing artworks. We can all be affected by artworks, and Rancière states that: “[t]he 
link between the solitude of the artwork and human community is a matter of transformed 
‘sensation’.”61 The capacity that artworks have for subjective transformation largely concerns 
the way that aesthetic experience provides the opportunity for a subject to think reflexively—
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to feel themselves feeling, or think themselves thinking—which consequently has the power 
to transform the nature of a subject. As Nöe points out: “Art aims at the disclosure of 
ourselves to ourselves and so it aims at giving us opportunities to catch ourselves in the act of 
achieving perceptual consciousness—including aesthetic consciousness—of the world around 
us.”62 Aesthetic experience is a process of self-transformation—at the very least on biological 
and experiential levels—and the essence of Rancière’s article is the search for the political 
mechanisms of artistic experience. The basis of politically transformative potential lies in the 
possibility of subjective renovation through the experience of artworks, which Rancière 
attributes to the processes of separation and connection that aesthetic experience entails: 
[Aesthetic experience produces] a multiplication of connections and 
disconnections that reframe the relation between bodies, the world they live in and 
the way in which they are ‘equipped’ to adapt to it. It is a multiplicity of folds and 
gaps in the fabric of common experience that change the cartography of the 
perceptible, the thinkable and the feasible. As such, it allows for new modes of 
political construction of common objects and new possibilities of collective 
enunciation.63 
 
Here we can begin to see the power of the concept of aesthetic separation, which implies 
processes of separation and conjunction on various levels. As Suzanne McCullagh notes, 
Rancière’s politics of aesthetics is related to a double break between the artwork and the 
world, and artistic depiction and its effect on bodies.64 These processes are instigated in the 
recognition and appreciation of an artwork, which implies the identification of some 
transformed material and the recognition of some form of subjective evaluation, which places 
everything within a specific context. McCullagh notes that the political possibility of this 
experience arises from: “a dismantling that would enable new forms of collectivity and 
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political subjectivity to emerge.”65 From the unique perspective that every artwork offers 
comes an opportunity to reflect on who we are and how we are. This is what Nöe refers to 
when he states that: “one of art’s tasks is to afford us just this sort of opportunity to catch 
ourselves in the act of encountering the world, and so to let us encounter ourselves in a way 
that we otherwise never can.”66 As we saw in Chapter 2.2.7. Perspective & Difference, 
observation of difference is what generates meaning, which entails that self-observation 
during aesthetic experience enables the association of significance to our selves as we feel and 
sense singular moments of awareness distinctly. 
While the mechanics of the political effects of aesthetic experience will be explored in 
further depth as we progress, the importance of the transformative nature of the practice of art 
is clear. As simple as an artwork may appear, the processes involved in its creation and 
appreciation encompass complexities that extend in all directions of human culture, whether 
artistic, scientific or philosophic. When artworks are created, materials from the earth are 
incorporated into artworks and transformed into forms, establishing one of the fundamental 
oppositions of aesthetic theory between the natural material and the ‘artificial’ composition of 
the artwork. As the identity of an organism must be established as distinct from its 
environment, so too must an artwork distinguish itself from its context, and it does this by 
manifesting the ‘seizing’ and ‘rending’ processes of its creation. Having said that, the identity 
of an artwork is also determined through external factors, in relation to an artistic tradition 
that came before it, which situates it within the context of a social practice. As artworks are 
evaluated aesthetically, another transformation occurs within the observer that translates sense 
into sense—external sensory data into internal cognitive thought. Rancière conceives of this 
process of internalization as having three-steps that include input, association and projection. 
While the first and possibly second stages may be similar amongst individuals, the projection 
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of associations into metaphor is a largely subjective attribution of meaning that defines 
aesthetic separation, where aesthetic interpretation is infinite. The reliance upon learned 
tradition and subjective evaluation make aesthetic experiences singular, which leads to the 
final transformation explored in this chapter, the subjective dis-identification of the observer. 
The potential transformation of self that aesthetic experience entails is largely due to the 
reliance on subjective thought, which enables observers to become reflexively aware of their 
position in relation to an unknown (i.e. without concept) external stimuli. Every aesthetic 
experience is a unique opportunity to reflect upon your self in the moment, and the potentially 
distinct self the aesthetic experience with catalyse. Art works through people and their 
experience of artworks. Thinking about art as a practice and as a process allows us to identify 
the myriad influences that contribute to the possibility of art, especially in terms of its 
foundation within the systems of human life that make it possible. When we think about art as 
a kind of experience that necessitates processes of interaction and reflection, we can begin to 
appreciate the ways in which it is distinct from other kinds of experience. The result is a better 
understanding of its functionality through processes of human transformation, and becoming 
more aware of our transformative selves through aesthetic experience.  
 
2.3.3. Organization 
Perhaps the strongest correlation between art and life is through the concept of 
organization. The two laws of autopoiesis demonstrate how life is defined in operative terms 
through systems of reflexive organization. The essential organization of life can be compared 
to the basic conception of artworks as organized materials in terms of creation and 
recognition. Alva Nöe’s organizational theory of art helps to demonstrate the ways that the 
raw materials and subject matter of artworks can be considered in relation to our imperative 
as human beings to organize, while evoking the two-tiered autopoietic structure of molecular 
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and molar levels of reflexive operation. The organizational foundation of artworks can be 
extended to establish the metaphor of the art world as an autopoietic system, and we will look 
at the many ways in which artworks are ordered within society. This prompts a consideration 
of how artistic tradition relates with social organization, which Rancière’s notion of the 
aesthetic regime addresses in terms of the connection of art and everyday life. Both life and 
art depend upon organization by definition, and as a result the concept of organization is the 
best way to explore the ways in which life and art are tied together. While this is easier to 
fathom in terms of the operational functioning of biological organisms and artistic creation, 
extending the connecting principle of organization to cognitive and social aspects of artistic 
practice is more difficult. Nonetheless, the basic tenet of organization underlies this thesis as 
it moves to connect life, human beings, and human thought to art. 
To begin with, the basic unit of art—the artwork—must be understood in terms of its 
organization to be understood as art. As Deleuze and Guattari state: “Composition, 
composition is the sole definition of art. Composition is aesthetic, and what is not composed 
is not a work of art.”67 In terms of creating artworks, every operation involved can be 
considered in terms of organization, as disorganized or spontaneous as these processes might 
be. In order to be evaluated as art, artworks must be displayed and accessed as well, which 
exposes an inherent organizational aspect in their requisite communication to others.68 As 
Luhman states: “A first-order observer must first identify a work of art as an object in 
contradistinction to all other objects or processes.”69 We distinguish an artwork from nature 
and other non-art products by recognizing some minimal form of human transformation upon 
a raw material (be it natural or man-made), which in essence is its organization. Rancière 
positions the artwork as the coincidence between the raw material of nature and the actions of 
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man that the material demonstrates. It is through the artist’s composition of material that an 
artwork stores and transmits vibrations of emotion during aesthetic experience. In this way, 
artworks are defined by their structure in much the same way that organisms are structurally 
defined in terms of their molecular functioning. While the recognition of structural or formal 
organization of an artwork is possible through the sensory capacities of individuals, the 
inference of referential associations largely results from our collective social organization, 
through which cultural and artistic traditions are learned, practised and extended.  
Alva Nöe’s recent theory of art uses organization to connect the basic and natural 
activities of our lives with the productive activities involved in making artwork. Nöe argues 
that organization is a biological concept that not only organizes our bodies but also our 
psychological and social selves.70 “To be alive is to be organized, and insofar as we are not 
only organisms but are also persons, we find ourselves organized, or integrated, in a still 
larger range of ways that tie us to the environment, each other, and our social worlds.”71 Nöe 
uses the term ‘organized activity’ to establish the foundation of his conception of art. An 
organized activity has six characteristics:  
1. It is primitive, basic, biological and natural. 
2. It requires the exercise of cognitive skills. 
3. It has a structure and is organized in time. 
4. The demands of the activity as a whole control the behaviour of the individuals 
involved. 
5. The activity has a function. 
6. It is a potential source of pleasure.72 
 
Another important point that Nöe makes is that organized activities are habitual, and in this 
way they are usually things that can be improved with practice and don’t always require our 
full cognitive attention.73 The best example that Nöe provides to relate organized activities to 
artistic creation is with dancing. In order to do this, Nöe separates the basic organized 
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activity—dancing—from a higher form of organized activity—choreography—which he 
terms first and second order organized activities respectively.  
When a choreographer stages a dance, he is representing dancing. That is, he puts 
dancing itself on display. Choreography shows us dancing, and so, really, it 
displays us, we human beings, as dancers; choreography shows us dancing; 
choreography exhibits the place dancing has, or can have, in our lives. 
Choreography puts the fact that we are organized by dancing on display.74  
 
With this description, Nöe intends to connect the artistic act of choreographing to the natural 
act of dancing through organizational relationships, both in terms of how we organize dance 
but also how dance organizes us.75 Choreography can thus be understood in relation to the 
nature of human organization, which provides a link between the perceived divisions of 
nature and culture.76 Nöe states: 
This idea that life is tied to autopoiesis, to use Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela’s apt term, points back to Kant. Kant appreciated that although Newtonian 
mechanics gives you the principles you need to describe and predict the 
movements of the smallest particles as well as the whole planets, physics as such 
can make no sense of life. Living processes—metabolism, growth, death—are not 
merely physical processes even if, of course, they are physical processes. Living 
beings are physical systems whose life consists in the distinctive manner of their 
organization; it consists, as Kant appreciated, in the fact of their self-
organization.77  
 
The key point that Nöe makes is that artistic practices extract and expose the innumerable 
ways in which we find ourselves organized as people. Art is not only organizational but also 
reorganizational, and its value is largely established in relation to the significance of 
organization in shaping human life.78 “Art—and philosophy, too—are practices for 
investigating the modes of our organization, or rather, the manner of our embedding in 
different modes of organization. Art is not just more organization.”79 Art is reflective 
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organization, and this idea of Nöe will be further explored in relation to technology in Chapter 
4.2.2. Reorganization. 
Organization can be easily seen as an integral aspect of the institutional system of art, 
commonly known as ‘the art world,’ where artworks enter into public circulation through 
exhibition and conceptualization. As spectators, we distinguish between art institutions, 
exhibitions and artworks in terms of recognizing and comparing the ways that they organize 
and the ways in which they are organized. The system of art is not only operated by 
institutions—galleries, museums, universities, governments—but through society in general, 
and the tradition of art that communities of people have nurtured and reproduced over 
millennia. When we think about the system of art, then, we need to consider distinct levels of 
operation, from the singular elements of artworks and individuals to a more general network 
of movement and relations. When we speak about artworks, we understand specific entities 
that exist within specific contexts. When we talk about art, we understand a generalization of 
various artworks that exist and operate within an implied system. The structures that are 
interrelated within the system of art are vast, ranging from educational structures that are 
implemented in art class curricula, to material structures that artists consider when making 
artworks, to personnel networks as curators develop group exhibitions for biennales, to 
logistical structures as collectors buy and ship artworks internationally. There are a lot of 
moving parts in the art world and artworks are but one fundamental element. This complex 
system, at both the level of the artwork and the level of the art world, is comparable to 
autopoiesis because its internal organization forms the fundamental structure of its autonomy, 
which will be explored further in Chapter 5.3.3. Autonomy. If we think about autopoiesis as a 
metaphor for the system of art, we can imagine how artworks are a form of currency that 
connect various practices together and facilitate a conceptualization of art. If we compare 
artworks to molecules, the art institutions as systems clearly demonstrate processes of 
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conservation and adaptation, with artworks flowing to and fro, in and out, of the art world. 
Similar to autopoiesis, the system of art demonstrates two levels of operation; the molecular 
and the molar. Singular artworks constitute the basic level of operation, while art as a general 
concept makes up the singular conceptual totality of art. Autopoiesis helps us to appreciate 
art’s autonomy in relation to other non-art practices and components (its law of conservation) 
and its sovereignty as an internally reflexive and transformative force (its law of adaptation), 
once again demonstrating the fundamental aspect of its organization. Nonetheless, it is 
important to point out that the functionality of an artwork is not the same as the functionality 
of the art system, once again reflecting the difference between molecular operation and molar 
observation of autopoietic systems. The unique functionality of artworks, which differs 
greatly from the intention and purpose of the art world, will be more fully explored in relation 
to technology in Chapter 4.3.4. Function. As a point of connection, though, organization can 
be understood as the cognition of the art system by establishing a basic operational union 
between separate levels. 
For Rancière, who is investigating the political efficacy of artistic practices, the 
concept of aesthetic separation is most relevant in terms of social organization. This involves 
how people relate with each other, but also how they relate with artworks, which he claims 
“assume the identity of a person.”80 To this effect, artworks act as proxies for human beings, 
in part because of the communicative implication that artworks embody. Artworks do no 
intrinsically have meaning, but rather we are taught that they have meaning, and we learn how 
to access and interpret that meaning. As we are socialized to be individuals, we learn how 
artworks are organized not only in terms of materials but also in terms of experience and 
tradition. One of the most influential factors in Rancière’s definition of aesthetic separation is 
the distancing of art current practices during the aesthetic regime of art from originary 
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contexts of artistic purpose and function. While art was traditionally associated with civic 
festivals, religious ceremonies and monarchic decorum, it is no longer organized in terms of 
these functions and destinations.81 “What is lost, along with the harmony between poiesis and 
aisthesis, is the dependence of artistic productions on a distribution of social places and 
functions.”82 The disjunction that Rancière refers to between poiesis and aisthesis reflects the 
separation of artistic practice into two isolated acts—creation and enjoyment—and this 
organizational format of artistic practice reflects the debt that art has to Greek theatre. While 
there was an established separation between the actors on stage and the audience, there was a 
concordance between artistic cause and emotional effect.83 With the freedom of subjective 
interpretation that arose as a result of aesthetic theory—in combination with other social 
developments, no doubt—this concordance dissipated in the wake of a more individuated 
reflection on artistic significance. This situation is the ‘aesthetic break,’ a concept that 
Rancière uses to describe the cultural shift away from the mimetic regime of art and the 
awakening possibility of a political effect through the aesthetic experience of artworks.84 As 
Joseph J. Tanke describes, the mimetic or representational regime held different assumptions 
about artistic practice than the current aesthetic regime of art.85 The mimetic regime viewed 
artworks as simple representations of life, at the same time placing limits on subject matter, 
depictions and expected reactions, while the aesthetic regime confuses the definite boundary 
between art and life by dismantling the purely representational function of artworks. This 
opens the door for subjective understanding when experiencing and evaluating artworks. 
What aesthetics advances, then, is an idea of art according to which art is at once 
informed by the products and practices of the everyday, and in some significant 
way different from it. Aesthetic art is that which cannot but call into question the 
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meanings assigned to roles, practices, and capacities because it is what questions 
the process of assigning meaning as such.86 
 
The requisite subjectivity of the aesthetic regime has helped to dismantle any hierarchies of 
high and low that might have traditionally existed, and established a more democratic basis 
upon which artworks can be enjoyed and discussed within society. Through this transition 
from the mimetic to the aesthetic tradition of art, we can begin to appreciate the political 
relevance that culture plays within society, which demonstrates very clearly how social 
organization is affected by the practice of art, and vice versa. As we continue, the topic of the 
political efficacy of artworks will be developed. 
Organization is a unifying concept that connects our biological operation as living 
beings and our artistic tendencies as people within society. As we have seen, artworks must 
be organized to some extent, and it is through their organization that we can recognize them 
as artworks. As Nöe has proposed, the foundation of an organizational theory of art relates 
organized activities of the first and second order in terms of reflexive transformation, which 
demonstrates how human beings organize and are organized by the world in which they live. 
His division of organized activities into first and second orders reflects the autopoietic 
separation of molecular operation and molar observation, and establishes a reflexive 
connection between natural and composed elements within artworks. Extending the concept 
of organization into the institutional world of art, we can begin to understand the relevance of 
an autopoietic comparison in terms of internal self-sufficiency, where artworks are organized 
in terms of conservation and adaptation in order to sustain the social system of art. While this 
system functions largely in experiential, educational and economic terms, it is important to 
differentiate between the intentionality of the social art system and artworks, which act as the 
basic unit of the art system with their own internal logic. This distinction between molecular 
and molar functionality reflects the autopoietic division that we exhibit as living systems, 
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where our structural components operate on a separate level from our self-conception as a 
whole. As we look at a broader perspective of the art world in terms of tradition and social 
organization, we can appreciate the role that experience and education have in the 
appreciation and enjoyment of artworks. Rancière’s conception of the aesthetic regime 
highlights the connection between social and cultural transformation over the past two 
hundred and thirty years, since the groundbreaking examination of aesthetic thought by Kant 
during the enlightenment. Rancière’s description of the aesthetic break helps to demonstrate 
how the confined and limited forms of artistic appreciation during previous epochs gave way 
to a more subjective and open artistic practice. Through the social constructs that tradition 
implies, we can more readily understand how the concept of art can be related to everyday 
life, as well as biological life. Organization defines us in many ways, and through our 
organizational proclivities we can appreciate how art and life are united.  
 
2.3.4. Context 
Artworks, just like organisms, exist in relation to their environment. This is the case 
on a physical level, but it goes further than that if we consider the conceptual realm of art, 
which necessitates shifting from environmental considerations into contextual ones. The 
concepts of “environment” and “context” are similar, although the former implies a more 
neutral, non-human connotation, and the latter connotes the attribution of meaning to an 
environment. While our environment can exist without us and thus be thought of as inert or 
natural, we as observers necessarily establish context, which associates a source of perception 
to an environment. As such, context not only associates information or significance in relation 
to the elements involved in an event or interaction, but it also assumes that there is a 
perspective from which a context is established in relation to time. Since autopoiesis deals 
with the concepts of environment, meaning and time, it is extremely relevant to our 
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exploration of aesthetic separation and the practice of art. Here we will begin to compare 
autopoiesis and art by looking at how artworks exist in relation to their physical surroundings, 
institutional context and a personal artistic practice. The idea of context will be further 
examined in terms of an artwork’s relationship to the conventions of art, specifically looking 
at the context of the ‘white cube’ exhibition space. Finally, we will return to Nöe’s 
organizational theory of art to explore how artworks function in part by being out of context. 
Just like in autopoiesis, where an organism’s identity is determined through its persistent 
differentiation from its environment, context can never be escaped when dealing with 
artworks and art. More than a simple environment, every artwork needs a context in order to 
exist as a singular being, and the significance of an artwork is conditional on processes of 
contextualization. 
There are many ways to contextualize an artwork. The relationship of artworks to their 
immediate environment on a molecular level is similar to autopoietic organisms, and as 
structural entities, artworks are constantly negotiating and changing because of this 
relationship. The connection between an artwork and its environment is entropic in nature and 
assures the global necessity of art restorers and conservationists. Chemical reactions cause 
pigments to change colour and structural components to weaken on a perpetual basis, as 
protracted as these processes might be. This is one reason why every specific experience of an 
artwork is different, since artworks transform just as we do, as corporeal beings and through 
relations. On the molecular level, the institutions of art attend to the degenerative coupling of 
artworks within their environments by establishing their protection and preservation as a 
principal virtue, and the people who work within the art system do whatever they can to 
prevent or delay artworks from changing, as impossible as this might be. On the molar level, 
the context of an artwork is paramount to its understanding. This refers to the physical context 
of an artwork, which attains significance based on its locational, institutional and cultural 
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association. Furthermore, temporal and traditional context play a role in artistic meaning, as 
the development of artistic practices and understanding ensures that the same artwork can 
mean different things to diverse people in distinct epochs. This leads us back to ‘the aesthetic 
break,’ which Rancière describes as the contextual dislocation that occurred as artistic 
practices transformed in relation to social changes over time. As mentioned earlier, while 
artworks traditionally entered the common realm of aesthetic experience through festivals, 
ceremonies and decoration, the aesthetic regime separated them from these specific functions 
and destinations.87 As artistic creation faded from being defined by its purpose in relation to 
particular social spaces and functions, it gained independence from authoritative standards. Its 
understood purpose as decoration or iconography began to dissolve, and through the dispersal 
of set intentions, artworks started to disrupt expectation and interrupt assured meaning.  
Aesthetic experience has a political effect to the extent that the loss of destination 
it presupposes disrupts the way in which bodies fit their functions and destination. 
What it produces is not rhetorical persuasion about what must be done. Nor is it 
the framing of a collective body. It is a multiplication of connections and 
disconnections that reframe the relation between bodies, the world they live in and 
the way in which they are ‘equipped’ to adapt to it. It is a multiplicity of folds and 
gaps in the fabric of common experience that change the cartography of the 
perceptible, the thinkable and the feasible. As such, it allows for new modes of 
political construction of common objects and new possibilities of collective 
enunciation.88  
 
In effect, artworks started to defy expectations through the loss of purpose and intention that 
they traditionally embodied. Rancière attributes the disruptive political potential of artworks 
in part to their loss of contextually defined meaning, demonstrating how cultural tradition 
develops in relation to the collective understanding of the society that upholds it. As such, the 
context in which an artwork is accessed and evaluated changes not only in terms of physical 
location but also in terms of ideological position, which is established by the culture of the 
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individual and society that engages it. This assures that the value associated with an artwork is 
always malleable and transitive, depending on the context of its evaluation.  
Another way that artworks are contextualized is in relation to an artist’s personal 
practice, and in relation to their history of exhibition and ownership. This may be secondary 
to aesthetic contextualization in the moment of experiencing an artwork, but it nonetheless 
contributes to the economic value of an artwork and thus influences its position within the 
social realm of art historical consideration. Take a look at any contemporary art auction 
catalogue and you will see how historic and relational information are key elements for 
establishing and justifying monetary value and artistic significance. By comparing an artwork 
to other artworks by the same artist, details regarding techniques and subject matter can be 
identified and explored more easily, especially as an artist’s body of work is contextualized in 
terms of progression. The provenance of an artwork lists its exhibition and ownership 
history—a kind of metadata that is attached to an artwork. This extends the more 
constitutional information contained on the label that accompanies an artwork during 
exhibition, which lists the artist’s name, the artwork name, the year of its creation, the 
materials it is composed of, and its dimensions—not to mention it’s price. The practice of 
labelling artworks is at least 2500 years old89, which demonstrates that the contextualization 
of artworks through the association of supplementary information is a fundamental 
convention of art. With the ubiquitous use of digital technologies nowadays, the registration 
of an artwork in art institutions involves the recording of an astonishing amount of metadata. 
As tangential as these practices may be, they certainly demonstrate contextualization to be an 
integral aspect of the art world.  
 Artworks are unavoidably experienced within an artistic tradition that is structured in 
terms of pre-existing artistic conventions. These principles establish the artwork within the 
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realm and tradition of art, while simultaneously being challenged by the innovation that the 
artwork inevitably demonstrates. While I have previously focused on artistic conventions in 
relation to evolutionary theories and a ‘cluster criteria’ definition of art,90 I would like to 
focus on the convention of the ‘white cube’ that describes the ubiquitous spatial context for 
the display of artworks during the Modern epoch.91 Providing a veil of neutrality, the 
convention of a blank exhibition space assures that artworks are seen as well-lit, independent 
entities with as little distraction as possible. Despite the supposed vacuity of the white cube, 
every exhibition space exists within various contexts—institutional, economic, national, 
cultural, etc.—and these encompassing conceptions of context are inevitably associated to 
artworks when they are exhibited, experienced or remembered. Escaping these contextual 
associations may be the impetus for artists wanting to: “get out of the museum and induce 
alterations in the space of everyday life, generating new forms of relations.”92 The space of 
everyday life offers fewer predefined links for the contextualization of artworks by avoiding 
the direct relations that art institutions embody through their inherent economic existence and 
ideological positions. Nonetheless, while many artists with relational practices are escaping 
the conventions of the traditional exhibition space, their artworks simply become dependent 
on other conventions of art. As Osborne states: “art can transform all kinds of place into art-
space (that is, art non-place), by bringing it into relation with gallery conventions.”93 While 
artworks may incorporate or appropriate elements from the real world, they nonetheless need 
to be recognized as an artwork in order to be understood as art, and this is especially true 
when the context doesn’t convey any artistic significance. This relates to the autonomy that an 
artwork must convey in order to exist in relation to tradition as art, which we will look at in 
chapter 4.7. Autonomy. As postconceptual artists move away from the purely technical 
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mediations of art, such as sculpture or painting, their artworks nonetheless embody some 
formal convention that allows them to be known as art. In autopoietic terms, if an artwork 
can’t differentiate itself as a unique identity in relation to its environment, it will never be 
contextualized as art. Artistic conventions ensure that artworks can always be contextualized 
as such. “Whatever counts as art is marked by an inevitable historical relativity, even at the 
most elemental level of operation.”94 This is yet another way that context becomes an 
important factor that ascribes significance to an artwork. The white cube makes it possible for 
anything to become an artwork by simply being exhibited within a conventional gallery space, 
and highlights the importance of the act of display for establishing artistic significance. At the 
heart of artistic practice, the act of display—art’s defining communicative convention—marks 
an important separation between the creation and the experience of an artwork.  
Acts of observation and perception ensure that every aesthetic experience brings 
context to an artwork. This is because artworks are always perceived and evaluated in relation 
to the cognition and memory of an observer. Try as one might, artworks are never isolated. 
“Art is always relational and contextual.”95 The cognitive processes of relating and 
contextualizing are how we engage to understand artworks, comparing them with feelings and 
concepts that we have achieved through experience. In contradistinction to artworks, Nöe uses 
the concept of tools to explore how context provides purpose and meaning. He contends that 
if you take a tool out of its context it is just an object without purpose. He believes that 
artworks place things out of context on purpose as a way of calling attention to them and 
examining their collocation in the world.96 As such, he defines artworks as strange tools, 
which reflects the impracticality that has become a standard through which artworks are 
defined. Within the fine arts there are many divisions, but the separation of design and art 
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demonstrates Nöe’s theory of strange tools well by pointing out the importance of context on 
how we understand things in general. For example, the pictures that we see in the newspaper 
or on your parent’s shelves at home are natural—they are not out of place because we are 
accustomed and not surprised to see pictures there. Nöe contends that pictures are like words 
of our mother tongue, a familiar way of communicating, and it is recognition and familiarity 
that makes pictures in these places seem natural.97 Good design works in the same way, 
according to Nöe, because when design works well we don’t notice it; it’s doing its job of 
organizing and enabling. Art, on the other hand, subverts, which contradicts the practical 
purpose and methodology of design. 98 Good design fits in with its context, standing out only 
when it is novel or improves upon expectations. The purpose behind design always connects 
it to intelligibility and places it in parallel functionality with technology, which we will 
explore more closely in chapter 2.8. Function. Nöe defines art as “bad design on purpose,” 
stating that the absence of defined use and contextual shifts ensure that artworks call attention 
to themselves.99 By being out of place, or out of context, artworks stand out. While design 
solves problems, art produces questions that bring individual subjectivity into play in the 
reflective judgement of an artwork. As Nöe states: “When we ask of a work of art what is 
this? What is this for? we need to come up with our own answer. And so we need to take a 
stand critically, on our relation to the background, on our relation to that which we normally 
take for granted.”100 Design, on the other hand, relies on determinant judgements that relate 
their evaluation to universal principles of rationality, reason and use. We will further explore 
Nöe’s consideration of artworks as a strange tool in chapter 2.6. Reorganization, but the 
general idea is relevant to point out here as we explore the importance of context to the 
practice of art. Needless to say, the observer brings their personal understanding of the world 
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to aesthetic experience, where the questions that artworks inherently evoke call forth 
processes of contextualization in an effort to establish meaning. 
While autopoiesis highlights the structural coupling between organism and its 
environment, an operational understanding of aesthetic experience demonstrates how 
artworks are equally dependent upon their context. Artworks exist within the cognitive realm 
of observers. While the concept of ‘environment’ implies neutrality, it changes into ‘context’ 
through the attribution of meaning that observation entails. Acts of contextualization not only 
attribute significance to interactions within an environment, but they also demonstrate a 
unique perspective from which context is established. Artworks exist in relation to their 
immediate physical environment as well as their conceptual context in terms of social 
associations such as tradition, personal practice and ownership. This idea of context can be 
expanded to reflect an artwork’s relationship to the institutions in which it is displayed, and 
the conventions of art that help to define its ideological contextualization. By functioning out 
of context, artworks call attention to themselves and the subversive way that they operate as 
art in counterpoint to other fields of culture. Rancière’s exploration of the aesthetic break 
helps us to understand the transformation of artistic tradition over time, and the disconnection 
of artworks from specific functions and spaces. In the aesthetic regime, predetermined 
conceptions of meaning have dissipated, and aesthetic experience has become a subjective 
process of contextualization to determine the meaning and value of artworks. This facilitates a 
greater appreciation of the importance of temporal and social considerations when associating 
meaning and value to artworks. As contexts change, so do the artworks, people and traditions 
that inhabit them, demonstrating how the concept and practice of art continually evolve.  
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2.3.5. Observation 
Observation is a key element of aesthetic experience, and autopoiesis helps us to more 
fully understand the operative foundation that makes observation possible. Here I will focus 
on the ways that observation is tied to communication in an attempt to clarify intention, and 
the ways in which observation functions in relation artworks. First I will examine how the 
intentionality and explanatory notions that arise from molar autopoeitic observation relate to 
artworks. Secondly I will explore observation in relation to Luhmann’s systems theory of art, 
where observation is divided into first and second orders of communication and is examined 
in relation to distinction and form. Of specific interest is his concept of the ‘observation of 
observation,’ which occurs when perceiving artworks and once again reflects a two-tiered 
reflexive system of separate yet interconnected levels. These various observational 
perspectives ultimately demonstrate that our capacity as human beings to perceive—as 
developed and sharp as it might seem—has an unstable foundation that leads to uncertainty, 
interaction and paradox in the process of experiencing and evaluating artworks. 
As explored in chapter 1.1 Autopoiesis, attempts to describe the intentionality of 
observed behaviour result in explanatory notions, which clarify or speculate on the purpose of 
observed interactions. The generation of thought and language provides meaning to 
observations and leads to a sense of understanding the world around us. Artists may have a 
specific reason for making an artwork or not—something that they want to communicate or 
evoke with a viewer in mind—but in the aesthetic regime, the exact understanding of what an 
artist wishes to communicate through their artwork can in no way be guaranteed to be 
understood. The ‘aesthetic break’ is important because it destabilizes any certain connections 
between the creation of an artwork and the perception of its meaning. Any determinate link 
between cause and effect is disrupted because of the separation of the experience and possible 
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metaphoric significance that sensory data may convey.101 The aesthetic break ensured that 
artworks began to speak for themselves, demonstrating how aesthetics is emancipatory in 
effect through its reliance on the free thought of subjective individuals to establish meaning. 
Rancière calls the ‘aesthetic effect’ an effect of dis-identification, where viewers are forced to 
reassess (and re-establish) their position, whether it’s political or emotional.102 The 
disconnections inherent in aesthetic separation and the transition from ‘sense to sense’ mean 
that no exact message can ever by guaranteed. “The very same thing that makes the aesthetic 
‘political’ stands in the way of all strategies for ‘politicizing art’.”103 As such, the intentions 
that artists provide in the form of explanatory notions must be interpreted as tangential to the 
original aesthetic experience of an artwork. In fact, listening to what artists have to say about 
their own artworks can often be misleading. As Luhmann states: “Most of the time, artists are 
in no position to provide a satisfactory account of their intentions.”104 This is in part because 
artworks communicate beyond the scope of any explanation of intention provided by their 
author. While explanatory notions have no power in the molecular functioning of organisms, 
neither should the explanation of intentions provided by artists be taken too seriously. They 
may give us insight into creative processes, but artworks ultimately speak for themselves. The 
British collective Art & Language undermine the validity of artistic intention perfectly as they 
describe the contemporary trend of “de-skilling” in contemporary art: “The bare bones are 
simple: if you can use some form of readymade you don’t need to learn to draw. At the same 
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time you need to learn to theorize and to ‘think’ – to devise strategies and entrepreneurial 
skills – in short, to bullshit.”105  
As aesthetic experience implies, observation is far from being a passive operation. We 
make observations, and there are many important implications to this generative process when 
it comes to creating and observing artworks. Luhmann explores the functioning of 
observation in relation to aesthetic experience in order to demonstrate art as a social system of 
communication. In general, every time an observer observes they create a distinction that 
results in two separations: one between a marked space and an unmarked space, and another 
between the observer and the thing that is being distinguished.106 Luhmann defines the 
observation of artworks as second order observation, which is an observation of an 
observation. Since artworks embody distinctions that were created by other observers—
artists—for the purpose of observation, they in turn should be understood as observations. 
The result of this distinction between first (direct) and second (indirect) observation assures 
that aesthetic experience is conditional on a paradox, which Rancière acknowledges in part in 
his exploration of ‘being apart together’. Luhmann describes the paradox as follows:  
[T]he activity of observing occurs in the world and can be observed in turn. It 
presupposes the drawing of a boundary across which the observer can observe 
something (or himself as an other), and it accounts for the incompleteness of 
observations by virtue of the fact that the act of observing, along with the 
difference of the observation that constitutes it, escapes observation. Observation 
therefore relies on a blind spot that enables it to see something (but not 
everything).107  
 
This seeing (or marking) one thing by not seeing (or not marking) something else is the 
paradox that is presupposed by all observation. When something is distinguished, it is always 
done so in reference to what is left out or not distinguished, which Luhmann illustrates 
                                                
105 Art & Language, “Feeling Good: The Aesthetics of Corporate Art,” in Aesthetics and 
Contemporary Art, edited by Armen Avanessian and Luke Skrebowski, (Norhaven, 
Denmark: Sternberg Press, 2011), 170. 
106 Luhmann, Art as a Social System, 54. 
107 Ibid., 56-57. 
 82 
linguistically as “this-and-not-something-else,” or “this-and-not-that.”108 In this way, 
observation must be understood in the same way as the autopoietic definition of behaviour, 
which is always established as an inseparable interaction between an organism and its 
environment. An observed distinction always has a two-sided form that demonstrates what is 
distinguished on one side and what is not distinguished on the other side. In difference to 
mere behaviour, however—which can be understood as a simple operation within an 
environment—Luhmann states that observation involves experience and action, which depend 
on capacities of distinguishing and indicating. While distinguishing can be understood as an 
act of differentiation, indicating is the transmission of a distinction to other observers. When 
something is observed, distinction and indication are executed simultaneously according to 
Luhmann. The significance is that form can be identified in both the thing that is being 
observed (artworks exist as form) and in the formal structure of the observation itself (the 
operational form).109 Luhmann uses the idea of form to connect the act of observing to works 
of art, where a formal procedure (aesthetic experience) is used to understand a specific kind of 
form (an artwork). Derrida makes a similar comparison in relation to Kant’s Analytic of the 
Beautiful, where formal structures inform the observation of form, which we will explore 
more thoroughly in Chapter 5.2.6. Form. Nonetheless, the active and transformative nature of 
observation in terms of its use of distinction and indication is becoming clearer. 
Luhmann claims that artworks are only produced for the purpose of generating the 
observation of an observation.110 His goal in describing the practice of art in terms of second-
order observation is to effectively correlate the functioning of individuals with social systems, 
both of which demonstrate autopoiesis through their operative closure (i.e. self-sufficiency) 
and reproductive capacities (i.e. self-perpetuation). To make this correlation, he utilizes the 
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concepts of form, distinction and observation to describe the practice of art. For artists, which 
are first-order observers during creation, a work of art must be identified as distinct from all 
other objects and processes, which we explored in Chapter 2.3.2. Transformation. Luhmann 
states that one of the key elements of an artwork is its artificiality—its condition as being 
man-made—which offers a recognizable signal that allows second-order observation to begin 
in observers. This is what Rancière, borrowing from Deleuze, describes as the vibrations of 
“seizing and rending” that are transmitted to human beings through the form of a monument. 
As Luhman describes, a second-order observer:  
searches the work for clues to guide further observation and only when these 
observations succeed will [they] be ready to identify the work as art. In order to 
do so, [they] must follow the forms embedded in the work. All of these are forms 
of difference; they fixate something on one side, which eliminates, or at least 
constrains, the arbitrariness of the other side.111  
 
Here Luhmann reiterates the paradoxical form of “this-and-not-that” that artworks embody in 
their use of distinction. Second-order observers become aware of multiple distinctions as they 
evaluate an artwork over the course of time, creating a complex nexus of forms that 
simultaneously indicate what is distinguished and what this distinction excludes. The 
boundary between what is present and what is absent in every distinction is an open border 
that must be tested in order to conceive of a unity that begins to define the artwork.112 
Differentiating between the creation of an artwork and its appreciation, Luhman describes 
how paradox is experienced by first-order observers (artists) and second-order observers 
(spectators). For artists, a temporal paradox is experienced through the simultaneity of 
distinction and observation, which stimulate consecutive operations until the artwork is 
complete. For spectators, paradox exists in the apprehension of a unity that can only be 
observed as a multiplicity, which can never be fully conceived.113 Through his use of separate 
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levels of observation, Luhmann demonstrates the problem of unity that all artworks embody 
in the form of a paradox.  
Art makes visible possibilities of order that would otherwise remain invisible. It 
alters the conditions of visibility/invisibility in the world by keeping invisibility 
constant and making visibility subject to variation. In short, art generates forms 
that would never exist without it.”114  
 
While attesting to the unique generosity of art, Luhmann’s two-tiered theory of artistic 
observation is yet another example of separation at the heart of aesthetic experience. 
Considering artworks as observations, and their aesthetic experience as the observation of 
observations, the reflexive operation of the enjoyment of art is based on the navigation and 
negotiation of these implicit separations, which are ultimately observed by the observer in the 
observer, connecting the practice of art to the processes of life. 
 In conclusion, the process of observation not only enables the practice of art but, 
furthermore, operates to define what it is and what it isn’t. Rancière’s notion of the aesthetic 
break, where the congruency of meaning in artistic practice became separated into two 
facets—poiesis from aisthesis, or creation from enjoyment—helps us to appreciate the newly 
found uncertainty of artistic experience in the aesthetic regime. Notions of artistic intention 
are no longer sufficient or authoritative. While Rancière demonstrates how the experience of 
artworks has a political effect through the process of dis-identification that it stimulates, it is 
important to note that the political effect cannot be guided nor guaranteed within the aesthetic 
regime. The semiotic process of observation reflects this internal-external division since it is 
defined by two implicit oppositions; one that separates the observer from the observed, and 
another that separates the distinguished from the ‘not-distinguished.’ In the case of observing 
artworks, the process moves from first-order to second-order observation in which artworks—
as indirect forms of communication—are considered as observations in themselves, thus 
making aesthetic experience the observation of observations. This process, which involves 
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both action and experience, has a formal structure that is paradoxical in nature since it 
inherently connects the ‘not-distinguished’ with the distinguished. The action of observation 
involves both distinction (which separates the object or being of interest) and indication 
(which conveys the distinction externally to other observers). Since an artwork must be 
recognized first to be observed as an observation, the concept of art is presupposed and 
contingent on the experience of the observer. This demonstrates the recognition of artificiality 
as a condition of aesthetic experience, which establishes an observational stipulation on both 
the creation and enjoyment of artworks. Observers not only distinguish the oppositions that 
are inherent in artworks, but they must test them in order to successfully identify the work’s 
boundaries, which ultimately exist as paradoxes in terms of temporal and apprehensive 
unities. As sources of unlimited observation, artworks demonstrate a unique generosity and 
infinite interpretive potential. As formal beings, artworks provoke the inherently formal 
operation of human observation, demonstrating how our biological capacities inherently 
inform the practice of art.  
 
2.3.6. Time 
Autopoiesis demonstrates time to be one of the most paradoxical yet omnipresent 
explanatory notions that our cognition affords us. As explored in Chapter 2.2.6. Observation, 
the only time that exists on the molecular level of autopoietic operation is the present; the past 
and the future are simply concepts that we as observers have developed to help explain the 
succession of events that we experience on the molar level of conscious thought. This is 
difficult to accept knowing that we are older than we were five years ago, and that we have 
plans for the weekend that we’re looking forward to. That’s because our cognition makes the 
past and future seem real thanks to our ability to remember and to imagine. As the neurologist 
Antonio Damasio explains:  
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Images of something that has not yet happened and that may in fact never come to 
pass are no different in nature from the images you hold of something that already 
has happened. They constitute the memory of a possible future rather than of the 
past that was. These various images—perceptual, recalled from real past, and 
recalled from plans of the future—are constructions of your organism’s brain. All 
that you can know for certain is that they are real to your self, and that other 
beings make comparable images.115  
While this neurological description of time in relation to cognition will be more thoroughly 
explored in Chapter 3.3.4. Experience, it is important to point out that time during aesthetic 
experience is always the experience of oneself in the present in relation to an artwork, which 
makes it congruent with time on the molecular level of autopoiesis. As Luhmann states: 
“What is at stake, operatively speaking, in the production and observation of a work of art is 
always a temporal unity that is either no longer or not yet observed.”116 In this chapter we will 
explore time in relation to artworks and aesthetic experience by looking at three key ideas. 
First we will explore time in relation to tradition, especially as conceived by Rancière in his 
text “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community.” Then we will look at Osborne’s 
exploration of time in terms of memory, attention and expectation, which considers aesthetic 
experience in the expanded present by comparing states of attention and distraction. Finally 
we will look at Husserl’s notion of the ‘horizon of expectation’ in order to consider art and 
knowledge in relation to both the promise of the future and limitation. In the end, the 
paradoxical notion of time that we encounter in autopoiesis becomes clearer as we consider it 
in relation to the creation and experience of artworks.  
The idea of tradition, which is paramount to Rancière’s text, demonstrates the 
transformation of a recurring practice over time. The tradition of art began, it is surmised, 
when our ancestors began creating images of elements from their environments on the walls 
of caves, and while it may not have been considered as art in that moment of time, our current 
tradition of art most certainly claims early cave paintings as an integral part of its history. In 
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his exploration of aesthetic separation, Rancière focuses on the difference between the ancient 
and traditional practice of art—at the very least, pre-enlightenment art—and the aesthetic 
separation that is present in the practise of contemporary art. As noted earlier, the place and 
purpose that artworks once had in human culture has since transformed or disappeared. The 
distancing from a common understanding that artistic meaning is dependent on place or 
function means that artistic significance is no longer fixed nor presumed, despite the fact that 
some artistic conventions have been upheld and continue to define art. Luhmann places the 
originary oppositions of our current tradition of art between physis and techne, which he 
equates to natura and ars. As he states: “A theory of art that negates traditional patterns of 
differentiation without ridding itself of these models runs straight into paradox.”117 It is this 
very paradox at the root of contemporary art that Rancière explores as he develops his idea of 
aesthetic separation. Aside from demonstrating the importance of the separation of artworks 
from traditional function and purpose, he also points out the transformation of the convention 
of the artist (creator) being separated from the audience (spectator). This set of disjunctions 
has come to define aesthetic experience in contemporary life, helping to ensure the subjective 
production of meaning during aesthetic experience. It also shows, however, how artworks 
continue to be dependent on precedent artworks and the tradition of art in general, through 
their perpetuation of artistic conventions over time. After all, it is only through conventional 
association with tradition that an artwork can be identified under the universal concept of art, 
as distinct from nature. This is the original opposition to which the tradition of art continues 
to abide, with which cave paintings and conceptual art can be connected. Heidegger refers to 
the distinction between nature and art as the difference between earth and world, both of 
which are present in the artwork and function in opposition to each other to generate the truth 
of the work. As he states:  
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Art is historical and, as historical, is the creative preservation of truth in the work. 
… This does not just mean that art has a history, a history in the external sense 
that, in the passage of time, art appears together with many other things, and in the 
process changes and passes away, and offers changing aspects to the study of 
history. Art is history in the essential sense: it is the ground of history.118  
 
Heidegger asserts that art as a concept and as a tradition is the origin of the artwork, and 
because of this, art becomes historical through the distinctive way that it comes into being as 
truth in the artwork. While this idea will be more fully explored in Chapter 5.3.3. Autonomy, 
the dependence of artworks on prior tradition is undeniable. And yet, while every artwork 
exists as a singularity in reference to art, every artwork also transforms the notion of art as it 
is incorporated into its comprehensive concept and tradition. 
Exploring the philosophy of time in relation to contemporary art, Osborne references 
the ‘time of the soul’ as described by Saint Augustine, in which the past, present and future 
are conceptualized in terms of memory, attention and expectation, respectively.119 For being 
written over one thousand six hundred years ago, this personal understanding of time 
correlates perfectly with Damasio’s neurological explanation, which respects the autopoietic 
idea of the present being the only actual time. According to Osborne, it is through this 
personal projection of time as memory, attention and expectation that the concept of history 
becomes inseparable from subjectivity and politics. History, after all, is a cultural creation that 
exists through people and their work, and as such it is never truly neutral. Osborne spends 
great energies exploring the notion of the time inherent to the idea of ‘the contemporary,’ 
especially in relation to contemporary art, which will be further explored in Chapter 4.8. 
Contemporary / Postconceptual Art. One of the biggest implications is that every 
contemporary artwork must be new, and Luhmann agrees. He argues that every artwork is 
inevitably created with an orientation towards time since it must distinguish itself in relation 
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to everything that has been done before it.120 Focussing on the present, Osborne explores the 
aesthetic experience of artworks in terms of attention and distraction, which produce the 
occurrence of time on a subjective level. “Its temporal aspect is a dialectic of duration, of 
continuity and interruption, of rhythm. As such, it is a particular inflection of the process of 
temporization—the production of time—itself.”121 Through the idea of duration, Saint 
Augustine’s threefold present gives rise to an expanded present, where memory and 
expectation push an observer’s attention in opposite temporal directions.122 This can be felt in 
the way that artworks generate the sensation of time through their enduring coupling with 
spectators, whose attention is held until distraction breaks the spell. In a museum or gallery 
setting, the rhythm of viewing works of art is undeniable.  
Extending the idea further, the power of an artwork to captivate in the moment of 
aesthetic experience can also be understood on a larger temporal scale, in terms of generations 
and epochs. Rancière focuses on the idea of expectation in relation to artistic creation. 
Describing the connection of an aesthetic community through its shared ‘sensory fabric,’ 
Rancière illustrates how the transformation of raw materials reverberates through humanity in 
terms of suffering and resistance, paralleling Heidegger’s notion of strife that results from the 
opposition of earth and world within an artwork. For the vibrations to communicate through 
material, though, they must be solidified in the form of a monument—the artwork—which 
assumes the identity of a person “who speaks to the ear of the future.”123 Every artwork waits 
in anticipation of its subsequent reception, and in this way artworks embody promise. This 
idea of hope is reflected in Husserl’s ‘horizon of expectation,’ which considers the 
“intentional constitution of meaning in perception.”124 Husserl uses this idea to explore the 
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paradoxical union of “determinable indeterminateness” that every horizon embodies, and 
Osborne relates this to a boundary-concept that “registers and articulates the bounds of 
knowledge.”125 The indefiniteness of this limit can be understood in two ways, according to 
Osborne. First, through its continuity as a boundary in spite of movement, meaning that you 
can change your position or perspective and the horizon is always there, in the distance. 
Secondly, indefiniteness is demonstrated by the fact that there is nothing on the other side of a 
horizon, meaning that the boundary is perceptual. Osborne differentiates Husserl’s ‘horizon of 
expectation’ from Kantian concepts of transcendental limits by using it to position a subject 
within the scope of a moving boundary. While the limit of the horizon is perpetually 
inaccessible, the location of the current horizon is potentially knowable if you go there. What 
was once beyond the horizon can be known, despite the fact that the horizon will move and 
the new limit will remain out of reach.126 This concept of limited yet accessible subjective 
knowledge can be found effortlessly in the appreciation of artworks, which act like ‘horizons 
of expectation’ in their provision and retention of comprehension. An artwork always has 
more to offer, but this is nothing compared to the greater limit of endurance as a spectator 
becomes distracted and moves on, or even worse, as the spectator comes to take an artwork 
for granted. These natural occurrences relate the horizon of expectation to our understanding 
of art and demonstrate how time—despite being an explanatory notion—is not only 
significant to artistic practice but is also produced by it. It also demonstrates how artworks, 
which speak to the ear of the future, function in relation to hope.  
While the act of viewing artworks is isolated to the present moment, it is inevitably 
linked with our cognition of time in terms of memory, history and projection into the future. 
In relation to artistic tradition, Rancière demonstrates the transformation of artistic 
understanding over time, which shifts the way in which place and function determine meaning 
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for artworks. Freed from the prescribed purpose and assumed intention of the mimetic regime, 
artworks inevitably embody contextual disjunctions that reverberate through spectators during 
aesthetic experience. While this provides artworks with the power to destabilize 
understanding in viewers—to provide the unexpected—artworks nonetheless require some 
adherence to artistic tradition, which is demonstrated through the use of convention that 
pertains to the concept of art. Osborne shows how history is always conceived subjectively 
through a temporal understanding of memory, attention and expectation, which reflects the 
autopoietic conception of time. Artworks always exist in relation to their antecedents, to 
tradition, and this conditions that artworks that have yet to be created must be novel and 
unusual. Exploring an artwork in the moment, we can see how attention and distraction come 
to define aesthetic experience in terms of duration, which demonstrates an artwork’s ability to 
generate time for a viewer. The vibrations an artwork transmits determine the rhythms of its 
aesthetic exploration—how we move to engage with artworks—as well as our cycles of 
attention and distraction when we view artworks within an exhibition. Artworks, after all, 
captivate us in part through their promise and their imminent potential. They embody hope in 
their tireless patience as they wait for viewers to come, which is facilitated through their 
indetermination, which we will expand upon in Chapter 4.3.4. Function. This nature of 
artworks demonstrates a ‘horizon of expectation’, where an artwork’s potential for 
communication and knowledge is paradoxical. As we move to explore and clarify one horizon 
or limit, another one forms as a new horizon in the distance, infinite possibility within finite 
form. This indefiniteness that artworks embody demonstrates the limits of art to be limits of 
people, a constraint most easily understood through our conception and limited existence in 
time. The artwork is the people to come, and a monument to that expectation.127 
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2.3.7. Difference 
Interactions acquire significance thanks to the perspective provided by the cognition 
of the observer. As explored in autopoietic theory, significance is not generated on the 
molecular level because the components of production and their products are the same. There 
is no difference between them so there is no meaning. On the molar level of observation, 
however, significance is generated due to the difference between the mechanisms of operation 
and its results. In this way, autopoietic theory shows how difference can be understood as a 
condition of significance. As we explored in Chapter 2.3.3. Observation, perception itself is 
an act of distinguishing, which inevitably separates the object or concept being focused upon 
from what is excluded from view. In this chapter we will review the autopoietic foundation 
that differentiates an organism from its environment, and then expand upon this idea of 
difference to explore two important notions that Rancière speaks of in “Aesthetic Separation, 
Aesthetic Community.” The first is his differentiation of ‘sense and sense,’ and the second is 
his paradox of ‘being apart together’. Exploring these concepts in terms of difference helps to 
demonstrate how meaning is created during aesthetic experience, and how that meaning is 
unique. Generating difference is the same as producing meaning, and whether you are making 
artworks or appreciating them, artistic practise demonstrates the creation of significance 
through acts of differentiation. 
The creation of difference is a founding principle of autopoiesis, which stipulates that 
an organism must continually undergo a reflexive operation of identification in order to 
distinguish itself from its environment, all the while maintaining its coupling with its 
environment. This fundamental act creates a threshold between the integral organism and its 
peripheral surrounding, and this difference between internal and external plays a crucial role 
in all aspects of the lives of people. While artworks stimulate our perception of the external 
world, it is the internal perception of our bodies that defines the reflective loop of aesthetic 
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experience as we sense how the external perception makes us feel inside. This will be 
explored more thoroughly in terms of thought in Chapter 3.3.4. Experience, and in terms of 
Kantian aesthetics in Chapter 5.2.2. Summary – The Critique of Judgement, Analytic of the 
Beautiful. In any case, the process of sensing operates through an individual organism that 
distinguishes itself from its environment, and this fundamental creation and maintenance of 
difference—of identity—is one of the two principle laws of autopoiesis.  
Identifying ourselves as human beings implies that we are the fundamentally the same 
biologically, with an acceptable range of variations, of course, within our species. As 
individual human beings, we embody a fundamental framework—a physiology—that we 
have inherited from our parents and is unique as a result of its genetic combination, contextual 
development and resultant distinguishing elements. This simultaneous embodiment of 
commonality and difference is paramount to Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation. One 
clever way in which he explores this is through the journey from ‘sense to sense,’ which we 
began to explore in Chapter 2.3.2. Transformation. The first conception of sense relates to the 
sensory capacities of a body to engage with its environment, and the second relates to the 
capacity of a person to know and to reason, demonstrating a transition from physiology to 
psychology. Rancière relates this latter conception to ideas of ‘common sense,’ which he uses 
to counterpoint the concept of a dissensus within the aesthetic community. As Tanke points 
out, dissensus is described by Rancière as a “separation [écart] of the sensible from itself,” 
where an assumed or pre-given understanding dissolves through the journey of aesthetic 
experience from ‘sense to sense.’128 To briefly review, Rancière divides the operation of 
sensing into three phases: the communication of sensory data through the senses; the 
perception or recognition of content within that data; and, the extrapolation of meaning. 
While it is reasonable to assume that we all sense the same thing in the first phase of sensory 
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input, the content or meaning of what we sense is highly dependent on what we know—our 
cognition and recognition. The second and third phases described by Rancière obviously rely 
on the memory of past experience, which ties our individual perception to our personal 
history and our changing contextual awareness. The first phase of observation demonstrates 
the internalization of external sensory data, the second phase associates it to past experience, 
and the third phase extends or augments the signification of the object or event sensed. The 
result is a connection of associated subjective meaning onto the memory of the object or event 
being observed, which we later externalize or project through thought or communication. This 
process of sensation translating into meaning during aesthetic experience ensures that the 
interpretation of external stimuli is subjective. “Aesthetic art is a rejection of the idea that 
things have a single and definitive meaning. It is therefore one of the means by which the 
meanings of an object, a body, a policy or a group of people can be contested.”129 Aesthetic 
art is political to the extent that our experience of it has the potential to change us, to make us 
different from before, through the processes of dissensus or dis-identification.130 If we 
consider this as the reversal of autopoietic identification, then we can imagine the suspension 
of the distinction or boundary between an organism and its environment, or the lapse of the 
unifying force that differentiates the being from its surroundings. While aesthetic experience 
might begin under similar sensory conditions for all individuals, the translation of ‘sense to 
sense’ shows how the association and attribution of meaning is ultimately a personal 
operation. The potential self-transformation that results moves beyond the personal through 
our communication of experience. Through communicative acts of individuals, subjective 
judgements once again enter into the realm of the universal, which we will look at in Chapter 
2.3.9. Coordination. Moving from the common to the individual and back again to the 
universal during the apprehension and appreciation of artworks demonstrates how processes 
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of sensory and cognitive differentiation power the generation and attribution of aesthetic 
signification.  
Moving from the individual to the social, and looking to distinguish the political 
power of art, Rancière uses the paradoxical condition of ‘being apart together’ as a basis for 
aesthetic separation. Taken from a Mallarme poem, where a potential suitor prefers to remain 
hidden in the assumed presence of the woman he desires, the concept of ‘being apart together’ 
could just as easily have come from autopoietic theory, as unromantic as it might be. The law 
of adaptation is exactly that—being apart together—although the organism’s other in this 
scenario is its environment. As Rancière’s purpose is more socially and politically motivated, 
it makes sense that he chose poetry over systems theory. Nonetheless, the difference that is 
implied in the simultaneous autopoietic coupling/separation has social and political 
implications. On my first reading, the romantic story of being apart together seemed to imply 
our condition as unique individuals within the same community, or as part of the same 
species. My second reading reversed this conception to entail that we are all together in the 
same situation because we are all distinct and isolated individuals. Recognizing oneself as 
separate while being socially connected is common to everyone. In his exploration of the 
concept of aesthetic separation, however, Rancière states: “an aesthetic community is a 
community structured by disconnection.”131 In part, this relates to our subjectivity—while we 
as humans sense the same material, object or environment, our individual perspectives assure 
that the results of our perception is more dissensual than consensual. The second aspect of 
aesthetic separation that Rancière proposes is the separation of artistic production from artistic 
appreciation, with the artist being distanced from the artwork and the aesthetic experience of 
subsequent observers. The point of connection—that which unites the being together and 
apart in this situation—is the artwork, which acts as a link between two people in spite of the 
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distance between them. In this way, the observational format of aesthetic experience ensures 
that artworks are infused with difference from the beginning. This, in turn, establishes the 
shift from first to second order observation, which assures that artworks are experienced 
differently from other objects and events, as a form of communication. In this way, the 
paradox of ‘being apart together’ becomes the perfect metaphor for exploring the political 
potential of aesthetic experience, where individuals can relate on various levels to the 
operations involved as meaning becomes associated to artworks as they are distinguished 
from what they are not.  
All acts of separation and distinction imply processes of differentiation. Recognizing 
difference is, in essence, the generation of significance. This becomes obvious by exploring 
the autopoietic law of adaptation that distinguishes an organism from its environment, which 
essentially creates the boundary between interior and exterior upon which we as individuals 
differentiate ourselves in relation to the world around us. Identifying ourselves as individuals 
implies differentiating ourselves from everything else, a process that establishes our human 
methodology for relating to the world around us. As we sense the world, the translation of 
external sensory data into known concepts and metaphoric meaning ensures that significance 
is largely subjective. Individual memories and associations assure that the meaning generated 
through observation is far from standard. Furthermore, the dissensus that is inherent in 
aesthetic experience guarantees that the identity of individuals is temporarily suspended and 
formed anew, different from before the experience. This not only generates meaning for the 
encounter, but it demonstrates the political mechanisms of aesthetic experience. While 
meaning originates within the thought of individuals, it can be shared and communicated 
through its externalization, be it directly through language or indirectly through works of art. 
This communicative process helps us to understand our paradoxical situation of ‘being apart 
together,’ where we share commonalities despite our uniqueness. Difference divides us, 
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making us singular individuals, but difference also unites us since our autopoietic condition is 
shared by everyone. The absence of meaning on our molecular level of existence is the 
opposite on our molar level of observation and engagement. While autopoiesis demonstrates 
how the fundamental oppositions of molecular/molar and internal/external are inherent to life, 
there are countless other oppositions that operate within aesthetics—differences that we 
recognize and use to create and distinguish objects, situations and ideas. All of these 
oppositions offer methods for organizing and ordering, but they also provide a dynamism that 
activates thought, knowledge and, eventually, understanding. Amongst others, the practice of 
art relies on these oppositions—subject/object, natura/ars, visible/invisible—since difference 
must be observed to generate significance.  
 
2.3.8. Lack 
The idea of lack is an important aspect of aesthetics that relates to the basic 
functioning of human life that autopoietic theory endeavours to establish. More than anything, 
lack is a recurring state of living beings that incites the impetus for intentionality in the world. 
In order to maintain their systemic functionality, autopoietic organisms are in constant cycles 
of interaction with their environment to attain what they need to survive. Advanced cognitive 
operations facilitate an organism’s survival by helping it to recognize what is missing or at 
fault and stimulating appropriate actions to resolve the situation. As we observe the actions of 
organisms in their environment, the significance of their actions can usually be connected to 
some kind of lack as they fulfil the autopoietic laws of conservation and adaptation. Our 
general condition as human beings is thus a state of need, which fuels our consumptive 
predisposition and establishes our basic routines as people. This is easy to understand in terms 
of nutrition, sleep and other physiological requirements, but it is also relevant for more 
psychological aspects of humans, especially regarding the significance we attribute to other 
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beings in the world, living or non-living. In this chapter we will further explore this idea of 
absence and fault in relation to Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation, which explores 
lack in relation to human nature and the Kantian theory of aesthetics. These two realms 
demonstrate how lack is not only a fundamental condition of life, but also a crucial element of 
aesthetic experience, which assists us to establish a connection between life and art.  
The concept of lack is an important aspect of aesthetic theory, and the ideas of 
deficiency that Rancière explores—especially ‘being apart together’ and the loss of tradition 
in the ‘aesthetic break’—are largely extrapolated from Kantian aesthetics. From Kant’s point 
of view, an aesthetic experience (of beauty) lacks determinant concepts in principle, which 
are always used to position a particular under a universal a priori concept.  
Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under 
the universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, or law,) is given, then the 
judgement which subsumes the particular under it is determinant. … If, however, 
only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the 
judgement is simply reflective.132  
 
This obligatory lack of determinant concepts to experience beauty forces a subject to rely on 
their own reflective perception in order to realize how an artwork makes them feel, which 
results in the generation of aesthetic meaning. A lack of determinant concepts, or prescribed 
general meaning, calls on the observer to speculate and produce it themselves. This initial 
lack of determinant concepts during aesthetic experience, however, is compounded by the 
obligatory lack of desire towards the artwork (or beautiful object) being viewed. According to 
Kant: “the judgement of taste is simply contemplative, i.e. it is a judgement which is 
indifferent as to the existence of an object, and only decides how its character stands with the 
feeling of pleasure and displeasure.”133 This lack of desire, or indifference, that must be 
demonstrated towards the observed object ensures that a subjective aesthetic judgement can 
be projected to universal validity, and as such it is an extremely important element of Kant’s 
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aesthetic structure. Without desire for the object being perceived, its judgement is impartial or 
unbiased, which changes how the subject understands their feelings when evaluating the 
object in question. If we look closer at the state or feeling of ‘indifference,’ which is the 
opposite of ‘difference,’ we can see how Kant’s requisite lack of predetermined meaning is 
twofold. If meaning is conditional on difference—as we explored in Chapter 2.3.7. 
Difference—then indifference assures that there is no a priori meaning associated with the 
object in question. Through this double negation of predetermined meaning, its absence 
becomes the precondition for aesthetic experience. Through these impositions of lack, Kant 
ensures that aesthetic experience focuses on subjective reflection in the moment to generate 
meaning in the presence of artworks. It also provides a legitimate reason for both Luhmann 
and Osborne to state that contemporary artworks must be new, which we will further explore 
in Chapter 5.3. ‘The Fragment.’ Nonetheless, Rancière makes an important caveat to the 
imposed lack of determinant concepts during aesthetic experience, stating: “Art entails the 
employment of a set of concepts, while the beautiful possesses no concepts.”134 Expanding 
well beyond the beautiful, Rancière want to show how ‘art’ is a tradition and a concept, and 
that artworks can and do employ concepts in their creation and evaluation. By shifting or 
negating the traditional collocation and function of art in the aesthetic regime, concepts 
associated with art become counterpoints against which ‘the known’ elements—that which is 
recognized or identified—are considered in relation to ‘the unknown’ that is implicit in 
artworks. Osborne agrees, and is critical of a purely aesthetic form of judgement because art 
relies on concepts and is logically conditioned, which is not the case when judging something 
as ‘beautiful’.135 This results in a rift between the concepts of ‘art’ and ‘aesthetics,’ which we 
will explore more thoroughly in Chapter 6.2.2. Summary – The Critique of Judgement, 
Analytic of The Beautiful. Osborne believes that aesthetic purity misses the point of art, 
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which is distinct from nature through its operation in “metaphysical, cognitive, and politico-
ideological functions.”136 Despite the incorporation of concepts into artworks, the aesthetic 
experience of them continues to embody a condition of lack that is inherent in the unknown 
that every artwork represents. While the lack of an artwork can be understood in relation to its 
uniqueness, which obviates the use of purely determinant concepts in its judgement, the lack 
of aesthetic experience is associated with the indifference, or absence of a priori meaning that 
the spectator must embody. While this idea of lack in artworks and aesthetics will be further 
explored in Chapter 5.2. Parergon, we can appreciate how the lack of predetermined meaning 
in aesthetic experience results in the origination of subjective significance. 
Reflecting on the creative process and the role of art within an aesthetic community, 
Rancière addresses creative intentionality and recognizes a motivating aim of artistic 
production. “The operations of twisting, seizing and rending that define the way in which art 
weaves a community together are made en vue de—with a view to and in the hope of—a 
people which is still lacking.”137 This idea of a ‘still-lacking’ people can be understood in two 
ways; in terms of people who continue to be missing something, and in terms of people who 
are not yet present. In relation to the former idea, Rancière suggests that artworks are made to 
provide what can’t be found by other means, a unique chance that is presented to people as 
the promise of meaning in the form of art. In autopoiesis, the lack of meaning at the molecular 
level provides the opportunity for the attribution of meaning on the molar level. Is it possible 
that artworks offer the same kind of opportunity, calling for the generation of meaning 
because of its implicit absence? In part yes, but there’s more to it than that. The practice of art 
fills a void by offering unique moments of personal reflection, using communicative models 
that are unusual because they subvert common modes of functionality.138 The second 
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suggested meaning of Rancière’s idea of “a people which is still lacking” points towards the 
temporally extended nature of artworks, which we explored in part in chapter 1.7. Time. As 
part of tradition, artworks are positioned within a social continuum since they have been 
experienced in the past and are yet to be experienced by a people to come in the future. 
Artworks require people to be activated, and this quote by Rancière demonstrates how 
artworks are perpetually lacking too, in need of people to observe them and provide them with 
meaning. The survival of an artwork depends on aesthetic interaction, for without the 
attribution of meaning from people, an artwork is just another thing lacking purpose. This 
idea of inadequacy relates to the suspended state of indetermination, which we will further 
explore in relation to people and technology in Chapter 4.2.3. Progression. In his search for 
the essential nature of art, Heidegger highlights the role of ‘the preservers of art’ as being 
equally important as the role of the creators of artworks.139 Art can only happen if artworks 
are accessible, after all, which establishes an important bond between the creators and 
preservers of artworks, who conserve them and the tradition of art as though following the 
autopoietic law of conservation. Considering artworks as an autonomous tradition that is 
fuelled by people to survive, we can begin to understand Luhmann’s claim for the autonomy 
of art and the autopoiesis of artworks. Just like an orchid uses a separate living being—the 
wasp—to reproduce and guarantee its specie’s survival, artworks can be understood to utilize 
human beings to do the same. Deleuze and Guattari describe a heterogeneous relationship of 
this type as a rhizome, where more than simple imitation occurs as two distinct beings adopt 
facets of the other: “something else entirely is going on: not imitation at all but a capture of 
code, surplus value of code, an increase in valence, a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of 
the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp.”140 The ideas of deterritorialization and 
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reterritorialization that Deleuze and Guattari associate with this interaction evoke the process 
of dis-identification that Rancière describes as the result of aesthetic experience, a process 
through which political subjectivication proceeds.141 Artworks need people to exist, but 
perhaps we need artworks to exist as humans as well—to experience the truth of being 
human. This proposal of inter-dependence will recur as we explore the ways in which we 
distinguish ourselves from other animals in Chapter 2. Human Beings / Intention. As you will 
see, language and technology—and by extension, art—are practices and methods that define 
us as a species, and in their absence we simply wouldn’t be human. As a people which is 
lacking, the practice of art brings meaning to our lives in addition to defining us as human. 
Through an exploration of lack in relation to autopoiesis, aesthetic experience and 
human nature, we can appreciate how the necessities of life give rise to our intentionality in 
the world and establish the practice of art as a fundamentally nourishing tradition. There are 
two principal occurrences of lack that Kant establishes as conditional for aesthetic experience 
to function. The first is the absence of determinant concepts when judging an artwork or an 
object as beautiful, which ensures that the judgement is reflective and established through 
subjective understanding as opposed to universal a priori knowledge. The second instance of 
lack is the indifference that the observer must demonstrate towards the artwork or object 
being evaluated, which allows an aesthetic judgement to transcend from the purely subjective 
to universal validity. These two impositions of lack compound Kant’s rejection of 
preconceived meaning when judging an artwork or something as beautiful, and help us to 
appreciate the requisite innovation and novelty of contemporary art practices. By creating or 
presenting the unknown, artworks ensure that aesthetic operations can result. Having said 
that, it is important to note that art and aesthetics is not the same thing, and that the concept 
and tradition of art—upon which artworks depend—are determinant concepts and function 
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through the use of a priori knowledge. This doesn’t negate the fact that beauty exists, as does 
the unknown, within elements and aspects of artworks, and it is through this persistent lack of 
determination—their incompleteness—that artworks continue to enthral us and engage us as 
spectators. We, as humans, are indeterminate as well. Rancière claims that artworks are 
created for ‘a people which is still lacking’, which can be understood as a community in need, 
and as generations of people yet to come. In the first case, the people are in need because of 
the inherent strife that living entails, and it is their knowledge of hardship that enables them to 
connect with the “seizing and rending” that all artworks embody. Artworks provide people 
with a unique opportunity, a chance to engage in order to disconnect and reengage, which 
fulfils a lack that may not be known. People who are yet to be will continue to benefit from 
the inimitable opportunities that the practice of art offers, demonstrating the temporal 
extensiveness of artistic practice as a transformative tradition. This reveals a reciprocal 
relationship between artworks and people, and the important role of the preservers of art to 
maintain the accessibility of artworks through the conservation of artistic tradition. Echoing 
the law of conservation of autopoiesis, acts of artistic conservation and preservation lead us to 
appreciate the symbiotic relationship between artworks and people. The example of the orchid 
and the wasp demonstrate the constructive potential of such interdependencies, where 
possibilities are expanded and perpetuated through nurturing interaction. In relation to the 
tradition of art, artworks are sustained so that people can be continually replenished. The 
relationship of mutual necessity between people and artworks shows how art is part of 
humanity, and how art comes to define us as human. As a people who are lacking, art 
reinforces us by defining us as a species and refining us as individuals.  
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2.3.9. Coordination 
The concept of coordination that is evident in autopoiesis provides a counterpoint to 
the many instances of separation in aesthetics, and reveals many useful relationships to further 
explore aesthetic experience and the practice of art. One of the most important ideas that 
autopoiesis presents is the coordination of separate elements into a whole, independent being. 
As we have seen, this independence is somewhat false since every organism originates from 
another organism and is inherently lacking in elements that must perpetually be obtained from 
the environment. Little is explained in autopoietic theory as to how this happens in terms of 
biochemistry, apart from the caveat that the structure of an organism within its context 
determines everything.142 The coordination of molecules and the communication between 
separate parts of an autopoietic system is obviously a vital condition of life. If part of the 
organism’s structure is lacking something it needs to survive—oxygen, for example—then 
there must be systems in place to provide it or the autopoieic system—the life of the 
organism—will fail. If an action at the molar level needs to happen in order to supply oxygen, 
some form of communication must occur between the molecular and molar levels in order for 
the organism cognite with its environment to resolve the problem. While systems of corporal 
communication will be further explored in Chapter 3.2.2. Parallelism, it is appropriate here to 
explore the ways that autopoietic coordination, or orchestration, relates to the practice of art 
and aesthetic experience. As we have seen in relation to Kantian aesthetics, the relationship 
between the particular and the universal and the transition from the subjective to the objective 
are important examples of unification that play out during aesthetic experience, and we will 
explore these connections more thoroughly here in relation to the idea of ‘common sense.’ 
Aesthetic experiences give rise to speech and lead to conversation, which in turn connects 
individuals together. This interpersonal communion is a way of further stimulating individual 
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potential, and highlights the discursive nature of aesthetics. This relates this with Rancière’s 
concept of ‘being apart together,’ which describes the relationship of the individual within 
society. Moving into more artistic terrain, the idea of coordination is becoming increasingly 
relevant to describe the expansive nature of contemporary artworks. We will explore how 
current creative strategies are reflecting architectural practices in terms of extension and 
multiplicity, where artworks avert contained media-based definitions by relating parts with 
wholes to provide new opportunities for collective understanding. While separation implies 
the division of something, the state of being separate provides the opportunity for 
coordination, which is an underlying impetus for the creative impulse. While the majority of 
this thesis focuses on acts and states of separation, it is important to demonstrate how 
processes of coordination provide movement, balance and meaning to the inherent divisions 
of aesthetic experience.  
Understanding how our thoughts are coordinated individually and in relation to 
society is important for understanding aesthetic experience. As we saw in Chapter 2.3.8. 
Lack, Kant defines how specific concepts are assembled together to create universal 
generalizations, which are relevant to the ways in which we interpret and understand the 
world around us. The experience of beauty is reflective because the observing subject must 
determine their own feelings of pleasure or displeasure to make a judgement in the absence of 
a priori determinant concepts. These are individual thoughts about unique things we are 
talking about. Kant’s Analytic of the Beautiful uses the lack of desire to transcend the 
subjective judgment of a particular thing into a collective, universal judgement. “[T]he 
judgement of taste, with its attendant consciousness of detachment from all interest, must 
involve a claim to validity for all men, and must do so apart from universality attached to 
Objects, i.e. there must be coupled with it a claim to subjective universality.”143 This is one of 
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the most interesting paradoxes of aesthetic theory, where an singular thought transcends to a 
universal position. This movement from an individual subject to the universal is the “conflict” 
that makes aesthetics work, according to Derrida, and what makes Kant theory so clever.144 
Indifference sets the judgment free, where the subject’s uninhibited thought follows nothing 
more than the subjective pleasure or displeasure that their feelings provide. Deconstructing 
the pleasure that is felt during pure aesthetic judgement, Derrida points out that it is not 
simply pleasure that results from perceiving a beautiful object. This happens, but it is simply 
the first instance of aesthetic pleasure. More important is the second instance, where the 
subject becomes conscious of feeling pleasure for feeling pleasure. This is a reflexive 
pleasure, a pleasure that is given to oneself.145 In Derrida’s terms, the pleasure received is the 
pleasure given, which perfectly reflects Spinoza’s assertion that the power to affect is the 
power to be affected, which we will explore further in Chapter 4.2.3. Progression. The 
catalyst for such a pleasure is beauty, but the source of the pleasure is the individual. While 
subjective universality is assumed in the judgement of beauty, a subjective judgement 
achieves universality through language—through the sharing of a judgement of taste. This 
“impossible” objective pleasure is what gives rise to speech, according to Derrida.146 It’s 
impossible because pleasure can only ever be felt subjectively, yet through disinterest it 
becomes theoretically objective. This happens through a simple declaration; “This is 
beautiful.” Aesthetics is thus a discursive practice, and the assent from the subjective to the 
universal escalates in importance since it presupposes the existence of a common sense.147 An 
aesthetic judgement based on subjective feeling moves to represent an objective feeling of 
collectivity through the assumption that everyone should feel the same.  
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This points towards the importance of language use in artistic practice, which is 
ubiquitous in relation to the shared enjoyment of artworks, and perhaps the most important 
result of aesthetic experience. Nöe’s idea of strange tools helps to elaborate the strong 
relation that the experience of artworks has with communication.  
Aesthetic responses are not fixed data points, but are more like positions staked 
out in an ongoing conversation, ongoing in our day, in our lives, and also in the 
historical time in our culture. Aesthetic responses are cultivated and nourished and 
they are also challenged. Aesthetic responses are themselves the question art 
throws up for us, not something we can take for granted in making sense of art 
itself.148  
 
In his critique of neuroaesthetic research, Nöe points out that an aesthetic judgement is not a 
termination but rather a beginning, and that the question that needs to be answered is not if 
you like an artwork, but why you like it.149 The answer to this question is always a subjective 
opinion—an explanatory notion—that connects the practice of art to language. Luhmann 
agrees with Nöe:  
“What matters is that in art, just as in all other types of communication, the 
difference between information [hetero-reference] and utterance [self-reference] 
serves both as a starting point and as a link for further artistic or verbal 
communication.”150   
 
In this description of communication, Lunmann relates information with hetero-reference, 
which is external, and utterance with self-reference, which is internal. While this division 
between internal and external will be more thoroughly explored in Chapter 3.4.3. Umwelt, it 
is important to note the combination of internal and external that is implicit in aesthetic 
experience. Whatever purpose an artist may have for transforming an internal intention or 
creative desire into an external expression, the result always promotes further conversation 
and influences potential creativity. The cyclical form of observation, where an internalization 
provokes an externalization, is how Luhmann defines the system of art as autopoietic in terms 
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of self-generation and communication. Statements of beauty are transmitted with language, 
which has an undeniable influence on human thought and will be explored in relation to art in 
Chapter 4.2. Language. 
Community is an grounding idea for Rancière as he examines the idea of common 
sense with his notion of the ‘sensory fabric’ that unites humanity. “What is common is 
‘sensation’. Human beings are tied together by a certain sensory fabric, a certain distribution 
of the sensible, which defines their way of being together; and politics is about the 
transformation of the sensory fabric of ‘being together’.”151 While aesthetic experience 
presupposes common sense, it equally functions through operations of dissensus that Rancière 
identifies in the conflict between the two levels of sense (i.e. sensation and reason). This is 
what makes the paradox of ‘being apart together’ a perfect basis for Rancière’s theory of 
aesthetic community, which provides a conceptual framework for understanding the tension 
between sensory realms of conjunction and disjunction. For Rancière, it is this conflict that 
makes aesthetic experience political in nature, as cycles of disconnection and connection lead 
to processes of subjective dis-identification and re-identification.152 Demonstrating perceptual 
shifts between subjective and objective positions, aesthetic experience reveals not only our 
capacity for subjective universality but also our fluctuating identity as we transform while 
remaining the same person. Aesthetics thus represents a renewal of self, and this act of 
restitution is compounded by the social connection at the heart of aesthetic experience. As I 
explored in Sweat, Feel, Think, Art, artworks require being communicated to observers to be 
conceived as art, which makes artistic practice conditional on communication. The roots of 
this can be explored in the creative impetus that has developed through human evolution—
specifically sexual selection—in relation to the display and discernment inherent in sexual 
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attraction and selection.153 Usoa Fullaondo emphasizes the affectability of human beings to 
extend this idea even further, stating that the social relations that are implicit in the practice of 
art result from a general need to connect with other people: “in such a way that suspends self-
absorption.”154 For Fullaondo, the desire to bond and to relate with others is the impetus 
behind creative acts in general, which she relates to collective ritual, celebration and play. Not 
only does the practice of art provide an opportunity for subjective growth through the 
processes of individual reflexivity—feeling yourself feeling—but also by connecting with 
other people in such a way that participants’ processes of self-awareness become receptive to 
unforeseen potentialities while their selfhood remains open to becoming during the bonding 
process.155 The social connection that results from aesthetic endeavours thus reinforces the 
process of subjective affection that artistic practices imply; a shared opportunity to extend, 
reposition and be conscious of one’s self. This idea of becoming will be more thoroughly 
explored in Chapter 3.2.4. Self. 
One final way that coordination works in relation to contemporary artworks is through 
a more open conception of the artwork itself. To address the kind of artworks that Rancière 
describes in his article “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” and the artworks I am 
presenting as practical research for this thesis, it is important to appreciate the expansive 
nature that has come to define postconceptual art practices. As the classical practice of 
categorizing artworks purely by media loses traction during the practice of contemporary art, 
artworks are increasingly defined in terms of associations and procedures. Osborne has noted 
that contemporary artworks progressively function like architectural practices, which 
demonstrate a broad understanding of relationships between people, practices, materials, 
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methodologies, and time.156 This can be seen on one hand through the plurality of 
materializations of contemporary artworks, where one single artwork can exist across a 
multiplicity of possible forms; as research, plans, objects, actions, language, or relations.157 
This will be more fully explored in Chapter 6. Practical Research in relation to two art 
projects of mine. Osborne notes how this tendency towards a plurality of materializations of 
one artwork mimics the diversity of processes that architectural projects incorporate, and 
opens an artwork both spatially and temporally, enabling it to exist simultaneously in various 
places and times. This problematizes a cohesive conception of the borders of the artwork, 
shifting it from a question of external boundary to an integral unity of the work.158 Taking 
autopoietic theory as an example, we must begin to understand artworks in terms of 
organizational imperative—the law of conservation—which prioritizes relational systems 
instead of physical composition to determine identity. As well, as artworks become more 
extensive and disperse in terms of their physicality, organizational strategies must be 
implemented to maintain the unity of the work, and this more often than not becomes the 
responsibility of art institutions. As artworks move out into the world of everyday life, 
eschewing the conventional setting of aesthetic experience, they increasingly rely on 
organizational conventions that define artistic practice in terms of methodology. This 
association with architecture leads to contemporary art’s increasing approach to urbanism, 
which Rancière recognizes when he describes artist’s desire to escape institutions and engage 
with the real world.159 I think this trend relates in part to artists’ desires to interact with 
spectators differently in spaces with fewer preconditions and prejudices that predetermine 
what an artwork can be. I also believe that moving artworks into the real world helps to make 
the complex sets of social and ideological structures that artworks are dependent upon more 
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visible. Without the protection of the hermetic ‘white cube’ of a gallery space, artworks can 
more easily come into contact with unexpected elements and become contaminated with 
associations that wouldn’t be possible otherwise. This increase in unexpected reactions and 
interactions instils artworks with exciting potential, at least from the perspective of the artist. 
From an institutional perspective this implies increased risk, which makes artistic projects in 
the ‘real world’ a matter of careful study and negotiation in order to eliminate unwanted 
negative consequences. While this negotiation between artist and institution inevitably affects 
the final outcome of site-specific artworks, a dialogic process that revolves around problem 
solving is a creative challenge that can potentially favour innovation and unexpected results. 
Nonetheless, artworks that escape the convention of the ‘white cube’ exhibition space must 
continue to exhibit some convention that allows it to be recognized as an artwork, as explored 
in Chapter 2.3.4. Context.  
While acts of separation divide and establishes oppositions, coordination functions by 
connecting and combining various elements together as one. In this chapter we have seen how 
Kant’s description of aesthetic judgement coordinates the particular with the universal and the 
subjective with the objective. This helps us to determine whether a concept is reflective or 
determinant, which in turn determines whether a judgement is aesthetic or not. Once a 
judgement is determined through subjective reflection, it ascends to an objective (or 
subjective universal) position providing it was made under the conditions of indifference and 
is communicated to others through language. In the absence of predetermined personal 
meaning or bias, an aesthetic judgement can be understood as a communal judgement, one 
that everyone would make. This leads to the notion of common sense, which Rancière 
addresses through his idea of the ‘sensory fabric’ that unites people through physical and 
cognitive sense. While the concept of cognition spans both the molecular and molar levels of 
autopoietic systems, sense provides a similar connectivity for aesthetic experience by bonding 
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the subjective individual with society at large. This is perfectly described by Rancière’s 
paradox of ‘being together apart,’ which involves a simultaneity of separation and connection. 
Through this human condition, Rancière demonstrates the dissensus that inevitably makes the 
practice of art political, through the destabilizing effect of aesthetic experience on both 
personal and social levels of self-awareness. Resulting artistic discussion unites individuals 
and provides the opportunity to activate potential subjectivities for its participants. The social 
coordination that is inspired by aesthetic experience is echoed in the increasing extension and 
multiplicity of artworks, which are adopting architectural methodologies to include research, 
plans, models and documentation as potential elements of singular art projects. Artworks that 
exist as unities of distinct parts expand the definition of art both physically and temporally, 
since they can be experienced in different locations at different times. This ensures that a 
conception of a whole artwork as a network of relations is constructed in the mind of the 
viewer, who combines various aesthetic moments into one, demonstrating the creative act of 
observing and experiencing. As contemporary art increasingly moves into the sphere of 
quotidian life by escaping traditional art spaces, its relation to the urban environment 
compounds its relation to architecture. This transforms the once solitary act of creation into a 
negotiation between artist and institutions as artworks are developed collaboratively in 
relation to more volatile ‘real world’ environments. Escaping the convention of the white 
cube, contemporary artworks must amplify their autonomy as art in order to be recognized as 
such, which simply means relying on other artistic conventions. While the structure of an 
artwork must contain and convey its artistic essence, its recognition as part of the social 
tradition of art presupposes our collective capacity to categorize it as such. As subjective as 
the practice of art might be, it relies on coordination to establish its unique significance. 
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2.3.10. Conclusion to Autopoieitic & Aesthetic Operation  
In this chapter we have established points of comparison between life and art by 
comparing autopoietic theory with aesthetic theory, using processes (transformation, 
organization, coordination), abilities (observation, contextualization, coordination) and 
qualifications (time, difference, lack) that are relevant to both the functioning of life and the 
practice of art. The autopoietic perspective focuses on the operation of life from a systems-
theoretical approach, which prioritizes dynamic processes of interaction to define life. This 
conclusion reflects these comparisons, processes and relationships in terms of the research 
questions that I posed in Chapter 1. Introduction, with the following themes; the relation 
between art and life; the concept of separation; human cognition and aesthetic thought; the 
functionality of artworks; and, the relation between art, society and tradition. There are many 
interesting comparisons that demonstrate how life and art are united through human practice 
and thought. Many of the ideas that are discussed in the following paragraphs will be further 
developed as this thesis progresses. 
 
Life and Art 
 Life and art inherently demonstrate processes of organized transformation, which 
distinguish themselves from non-living materials and non-art practices respectively. 
Organization thus becomes one of the best ways to connect the practice of art with life—both 
as a biological condition of living beings on a molecular level, and a reflexive comprehension 
of individual existence on a molar level. The opposition of material and form, which can be 
understood as the foundation for all aesthetic theory, reflects the autopoietic condition of life, 
where molecular level functioning enables molar level capacities of observation and 
signification, through which form is recognized. The contrast between material and form also 
reflects Rancière’s metaphor of ‘being apart together,’ which further relates to the human 
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conditions of being an object and subject simultaneously, and being an individual in relation 
to society. As living beings we encompass the molecular and the molar concurrently, despite 
the radical separation between our microscopic physical structure and our sophisticated 
cognition. The practice of art functions on the molar level of consciousness and 
communication, although its essential use of material and form parallels the inherent conflict 
between nature and culture that defines humanity. While we are natural creatures, the word 
“artificial” is synonymous with “man-made.”160 The practice of art mirrors the tension 
between the natural and the artificial and provides an opportunity for people to observe and 
contemplate the contradictions that inform their lives. One example of this artifice is our 
invention of time, which only exists in the present moment according to autopoietic theory. 
Osborne shows how history is always conceived subjectively through a temporal 
understanding of memory, attention and expectation.161 Just like people, artworks always exist 
in relation to their antecedents, demonstrating how aesthetic experience of artworks are 
socially influenced through the use of predetermined concepts. Another temporal way that 
artworks and people are similar is through their indetermination, or incompleteness, which 
demonstrates the limits of aesthetics to be a limitation of life and our finite existence in time. 
This presents another paradox that affects artworks and individuals, which is the promise of 
infinite potential within a finite form. For humans, the fixed structure is the self, but it is 
continuously open to possibility as we develop as people. Artworks, on the other hand, must 
be complete and unified by physical or conceptual definition, while being open to 
interpretation for as long as they are accessible to interaction. In the end, our unique 
individuality unites us with artworks, once again demonstrating the condition of ‘being apart 
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together.’ In our individual specificity, we attain equality in our common states of isolation. 
Human life connects with and is captivated by art in these various ways. 
 
Separation 
 Rancière distinguishes aesthetic separation as two combined divisions at the heart of 
aesthetic experience.162 The first is the separation between ‘sense and sense’ that involves the 
apprehension of external sensory stimuli and transforms it into significant thought, and will be 
further explored in the following paragraph. The second is the distinction between the artwork 
and the tradition of art that precedes it, which positions artworks in opposition to the concept 
of art that is used to identify them. This will be further explored in the final paragraph of this 
conclusion, which will focus on the tradition of art. Both of these aesthetic separations imply 
other separations, most notably the distinction between individual people and society, which 
relates to the separation of subjectivity and objectivity. The two principal separations and the 
heart of autopoietic theory are reflected in two theories of art that are based upon two distinct 
but related levels of operation. Autopoiesis defines the separation of the organism from its 
environment as an integral process of all living organisms, and this definition of a boundary 
between interior and exterior plays a major role in the cognitive processing of aesthetic 
operations. The autopoietic separation of the molecular level of structure and function from 
the molar realm of observation and understanding compounds the separation of interior and 
exterior that informs human life. The two-tiered system of molecular and molar function is 
paralleled in the organizational theory of art provided by Nöe and the observational theory of 
art provided by Luhmann. In both of these cases, a basic level of functionality is moved to a 
second power to describe the more complex and reflexive organization and observation of 
artworks. As Nöe has proposed, the foundation of an organizational theory of art relates 
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organized activities of the first and second order in terms of reflexive transformation through 
use, which demonstrates how human beings organize and are organized by the world in which 
they live.163 His division of organized activities into first and second orders reflects 
autopoietic separation of molecular operation and molar observation while establishing a 
reflexive connection between natural and composed elements within artworks. Since 
organization can be used to distinguish living beings from non-living things, Nöe’s 
organization theory of art is a valid attempt to connect the complex theoretical practice of art 
with our basic biological truths. Luhmann’s observational theory of art reflects the internal-
external division generated by the autopoietic law of adaptation and is defined by two implicit 
oppositions; one that separates the observer from the observed during acts of observation, and 
another that separates an observed distinction from the not-distinguished aspect of the 
observation.164 In the case of observing artworks, the process of observation changes from 
first-order to second-order because artworks must be considered as forms of communication 
in themselves, which converts the aesthetic experience of an artwork into the observation of 
an observation. This reflexive operation mirrors the communicative foundation of artistic 
practice, which is based upon the cognitive capacities that autopoiesis facilitates in the molar 
realm of human life. Luhmann’s observational theory of art is especially useful for connecting 
the practice of art with life because it takes into account the ‘blind spot’ that is inherent in 
human observation, which acknowledges our cognitive limitations as outlined by 
autopoiesis.165 It further demonstrates the reflexivity of artistic practice by demonstrating how 
the concept of form establishes both the methodology of observational thought and the 
composition of the artwork that is being observed. While the modality between first and 
second levels provides both Nöe’s and Luhmann’s theories of art with dynamic and reflective 
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potentiality between levels, it is important to remember that they both operate within 
autopoietic observation, which is informed and constrained by biological functionality at the 
molecular level. The inherent fallacy and limitation of our cognitive capacities is what 
undoubtedly gives rise to the paradoxes that artworks elicit, which we will explore more 
thoroughly as this investigation continues and at the end of these conclusions.  
 
Human Cognition / Aesthetic Thought 
 Kant’s aesthetic theory is defined by several principal separations as well, which can 
also be related to the basic divisions that are stipulated by autopoiesis. The law of adaptation 
requires the process of identification to distinguish an organism from its environment, which 
is the basis of autonomy of all living beings. This not only establishes individuals as distinct 
from their surroundings but also as different from other beings within their species, and the 
reflexive recognition of this forms the counterpoint of subjectivity and objectivity.166 The 
transition between these two modes of particular (subjective) and universal (objective) 
understanding are what make aesthetics function as a theory, demonstrating how we as 
individuals are simultaneously capable of being subjects and objects at the same time.167 This 
coexistence of parallel modes of being is reflected in autopoietic theory, where molecular 
functionalism enables molar cognition, two interconnected yet distinct modalities of life. 
Aesthetic experience is largely about becoming aware of and navigating this inherent object-
subject duality of human life, by experiencing the intrinsic separations of thought and feeling 
during artistic interaction. Determinant and reflective judgements are defined in terms of 
having or not having predetermined meaning, and the requirement of indifference towards the 
object of aesthetic judgement is a second condition placed on having unbiased preconceptions 
about the object in question. This ensures that the judgement of the object will be based upon 
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the subjective feelings of the viewer that the observation of material and form instigate. The 
pleasure or displeasure felt in aesthetic experience as a result of external stimuli is 
compounded by the reflexive pleasure felt for feeling pleasure—an internal feeling based on 
an external source of interest. The reflexivity that this operation demonstrates is yet another 
essential element of autopoietic theory and aesthetic experience. 
 Rancière conceives of this process of internalization that initiates aesthetic experience 
as having three-steps that include input, association and projection.168 While the first and 
possibly second stages may be similar amongst individuals, the projection of associations into 
metaphor is a largely subjective attribution of meaning that defines aesthetic separation, 
where aesthetic interpretation is infinite. The potential transformation of self that aesthetic 
experience entails is largely due to the reliance on subjective thought, which enables 
observers to become reflexively aware of their position in the moment in relation to unknown 
(i.e. without concept) external stimuli. Every aesthetic experience is a unique opportunity to 
reflect upon the self in the moment, and the potentially distinct self the aesthetic experience 
will catalyse. Rancière’s conception of the aesthetic regime highlights the connection between 
social and cultural transformation over the past two hundred and thirty years, since the 
groundbreaking examination of aesthetic thought by Kant during the enlightenment. 
Rancière’s description of the ‘aesthetic break’ helps to demonstrate how the confined and 
limited forms of artistic appreciation during previous epochs gave way to a more subjective 
and open artistic practice.169 Rancière’s description of the ‘aesthetic break’ helps us to 
appreciate the transformation of artistic tradition over time, and the disconnection of artworks 
from specific functions and spaces. Unlike the mimetic regime, where predetermined 
conceptions of artistic meaning are assumed, the aesthetic regime promotes and aesthetic 
experience where a subjective process of de/re/contextualization is required in order to 
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determine the meaning and value of artworks.170 Freed from prescribed purpose, artworks 
inevitably embody contextual disjunctions that reverberate through spectators during aesthetic 
experience. The dissensus that is inherent in aesthetic experience ensures that the identity of 
individuals is temporarily suspended and formed anew, different from before the experience. 
Artworks thus provide people with a unique opportunity for self-discovery, a chance to 
disengage in order to re-engage anew. Rancière demonstrates how this dissensus inevitably 
makes the practice of art a political practice, through the destabilizing effect on both the 
personal and social levels of self-awareness.171  
 
Artworks 
 Since an artwork must first be recognized to be observed as an observation—an 
indirect form of communication—the concept of art is presupposed and contingent on the 
experience of the observer.172 This demonstrates the recognition of artificiality as a condition 
of aesthetic experience, which establishes an observational stipulation on both the creation 
and enjoyment of artworks.173 This relates in part to an artwork’s relationship with the 
institutions in which it is displayed, but more importantly to the conventions of art that help to 
define its ideological contextualization. By functioning out of context, artworks call attention 
to themselves and the way that they operate in counterpoint to other fields of culture.174 While 
contextual disjunction provides artworks with the power to destabilize understanding in 
viewers—to provide the unexpected—artworks nonetheless require some adherence to artistic 
tradition to be recognized as art, and is facilitated through the use of convention that pertains 
to the concept of art. Artworks always exist in relation to their antecedents, and this 
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conditions that artworks must be different in order to generate meaning. The two instances of 
lack imposed by Kant’s aesthetic theory stipulate the absence of preconceived meaning when 
judging an artwork or something as beautiful, and help us to appreciate the requisite 
innovation and novelty of contemporary art practices. By presenting the unknown and 
evading determinant concepts, original artworks ensure that aesthetic operations result.  
 
Art, Society & Tradition 
Relating autopoietic and aesthetic theory with society, Rancière claims that artworks 
are created for “a people which is still lacking.”175 This can be understood as a community in 
need, but also as a people yet to come. In the first case, the people are in need because of the 
inherent strife that living entails, and it is their knowledge of hardship that enables them to 
connect with the “seizing and rending” that all artworks embody. In the second case, future 
generations will continue to benefit from the inimitable opportunities that the practice of art 
offers, demonstrating the temporal extensiveness of art as a transformative tradition. This 
displays the reciprocal relationship between artworks and people, and the important act of 
maintaining accessibility of artworks through the conservation of art. Relating to the law of 
conservation of autopoiesis, acts of artistic conservation and preservation lead us to appreciate 
the symbiotic relationship between artworks and people. The example of the orchid and the 
wasp demonstrates the constructive potential of interdependence, where possibilities are 
expanded and perpetuated through nurturing interaction.176 In relation to the tradition of art, 
artworks are sustained so that people can be continually nurtured through social communion. 
The relationship of mutual necessity between people and artworks shows how art is part of 
humanity, and how art comes to define us as human. As a people who are lacking, art 
replenishes us as individuals and a society. We are united by common sense, which Rancière 
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addresses through his idea of the sensory fabric that connects people through physical 
sensation and collective logic.177 While the concept of cognition spans both the molecular and 
molar levels of autopoietic systems,178 sense provides a similar connectivity for aesthetic 
experience by bonding the subjective individual with objectivity of society at large. Through 
this human situation of potential union, Rancière demonstrates the dissensus that inevitably 
makes the practice of art a political practice, through a destabilizing effect on both the social 
and personal levels of self-awareness.179 This connects the practice of art to communication, 
which unites individuals in absence and provides the opportunity to activate potential 
subjectivities for its participants. 
 In these various summaries, the connection between life and art is easily identified as 
autopoietic theory is compared with the practice of art. The processes and relations that define 
life systems in terms of autopoietic functionality can be logically applied to the processes and 
relations that define the practice of art. The result is a dynamic portrayal of the various 
aspects that inform artistic practice, from the cognitive mechanisms of aesthetic experience to 
the social framework that supports the tradition of art. The resultant comparisons demonstrate 
how life and art are intertwines through human thought, which is established in relation to 
biological function and philosophical comprehension.  
 
2.4. Conclusion to Life / Context 
As autopoietic beings, humans have the same fundamental operational conditions as 
all living being, which establish both capacities and limitations for our cognitive interaction 
within our environment. We are made of molecules, but the organizational system that 
constitutes these molecules as an autopoietic organism—as a living being—is a system that 
                                                
177 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 57. 
178 Varela, Autopoiesis, 5. 
179 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 69. 
 122 
both influences and reflects the operations at the heart of artistic practice. Life is 
fundamentally constitutive, reflexive, and differential, and these three concepts can be found 
in the formal, subjective and observational nature of aesthetic experience. While art and 
artworks can be conceived as concepts, their experience is just as procedural as living. The 
constant and indispensable relationship between an organism and its environment, which is 
implicit to autopoiesis, parallels the implicit relationship that artworks have with their 
contexts, both physically and conceptually. While the significance of artworks depends on 
their ability to be distinguished from other beings, their relationship to the artistic tradition 
they emerge from is simultaneously compliant and antagonistic. Transcending from the 
conception of a specific artwork to the conception of art in general connects the practice of art 
on a personal level to the social tradition of art that exists as a communal, universal 
abstraction. It is here where art becomes more difficult to align with a bio-logic, despite its 
continued existence in the minds of people. Nonetheless, the theory of autopoiesis is 
remarkably useful for exploring the biological, cognitive and contextual capacities that we as 
human beings possess, which give rise to the creation and enjoyment of artworks. It becomes 
obvious through the various processes and concepts explored here that the biological 
foundation and operation of human life is the basis of aesthetic experience and artistic 
practice. A more thoroughly exploration remains into human cognition, the influence of 
language and technology on our culture, and the aesthetic tradition of art, all of which 
influence the practice of art and aesthetic experience. Through these topics we will discover 
the importance of subjectivity, functionality and contextual relations on the significance of 
artworks, and be able to more fully appreciate the function of separation in defining the 
practice of art and its relationship with life.  
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CHAPTER 3. THOUGHT / SELF 
3.1. Introduction to Thought / Self 
 In this chapter we will focus on how thought functions and enables us to distinguish 
ourselves as separate beings from our environment. Our ability to think sets us apart from 
other species, and while recent research has greatly advanced our understanding of cerebral 
functionality, our philosophical conception of thought has been explored for thousands of 
years. In response to Kant’s groundbreaking exploration of aesthetic thought, Freidrich 
Schiller wrote a series of letters regarding “the aesthetic education of man” in which he 
describes the necessity of placing limits or boundaries in order to think. According to Schiller, 
the human spirit is in a state of pure freedom before receiving stimulation from its 
environment through the senses.180 This unlimited space and time is made possible by the 
imagination, where indetermination allows for infinite possibility. After being stimulated 
externally, a representation surges forth in the mind. What before was a passive state of 
possibility changes to an active state of determination. Yet to achieve reality, infinity must be 
lost. As content is received through the senses (or achieved in the mind), a limit is placed on 
what was previously unlimited. To describe a figure in space, we must limit infinite space. To 
represent a modification in time, we must divide the totality of time. Our reality is achieved 
only through limitation, and a true position or affirmation only through an exclusion or 
negation. We distinguish and determine through the suppression of our free disposition.181 
While the previous chapter explored how the theory of autopoiesis establishes a 
foundation for cognition through separation, which enables us to know when we interact with 
our environment, this chapter will focus on the corporal mechanisms that enable thought and 
knowledge to function within humans. We will begin by looking at how the body and mind 
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work together to establish the idea of self within individuals. To do so we will examine the 
approach established through embodied cognition, which disputes the Cartesian division of 
body and mind in favour of a psychophysical parallelism. This will illuminate the processes 
of thought, memory and learning, which facilitate the development of subjectivity and the 
establishment of self. In the second chapter we will look at perception, enaction and 
experience. This involves examining the duality of internal and external perception, which 
demonstrates how action within a context is always coupled with reception in the form of 
feeling. Then we will explore the idea of enaction, which reveals how our perception is 
contingent on our active engagement with our environment and compensates some inherent 
perceptual inadequacies, which become evident when attempting to study perception and 
consciousness. This leads us to the third chapter, which explores how human consciousness 
enables us to conceive of ourselves as separate from our environment. This is largely based 
upon our perceived division of inner self and outer world, and the concept of umwelt helps to 
reveal how species-specific perception implies a distinct reality for every type of being. For 
humans, our consciousness allows us to understand our environment and ourselves in a 
special way, and this will be further examined through the related ideas of Dasein and ‘the 
open.’ These concepts help to demonstrate how human consciousness allows us to move 
beyond mere captivation within our environment, towards a freedom and openness made 
possible through our ability to separate. As a prerequisite for establishing subjectivity, the 
ability to separate our selves from our context—or at least to consider ourselves as separate—
has vital ramifications when it comes to understanding the functioning of aesthetic thought.  
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3.2. The Self 
3.2.1. Introduction to The Self 
To better understand how we are capable of considering ourselves as separate from 
our environment, we will begin by looking at the interconnected systems of communication 
within our bodies. Our ability to consider anything at all is dependent on our nervous 
system—specifically our brains—and we will continue by exploring how the brain enables 
thought by generating neural representations. These neural images play an important role in 
our ability to remember and learn, which ultimately result in establishing mind and 
consciousness. We will consider these neural images in relation to sensory and aesthetic 
thought, which share components of cerebral architecture in order to function. We’ll continue 
by looking at how memory helps to establish our idea of self by offering a consistent 
perspective that we can perpetually refer to. Self is further established through inter-
objectivity, which is reflected in language and allows human beings to conceive of themselves 
as subject and object simultaneously. Finally, we’ll look at the idea of becoming, which posits 
a processual conception of self through our incessant relation with our environment over time. 
This conception of being highlights the parallel functioning of body and mind as individuals 
develop within the world, where our potential to act is equal to our potential to be affected. 
These cognitive mechanisms and processes help to illustrate how the division that our 
consciousness makes between internal and external grounds the very idea of human 
individuality and agency in the world. Understanding how we relate with and think about the 
world around us is crucial to understanding how thought and consciousness both capacitate 
and limit our conception of art. 
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3.2.2. Parallelism 
 The theory of parallelism contends that the body and mind are inseparable and 
function simultaneously in the absence of causal interaction between them.182 Separating the 
human body and mind in terms of structure and function is completely erroneous, according 
to Damasio, despite its ubiquitous acceptance as fact.183 It’s easy to think that our bodies 
alone interact with the environment and then send information to our minds to control the 
situation from a position of command. Damasio negates this idea, stating that every time we 
interact with our environment—every time we use our senses—our bodies and brains 
participate in the interaction. Nöe concurs and thinks that the separation of mind and body in 
one of the key faults of neuroaesthetics, which aims to uncover the neurological mechanisms 
of aesthetic experience.  
We need finally to break with the dogma that you are something inside of you—
whether we think of this as the brain or an immaterial soul—and we need finally 
to take seriously the possibility that the conscious mind is achieved by persons 
and other animals thanks to their dynamic exchange with the world around them 
(a dynamic exchange that no doubt depends on the brain, among other things).184 
 
The fact of the matter is that our body and brain are inseparably incorporated in two ways: 
biochemically and neurally.185 The nervous system is usually the only corporal aspect that 
people think about, where sensory and motor peripheral nerves transmit signals from all areas 
of the body back and forth to the brain. Nonetheless, Damasio describes how the body also 
employs biochemical communication, which uses the bloodstream to transmit hormones, 
modulators and neurotransmitters, and is much older than communication via the nervous 
system. This is called the endocrine system, and its regulation of the body is necessary for 
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sustaining metabolic function and defending the body against viruses and bacteria.186 In this 
system, chemical signals stimulate neural signals, and vice versa, as hormones act on the 
gland that secreted them as well as stimulating various parts of the brain, specifically the 
pituitary and hypothalamus.187 Chemical signals can modify the role of many cells and 
tissues, which in turn can change the functioning of a particular system itself.188 The 
endocrine system works in specific regions and through the body as a whole so that the 
components of the organism—from molecules to organs—function in the appropriate 
conditions for life to thrive.189 Damasio explains the complexity of the intercommunication of 
the various systems within the body, especially as the body interrelates with its environment. 
When a person interacts with their environment, not only does their brain receive signals 
through the nervous system and the endocrine system, but also from other sectors of their 
brain.190 Damasio distinguishes human interaction within an environment from other 
organisms because our interaction is more than just impulsive or automatic response to a 
given situation. We are able to generate internal cognitive reactions based on our interaction 
with the world that call forth sensory (or somatosensory) images,191 which we will look at 
more closely in Chapter 5.2.3. Thought. Damasio considers these neural representations to be 
the foundation of the human mind.  
The integrated relationship between body and mind was expressed in a similar manner 
by Spinoza in his philosophical treatise Ethics, which was published posthumously in 1677. 
Examining the philosophy of Spinoza, Deleuze explains the idea of parallelism as follows:  
[W]hat is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and 
what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind. There is no 
primacy of one series over the other… It is a matter of showing that the body 
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surpasses the knowledge that we have of it, and that thought likewise surpasses 
the consciousness we have of it… So it is by one and the same movement that we 
shall manage, if possible, to capture the power of the body beyond the given 
conditions of our knowledge, and to capture the power of the mind beyond the 
given conditions of our consciousness.192 
 
The idea of parallelism was revolutionary in its time because it opposed the conventional 
religious idea that founded morality; that passions of the body could and should be dominated 
by the conscious mind.193 In addition to its groundbreaking social influence, the parallelism 
that Spinoza proposed is even more significant as it points towards the existence of 
unconscious thought, over two hundred years before the work of Sigmund Freud.194 For our 
purposes, parallelism grounds the idea that there is a condition of concurrent separation and 
conjunction at the root of human cognition. While the ‘together apart’ paradox of autopoiesis 
was between an organism and its environment, another ‘together apart’ paradox is at the root 
of human consciousness. 
 
3.2.3. Thought 
To understand how body and mind work together to constitute the self, we must 
distinguish between the brain—which is understood and studied in terms of anatomy and 
neurology—and the mind—which is understood and studied in terms of psychology.195 Many 
organisms have brains but that doesn’t mean that they have minds. Damasio believes that the 
mind is only possible through the ability to generate internal neural images and to organize 
those images in a procedure called thought.196 He claims that the capacity to manipulate 
neural representations, which are modelled and arranged through thought, is what influences 
action on the molar scale of an organism’s interaction with the environment. These neural 
                                                
192 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 18. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 19. 
195 Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 40. 
196 Ibid., 89. 
 129 
images in thought impact human behaviour in part by assisting to anticipate the future, to 
make plans and to act accordingly.197 The ability to manipulate neural images in terms of 
derivation and classification—moving from general rules and concepts to specific examples, 
and vice versa—is the capacity of abstract thought.198 
While many organisms survive perfectly well without a mind—or even a brain, for 
that matter—the function of the human mind is certainly linked to ensuring our survival 
within our environment. The ability to form and reform neural images establishes our ability 
to learn, which in turn influences our behaviour and decision-making.199 Learning, according 
to Damasio, is the establishment of neural pathways that can be used to generate thought—the 
processing of neural representations—and the complexity of our neural architecture is what 
allows these images to form. Thanks to these neural constructions we can understand signals 
that are introduced in the early sensory cortices and arrange them as concepts, and we can 
accumulate approaches for reasoning and decision-making in relation to these concepts.200 
Damasio contends that this affords us the capacity to select motor responses that are already 
established and accessible in our mind, or to calculate new reactions depending on the 
situation. As we interact with our environment in our efforts to survive, the ability to learn 
from others and from our own experience provides an obvious survival advantage by 
facilitating our abilities to acquire what we need and to avoid potentially dangerous situations. 
Expanding upon the technicalities of our nervous system and the thought that these neural 
images impart, Damasio theorizes on how these images might function within the brain. 
In between the brain’s five main sensory input sectors and three main output 
sectors lie the association cortices, the basal ganglia, the thalamus, the limbic 
system cortices and limbic nuclei, and the brain stem and cerebellum. Together, 
this “organ” of information and government, this great collection of systems, 
holds both innate and acquired knowledge about the body proper, the outside 
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world, and the brain itself as it interacts with body proper and outside world. This 
knowledge is used to deploy and manipulate motor outputs and mental outputs, 
the images that constitute our thought. I believe that this repository of facts and 
strategies for their manipulation is stored, dormantly and abeyantly, in the form of 
“dispositional representations” (“dispositions,” for short) in the inbetween brain 
sectors. Biological regulation, memory of previous states, and planning of future 
actions result from cooperative activity not just in early sensory and motor 
coritces but also in the inbetween sectors. 201  
 
The communication and cooperation of components within the brain are thus key factors in 
the functioning of learning and memory.  
This interconnected cerebral coordination is especially important for aesthetic 
experience, as outlined by Gabrielle Starr in her book Feeling Beauty, where she defines the 
“Default Mode Network” in relation to neuroaesthetic research. The Default Mode Network is 
an important part of the distributed neural architecture that connects and coordinates the 
specific brain areas involved in aesthetic experience, including emotion, perception, neural 
imagery, memory and language, in conjunction with systems for pleasure and reward.202 
While admitting that the neural events involved in aesthetic experience need to be further 
developed experimentally, her research suggests that: “powerful aesthetic experience calls on 
the brain to integrate external perceptions with the inner senses, and ultimately, that [mental] 
imagery may be a key component of powerful aesthetic response.”203 Starr says that both 
short and long term memory support mental imagery, which equally depends on external 
propositions from the world.204 As some of the cerebral architecture for perception and mental 
imagery is shared, areas of the brain involved in external perception are activated across 
sensory modes for imagined perception as well.205 Neural representations work to model 
existing knowledge but also to indicate potential possibilities since they can combine diverse 
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types of information that augment our modes of knowledge.206 Another overlapping aspect of 
perception and neural representations is that sensory images of the individual senses are 
inherently multisensory. For example, mental images related to touch use representations of 
texture, temperature, motion, and vision.207 All of our senses involve multiple modes, some of 
which are shared. For example, visual imagery incorporates motor imagery as well, which 
helps to facilitate and imagine potential action in our environment.208 Starr believes that this 
connection has important implications for perceiving artworks since our ability to imagine 
action is considered as necessary for recognizing both mimesis and empathy. Starr underlines 
the importance of mental images by arguing that: “the connection of imagery processes to 
aesthetic experience has broad repercussions, for the network of brain areas that produces 
imagery is to a significant extent coextensive with the default mode network.”209 While 
Starr’s work is advancing our understanding of neurology, Nöe is sceptical about its 
importance in terms of advancing our understanding of art. One of the biggest problems is 
neuroaesthetic’s insufficient consideration of the artwork, which is often reduced to a picture. 
“At root, this inability to bring the artwork into focus stems from the doctrine that the 
artwork’s significance is its effect on our perceptual (or emotional) systems.”210 One of the 
main purposes of this thesis is to discover to what extent art is biologically determined 
through its dependence on human experience. 
Neural imagery is perhaps most significant because it is the foundation of memory, 
and Damasio emphasizes the magnitude of personal experience and its collection and storage 
for creating and understanding self.211 As we exercise our own memory or remember the 
images of our dreams, the functioning of neural representations can be felt as both personal 
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and real. Referring back to autopoiesis, memory demonstrates how cognition—the ability of 
an organism to know within its environment—becomes recognition through the use of 
established neural pathways or representations. If an organism with memory doesn’t know 
something, it can learn by creating new neural pathways that can be accessed through 
memory in the future. Damasio states that dispositional representations are a potential pattern 
of neural activity within a tiny cluster of neurons.212 These convergence zones are composed 
of a set of possible dispositions, and the recallable dispositions acquired through learning 
constitute memory. In spite of this capacity to recall past thoughts and experiences, memory is 
entropic in nature and is nothing like time travelling into the past in your mind. A memory is 
the reproduction of an interpretation of an original situation, object or face in the present, 
which is always reconstructive.213 This not only references Damasio’s description of the self 
as a perpetually re-created neurobiological state, but also the persistence of the biological 
present. A dispositional representation is not a real picture, but rather a biological way of 
reconstructing a picture in your mind. When you remember an artwork, its image is never an 
exact visual replica but rather the activation of neural patterns in early visual cortices that 
stimulate a temporary reconstitution of an estimated representation of the artwork.214 Damasio 
stresses that the dispositional representation of an artwork is distributed in various sites of 
your brain, and when you summon a memory these parts coordinate to bring the memory 
forth in various early sensory cortices, for as long as you focus to construct some meaning of 
the artwork. Memory as such is unstable and fleeting.  
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3.2.4. Ipseity 
While the generation and manipulation of neural representations is essential for 
thought, it is our capacity to reuse these neural patterns through memory that facilitates 
subjectivity and the self. The consistent perspective of our experience provides a sensation of 
propriety for the contents of our memories, which Damasio attributes to our reasonably 
constant and repetitive biological state.215 While the consistent biological structure and 
function of an organism provide part of this stability, he states that the production and recall 
of autobiographical memory provides the rest. It is this production and reproduction of 
dispositional images about identity that Damasio purports to be the foundation of the state of 
self. Referring once again to autopoiesis, the process of establishing identity is that of 
distinguishing oneself from their environment. As such, self can be understood as the 
consistent and persistent cognitive distinction of oneself in relation to their context.  
Damasio proposes that the psychological basis of subjectivity emerges from an 
objective understanding oneself.216 This happens, he claims, when people produce neural 
images not just of an object or of themselves, but of themselves in the process of sensing and 
interacting with an object. The content of this third kind of disconnected perception of self in 
context establishes the subjective perspective.217 As such, subjectivity arises when the 
organism becomes reflexively conscious, or self-aware. This subjectivity, or self-awareness, 
is reflected in our language, which provides us with narrative capacities and can generate 
verbal descriptions of nonverbal events. Damasio states that the “I” of language helps to 
consolidate our understanding of self as subject, the achiever and controller of action. 
Maturana explores this same thought:  
The body, and its parts […] arise in language in the same manner as any other 
entity arises in the flow of languaging [sic] as a manner of doing things together. 
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The observer sees that the operation of self-consciousness is the reflexive 
distinction of a self in language that takes place as an operation that constitutes 
our body and our being as an object in inter-objectivity, yet the person in the flow 
of his or her living in languaging lives the self distinction in the paradox of 
distinguishing an independent entity that feels as being the doing of the 
distinction.218  
 
This relates to the autopoietic process of identification, but transfers it from the molecular to 
the molar level with our ability to perceive ourselves interacting with the environment, and to 
confirm it with language. Damasio affirms the continual perception we have of our bodies 
acting and as the source of self. He states that the neural representations of our bodies in 
action provide a hub for the self, which becomes our internal and external reference.219 The 
hub of self, Damasio posits, is anchored in a successive process where multiple organism 
states are concurrently and persistently reproduced in the mind. Our capacity for inter-
objectivity—to transfer from subject to object, or to simultaneously be subject and object—
plays in important role in aesthetic thought, as we will explore in Chapter 5. Artworks & Art. 
The idea that self as an ongoing process of reconstruction in the minds of individuals 
is reflected in Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the world becoming in their philosophic 
discourse. As opposed to simply being, they state: “[w]e are not in the world, we become with 
the world; we become by contemplating it.”220 This manner of thinking respects the 
operational functioning of the molecular domain as described by Maturana and Varela, and 
the description of self as a perpetually re-created neurobiological state as defined by Damasio. 
It acknowledges the indeterminate state of human life, as well, which will be compared with 
the indetermination of the artwork in Chapter 5.3.5. Series & Projects. The idea of becoming 
reflects the fact that life is never static, and affirms the ongoing interaction of an organism 
with its environment as it develops. Cameron Duff describes the impact of such an idea: 
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Deleuze’s work highlights the relationality of all developmental processes, 
including the affective and material engagement that grounds the person in 
context. Taken from a Deleuzean perspective, human development is a 
discontinuous record of affective encounters; of the creation and suspension of 
relations between diverse bodies and the affects these relations support. Deleuze’s 
work establishes a means of studying these discontinuous becomings and the 
developmental transitions they entail. 221  
 
As we develop as selves, the idea of becoming affirms that our unique relationships with our 
environment and other people play a fundamental role in creating and understanding who we 
are as individuals. “The body is not a singular ontological essence deserving of some a priori 
regard; instead the body emerges in a series of affective and relational ‘becomings’, each of 
which shapes a body’s distinctive ‘capacities’ or ‘powers’.” 222 Our phylogenetic existence as 
humans may be defined by genetics and evolution, but our ontogenetic development as 
individuals is definitely determined by experience. Discussing the philosophy of Spinoza and 
Deleuze, Duff reflects the idea of parallelism to explain how our ability to be affected by the 
world mirrors our capacity to affect it: 
Spinoza insists that a body’s ‘power of action (is) the same as (its) capacity to be 
affected’ (cited in Deleuze, 1992: 225). This finally reveals something of the 
nature of affect in terms of its transitions and effects. Spinoza understands affect 
as a modulation or quantum of a body’s power of action; or its capacity to affect 
the diverse bodies, both human and non-human, that it encounters. This power 
determines a body’s capacity to affect the world, to manipulate the circumstances 
or conditions of its environment and to shape the behaviour and/or intentions of 
other bodies. 223  
 
Our capacity to be affected is particularly prescient during aesthetic experience, and 
Spinoza’s equivalence between the powers of being affected and affecting suggests that 
responsiveness and vulnerability are important counterpoints for influencing the world. As we 
explore the vulnerability of artworks in Chapter 5.2.3. Description - The Parergon, this 
equivalence of affective power should be kept in mind. Processes of affection and action 
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inevitably involve both the body and mind of a subject, who interacts in relation to their 
environment to establish a reflexive understanding of self. Aesthetic experience depends upon 
these reflexive capacities, which enable subjective perspective and experience in relation to a 
distinction of internal and external.  
 
3.2.5. Conclusion to The Self 
 The body and mind work together to create our idea of self, which is consolidated in 
an individual’s reflexive distinction of themselves from their environment. Communication 
within our bodies is achieved through the cooperation of the endocrine and nervous systems, 
which work together internally in order to facilitate our understanding of our external world. 
The intercommunicated architecture of the human brain enables creation and recognition of 
neural representations, mental images which are called forth and manipulated through 
thought. These representations are neural pathways that are created to form new thoughts or 
reused to generate recognition, both of which are key processes involved in the formation of 
memory. Thoughts combine a variety of neural images simultaneously, from internal and 
external sources, suggesting that each human sense is actually multi-sensory, with neural 
representations often being shared between senses. Despite the entropy of human memory, it 
provides a consistent perspective that enables learning and the establishment of individual 
identity amongst humans. Our reflexive idea of self is further strengthened by our ability to 
recognize ourselves as both subjects and objects at the same time, which is reinforced in 
language. The neural images that form self provide a core that allows us to compare our 
current state in relation to internal/external and past/present associations. The inherent 
relational nature of our individual development as human beings demonstrates self as a 
process of becoming in relation to context, where our changing bodies and minds inform our 
self-conception as we interact with the world around us. The influence of these cognitive 
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mechanisms is undeniably important in understanding the processes of creation and reflection 
as they relate to the practice and experience of art. The subjective self is the experiential 
foundation that establishes the operation of aesthetic thought. 
 
3.3. Perception & Experience 
3.3.1. Introduction to Perception & Experience 
When considering aesthetic experience, the perception of artworks is an extremely 
important factor to consider. To better understand how our perception enables us to 
experience the world, we will explore the mechanisms of sense in the human body externally 
and internally. We will see how perception is achieved through active engagement with the 
world, not simply passive reception of it. Action is inextricably combined with the reception 
of external percepts, which are in turn combined with internal feeling. We will then look at 
enaction, a conception that helps to engage with the paradox of perceptual transparency. 
Enaction focuses on the temporal, active and conditioned nature of experience in a way that 
facilitates a more accurate study of perception and experience. It once again highlights the 
connection of individual and their environment, focusing on sensorimotor contingencies as a 
means of demonstrating perception to be an activity based on skill. Enaction also shows how 
experience is a creative process. A particular experience is established in memory through its 
unity, which implies a sequential separation of before and after, and the association of 
emotion, which marks experience with a quality and finality. The distinction between sensory 
(external) and cognitive (internal) experience—both of which occur during aesthetic 
experience—reveal once again the duality that enables our conception as separate beings from 
our context. It also implies that perception and experience are inevitably imbued with a colour 
of emotion and meaning. Despite the seamlessness of consciousness, the body and mind are 
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both involved in conditioning our perception, experience, and hence understanding of 
ourselves and the world. 
 
3.3.2. Perception  
Perception is not simply the passive operation of the brain receiving signals from a 
stimulus in the environment, but rather the active operation of an organism connecting with 
its environment so that an interaction with a stimulus can happen in the first place.224 The 
action of interacting with the environment (or “interfacing” as Damasio puts it) usually results 
from an organism’s drive to maintain homeostasis, which we explored as Spinoza’s conatus 
in Chapter 2.2.9. Conatus. When we feel satiated and don’t need anything, we relax, but when 
problems arise or we lack something, we need to do something to resolve the imbalance. 
Organisms continuously act on their environments in order to achieve what they need to 
survive, but survival is not simply concerned with attaining food and water. It is also the 
capacity to evade dangerous situations, find shelter for protection and encounter other 
individuals for socialization and procreation. In order to successfully realize these endeavours 
an organism must be capable of sensing their environment, amongst other things. Perception 
enables organisms to cognite with their surroundings more efficiently, which implies actively 
interacting with the world as much as it is the passive reception of signals to the brain.225 We 
exist in a state of continual relation with our immediate surroundings, and we are constantly 
adapting our situation and adapting to our situation in order to survive. Perception helps these 
operations significantly. 
 John Dewey points out the dualistic nature of perception by defining it as “an activity 
of doing and undergoing, a transaction with the world around us.”226 As Dewey insightfully 
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explains common patterns of experience, he points out the union of action and reception that 
results as organisms perceive the world around them. These two aspects of experience happen 
simultaneously and exist in relationship with each other. “The action and its consequence 
must be joined in perception. This relationship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the 
objective of all intelligence.”227 Thinking back to the generation of meaning as discussed in 
autopoiesis in Chapter 2.2.7. Perspective & Difference, we once again can see how the 
simultaneous development of an event on two separate levels generates meaning through the 
generation of difference, which establishes an inherent relational quality to any one aspect of 
thought. It also evokes the subject-object opposition that establishes the self (see Chapter 
3.2.4. Self) and generates aesthetic movement (see Chapter 5.2.5. Position). Perception, as 
such, is action and reception combined. Cause and effect are one and the same. Furthermore, 
Dewey is sure to distinguish that receptivity is not the same as passivity. In perception, 
receptivity is a succession of responsive acts that join together to provide objective 
fulfilment.228 He attributes passivity, on the other hand, to recognition since it halts perception 
in its open process of exploration. Recognition happens through the association of 
determinate concepts, which negate aesthetic experience in Kantian terms. The point being 
that perception is something that we do in conjunction with the world around us, and not 
some passive, isolated, interior reaction. 
This doesn’t mean that we don’t have internal perception. While our perception is 
usually focused on external interactions, it exists internally as well. Damasio believes that as 
our senses evolved, our attention to the external world through the five senses increased in 
turn with conscious thought, leaving the perception of the internal body in the background of 
our attention, where it functions best.229 The autonomic nervous system exists outside of our 
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conscious control and functions within us imperceptibly, allowing us to focus our conscious 
attention on more specified forms of perception—that of the five senses. Nonetheless, the 
perception that we have of our body proper is of the utmost importance. Your body 
continually monitors itself through neural and chemical signals, and the experience that you 
have of your body in relation to particular thoughts is Damasio’s definition of feeling. The 
thought could be associated with either external or imagined stimuli, but the key aspect of 
feeling an emotion is the juxtaposition of perceived changes in body state in conjunction with 
the mental images that started the experience.230 The changes you perceive in your body when 
you feel an emotion are measured against the “neutral” background feelings of your body 
state between emotions, when your body is in a state of homeostasis.231 On top of this, the 
process of feeling must be processed and reflected upon by the brain, which Damasio states in 
a more scientific manner:  
A feeling about a particular object is based on the subjectivity of the perception of 
the object, the perception of the body state it engenders, and the perception of 
modified style and efficiency of the thought process as all of the above 
happens.”232  
 
Internal perception, or feeling, is especially important to our external perception of the world 
because it modifies our comprehensive notions of things and situations, according to 
Damasio. Through juxtaposition, feelings help to imbue external stimuli with qualities such as 
good or bad, safe or dangerous, or pleasurable or painful, as we will see in Chapter 3.3.4. 
Experience. Because of their integral nature, feelings become frames of reference that quietly 
mediate our cognitive lives.233   
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3.3.3. Enaction  
Perception is natural to us, but it is also something that we learn and adapt over time. 
Nöe states that our perception is automatic most of the time, mediated by learned patterns of 
movement and behaviour, and carried out on the embodiment level of cognitive function. The 
embodiment level establishes a level of operation between the subpersonal and the personal 
levels of cognition.234 It is not the molecular or cellular level where biochemical reactions 
take place during autopoiesis, and neither is it the level of consciousness where a person 
intentionally decides their actions. The embodiment level involves action without conscious 
thought.235 For example, when you finish reading the page or a book or a thesis you do not 
pause and decide to turn the page, but you turn it successfully nonetheless to continue 
reading. It’s a learned behaviour that has become habit. Nöe contends that our perception of 
the world is also learned over time, allowing us to establish recognizable patterns that help us 
to masterfully grasp and manoeuvre within the environment around us.236 He claims that 
sensory changes are produced every time we move our eyes or hands, even though we’re not 
usually conscious of it, and when we want to contemplate the world around us we do so 
actively. We move around our environment, adjusting our position, tilting our heads and 
straining our eyes. As Nöe states, we bring and maintain the world in focus.237 By showing 
how perception is learned to the point of habit and thus influenced by a variety of principles, 
seeing can be considered an organized activity. In relation to Nöe’s organizational theory of 
art that we explored in Chapter 2.3.3. Organization, this positions the act of seeing as a 
possible foundation for artistic expression. Despite the fact that we do not consciously move 
and adjust our eyes in most situations, seeing is a fundamental yet cognitively complex way 
of accessing the world. “Seeing isn’t something that happens in us. It is something we do. 
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And like everything else we do, it depends on where we are, whom we’re with, what we 
know, what we want, and what there is.”238 Seeing, as such, is never neutral, and always has a 
source. Both body and context simultaneously exert control upon the received content of 
perception. The relevance of this cognitive capacity will become increasingly relevant as we 
explore the internal/external oppositions that help to form consciousness (Chapter 3.4.2. 
Consciousness) and establish a relational ontology of art (Chapter 5.3.2. ‘The Fragment’). 
In his essay titled Art as Enaction, Noë asks: “Can there be a science of 
consciousness, then, if the object of consciousness itself is too slippery or transparent or 
vague to be captured in thought? Is phenomenology possible?”239 The problem is that 
perceptual experience is a difficult object to clearly determine and observe, since most 
attempts to ascertain or isolate perception as an object of study usually miss the target by 
focusing on objects that are experienced and not the perception of experience itself.240 “We 
encounter what is seen, not the qualities of the seeing itself.”241 This reflects Maturana’s 
reflections on the reflexive and paradoxical investigation of cognition, where no other option 
exists but to use cognition to examine itself (see Chapter 2.2.5. Cognition). The philosopher 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty questions the pragmatism of a purely scientific understanding of the 
body and visual perception as well. He believes that something important is lost when the 
subjective perspective of the individual is removed from the equation, which is necessary to 
achieve the universal, objective perspective that science demands.242 He maintains the priority 
of individual human sensation, which modifies the world in order to interact and understand 
it, instead of a possible, general human body that science puts forward in its quest to explain 
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experience.243 To help correct the problem of examining perceptual experience, Noë 
demonstrates the benefits of an enactive conception of experience. Borrowed from a phrase 
used by Varela and his collaborator Evan Thompson, Nöe’s idea of enaction helps to explore 
the process of experiencing more thoroughly.244 This is accomplished by taking three 
important aspects into account when defining experience; first, experience is an activity of 
encounter with the world; second, it is temporally extended; and third, it is fixed by laws of 
sensorimotor contingency. This definition of enactive conception aligns with the operational 
nature of autopoiesis as described by Maturana and Varela, and is further affirmed by 
Damasio’s interactive definition of perception. Nöe thinks that part of the problem with 
examining perceptual experience is that it is always interpreted in relation to knowledge.245 
Perception is always associative and relational, working in conjunction with our memory of 
past experience in order to help complete the limited or partial sensory experience we have of 
our surroundings. For example, when we see one side of a three-dimensional object, we 
understand that there are other sides even though we don’t perceive them.246 “We don’t really 
experience the objects as wholes; we infer their wholeness.”247 As we explore the idea of the 
parergon in Chapter 5.2. Parergon, this function of supplementing lack will be explored in 
relation to artworks, which are necessarily indeterminate. Nelson Goodman affirms this same 
quality of perception and states: “[o]ur capacity for overlooking is virtually unlimited, and 
what we do take in usually consists of significant fragments and clues that need massive 
supplementation.”248 Goodman further addresses the conditions that body and memory place 
on perception. He contends that: “the visual system drives toward uniformity and continuity, 
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constrained by its anatomy and physiology, and influenced by what it has seen and done 
before, but improvising along the way.” 249 Our ability to improvise ensures that appropriate 
actions can be made in the absence of known or recognized situations. Nonetheless, it is 
becoming clear how the corporal mechanisms that enable perception also involve flaws and 
impose limitations.  
Noë identifies two problematic aspects of visual perception due to the influence of our 
body and knowledge on our perception. 250 The first is that we experience our environment as 
complete and instantaneous without the subjective experience of perceiving ourselves 
perceiving our environment. This isn’t really a problem of perception—it’s like a built-in 
editor that automatically corrects mistakes—but it does make it exceedingly difficult to 
identify the manipulations of the mind in perception. We can’t hear or feel the cerebral motor 
of consciousness running, so it’s difficult to properly access its influence. Secondly, our 
visual perception is structured by sensorimotor contingencies, which are based on the fact that 
we access our environment—physically and perceptively—in a practical way that enables us 
to confirm details and knowledge in three-dimensional totality.251 Nöe describes sensorimotor 
contingency in relation to movement-dependence and object-dependence, which influence 
how we perceive things externally in the world. Patterns of interdependence between 
movement and sensory stimulation demonstrate how familiar we are with these sensorimotor 
contingencies.252 For example, as we move closer to an object it grows in size, and when we 
move around an object its profile changes. Nöe states that these patterns are learned and 
mediate our relation with our environment, which allows us to predict probable and possible 
states of things in relation to our context in the world. Sensorimotor contingencies, 
nonetheless, demonstrate how movement and object dependence condition our perceptual 
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states, and that the content of an experience is gained over time through interaction, not 
instantaneously as with two-dimensional representations.253 Nöe defines experience as 
enacted because it transpires through the knowledge and use of patterns of sensorimotor 
contingencies as observers interact with the world.254 This knowledge, which can be practiced 
and developed, makes exploration of the environment an activity based on skill. In relation to 
aesthetic experience, this suggests that the more practice you have perceiving the world, the 
better you will become.  
 
3.3.4. Experience 
 The enactive conception of perceptual experience contends that the world is not 
simply there, but rather that we produce the world by moving through it and interacting with 
it. Perception is a creative act and this has implications on how we practice and understand 
art. Noë sees the significance of artworks in their potential to present both perception and 
experience to observers, placing the value of artworks on their availability to be encountered 
over time and their inducement to construct perceptual experiences.255 Every time we see and 
experience an artwork we re-enact it, since the original enaction is that of its creation. 
Through enactive experience, the productive acts of making and perceiving artworks, or 
perceiving and making artworks, become methods for enlightening experience itself.256 It is 
this idea that led Nöe to define artists as experience engineers. He likens artistic practice to 
acts of phenomenological positioning, and believes that the philosophical practice of 
phenomenology can further advance by reflecting more on the practice of art. Nöe thinks that 
artworks can help to solve the paradox of perceptual transparency—the difficulty to focus on 
the study of experience because attempts to do so automatically deflect the focus to the 
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content that we perceive in experience. As artworks deal with both the sensory world in terms 
of active exploration and the cognitive world in terms of concepts, they help to reveal the dual 
aspect of experience.257  
 Noë focuses on the idea of access as he differentiates between our perception of things 
in the world and things that are perceived indirectly or as thought. Dewey also differentiates 
between sensory (aesthetic) and the cognitive (intellectual) experience and highlights that the 
difference is primarily material. While the sensory experience of the world relates to the 
qualities of things, the material of cognitive experience consists of signs and symbols that 
represent things that can be experienced qualitatively.258 He determines, nonetheless, that all 
experiences are marked with an aesthetic quality because of their structure; they conditionally 
comprise unification and fulfilment, which are accomplished through the organized and 
structured movement of experience. Without these qualities of unification and fulfilment, 
Dewey states that thinking is inconclusive. “In short, esthetic [sic] cannot be sharply marked 
off from intellectual experience since the latter must bear an esthetic stamp to be itself 
complete.”259 An experience is unified when it moves from experience in general to a 
singular, countable experience, which is accomplished when it is demarcated from what 
happened before and what happened after.260 Furthermore, a single quality pervades each 
experience—despite its variable components—which further consolidates the unity of an 
experience.261 An experience achieves fulfilment when emotions become associated to it, 
according to Dewey. “Under conditions of resistance and conflict, aspects and elements of the 
self and the world that are implicated in this interaction [of live creature and environing 
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conditions] qualify experience with emotions and ideas so that conscious intent emerges.” 262 
Dewey uses a lack of unity and fulfilment to define regular, non-aesthetic experience in 
general, which is so ubiquitous that it establishes the unconscious norm of all experience.263 
He claims that all conscious engagement with the world forms part of our personal stream of 
experience, most of which is unremarkable and easily forgotten. To distinguish an experience 
means to separate it temporally and emotionally from the constant activity of our lives. 
 
3.3.5. Conclusion to Perception & Experience 
When considering aesthetic experience, the perception of artworks is paramount. 
Perception enables us to connect and experience the world in a variety of ways, and this 
includes the internal perception we have of our own bodies. It has been demonstrated how 
perception is achieved through active engagement with the world, where body movement and 
sensorimotor contingencies help us to maintain our context in focus. Action is inextricably 
combined with the sensation of external stimuli, which combine with internal feeling as the 
brain receives signals from multiple sources simultaneously. Perception thus involves a dual 
process of action and reception that are inextricably combined, which automatically ensure 
that internal feelings are associated with external stimuli. Emotion thus becomes a frame of 
reference through which all perception is considered. The idea of enaction helps us to better 
focus on the study of perception, which is easily deflected towards the content of perception 
instead of its functioning. Enaction reveals perception as the temporal process that involves an 
active engagement with the environment that is conditioned by operational parameters of the 
body. These object and motion-dependent contingencies that the body uses to facilitate 
perception are learned, embodied resources that also mark a corporal reference point that 
influences our understanding of the external world. By showing how perception is modified—
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corrected, polished, or completed—by consciousness, enaction further demonstrates how our 
experience of the external world is an act of creation. As we combine external sensation with 
internal sensory and conceptual stimuli, we construct specific experiences by separating them 
from the flow of general experience and sealing them with a felt emotion or quality. 
Understanding how our bodies and minds unite to make experience possible is an important 
step in considering how works of art are able to influence and change individuals, as well as 
how aesthetic experience is feasible in the first place. 
 
3.4. Consciousness  
3.4.1. Introduction to Consciousness 
Aesthetic experience is only possible through human consciousness, which implies the 
processes of both feeling and thinking in relation to context. The opposite, anaesthesia, 
demonstrates this to be true. When we are anaesthetized generally we are unconscious, feel 
nothing, and are unaware of our context. Consciousness, however, is similar to perception in 
that it too demonstrates a paradox of transparency. When we try to focus on the operation of 
consciousness, it deflects us to the content that consciousness provides instead of the process 
itself. As Nöe contends:  
the fact is we don’t actually have a better understanding of how the brain produces 
consciousness than Descartes did of how the immaterial soul accomplishes this 
feat. After all, at present we lack even the rudimentary outlines of a neural theory 
of consciousness.264  
 
Perhaps science, then, isn’t the only place to look for an understanding consciousness. In the 
following chapter, we will turn to philosophy to get a better handle on the role of 
consciousness in gaining perceived separation from our environment. We will begin by 
looking at the work of Nicolas Luhmann, who attributes our ability to separate inner self from 
outer world as the basis of self-reference and subjectivity. This is compounded in language, 
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and our ability to simultaneously and alternatively employ subject and object determinations 
implies that meaning is associated with all perception. We will then look at the theory of 
umwelt as defined by Jakob Von Uëxkull, which demonstrates that an organism’s relation 
with its environment is distinct for every species. Umwelt shows how perception and 
consciousness vary greatly amongst species because they are informed by different markers of 
significance, which demonstrate a multiplicity meanings and realities. We will then look at 
Martin Heidegger’s concept Dasein, which considers “being in the world” as being-in-the-
world, since neither being nor world can exist without the other. Dasein compares human 
consciousness with animal consciousness to explore how the concepts of captivation, 
disinhibition and revelation can help us to define consciousness. Finally, we will look at 
Giorgio Agamben’s exploration of ‘the open,’ an idea of Heidegger’s that describes how our 
consciousness permits us to understand distinct beings from the world around us, including 
ourselves. The detachment that is enabled by human consciousness both establishes and 
underlies all of our relationships with other beings, and thus greatly influences our capacities 
to be affected, to act and to understand. This is the essence of aesthetic separation.  
 
3.4.2. Consciousness  
 In his book Art as a Social System, Luhmann is greatly influenced by the theory of 
autopoiesis as he explores art as a form of communication. While his theory of 
communication is largely based in semiotic theory, it also relies heavily on biological and 
neurological research that found theories of human mind and consciousness. One of the 
separations that defines his theory is the distinction between internal and external, which is 
established through the conscious perception that people are capable of.265 We can feel our 
own bodies internally and externally, and we can perceive the world around us through our 
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senses. Our bodies, equipped with various types and intensities of sensory receptors, define 
the threshold between this inner self and outer world. While we usually take this natural 
boundary for granted, Luhmann claims that this division of interior and exterior is a 
prerequisite for self-reference that is generated by our consciousness.266 As we saw in Chapter 
3.2.4. Self, our reflective capacity to picture our self as an object is the foundation of 
subjectivity. Not all organisms are capable of recognizing themselves as separate or different 
from their environment. In fact, it’s something quite special for humans. Luhmann contends 
that our distinct human nervous system constructs the external world around us with the aid of 
perception, which our consciousness in turn establishes as reality.267 He points out the 
important filtration process that our brains carry out so that some perceptual information 
(such as the brain’s own processing) is repressed and not brought forth into consciousness, 
which assists in creating the seamlessness of our “reality”. As we saw in Chapter 3.3.3. 
Enaction, our incomplete perception of the world is cognitively supplemented to generate a 
more fluid conception of our interaction with the world.268 Luhmann speculates that our 
shared acceptance of being distinct from our environment is facilitated through the copying of 
the “double closure” that distinguishes internal from external within consciousness.269 This 
double closure refers to the brain’s ability to divide levels of operation and position itself as 
the ‘coordinator of coordination’ of multiple functions.270 Nonetheless, Luhmann admits that 
many questions remain as to how our consciousness affords us this operative closure. 
Perception, nonetheless, unites our understanding of internal body and external 
environment, and the perception we have of ourselves as objects and not simply as subjects—
the “me” as object and the “I” as subject—is modelled on our perception of the world. 
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Luhmann uses this operational analogy of internal and external perceptual function to 
establish that all communication depends on perception.271 Differentiating between the 
elements involved in perception and communication, Luhmann points out the important yet 
limited role of the nervous system, which only has the capacity to observe itself. It is a closed 
system or circuit that has no direct contact with the outside environment, requiring other 
systems to assist it to connect externally. Consciousness, on the other hand, is able to mix 
internal self-reference and external hetero-reference in its recursive functions.272 It is capable 
of incorporating sensations beyond the boundaries of the body as concepts in simultaneous 
relation with the internal state of the body, according to Luhmann. This operational capacity 
of consciousness to distinguish between concurrent self-reference and hetero-reference is 
what allows Luhmann to presuppose that meaning is attributed to all conscious operations. 
This reflects the generation of significance through difference that we explored as a result of 
autopoietic separation between the molecular and molar levels (see Chapter 2.2.7. Perspective 
and Difference) and the implied meaning of every experience as internal emotion is coupled 
with external reference (see Dewey’s explanation in Chapter 3.3.4. Experience). Thanks to the 
capacity for externalization, our consciousness presupposes an operative structure of 
signification that ensures the synchronized processing of signifier and signified.273 As such, 
our capacity to combine internal and external perceptions endows our consciousness with the 
power to generate meaning for external stimuli, which we will explore more closely in 
Chapter 4.2.3.3. Subject of the Signifier. As we continue to explore aesthetic meaning, this 
ability is of vital importance. 
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3.4.3. Umwelt  
Jakob von Uexküll’s theory of umwelt helps to develop a more thorough 
understanding of the relationship between animals—including humans—and their 
environment. The semiotic theory of umwelt, which means “environment” in German, claims 
that different animal species perceive the same environment distinctly.274 Every species has 
its unique umwelt, which means that the conception that humans have of space and time is not 
repeated in the animal kingdom. Our human reality is unique to us. Umwelt develops the 
autopoietic idea that significance is generated in relation to the recognition of difference in 
context (see Chapter 2.2.7. Perspective & Difference) and explores how beings connect with 
specific aspects of their surroundings. The philosopher Giorgio Agamben describes how 
environment-worlds, umwelten (plural) are populated with a variety of ‘carriers of 
significance’ or ‘marks,’ which are the only things that attract the attention of animal 
species.275 Uexküll uses the word umgebung to define the umwelt from the perspective of 
observation—the objective space in which humans perceive other animals behaving as they 
interact with their environments.276 The theory of umwelt contends that animals are limited to 
consider objects as meaningful on three terms: desirable (+), undesirable (-) or safe to ignore 
(0).277 Humans, on the other hand, have developed an innenwelt (inner-world) that includes a 
conception of self when they relate with the environment.278 The concept of an inter-objective 
self allows us to distinguish objects in the world as distinct beings, which opens our capacity 
to attribute significance to our world well beyond the limits of desirable, undesirable or safe 
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to ignore.279 The semiotician Thomas A. Sebeok posits that the cultural world for humans is 
only possible thanks to the ‘symbolic objectivity’ that their innenwelt enables, while other 
animals are limited to ‘sensory objectivity’ and thus are limited to social organization within 
the world.280 This is important for our conception of aesthetic theory, since art is not possible 
without symbolism.281 This also grounds the framework that Luhmann uses to found his 
theory of observation that we examined in Chapter 2.3.5. Observation. The theory of umwelt 
demonstrates how the richness of our symbolic and communicative capacities as humans is 
dependent on our capacity to establish self through subject-object relativity, which greatly 
distinguishes us from other animals. Cognitive capacities are species-specific and play an 
important role when recognizing and endowing significance to elements within the 
environment.282 A maple leaf, for example, signifies different things for distinct animals: food 
for a snail, shelter for bird, camouflage for a moth, or national identity for a Canadian citizen. 
Through the concept of umwelt, we can begin to appreciate how the practice of art is specific 
for humankind. 
 
3.4.4. The Open 
Heidegger used Uexküll’s theory of umwelt to form his idea of Dasein, which offers a 
distinct conception of human existence by stressing the importance of our inherent coupling 
with the environment.283 As mentioned in the chapter introduction, Dasein reconsiders the 
existential state of ‘being in the world’ without the separation that is implied by putting 
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spaces between the words, since neither ‘being’ nor ‘world’ can exist without the other. 
Heidegger uses hyphens to provide a sense of connection, and when he compares the human 
“being-in-world” to the animal’s “poverty-in-world,” he is referring to the limited relationship 
that animals have with their environment.284 Humans, on the other hand, are capable of 
forming worlds, which are unique, meaning-infused conceptions of our environment based on 
our powers of perception—similar to the shift from ‘environment’ to ‘context’ that we 
examined in Chapter 2.3.4. Context. In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger reflects the 
aesthetic opposition of material and form with the words ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as a way of 
differentiating between the natural material and the composed form of artworks.285 He defines 
‘knowing’ in reference to the Greek origin of the word: “a bringing forth of beings in that it 
brings forth what is present, as such, out of concealment, specifically into the unconcealment 
of their appearance.”286 In reference to Uexküll’s assertion that the environment is populated 
with carriers of significance, Heidegger agrees that animals are only affected by the things 
that trigger their actions, or activate their “being capable,” when they relate with their 
environment.287 They are in a constant state of inhibition until they are disinhibited by 
something in their environment.288 Heidegger uses the term benommenheit to describe the 
animal’s constant state of captivation, which he later associates with “being blocked,” or 
“being absorbed” (eingenommen).289 Agamben states: “[i]nsofar as it is essentially captivated 
and wholly absorbed in its own disinhibitor the animal cannot truly act (handeln) or comport 
itself (sich verhalten) in relation to it: it can only behave (sich benehmen).”290 The limited 
relationship that animals have with their environment implies that they are unable to 
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comprehend the distinct components they interact with as symbolic beings. They are unable to 
see the world that humans can see. Heidegger states: “[t]o say that captivation is the essence 
of animality means: The animal as such does not stand within a potentiality for revelation of 
beings. Neither its so-called environment nor the animal itself are revealed as beings.”291 Our 
ability to comprehend the things within our environment as distinct beings—including 
ourselves—enables us to escape the captivation that defines animal existence. While other 
species only recognize the ‘earth’ of an artwork, humans are able to recognize both ‘earth’ 
and ‘world’—the raw material of the artistic support and its formal composition, which we 
understand as being contingent on human intentionality. While we will explore this more 
thoroughly in the coming chapters, the unconcealment that our cognitive powers of distinction 
provide us is obviously influential to our practice of art. Agamben muses on the special 
capacity of humankind to consider ourselves as separate from the world, proposing that the 
impulse to divide, separate, and distinguish is what truly makes us a distinct species: 
“In our culture, man has always been thought of as the articulation and 
conjunction of a body and a soul, of a living thing and a logos, of a natural (or 
animal) element and a supernatural or social or divine element. We must learn 
instead to think of man as what results from the incongruity of these two 
elements, and investigate not the metaphysical mystery of conjunction, but rather 
the practical and political mystery of separation. What is man, if he is always the 
place—and, at the same time, the result—of ceaseless divisions and caesurae?”292 
 
Agamben contemplates Heidegger’s notion of ‘the open’ as the potential space of truth 
as animals behave in their environment.293 Humans and other animals demonstrate different 
states of Dasein within the open, but we are the only species that is able to perceive it as such; 
a potential space of truth. Agamben equates the “poverty in world” of the animal to an 
“openness without disconcealment,” which contrasts with the “world-forming” capacity that 
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characterizes the human conception of the environment.294 While animals are open to their 
disinhibitors, they are not open to their disinhibitors being revealed as such, as beings.295 
Agamben contends that this means that animals exist in a dual state of constant lack in 
relation to their environment. They lack what they need to survive physiologically—food, 
water, shelter, etc.—but they also lack the ability to recognize and understand their situation 
of being within its environment. Heidegger states: “Plant and animal depend on something 
outside of themselves without ever ‘seeing’ either the outside or the inside, i.e., without ever 
seeing their being unconcealed in the free of being.”296 Agamben reiterates this thought, 
focusing on the reflexive inter-objectivity that allows human thought to awaken to the 
possibility of meaning. “Only man, indeed only the essential gaze of authentic thought, can 
see the open which names the unconcealedness of beings. The animal, on the contrary, never 
sees this open.”297 ‘The open’ provides the idea of a conceptual space that exists in duality as 
a physical and psychic relationship between organism and environment. While the physical 
relationships human beings and animals have with the environment are similar, our psychic 
relationships are very distinct. According to Heidegger, seeing ‘the open’ is tantamount to 
experiencing truth. “Truth is the ur-strife in which, always in some particular way, the open is 
won; that open within which everything stands and out of which everything withholds itself—
everything which, as a being, both shows and withdraws itself.”298 Truth, as such, needs to be 
actively achieved, and seeing the truth in artworks is an excellent example of the specialized 
contemplation that our species has come to excel at. Our human consciousness allows us to 
separate ourselves from the world and, in turn, to consider components of our environment as 
distinct beings with potential meaning. In addition, our cognitive processes creatively 
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combine external references and internal feelings that attribute signification as we interact 
with our environment. As we become unconcealed to ourselves, meanings are generated and 
revealed to us in the open.  
 
3.4.5. Conclusion to Consciousness 
When it comes to understanding how consciousness enables us to perceive ourselves 
as separate from our environment, science, semantics and philosophy combine to give a well-
rounded picture. Our ability to separate inner self from outer world forms the basis of self-
reference and subjectivity, against which objectivity and the idea of other are established. 
This is reflected in our capacity for language, which enables us to simultaneously and 
alternatively employ subject and object determinations. This, along with the duality of our 
cognitive architecture, implies that meaning is associated with all perception, which helps us 
to understand that no observation is neutral. Umwelt demonstrates that an organism’s relation 
with its environment is distinct for every species. It further shows how markers of 
significance inform our perception and consciousness of the environment. These vary greatly 
depending on each species, and in turn demonstrate a multiplicity of possible meanings and 
realities. While meaning associated to external stimuli is mostly limited to positive, negative 
or neutral, humankind is capable of expanding external relationships through our competence 
for inter-objectivity and our ability to understand objects in the world as ‘beings.’ Dasein 
relates our coupling with the environment to being-in-the-world without subject-environment 
separation. It shows how the concepts of captivation, disinhibition and revelation can help us 
to define human consciousness in contradistinction to that of animals. Our consciousness 
permits us to understand ourselves as distinct beings from the world around us, and to 
appreciate the potential for the unconcealment of truth. The detachment that is enabled by 
human consciousness both establishes and underlies all of our relationships with other beings, 
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and greatly influences our capacities to act, to be affected and to understand. All of these 
abilities are critical aspects of the captivating practice of art.  
 
3.5. Conclusion to Thought / Self 
Life and Art 
 Our cognitive abilities facilitate aesthetic experience and the practice of art. Without 
the reflexive conception of self and the perception of experience that it allows, our 
consciousness wouldn’t be able to reveal the significance that artistic practice depends upon. 
While this chapter on human thought doesn’t directly broach the subject of connecting life 
with art, it does prepare the coming chapters to do so by establishing the cognitive framework 
that makes artistic practice possible. It explores various ways in which separation is evident in 
our corporal and cerebral functioning, which work together to combine internal and external 
reference. It also looks at the cognitive processes that form the foundation of aesthetic 
experience, including thought, memory and self. Furthermore, it divulges various fallacies 
and inadequacies of human thought that are supplemented by our consciousness. We are left 
with a picture of human cognition that is capable of reasoning and understanding, but also of 
being creative through its association of internal and external sensations in reference to a 
qualitative evaluation of self in order to form experiences. More than anything, it is our inter-
objectivity and our reflexive distinction of self from world that enables our species to 
conceptualize beings symbolically, and establish new carriers of significance within the world 
in which we live together. This is the true foundation of aesthetic experience, as feelings and 
concepts intermingle to inform our complex being-in-world. 
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Separation 
 Separation is an obvious aspect of parallelism, where every physical event is 
necessarily a cognitive event, and vice versa, which demonstrates the interconnectedness of 
body and mind. The human body and mind work in tandem to facilitate thought, memory and 
perception, all of which combine to produce consciousness, experience and a conception of 
self. These processes and capacities are contingent on an individual’s constant relation with 
their environment, which becomes the external counterpoint that reinforces the individuation 
of self and permits the psychic distinction from the environment. This is reinforced by the 
twofold capacity for communication within the human body, which utilizes both the 
endocrine (chemical) and nervous (neuronal) systems to maintain all parts of the body 
connected and responsive.299 The distinct functionality of these two systems provides an 
added layer of complexity to both internal and external communication, which helps to 
establish our understanding of self. Our reflexive self-conception becomes the persistent 
reference point against which we understand the world as we become individually in relation 
with our environment.300 Perception is the active process of coupling with our surroundings to 
receive information about our situation. Perception is also a twofold operation that combines 
external sensory or internal conceptual stimuli in reference to the concurrent emotional body 
state at the time of interaction.301 Feeling marks perception automatically, as such, and 
becomes a frame of reference through which all perception takes place. While our nervous 
system is limited in its internal mechanisms of neuronal communication, the consciousness 
that it supports extends into the world and mixes external hetero-reference with internal self-
reference.302 The twofold architecture of conscious experience thus ensures that meaning is 
attributed to all conscious operations through the inherent association of internal and external 
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components. Sensation and/or conceptualization combine with emotion to mark each 
conscious experience with both signifier and signified.303 While other species have limited 
understanding of their relation with their carriers of significance, humans are able to objectify 
beings in their environment, which permits us a far more complex relationship and 
comprehension.304 Understanding elements of our environment as beings enables us to escape 
the captivated inhibitive nature that characterizes animal behaviour.305 This is dependent on 
our ability to understand ourselves as separate from our environment, which is an inherent 
consequence of self-reference and human consciousness. It implies that disconnection founds 
other profound and inescapable existential issues that define our human nature, conditioning 
us to contemplate the paradox of our shared isolation as we live our lives ‘apart together.’ 
 
Human Cognition / Aesthetic Thought 
Our unique capacity to think establishes the mechanisms that enable aesthetic 
experience. While thinking is a corporal event that demonstrates the interconnectedness of 
body and mind, the control centre of the nervous system is the brain, which uses ‘neural 
representations’ to generate thought.306 These mental images are neural patterns that can be 
established, modified and referenced as the brain orchestrates a remarkable interconnectivity 
of input and association, both internal and external. Our ability to store and represent mental 
imagery facilitates memory and subsequently our aptitude to learn.307 While it is limited and 
entropic in nature, memory allows us to recognize, which is the basis of autopoietic identity 
formation. As such, it establishes our foundation of knowledge, which the mental processes of 
conceptualization and categorization depend, and lead to the human faculties of reason, 
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understanding and judgement, which define aesthetic thought. Memory also provides us a 
consistent perspective of corporal and cognitive states, both of which help to consolidate our 
individual conceptions of self.308 This reflexive ability to distinguish inner and outer stimuli 
reinforces our self-identity in language in relation to subjectivity and objectivity.309 All of our 
conscious thought uses this conception of self as a backdrop against which the world is 
experienced and considered.310 The combination of action with reception in perception also 
helps to demonstrate the sensorimotor contingencies that condition our observation of the 
world around us. Enactive conception highlights the fact that perception is temporal, active 
and conditioned by the cognitive functioning of our bodies.311 The partial and fallible 
perspective that perception affords us is filled in and polished by our consciousness, which 
eliminates all traces of its operation and impact.312 As we explore the paradox of 
visibility/invisibility and notions of self-deception in Chapter 6. Artworks & Art, this point of 
comparison between people and artworks will be more fully explored. The action and 
impressionability involved in perception ensure that it’s a naturally creative process. The 
experience that it facilitates for us is equally creative, as we combine external and internal 
reference as we engage with the world around us.313 Even when we perceive purely cognitive 
concepts, there is always a reference to external context. While we experience the world and 
our thought as ongoing processes in consciousness, specific experiences are marked by 
temporal and qualitative distinctions.314 Every experience is composed in time with a 
beginning and an end, and every experience is imbued with an emotional quality that 
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separates it from ubiquity.315 This is the essence of aesthetic experience, as subjective 
emotions are reflexively engaged during interactions with beauty, art or the unknown. 
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CHAPTER 4. HUMAN BEINGS / INTENTION 
4.1. Introduction to Human Beings / Intention 
 Art is connected to life through human activity and thought, and in order to thoroughly 
appreciate this union it’s important to understand what makes human beings unique. Why 
don’t other species practice art? Are the capacities that facilitate art purely human or could 
they extend to other forms of intelligence—animal, artificial or alien? According to Kant, the 
various modes of cognitive thought that humans are capable of—specifically rationality, 
judgment and understanding—enable a special kind of comprehension and experience that is 
called aesthetic. While aesthetics and art are not the same, they are definitely related in our 
contemporary understanding of artistic appreciation. Rancière’s aesthetic philosophy, in 
particular, is dedicated to exploring how the aesthetic regime of art—our practice and 
understanding of art after Kant—demonstrates the connection of art and everyday life.316 As 
mentioned in Chapter 2.3.3. Organization, artworks in the ‘mimetic regime’ of art were 
understood as distinct from life because they were thought of as mere representations—
mimetic copies that separated the subject from its image.317 Kant’s Critique of Judgement 
changed everything, though, and helped people to begin to think about the practice of art 
differently, and to think of artworks as something that provided a unique experience. 
Artworks began to be considered as vessels of truth that functioned well beyond simple 
representation. As Tanke states:  
Aesthetics, with its central categories of experience and reflection, emerged with 
the recognition that there were no longer any preordained rules for distinguishing 
in advance the objects of art from the products of everyday life, and that each 
experience had to be evaluated in its irreducible singularity.318  
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The thought processes that Kant defined in his aesthetic theory enable art to be understood as 
an inimitable, transcendental practice of humanity, the mechanics of which will be further 
explored in Chapter 5.2.2. Summary – The Critique of Judgement, Analytic of the Beautiful.  
 Art, however, needs more than intelligence and aesthetic thought to exist. Beyond the 
cognitive processes that are necessary for an individual to know and appreciate art, artworks 
require human society and institutions in order to function. Art only works in relation to 
systems of artistic practice that have been established and developed by people over time. 
Artworks may be new, but art certainly isn’t. It’s something that we are born into, something 
we’re exposed to, something we learn and something we advance. In order to understand how 
life is reflected in art, then, we must take into account the institutionality that supports the 
practice of art. How, though, can we begin to relate our convoluted understanding of the art 
world with our self-conception as autopoietic organisms? How do the building blocks of 
life—our molecular entities—extend to facilitate the complex operation of the art system on a 
global scale? Taking on the task of answering such expansive philosophical questions, Searle 
has championed a naturalist philosophy that attempts to connect our mindless and 
meaningless molecular selves with our conscious and significant molar selves. While Searle 
posits that collective intentionality is the foundation of society, our specifically human 
political reality is comprised of two more characteristics: constitutive rules and the imposition 
of function.319 These two ideas lead us to the focus of this chapter, which will explore 
language and technology as two distinguishing features of human society that play a crucial 
role in our conception of art and aesthetics. While constitutive rules require language to be 
established, the imposition of function leads us to explore the role of technology in defining 
who we are as a people and a species. Exploring language and technology—two defining 
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characteristics of humanity—will help us to establish how artworks exist as beings in relation 
to society. 
Tangentially, using language and technology to differentiate between humans and 
other animals not only demonstrates how art reflects human society, but it also helps to better 
understand our tendency as a species to distinguish and separate in the first place. This, in 
turn, will help to clarify some of the mechanisms involved in acts of separation, which are 
needed to distinguish the practice of art from other human practices and to dismantle the 
distinctions between art and life. Studying how we as a species establish and manoeuvre 
around boundaries and limits helps to enlighten our human nature and the possibility of 
thinking of art as autonomous. The division between humans and animals is doomed from the 
beginning, however, since human beings are animals by definition. Two contemporary 
philosophers—Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida—have recognized the practice of 
language and the use of technology as the two main attributes that have historically separated 
homo sapiens from other animal species. As they dismantle this distinction, I will continue to 
explore the work of Nöe, who demonstrates how our conception of art directly relates to both 
language and technology. With regards to language, I will explore the influence of 
establishing a subject, the difference between the words ‘reaction’ and ‘response,’ and the act 
of writing or mark-making in relation to art. As I move on to examine our use of technology, I 
will largely explore the underlying ideas of reorganization, progression and function that 
relate technological practices to art and aesthetics. In conclusion, language and technology are 
demonstrated to be specialized capacities that establish human politics, while the practice of 
art subverts them to distinguish its own value and autonomy within human society. 
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4.2. Language  
4.2.1. Introduction to Language  
Human society is largely established through language, which makes it an important 
aspect to explore in our journey to relate art to life. Exploring language as a distinguishing 
factor between humans and animals is not without its difficulties. Agamben speaks of the 
aporia that the linguist Heymann Steinthal encountered in the nineteenth century in his work 
to determine the prelinguistic stage of homo sapiens. If we did evolve from another great ape 
species, then he thought it was obvious that at some point ‘we’ did not have language. But 
this, here, is the difficulty. Without language, this ancestor of ours is not ‘us.’ It is a different 
species. As Steinthal states, “Either man has language, or he simply is not. … With it, true 
and proper human activity begins; it is the bridge that leads from the animal kingdom to the 
human kingdom.”320 As Agamben explores Steinthal’s contradiction of a prelinguistic man, 
he tries to demonstrate the “anthropomorphic machine” that is constantly at work in 
contemporary culture, and the contradictions that it inherently entails. The problem, according 
to Agamben, is that this ‘machine’ functions by means of an exclusivity-inclusivity duality 
that always presupposes the human. We are left with a circular definition that Agamben 
describes as a state of indeterminacy, which has little use aside from illustrating the 
contradictory nature of our being. For me, however, this unstable definition of humanity can 
be viewed positively, as it assures that we as humans recognize that we are still in a state of 
development and transformation. Furthermore, this indeterminate state can be seen to reflect 
the ontology of artworks, which we will explore in Chapter 5.3. ‘The Fragment.’ Returning to 
the idea of a prelinguistic humanity, Agamben rejects the thought of defining the human as an 
animal plus something (for example, “animal plus language” or “animal plus technology”). 
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He believes that rationality and language are not things that humans have, but rather they are 
things that we are—abilities that we use in order to be.  
Despite the great leaps in the philosophy of language over the past century, Searle 
laments the continued resistance to thinking of language as an extension of human biology. In 
his work to relate molecular biology with sociology, he defines language as: “[our] special 
ability to form derived intentionality, i.e. meaning, in sentences and speech acts.”321 As we 
explored in autopoiesis (Chapter 2.5.3. Observation), intentionality is based upon the 
molecular functioning of an organism but implies the molar consciousness of the organism in 
relation to perception and action within their environment, which in turn relates language to 
expressions of purpose and desire. Searle constructs his theory of language in terms of 
functions and rules that attribute meaning to things through the use of symbols. Aside from 
facilitating elaborate forms of communication, language provides humanity with two specific 
abilities that enable our uniquely political nature. The first is the ability to attribute “status 
functions” on objects, which are collectively accepted purposes or meanings.322 A perfect 
example is money, which functions not because of its physical structure but because of the 
shared attitudes we have towards it. The second ability that language provides us is the ability 
to establish rules, and Searle distinguishes between “regulative” and “constitutive rules.” 
While regulative rules regulate familiar norms of behaviour (i.e. drive on the right side of the 
road), constitutive rules regulate while creating new forms of behaviour. His example is the 
game of chess, which is defined and functions according to its rules in context. Two players 
must accept and follow the rules of chess, which stipulate how each distinct piece can move, 
which establishes what a checkmate position can be.323 Language helps to establish 
constitutive rules by establishing that x equals y, or x equals y in context z, which means that 
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we can place meaning or function on anything and, furthermore, make this meaning 
conditional. Through our accepted use of status functions and constitutive rules, Searle asserts 
that human society becomes institutionalized through ideas of family, education, politics, 
economics, and religion. While highlighting the necessity of individual belief in these social 
rules and functions—their recognition and agreement—Searle also points out the necessity of 
representing them in language.  
In order that something can be money, property, marriage, or government, people 
have to have appropriate thoughts about it. But in order that they have these 
appropriate thoughts, they have to have devices for thinking those thoughts, and 
those devices are essentially symbolic or linguistic.324    
 
 In this chapter we will explore three distinct aspects of language that play an important 
role in establishing communication, subjectivity and symbolism. All three of these concepts 
are essential to the practice of art, and we will explore how language is constitutive of these 
ideas by looking more specifically at speech, subjects and writing. Furthermore, these topics 
help to clarify how we as a species separate ourselves from other animal species, and more 
importantly, how our tendency to separate defines us as a species. As we explore aesthetic 
separation and the thresholds of art and life, the role of language in facilitating separation is of 
key importance. Understanding the purpose and functionality of language will help us to 
establish the mechanisms through which art is practised on with the aid of reflexive and 
symbolic thought. It will begin to do so by looking at the way in which we as a species use 
language to differentiate ourselves through thought.  
 
4.2.2.  Speech  
4.2.2.1. To Name 
As humans, we speak for many reasons. In our condition of ‘being apart together,’ 
speech offers us a way to communicate and connect with others, a way of externalizing and 
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sharing our interior lives. We use language in other ways, though, in order to relate with and 
understand the world around us. This chapter is largely based upon an examination of recent 
texts by Derrida and Agamben, which explore how we use language to distinguish ourselves 
from other animals. Through their insight it becomes obvious that language is not only used to 
define and differentiate, but also to establish authority and influence. Derrida looks to the 
creation narrative of Genesis to explore the originary power of language to exert control, 
before cautioning about the potential of abstraction that language offers. This is evident in the 
theorization of art, in the naming and renaming that is constantly practiced in attempts to 
understand and position movements and periodizations. It is also apparent as we shift our 
thought from artworks to art, a generalization that uses language to transform real objects into 
abstract, universal concepts. Returning to the distinction of humans and animals, Agamben 
explores the influence of the biological taxonomy of Linneaus, a Swedish biologist who used 
language to identify living species, while distinguishing humans by their reflexive nature. 
Taxonomy is used in the realm of art too, and we will look at the work of Osborne to describe 
and define the are movements of the aesthetic regime and the various facets of modernism, all 
of which relate to our understanding of contemporary art practices. For my purposes, these 
various uses of language reflect the manner in which art is continually subjected to linguistic 
analysis in attempts to identify, distinguish, position and challenge. By examining the role of 
language to establish difference between species, or practices within the history of art, we can 
begin to see how language is used as a way of differentiating and organizing ourselves within 
the world around us. Understanding how we separate and distinguish ourselves is an 
important step to fully appreciate the complex connections between art and life.  
Language is a creative and powerful force. In his exploration of the distinction 
between humans and animals, Derrida examines the biblical story of Genesis to uncover the 
linguistic mechanisms at play in the creation narrative of Judaism and Christianity. After 
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making the universe and resting for a day, God creates man—Adam—and gives him authority 
over the animals. Derrida notes the importance of man coming after animals—following, as it 
were—and highlights the manner in which the authority over animals is granted to man 
through the act of naming.325 Power is established within man through spoken language, and 
the resounding silence of the animals during this process appears to confirm the truth and 
weight of this vocal act. The tradition of naming is repeated to this day, as we name our pets 
through spoken acts and use these names to call, command, scold or tame. Derrida attributes a 
“deep sadness” to the animal kingdom as a result of their inability to speak or to name 
themselves.326 In terms of art, acts of naming are mandatory. Aside from the naming of 
artworks by their authors, which establishes their authority as creators, art historians and 
theorists mount elaborate arguments in support of the naming and renaming of artistic 
tendencies and movements. Rancière is no exception, and his fabrication of terms such as ‘the 
aesthetic regime,’ aesthetic separation, and ‘the aesthetic break’ can be seen to function in two 
distinct ways. On one hand, the invention of new terminology offers a fresh start to 
understanding what something is and how it works, without the distraction of preconceived 
notions that existing terminology might impose or limit. This is the creative use of language, 
once again demonstrating authority over a subject. Once this new terminology becomes 
collectively accepted over the course of time, however, it can become just as restrictive and 
controlling as the previous terminology, or it can become collectively accepted to mean 
something that wasn’t originally intended. As we briefly explore the word ‘modernism’ in the 
coming paragraphs, this possible subversion of language becomes obvious. Sometimes, 
though, a new name helps to reposition an ill-conceived, accepted conception of something. 
Take, for example, Osborne’s effort to replace the label ‘contemporary art’ with the term 
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‘postconceptual art.’ It is an attempt not only to eliminate a general and somewhat confusing 
term for a periodization, but to acknowledge the importance that conceptual art strategies and 
methodologies continue to have on the practice of art at the moment. While the logic behind 
this periodization will be further explored in Chapter 5.3.4. Contemporary / Postconceptual 
Art, I for one am comfortable to identify my current practice as postconceptual, with a ‘tip of 
the hat’ towards some of my main artistic inspiration.  
As Derrida continues to explore how language is used to differentiate humans from 
animals, he notes that part of the problem is language itself. In particular, he looks at the 
problematic difference between uncountable nouns (i.e. ‘the animal’ in general) and countable 
nouns (i.e. a specific animal). If we consider a parallel situation between ‘art’ (uncountable) 
and ‘artwork’ (countable), we can begin to see the relevance for this thesis. The difficulty is 
that the subject ‘the animal’ as a universal singular is in fact no specific animal at all, and yet 
it conjures the meaning of the entire animal kingdom, apart from humans of course. The 
problem is that this use of language allows us to group and understand an abstract 
generalization in a specific way, which in turn allows us to disregard a variety of specific 
details (i.e. gender or age in terms of animals, or media and dimensions in terms of artworks) 
that should be taken into account if we are to thoroughly understand any actual (structural) 
differences between organisms. For this reason I am very careful to differentiate between the 
word ‘art’ as an abstraction of the mind and ‘artwork’ as a real, specific thing or being. 
Derrida demonstrates his creative knack by developing the word “animot,” which combines 
the words “animal” and “mot” (meaning “word” in French).327 As a new word, it avoids any 
interpretive possibility of ‘the animal’ in general singular, while simultaneously pointing 
towards the function of language as it is used to define—or in this case, to subject—individual 
animals and species to anthropomorphization. By subjecting animals and artworks to human 
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language through naming and generalization, we impose anthropomorphic meaning upon 
them. As we examine the idea of the artwork as subject and Other in Chapter 4.2.3. Subjects, 
the significance of this will become clearer. This imposition of language, as natural as it may 
be, determines, distinguishes and directs the world around us. 
Naming is more than simply establishing power relationships, however. It is through 
naming that we differentiate and identify the vast array of life with which we share our planet. 
In the mid-eighteenth century, fifty-five years before Kant published his Critique of 
Judgement, the Sweedish biologist Carl von Linne (a.k.a. Linnaeus) had begun dividing all 
living things into their nomenclatures and taxonomies. In the tenth edition of his Systema 
Naturae, Linnaeus coined the term Homo sapiens, which was polemical at the time for two 
reasons.328 The first was that he placed humans within the category of ‘animal,’ disregarding 
any hierarchy that the prevalent religious thought of the day sought to impose. The second 
reason was that the Latin words which he chose to define humans didn’t follow the 
physiological binomial that was used to attribute names to other animals and plants. Instead, 
Linnaeus defined humans by their cognitive faculty of “knowing oneself,” effectively 
describing humans as fundamentally reflexive animals. Agamben once again points out the 
state of indeterminacy that is implied in this reflexive taxonomy of modern man: “Homo 
sapiens, then, is neither a clearly defined species nor a substance; it is, rather, a machine or 
device for producing the recognition of the human.”329 In other words, being a member of our 
species is the capacity of self-recognition as human in relation to our non-human ancestors 
who share the homo genus. Rancière’s condition of ‘being apart together’ once again gains 
relevancy, but this time in relation to interspecies relations. Nonetheless, the biological 
archive that Linnaeus began during the enlightenment had such influential intellectual 
repercussions that it can only be rivalled—in biological terms—by the groundbreaking 
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discoveries of Darwin’s The Origin of the Species, which was obviously informed by 
Linnaeus’ initial separations.  
The use of language to categorize can also be easily found in historical and theoretical 
discussions about art. In his recent analysis of modernism, Osborne maps out the art 
movements that form the aesthetic regime, the term defined by Rancière that spans the art 
movements from the age of enlightenment to now. For a general overview of the 
periodization of the aesthetic regime in relation to both Osborne’s conception of modernism 
and the source material of this thesis, see Appendix 2.  Osborne separates the main 
movements and includes the main mediating principles at work during each period and the 
logical form of each period’s key principles. 
Periodization Mediating principle(s) Logical forms 
Classicism hierarchy of genres subsumption 
Romanticism primacy of the individual 
work 
fragment 
Aestheticism / aesthetic 
modernism 
aesthetic intensities of 
modern life 
aesthetic identity 
Modernism of avant-gardes isms of movements groups 
Formalist modernism mediums species 
Generic modernism 1 [‘readymade’ as negative 
meta-medium / vanishing 
mediator of the destruction of 
mediums] 
proper name 
‘Contemporary art’ / generic 
modernism 2: dialectic of 
modernisms 
critical isms and series distributive entities 
Table E. Periodization of mediating forms.330 
This chart offers a simple reduction of many pages of art historical and philosophic research 
into the tendencies of media use and formal structures that have been used by artists and 
generalized by critics over the past three hundred years. The purpose of Osborne’s broad view 
is to position contemporary art practice in relation to antecedent practices. This is an 
important contextualization that takes into account the autopoietic logic that: “[a]n organism 
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is never outside a history, and necessarily always finds itself in a particular state and position 
as a result of its previous states and positions.”331 As you can see, there are five different 
conceptions of modernism listed in the periodization provided by Osborne, who borrows 
Linnaeus’ biological nomenclature to define relationships at work within contemporary 
artistic practice—what Osborne refers to as “generic modernism 2”. Referencing Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory, Osborne tries to settle the disparate reality between the universal (abstract) 
conception of ‘art’ and the determinate (real) singularity of ‘artwork’ discussed a few 
paragraphs ago. As he states: “the challenge is to theorize the unity of the generic concept of 
art conceptually, as the distributive unity of a historical process of determinate negations.”332 
For Osborne, every individual artwork within modernism represents a determinate negation 
(or set of negations) of ‘art’—for example, in order to be modern an artwork must be new and 
perform a temporal logic of negation in relation to its precursors333—and thus relies upon an a 
priori conception of ‘art’ in order to function as an individual ‘modern’ artwork. The 
interdependence of artworks and art—the singular and the universal—differentiates the 
“generic modernism 2” conception of modernism from Osborne’s other conceptions based on 
the theories of Greenberg or the readymades of Duchamp.  
Genus ‘Art’ Critical distributional unity of the historical totality of 
works of art 
Species Arts Afterlife of mediums within ‘art’; critical ‘isms’, 
individual series and new forms, corresponding to 
structural negations of the received artistic field 
Individuals Works of art Ontologically distinctive subject-like entities producing 
the illusion of autonomous meaning-production through 
the mediation of determinate negations 
Chart D. Generic artistic modernism 2/dialectic of modernisms (historical ontology): a 
negation of historically received (craft-based) mediums; an affirmation of new determinate 
negations of varying aspects of the established artistic field.334 
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Osborne acknowledges that problems arise with the term ‘modernism’ either because it isn’t 
understood as an operative or generative logic, or because we associate the name modernism 
to one specific facet (i.e. High modernism).335 This conception of contemporary art will be 
further explored in Chapter 5.3.2. Description – ‘The Fragment’ and 5.3.3. Autonomy. For 
now, it is enough to demonstrate how the structural logic of Linnaeus is used to categorize 
various facets of art practices within the aesthetic regime and modernism, demonstrating once 
again how language is used to differentiate, define, and position.  
 In conclusion, the use of language to differentiate humans from other animals offers 
an example of how we use words to understand through identification and distinction. By 
attributing words to things, we gain cognitive power over those things, which can be called 
and manipulated in thought through their representation in language. The power of language 
was demonstrated by Derrida in the creation narrative of Genesis, where man’s naming of the 
animals was concurrent with his achievement of dominion over them, and their silence 
foreshadowed their impending domestication. The act of naming is central to artistic practice 
as well, where artworks obligingly distinguish themselves with a proper name and the 
associated name of their creator. Authority is established through naming. The theorization 
and historicization of artistic practice also demonstrate a continued tradition of naming that 
offers potential new ways of understanding or reconsidering specific topics. One of the key 
functions of naming is providing an accessible handle for abstract concepts so that things 
which don’t exist physically or are difficult to identify can be more easily represented in 
thought. An example is art, which is a generalization of all artworks, an impossible yet 
necessary concept upon which contemporary—and postconceptual—artworks rely. This 
relation of the singular being to the universal generalization is a key movement that aesthetic 
experience embodies, made possible through language but also present as we consider the 
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subject within society and the artwork in relation to art, equally ‘together apart.’ As art 
movements are categorized and positioned to highlight various relationships, the use of 
language is prevalent once again. This is evident in the adoption of Linneaus’ taxonomy, 
which was a very influential conceptualization of the distinctions and relationships of living 
species. As reflected in the taxonomy of modernism by Osborne, providing a nomenclature of 
movements and tendencies allows us to grasp a broad perspective in a glance, which 
facilitates a positioning of art practices in relation to collective trends. As we briefly explored, 
Osborne’s notion of contemporary art requires a preconceived idea of art, an established 
counterpoint against which artworks must demonstrate some form of novelty to be 
categorized by the temporal artistic conceptions of ‘contemporary’ or ‘modern’. While our 
personal conceptions of art may not require language to function as such, language provides 
an example of how a singular entity like an artwork can become a universal generalization 
like ‘art’ through the simple act of being represented by a word. This is how we use language 
to think,336 which we explored more thoroughly in Chapter 3.2.3. Thought. For now, though, 
we can begin to see how language is a distinguishing and authoritative capacity. Not only do 
we use it to separate ourselves from other animals, but we use it to discern everything and 
anything, even things that can only ever exist as abstractions. This is how we differentiate and 
organize ourselves, using language to command and control the world around us. As we 
continue to explore the power to respond, the importance of language to the practice of art 
will become all the more noticeable. 
 
4.2.2.2. To Respond 
Language endows humanity with the ability to respond, which helps to establish 
relationships amongst people and forms the basis of our political reality. As Searle notes: 
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“There are lots of social animals, but man is the only political animal. What has to be added to 
the fact that we are social animals to get the fact that we are political animals?”337 As we will 
explore in this chapter, language offers us the opportunity to expand and complicate our 
interpersonal relationships while clarifying our understanding of communicated reality, 
through which our beliefs and knowledge are shared. We will look once again to Derrida, 
who connects a lack of response to a lack of responsibility in other animal species. In the 
absence of responsibility, we can begin to understand how the institutional constructions of 
human society are largely based on language. In particular, the ability to respond allows us to 
position ourselves politically in relation to other people and ideas. As we look more closely at 
the work of Searle, who clarifies epistemological and ontological perspectives in terms of 
subjectivity and objectivity, we can begin to understand how our own beliefs and knowledge 
of the world are formed through language and our ability to distinguish between fact and 
opinion. Finally, we will look at the way in which Rancière connects the political efficacy of 
art with the capacities to being affected and responding. Since Rancière believes that politics 
is largely about the ability of being seen and heard,338 the practice of art becomes the perfect 
arena in which significance and truth are contested and repositioned. Whether an artwork is 
understood as a response in itself or is appreciated for the responses that it generates, the 
political implications of these responses once again demonstrate the relevance of language in 
establishing the political nature of art. 
 It is not simply the deprivation of language that distinguishes animals from humans, 
but rather their inability to respond that defines them—or better yet, confines them. While 
humans can both respond and react, animals are condemned to instinctive reaction. This has 
repercussions that extend well beyond individual survival and into the social realm. As 
Derrida points out, the inability of animals to respond means that animals lack responsibility, 
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and are incapable of being responsible.339 Responsibility thus becomes a distinguishing 
quality for humans, an attribute that once again bestows an authority upon humans in terms of 
duty and accountability, which is denied to other animals. As Searle notes, this deontic 
capacity of humans is essential in order to establish collective recognition between 
individuals, which in turn enables the ‘status functions’ that structure our institutional lives.340 
While pointing out the lack of responsibility in animals, Derrida nonetheless questions the 
boundary between “reaction” and “response,” which Lacan uses as a firm point of distinction 
between humans and animals. While Lacan associates animal communication with fixed 
codes that elicit reactions, he permits responses to humans through the recognition of both 
semiotic language and the Other, which implies subjective recognition.341 Animals only react 
to things, while humans can react to both things and to other people as beings. Derrida 
summarizes the thoughts of Lacan:  
When bees appear to “respond” to a “message,” they do not respond but react; 
they merely obey a fixed program, whereas the human subject responds to the 
other, to the question from or of the other. This discourse is quite literally 
Cartesian. Later, as we shall see, Lacan expressly contrasts reaction with response 
as an opposition between human and animal kingdoms, in the same way that he 
opposes nature and convention.342  
 
The problem, according to Derrida, is that this differentiation of reaction having fixed 
meaning and language not having fixed meaning is not entirely true. Derrida notes that the 
meaning of signs—for example, letters that form words that form sentences—are always 
dependent on their position and relation to other signs, meaning that there is a “fixity,” to use 
Derrida’s term, that underlies human language as well. While the scope of human language, 
and thus response, is much broader than the possibilities of animal reaction, it nonetheless is 
limited in its functionality. The value or meaning of language is contextual, based on order, 
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position and relations. As such, the argument of Lacan rests on a matter of amplification, 
which can ultimately be reduced to the same limitation of meaning because it must be fixed or 
coded at some point in order to work.343 This demonstrates that as grandiose as our language 
use might be, it can be deconstructed to its elemental parts and more easily connect to our 
existence as genetically coded organisms. Having noted that, the constructions that language 
facilitates are definitely improvisational and can be seen to provide us with definite 
advantages over other animal species, especially through our abilities to organize ourselves 
politically and institutionally.  
 Our ability to respond—to answer, or to contest—is a crucial element of our political 
reality. While there are many social species of animals, human beings are the only political 
animals, and language plays a significant role in establishing this distinguishing capacity.344 
Considering the mechanisms that enable our political reality, Searle notes the importance of 
language in distinguishing between observer-independent and observer-dependent reality, 
which separate reality into things that don’t require a consciousness to exist (i.e. gravity) and 
things that do require a consciousness to exist (i.e. money). This takes into account the 
autopoietic intentionality that is characteristic of organisms as they observe and interact with 
the world, while noting how the act of observation filters and thus changes reality. Another 
level of distinction is also necessary to consider, since observer-independent and observer-
dependent attributes of the world can be distinguished between epistemic objectivity or 
subjectivity, and ontological objectivity or subjectivity. As Searle describes:  
Epistemic objectivity and subjectivity are features of claims. A claim is 
epistemically objective if its truth or falsity can be established independently of 
the feelings, attitude and preferences, and so on, of the makers and interpreters of 
the claim. Thus the claim that van Gogh was born in Holland is epistemically 
objective. The claim that van Gogh was a better painter than Manet is, as they say, 
a matter of opinion. It is epistemically subjective. On the other hand, ontological 
subjectivity and objectivity are features of reality. Pains, tickles, and itches are 
                                                
343 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 124. 
344 Searle, Freedom & Neurobiology, 84. 
 180 
ontologically subjective because their existence depends on being experienced by 
human or animal subject. Mountains, planets and molecules are ontologically 
objective because their existence is not dependent on subjective experiences.345 
 
These are important distinctions to consider as we determine the nature of politics and art, 
which are observer-dependent and thus ontologically subjective features of our reality, 
requiring subjects in order to exist. It also helps us to appreciate vocalizations of aesthetic 
experience, which are epistemically subjective claims that convey ontologically subjective 
thoughts and feelings. More generally, this categorization of language helps us determine the 
differences between what we believe and what we know—whether a claim is true or false or a 
matter of opinion, or if something is only real because of our subjective, human existence, or 
in spite of it. This language provides us with the tools to distinguish, rationalize and 
understand, which in turn establishes our social, political and institutional reality. It also 
allows us as individuals to position ourselves—to make a stand—in relation to others, and 
responding to someone else’s claims as true or false or a matter of opinion is the foundation 
of our political capacity as subjects. The ability to contest is the political potential to 
challenge other people, ideas and institutions. In relation to the politics of aesthetic 
experience, Rancière purports that artworks function through the subjective repositioning of 
subjects. The creation and enjoyment of artworks provide the opportunity for people to 
become aware of and to alter their subjective positions in the world.346 Tanke states:  
Aesthetic practices are political because they contest, impact, and alter what can 
be seen and said. … Aesthetic art is a rejection of the idea that things have a 
single and definitive meaning. It is therefore one of the means by which the 
meanings of an object, a body, a policy or a group of people can be contested.347  
 
Art from the aesthetic regime gives priority to subjectivity and reflection and thus persistently 
challenges the authority of established, universal significance. As such, political efficacy is 
established in artworks through their capacity of being seen and heard, independent of their 
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subject matter. The experience of artworks is political in itself, through the potential to alter 
the understanding that people have of themselves and their position in relation to the world 
around them.  
 In conclusion, our ability to respond endows us with responsibility and separates us 
from other animals, which are confined to mere reaction. With responsibility, human beings 
attain both duty and accountability by establishing a unique subjectivity through language. 
Furthermore, the deontic powers that responsibility bestows upon us enable us to be political 
beings. As Searle states: “All political power is a matter of status functions, and for that 
reason all political power is deontic power.”348 As ‘status functions’ are the collectively 
accepted attributions of meaning through the establishment of rules and function, language 
can be seen as a crucial element of our political nature. Language not only allows us to 
position ourselves in relation to facts and claims, but it empowers us to contest and challenge 
these facts and claims, and to consider them in broader terms of epistemology and ontology. 
This helps us to appreciate the political nature of artworks, and more easily understand the 
claims of Rancière that the practice of art is inherently political. Since Rancière believes that 
politics is largely the struggle to be seen and heard—which in effect offers the opportunity for 
your subjective position to be publicly or officially established—artworks are political 
because their existence as art is conditional on being experienced by people. Furthermore, 
artworks have the power to stimulate self-awareness and reposition the understanding that 
observing subjects have of themselves, in part through the ability of artworks to function as a 
proxy for a subject.349 Thus, aesthetic experience is not only political in reference to 
responsibility, but also in terms of our capacity to be responsive—adaptable and 
impressionable in the presence of works of art.  
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4.2.3. Subjects  
4.2.3.1. The Bio-political Subject 
As we explore the role of language in constructing our social and political existence, 
our perspective on the paradoxical condition of ‘being apart together’ that Rancière uses to 
found his theory of aesthetic separation becomes clearer and clearer. Furthermore, we can 
appreciate the capacities that language provides us as a social and political species, 
specifically in contrast with the existence of animals that lack the many skills that language 
provides us with. One of these skills is very basic but fundamental—our ability to establish 
subjectivity through the use of a linguistic subject. In this chapter we elaborate upon the use 
of language to enable political agency by examining the importance of the subject in 
establishing rationality and dignity. This will be done by exploring Derrida’s examination of 
Kant’s analysis of Descartes’ famous cogito ergo sum, the original Cartesian separation 
between thought and being. We will then look at Agamben’s reading of Foucault, who 
explores the transformation of the human subject to ‘vegetable’ in the absence of potential 
subjectivity in the state of clinical death. These considerations help us to appreciate the ways 
in which language helps to generate subjectivity, and the importance of the subject in 
establishing our political existence. As we consider the political nature of artistic practice, 
these deliberations will help us to realize the political function of artworks. 
One important thing that language allows humans to do is to identify themselves as 
subjects—as an active agent in a linguistic sentence. The grammatical subject (I, you, he, she, 
we, they, it) is necessary to form sentences, and thus to represent thoughts, beyond 
exclamation.350 Subjects allow us to differentiate between individuals, groups, or things 
involved in an action, whether physical or psychological. More importantly, they allow us to 
distinguish the self from the Other, offering symbolic representations that provide an example 
                                                
350 This is true in English. The Spanish language allows for verb tenses to identify the subject 
without stating it, although the subject is always implicit and recognizable. 
 183 
of our subjective independence. According to Agamben, it is this ability to separate, divide 
and isolate that makes humans capable of distinguishing between humans and animals in the 
first place.  
The division of life into vegetal and relational, organic and animal, animal and 
human, therefore passes first of all as a mobile border within living man, and 
without this intimate caesura the very decision of what is human and what is not 
would probably not be possible.351  
 
Kant determines that the animal is not rational because it lacks the “I think” that is necessary 
in order to understand and to reason.352 This, of course, refers to Descartes’ cogito ergo 
sum—“I think, therefore I am”. If we explore the proposition “I think” more closely, we can 
see how language allows us to separate the subject from the verb, or the agent of the action 
from the action itself. The space that we leave between the “I” and the “think” is monumental, 
because in objective reality, the agent and action are never actually separate. Language offers 
us the ability to conceptualize this separation nonetheless, allowing us to think of ourselves as 
independent beings in relation to other beings. As we saw in the last chapter, without the 
rationality upon which understanding and reason function, the animal is incapable of 
becoming a subject that can uphold duties and enjoy rights, both of which are inherent 
possibilities for human subjects.353 Derrida purports that the result of said obligations and 
rights (which are established and granted through language) is that the life of the rational 
human can be an end in itself—a culmination of intentions, aspirations and purpose. The non-
rational animal is denied this opportunity by humans, and the animal is only ever a means and 
can never be an end, aside from a sacrificial end at the hands of humans.354 The difference 
that Kant establishes, according to Derrida, is that in addition to being denied subjectivity, the 
animal is deprived of dignity—the ability to reflexively value one’s own life as an end in 
                                                
351 Agamben, The Open, 15. 
352 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 49-50.  
353 Ibid., 99-100.  
354 Ibid.  
 184 
itself. As an abstract value established through language, dignity neither correlates with any 
market nor equates with any price.355 The use of language, once again, empowers us not only 
to be independent, but also to be dignified. 
Considering how the human subject is understood by modern governmental 
institutions, Agamben refers to the biopolitics that Foucault championed to explore another 
interesting aspect of political subjectivity. Moving beyond comparisons of human life with 
animal life, Agamben emphasizes the use of the medical term “vegetative state” to describe 
complete lack of cognitive function in human patients with brain trauma. In the absence of 
brain activity, a human being is incapable of conscious thought and is thus separated from 
their subjectivity—from the ability to demonstrate their self as an independent subject.356 
While the patient is still alive, their complete lack of self-awareness places them in direct 
comparison with plant life, while molecular biological and autonomic functions continue to 
operate and maintain their life in the absence of the molar capacities of consciousness. After a 
year of stasis, and with the medical assurance that recovery is impossible, family members 
must take the responsibility themselves to decide whether the unconscious life of their loved 
one is worth maintaining in a vegetative state. Needless to say, so much of how we define 
ourselves—specifically as individuals and generally as a society or species—is dependant on 
the subjective abilities that conscious thought facilitates. If we compare this vegetative state 
with the practice of anaesthesia, where patients are induced into temporary states of 
unconsciousness, we can see how this line of thought relates with aesthetics through a 
negative comparison. As a negation of aesthetic experience, anaesthesia is defined by three 
main functions that combine to alleviate a patient’s discomfort during invasive surgical 
procedures. These include analgesia, which provides relief from pain; paralysis, which 
relaxes muscles and limits movement; and, amnesia, or memory loss, which is achieved by 
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rendering the patient unconscious.357 Anaesthesia can consist of any combination of these 
three factors, and is further distinguished between local and general, only the latter of which 
involves unconsciousness. If we look at the opposite of anaesthesia, we are faced with a 
heightened form of ‘aesthesia’ that could be refined to feeling (pain or sensation), moving (or 
locomotion), and consciousness (or awareness). These three human capacities most definitely 
distinguish us from plant life, and furthermore, they help us to focus upon the defining 
operations of aesthetic experience. While these topics will be more thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter 5. Artworks / Art, it is obvious that they help us to understand how our capacity for 
subjectivity, which is facilitated through biological operations, is the foundation for our 
political existence as human individuals within society. 
In conclusion, political capacities are subjective capacities, and without the possibility 
of demonstrating selfhood, political responsibility is denied. Subjectivity is established and 
demonstrated through language, which enables us to think of an agent as separate from its 
actions and in relation with other agents and actions. One result of this separation is a sense of 
independence, which we as individual subjects demonstrate politically through our decisions 
and acceptance of responsibility for those decisions. As subjects, we attribute a sense of 
purpose to our lives—an end, as Derrida describes it—which gives us a sense of dignity that 
we deny to other animals. If we become unable to demonstrate our subjectivity, however, we 
too are stripped of self-worth. This is evident in the case of patients in vegetative states, 
whose lives must be negotiated in the absence of both their consciousness and the hope of 
their recovery. In the situation of being equated with plant life, the value of our human 
consciousness and subjectivity becomes obvious in the ways that we differentiate our lives 
from other beings. The meaning of aesthetic experience becomes evident when we conduct a 
similar comparison, examining the medical practice of anaesthesia, which can be understood 
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as the negation of aesthetic capacities. Since anaesthesia functions in terms of relieving pain, 
limiting movement and eliminating memory or consciousness, aesthetics can be understood as 
causing sensation, stimulating movement and generating awareness and association. All of 
these elements of aesthetic experience are dependent on the subjective capacities of an 
individual human being, who establishes their subjectivity through biological operation and 
cognitive abilities. As language both enables subjective thought and facilitates political 
practice, we can further appreciate the connection between the biopolitical subject and the 
political function of artworks. 
 
4.2.3.2. The Legal Subject 
Legal subjects can be identified and categorized in different ways, and attain rights 
and obligations that are granted or restricted under various rules of law. Since subjectivity is 
largely identified and proven through language use, the inability to speak excludes animals 
from enjoying the rights and obligations of a legal subject. Language, as such, is both the 
characteristic and the methodology for proving subjectivity, empowering human beings to 
separate themselves from other forms of life and to deny other species of the rights and 
privileges that selfhood legally implies for us. As we will explore in this chapter, human 
subjectivity was established and has been upheld through the transmission of Descartes’ 
cogito ergo sum—“I think, therefore I am”—which has been used by many great philosophers 
to explore the relationship of the subject to thought, reason, being and the unconscious. This 
subjective foundation of human thought, however, is not without its problems, suggesting that 
the basis of human society is not as isolated or pure as often believed. Looking at a recent 
court case that bestows some human rights on an orang-utan, we will examine the blurring of 
the boundary between human and animal in terms of legal rights. Examining how the system 
of law uses language to make arguments and build cases, the connection of law and aesthetics 
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becomes obvious as they both rely on the subjective judgement of individuals. As court cases 
culminate in a requisite subjective decision, the value and power of the subject is once again 
upheld through the use of language. Understanding how language empowers us as a species 
and facilitates our separation from other species will help us to better understand the 
mechanisms with which we establish our unique political abilities and understanding. It will 
also help us to better understand the nature of our subjectivity, through which we exercise our 
aesthetic capacities as humans. 
Law, which is established and functions through language use, also has a role to play 
in distinguishing human subject from animal subject. As Derrida examines the work of 
various philosophers, he develops a sequence of thought that establishes human rights upon 
the basis of the human subject, the possibility of an “I,” while making animal rights 
problematic through their inability to claim themselves as a self. Beginning with Descartes, 
Derrida shows how a series of influential thinkers have helped to deny animals the ability to 
be legal subjects because of their inability to speak and respond, and their inability to produce 
or understand signs outside of basic instinct. As humans have these abilities, they gain the 
legal right to subject animals to atrocities that humans are legally protected from. From a legal 
perspective, the cogito ergo sum of Descartes establishes the foundation of the subject (or the 
ability to proclaim oneself as subject) as the underlying element that differentiates humans 
from animals.358 Exploring the role that this grammatical subject has had in maintaining the 
distinction of human and animal, Derrida develops a lineage of philosophical influence that 
stems from the subject “I” in the “I think therefore I am” of Descartes. To begin with, when 
Kant relates the self to reason, which accompanies every representation, he bases it upon the 
subject “I” in Descartes’ “I think”.359 As the judgement involved in aesthetic experience is 
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entirely based upon subjectivity, the importance of this grammatical subject “I” becomes 
obvious. As Derrida states: 
“This capability, this power to have the “I” takes the high ground; it erects, it 
raises man infinitely above all the other beings living on earth. This infinite 
elevation identifies a subject in the strict sense, for immediately after Kant 
emphasizes the fact that “I” signifies the unity of a consciousness that remains the 
same throughout all its modification. The “I” is the “I think,” the originary unity 
of the transcendental apperception that accompanies every representation. The 
subject that is man is a person, “one and the same person,” therefore, who will be 
the subject of reason, morality, and the law.”360  
 
Next, Derrida claims that Heidegger uses Descartes’ “I am” to found his idea of Dasein, 
which is determined through a deconstruction of Cartesian subjectivity.361 Derrida is referring 
to Heidegger’s attempt to eliminate the space, or separation, that consciousness permits us to 
think and, as a result, experience ourselves as separate from our environment. As we saw in 
Chapter 3.4.4. The Open, this is an important concept in understanding how our context 
greatly influences our cognition of ‘being-in-the-world.’ Continuing his investigation of 
Cartesian influence, Derrida then speaks of Lacan’s psychological subject as being inherited 
from Descartes, and although it is based upon the Freudian unconscious, it is still rooted in the 
Cartesian subject who is as a result of thinking.362 Once again we can see how the 
grammatical subject enables us to separate ourselves as subjects, but this time it is in relation 
to the Other. As clarified in Chapter 5.3.3. Autonomy, the idea of the Other is another 
significant factor in understanding aesthetic experience, especially as we consider the artwork 
as a substitute of a human subject. In terms of the legal subject, Derrida makes it obvious how 
so much of our current society and culture, whether inherited or reproduced, is still based 
upon Descartes famous declaration, “I think, therefore I am.” The power of the grammatical 
subject, especially the “I,” is irrefutable, especially as we appreciate how our political lives 
are based upon the subjectivity that language helps to provide us. As explored in Chapter 
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3.2.2. Parallelism, this is a problematic foundation upon which our modern society is based, 
for the cogito ergo sum implies a division of mind and body, and this division is in fact 
illusory.363 This is the basis of Damasio’s revolutionary book, Descartes’ Error. Nonetheless, 
Derrida’s ancestry of Cartesian influence makes it clear that the separation implied in the 
perceived division of mind and body forms the basis of a large part of our cultural inheritance, 
which includes our legal consideration of the subject. Human rights remain a privilege for 
those who are capable of identifying themselves as human subjects.  
Eyal Weizman explores this boundary between human rights and animal rights by 
exploring a recent court case in Argentina in which an orang-utan ape was declared to be a 
“non-human person” that was being unjustly denied of her liberty in a zoo.364 While human 
rights purists defended the boundary between human and animal based on differences of 
language ability and inability, animal rights activists made their arguments based on 
similarities between the anatomical and cognitive proximity of apes to humans.365  As 
Weiman states:  
In recent years, primatologists have successfully mapped traits and proven 
characteristics as complex as mental and emotional consciousness, self-awareness, 
compassion, causal and logical reasoning—previously thought to be uniquely 
human—as existing in these ‘almost human’ creatures.366  
 
Furthermore, it has been clearly demonstrated that some apes have language capabilities, 
which was confirmed in the adoption of non-vocal human sign language and pictorial 
language, and has supported claims that the orang-utan has its own non-human language in its 
natural habitat.367 As noted in Chapter 4.2.2. Speech, the distinction of the species homo 
sapiens was fairly indeterminate to begin with in terms of nomenclature. Animal to human 
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organ transplants are the clear example of this imprecise border, with the baboon heart 
transplant recipient “Baby Fae”—the first infant xenotransplant procedure performed in 
1984—being the most poignant example, despite its brief duration of success.368 This blurry 
boundary between human and animal demonstrates the importance of language in establishing 
the arguments that determine and challenge existing laws that maintain a strict separation. As 
Thomas Keenan and Eyal Weizman point out in their exploration of forensic aesthetics, 
lawyers must argue their cases in relation to measures of probability and margins of error. The 
implementation of the law is never a mechanical operation or a simple calculation, and as 
such, a final decision of judgment is always required in legal cases. If we take into account 
Kant’s Critique of Judgement, we can see just how much our judicial institutions rely on the 
functioning of aesthetics. Judges in the court of law need to be impartial and make their 
decisions based on their powers of reflexive subjectivity and the evidence presented to them. 
While the outcome of aesthetic judgment isn’t as profound or severe as court rulings, focusing 
more on notions of taste and beauty or subjective pleasure and thought, they both rely on the 
faculty of judgment and thus their operation and operating conditions are the same. 
Furthermore, the court of law is a naturally creative environment, since lawyers must combine 
evidence and construct lines of reasoning in order to make their cases. This likens the making 
of facts with the making of artefacts, which are created in an attempt to convince the judge 
through the senses, including common sense. “The word conviction thus articulates the legal 
verdict with the subjective sensation of confirmed belief, of being convinced.”369 Belief, in 
the end, is all about subjective thought. As it becomes apparent how judgment connects legal 
and aesthetic practices through the primacy of the subject, the boundary that separates humans 
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from other animals, or culture from nature, becomes clearer too. It is a separation that we 
establish through language, an argument that excludes animals from legal rights based on 
their inability to make a case for their own subjectivity.  
 In conclusion, language is the characteristic that we possess and the methodology that 
we use to prove our subjectivity. This, in turn, empowers us as a species to separate ourselves 
from other forms of life and to deny the rights and privileges that we enjoy to other species. 
Nonetheless, as we saw in this chapter, the human subjectivity that we establish through the 
cogito ergo sum of Descartes has a defect in its implied separation of body and mind—a 
separation that is illusory, as we explored in Chapter 3.2.2. Parallelism. A lot of recent 
evidence suggests that not only is this separation of body and mind faulty, but also the 
supposed separation between humans and other animals. This is evident in the court case that 
bestowed human rights to an orang-utan, a non-human subject. This not only questions our 
understanding of the legal subject, but it highlights the ways in which the legal system 
operates through language use and aesthetic thought. Since lawyers use language to make 
arguments and build cases, and court cases culminate in a requisite subjective decision, the 
connection of law and aesthetics becomes obvious on the basis of subjective judgement, 
where the value and power of the subject is once again upheld through the use of language. 
This demonstration of how language empowers us as a species to distinguish ourselves from 
other species shows how fundamental and significant subjectivity is to us as a species. In 
consideration of aesthetic separation, the dependence of subjectivity on language shows how 
inherently divisive it is in the first place.  
 
4.2.3.3. Subject of the Signifier  
As any good anarchist would ask, why do we need laws? The answer, of course, is to 
protect ourselves from each other. Human beings are complicated, and our capacity for 
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dishonesty is yet another distinguishing feature of our species. In this chapter we will consider 
the subject once again as the distinguishing factor between humans and other animals, but this 
time we will do so by looking at the ability to recognize oneself as ‘the subject of the 
signifier.’ This is an expression that Derrida finds in the work of Lacan, who uses it to explore 
the psychological recognition of the Other. While attributing this capacity to humans, Lacan 
denies it in animals because of their supposed inability to cover their own tracks. Humans, on 
the other hand, are able to recognize the potential meaning of the marks that are left in the 
world, and an implications of this, according to Lacan, is our capacity to “pretend pretence.” 
If we consider the ability to fake, and then duplicate it to achieve ‘faking to fake,’ the 
relationship of reflexive trickery to the practice of art begins to undeniably appear. If we 
consider the condition that artworks be artificial—that they be made by a human rather than 
occurring naturally—our ability to deceive our self and each other becomes a fascinating 
prerequisite for artistic practice. The representational nature of mimesis, which is a 
conventional tradition of artistic practice, certainly relates with this ability to pretend pretence 
as well. It is our biological nature to imitate—that is how we learn, after all—and our capacity 
to deceive not only defines us as a species but also structures the practice of art. 
Derrida further explores the separation of human beings and animals by examining 
Lacan’s ideas of the unconscious and how it relates to both the subject and to language, 
including the abstraction of language and the abstract thought that it enables. As stated earlier, 
Derrida’s problem with Lacan’s distinction of human and animal is that his idea of the 
conscious and unconscious subject is based upon Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. Derrida states 
that while Lacan attributes the unconscious to humans, he denies it to animals largely because 
they are incapable of recognizing the Other. “[T]he animal has neither unconscious nor 
language, nor the other, except as an effect of the human order, that is by contagion, 
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appropriation, domestication.”370 In effect, Lacan denies meaning to the animal, unless of 
course it is achieved through anthropomorphic means. He proves his theory with an 
interesting observation: animals never intentionally cover their own tracks. Humans are the 
only species that have demonstrated the ability to do so, and according to Lacan, this inability 
of animals to erase their own tracks demonstrates a few important things. Not only are 
animals limited in their ability to identify or to recognize—to know—the significance of the 
marks that they make in their environment, but they are also unable to be the “subject of the 
signifier,”371 which would necessitate adding reflexivity to the equation. Derrida states:  
to be subject of the signifier is also to be a subjecting subject, a subject as master, 
an active and deciding subject of the signifier, having in any case sufficient 
mastery to be capable of pretending to pretend and hence of being able to put into 
effect one’s power to destroy the trace.372  
 
The agency of the self, according to Derrida, is based upon the ability to be a reflexive 
“subject of the signifier,” which in essence is to recognize oneself as a self. It is also about 
recognizing one’s affect on the environment; one’s ability to interact with and alter the world. 
While we have already explored the idea of self quite thoroughly in Chapter 3.2.4. The 
Self, a basic summary would be helpful in this linguistic context. The “I” in the “I think, 
therefore I am,” could be anyone, yet it denotes a specific person, the person who thinks it or 
claims it. The subject “I” is an auto-deictic term, which means that its significance is derived 
from its context. In stating “I”, any person establishes themselves as a subject, an individual, 
and a self. In essence, a self is a person capable of reflexive recognition or auto-identification. 
Human languages exist through the use of symbols and signifiers, where spoken sounds and 
visual or tactile marks attain significance through collective acceptance. As a self learns and 
as a self remembers it gains both history and meaning, and it is through this history and 
consistency of meaning that a self is established. It is not that other animals can’t learn, 
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remember or have a personal history, and Lacan acknowledges the strategic pretence that 
animals are capable of as warriors, predators, persecutors or seducers.373 Nonetheless, they are 
unable to recognize themselves, their sounds or their marks in a symbolic way. This is 
something that humans do naturally, something that language enables and makes certain.  
According to Lacan it is that type of lie, that deceit, and that pretence in the 
second degree of which the animal would be incapable, whereas the “subject of 
the signifier,” within the human order, would possess such a power and, better 
still, would emerge as subject, instituting itself and coming to itself as subject by 
virtue of this power, a second-degree reflexive power, a power that is conscious of 
deceiving by pretending to pretend.374  
 
What Derrida suggests in this sentence is that we attain subjectivity by deceiving ourselves 
that we are subjects, and through this self-deception we are capable of identifying the deceit 
of others. The implications of this should not be taken lightly, especially considering the 
magnitude of the social institutions that are built upon the foundation of the subject. This 
relates with the capacity that our consciousness has for illusion, which we explored in Chapter 
3.7. Consciousness. Nonetheless, recognizing your footprints and deciding that you don’t 
want others to see them is a perfect example of how human beings understand the potential 
meaning of their marks, and Derrida asserts that the complex understanding that this 
demonstrates helps to make us unique as a species. “It is by means of a power to pretend a 
pretence that one accedes to Speech, to the order of Truth, to the symbolic order, in short, to 
the order of the human.”375 Through our capacity to be reflexively dishonest, we enable our 
potential to understand truth.  
The connection between artifice, deception and art becomes clearer if we consider an 
artistic example of erasing tracks or pretending pretence, such as Robert Rauschenberg’s 
                                                
373 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 127-128. 
374 Ibid., 128. 
375 Derrida, The Animal That Therefore I Am, 131. 
 195 
“Erased de Kooning Drawing” (1953),376 where the artist’s creative act was the erasure of an 
existing drawing by another artist. There is definitely an acknowledgement of reflexivity at 
play in this artwork, which is an inspiration for project I created for the practical research in 
Chapter 6.3. Cover Your Tracks. Rauschenberg recognizes that art and life are distinct and yet 
related, as recognized by his intention to position his practice “in the gap between art and 
life.”377 One important difference between the two is the neutrality of nature and the marks 
that human beings make, which can be interpreted by others to have meaning because we 
understand them ourselves to have communicative or symbolic potential. The misleading 
intention of covering your tracks uses mimesis to represent nature, which demonstrates the 
duplicitous nature at the heart of mimetic representation. According to Rancière:  
This is what mimesis means: the concordance between the complex of sensory 
signs through which the process of poiesis is displayed and the complex of the 
forms of perception and emotion through which it is felt and understood—two 
processes which are united by the single Greek word aisthesis.378  
 
Rancière describes the aesthetic break and the shift from the mimetic regime to the aesthetic 
regime of art as the collapse of the connection between poiesis and aiesthesis, where creation 
and sensation are no longer interdependent. He uses the Greek theatre as an example of 
artistic tradition, where the action on the stage was directly understood by the audience 
because of a continuity between signs and bodies. In the aesthetic regime, the deceptive 
nature of artifice is recognized with a willing suspension of disbelief, where the subject 
knows it isn’t true but temporarily believes it’s true for the purpose of enjoyment.379 It is also 
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a realization that artistic intentionality can never prescribe a specific effect because it can 
never escape its deceptive impetus, the subject. Within the aesthetic regime of art, what is 
astonishing is that pretending pretence positions artworks within the realm of truth, as though 
they were two negatives that cancel each other to become a positive. While we will study this 
more closely in Chapter 4.7. Autonomy, our capacity for pretending pretence is based upon 
our ability to self-identify as ‘subject of the signifier.’ Considering the deceptive human 
tendency that underlies mimesis and trickery, we can begin to understand the enjoyment that 
the practice of art provides us. We are not disappointed by the deceit of artifice because we 
expect it. In this way, even an erased drawing can provide us with sensational pleasure. 
In conclusion, not only does dishonesty distinguish humans from other animals, but it 
connects the practice of art to the imitative nature of mimesis and representation. By looking 
at the ability to recognize oneself as ‘the subject of the signifier’ we can see how human 
subjectivity forms the basis of recognizing meaning. While animals are incapable of covering 
their own tracks, human beings are able to recognize the potential meaning of the marks that 
they leave in the world. Lacan bases this on our capacity to pretend pretence, a multiplication 
of false display that can only be reflexively understood. In relation to the representative nature 
of artistic practice, where artifice functions through simulation and symbolism, we can 
appreciate the deceptive foundation that mimetic acts entail. The artificial requirement of 
artworks suggests that we take great pleasure in being deceived, and deceiving ourselves, but 
only when we can anticipate the impending trickery. At the root of this deception is the 
human subject, who is capable of recognizing deception because of the inherent duplicity at 
the root of subjectivity itself. Ironically, however, pretending pretence leads us to appreciate 
the instability of our subjective truth, and the truth of the world that selfhood facilitates. 
Artworks, in all of their misleading layers, enable us to recognize our truth.  
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4.2.4. Writing 
4.2.4.1. Mute Speech 
As we explore the relationship between language and aesthetic experience, the 
symbolic nature of written language and artworks are an obvious point of connection. Moving 
from direct to indirect forms of interpersonal communication, we encounter symbols that 
function through representation and meaning. While this relates to Rancière’s conception of 
translating ‘sense to sense,’ it also demonstrates the combination of earthly and manipulated 
materials that compose the sensory fabric of our world. To explore these connections and 
combinations, we will look at Rancière’s book The Aesthetic Unconscious, which explores 
how Freud’s ideas on the unconscious relate with aesthetic experience. To begin, we will 
explore the nature of writing as a carrier of thought and non-thought, a paradoxical idea that 
demonstrates the uncertainty of meaning at the heart of the ‘aesthetic realm.’ We will then 
look to the work of Novalis, a German philosopher who reveals the possibility of meaning in 
all objects, on condition that they be understood in terms of the history that they imply in their 
material and form, and that they enter into human narrative. The relation of these ideas, which 
Rancière uses to explore the functionality of written language, is obviously relevant to our 
understanding of the functionality of the artwork, which: “remains somewhere between the 
cry of the suffering and struggling people and the ‘earth’s song’, between a voice of human 
division and a melody of cosmic—inhuman—harmony.”380 In our search to understand the 
nature of the aesthetic experience of artworks, written language is an excellent point of 
comparison. The symbolic nature at the base of writing provides the perfect example of how 
artworks function through their form, interpretation and meaning. 
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Rancière’s argument that the human unconscious is relevant to aesthetics and the 
practice of art rests on his paradoxical idea that there exists a “thought that does not think.”381 
With written words or artworks in mind, this idea is fairly easy to grasp, as words and 
artworks can be considered as the results or products of human thought—conscious decisions 
made and actions carried out that result in a physical entity—that act as a container or holder 
of antecedent human thought. A second and more difficult idea to understand, which is 
implicit in this last idea, is Rancière’s conception that there is non-thought in thought.382 This 
can be understood as the absence of thought that thought implies simply by functioning, or as 
the unconscious element that is always present in consciousness. Casey Ford expands upon 
these notions by describing two ways we might conceive of this ‘unthought in thought.’383 In 
the first case, the unthought in aesthetic experience reflects a reality that is partially 
independent of the subject and object because it is based upon the affects of the experience. 
As defined by Deleuze in What is Philosophy?, “Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings 
whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist in the 
absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by words, is himself a 
compound of percepts and affects.”384 Secondly, aesthetics is founded upon the ‘unthought’ 
condition of human consciousness that is established prior to any experience, which connotes 
the underlying physiology upon which aesthetics depends. When we think about written 
words or artworks as examples, there is always some unconscious element brought forth 
through the writer or artist who produces it, just as there is residual non-thought in the result 
of their decisions and actions. After all, not everything can be considered when creating, and 
this can be understood as non-thought present in thought. If we remember Luhmann’s 
description of the form of observation (see chapter 1.6. Observation)—the “this-and-not-that” 
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that necessarily separates the distinguished from the non-distinguished—we see a perfect 
reflection of Rancière’s notion of non-thought in thought. Rancière describes a power that 
exists in this polarity of thought in non-thought, and non-thought in thought, and uses written 
language as a means to explore it.  
Writing refers not only to a form of manifestation of speech but more 
fundamentally to an idea of speech itself and its intrinsic power. It is well known 
that for Plato writing designated not only the materiality of the written sign on a 
material support, but a specific status of speech. He considered writing to be a 
mute logos, speech that is incapable of saying what it says differently or of 
choosing not to speak. It can neither account for what it proffers nor discern those 
whom it is or is not appropriate to address. This speech, simultaneously mute and 
chatty, can be contrasted with speech that is action, discourse guided by a 
signification to be transmitted and a goal to be achieved.385 
 
For Rancière, this contradictory nature of writing—to speak and be silent at the same time, to 
know and not know what is being communicated—makes it a perfect metaphor for what he 
calls the “aesthetic revolution.”386  
Exploring the relationship between thought and non-thought that is implicit in writing 
and aesthetics, Rancière goes further to explore two major influences that contribute to this 
understanding. The first is that “everything speaks,” an idea conceived by the poet-
mineralogist Novalis, who was part of a group of German philosophers known as the Jena 
Romantics (who will examined more closely in Chapter 5.3. ‘The Fragment’). While both 
written language and artworks imply human production, this is not a necessary condition for 
something to speak or have meaning. As Novalis states: “[e]very sensible form, beginning 
from the stone or the shell, tells a story.”387 Thinking back to the contextual logic of 
autopoiesis, this adds narrative to the idea that everything exists in the present as the result of 
its previous circumstances.388 For Rancière, this denotes the possibility of meaning that every 
inanimate object implicitly carries in its matter and form. The idea of traces or tracks is very 
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relevant here, and it is important to understand that traces can be left and tracks can be made 
by living and non-living sources. Returning to the idea of the unconscious, Rancière compares 
the methodical questioning that Freud espouses in The Interpretation of Dreams, which 
contends that nothing is insignificant and every detail denotes a mark, a meaning.389 This 
brings us to the second influence that Rancière employs to help understand the polarity of 
thought and non-thought in aesthetics: “in order for the banal to reveal its secret, it must first 
be mythologized.”390 This, of course, brings us back to language, back to the realm of human 
action and thought. This returns us to aesthetics, to recognition and creation, to 
communication and understanding, to sensation and feeling. Anything can gain significance 
through the communal act of revelation. This, of course, is what making art is all about, and 
written language offers a perfect parallel to better understand this functionality. Rancière 
summarizes as follows:  
The aesthetic unconscious, consubstantial with the aesthetic regime of art, 
manifests itself in the polarity of this double scene of mute speech: on the one 
hand, a speech written on the body that must be restored to a linguistic 
signification by a labor [sic] of deciphering and rewriting; on the other, the 
voiceless speech of a nameless power that lurks behind any consciousness and any 
signification, to which voice and body must be given.391 
 
Looking at the operation of writing and reading, we can see how letters and words come to 
have meaning through the recognition of their material and form, and their existence within 
human narrative tradition. This of course implies learning. Speech comes quickly and 
naturally to humans through imitation, but to read and write takes longer, and we must learn 
to connect visual forms with sounds and meanings in order to be capable of reading and 
writing. This points towards the tradition of art that precedes our capacity for art, and the 
assertion that an artwork can never be understood outside of context.  
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Written language provides a window into the symbolic functioning of artworks. As 
indirect forms of communication, artworks combine materials of the earth and the form of 
their creation, and the traces that are embodied can be interpreted and read, just like a written 
text. And just like sentences, there are implicit and explicit details. Rancière develops his idea 
of the aesthetic unconscious by showing the existence of non-thought in thought, a 
paradoxical idea that connotes various things. For one, it demonstrates the impossibility of 
authors and artists of being completely in control and conscious of their effects as they create. 
As indirect forms of communication that need to be interpreted, much the same way that 
Freud interprets dreams, artworks are also subject to the aesthetic separation that this 
interpretation involves. Aesthetic experience involves the translation of ‘sense to sense,’ and 
this implies that nothing can be guaranteed to be interpreted in a specific way. The idea of 
non-thought in thought reflects the idea that our physiology and unconscious have a 
transparent effect on aesthetic experience. This is reflected in the form of observation, where 
a distinction separates the focus of attention from that which is disregarded, and implicitly 
connects the distinguished to the non-distinguished. Once again a being’s inability to escape 
its context becomes evident. Acknowledging that everything has potential meaning, Rancière 
demonstrates the process through which significance is established and conveyed, through the 
material and form that the history of every object displays, and through the mythologizing of 
objects and their deciphered histories. By penetrating the realm of human thought and 
becoming language, symbolic meaning is both established and conveyed.  
 
4.2.4.2. Mark-making 
Moving beyond the inherent symbolism at the root of orthographic functionalism, the 
relationship between writing and language offers an interesting model for the organizational 
operation of artistic practice. Focusing on Nöe’s organizational theory of art, this chapter will 
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explore the ways in which writing is more than a mere transcription of verbal language, but 
rather a form through which we think with language. Writing offers a reflexive and 
organizational structure for verbal language to be recorded, transmitted and considered. 
Furthermore, writing transforms how verbal language is practiced, and the relationship 
between the two forms of language creates a transformative feedback loop that establishes 
both the functional and transformative nature of language. Nöe uses this as a model for the 
metamorphic nature of artistic practice, where two levels of organizational activities provide a 
reflexive functionality for writing and artworks. The first level is the basic level of organized 
activities, such as seeing or drawing. The second level uses the first level activities as its raw 
material, exploring the nature of the basic activities and, in doing so, the nature of how we as 
humans organize ourselves in the world. This organizational model for artistic practice offers 
a different perspective for appreciating how contemporary artists incorporate everyday life to 
create artworks and new relations within society. Furthermore, it offers a transformative 
structure upon which we can better understand the influential and transitory relationships that 
artworks have with tradition. Both of these are key concerns of Rancière’s aesthetic regime, 
which makes an exploration of writing and language a relevant perspective to examine. 
Just like Rancière, Nöe asserts a direct connection between written language, art and 
aesthetics. In fact, he claims that both art and philosophy “are bent” on the invention of 
writing, implying that not only is there a relationship between writing and art, but that art 
presupposes the invention of writing.392 His argument begins by asserting that writing does 
not simply depict sound, but rather, it represents language.393 An example is the phonetic 
alphabet, which is not the alphabet we use when we write words, but rather it’s the alphabet 
we use to signify the pronunciation of word elements. As well—in the English language at 
least—the same letter can have different sounds depending on its context. Take, for example, 
                                                
392 Nöe, Strange Tools, 37. 
393 Ibid., 34. 
 203 
the letter “s”, which sounds differently when you say “this is” out loud. The “this” carries an 
“s” sound and “is” carries a “z” sound, and this variation is the same for many letters and their 
myriad possible combinations. Nöe asserts: “We do not write to record language. Like 
language itself, writing is to think with.”394 Writing began with scoring, a simple way of 
annotating or counting so that we could frame problems or think about phenomena 
differently.395 Nonetheless, speech and writing are obviously related, and our use of them in 
contemporary society is such that establishing precedence of one over the other has little 
relevance. Sure, our hominid ancestors probably attributed meaning to sounds before 
attributing meaning to marks, and today children learn to speak well before they are able to 
read and write. Nöe states that despite this logic, speech and writing are so intertwined in our 
contemporary lives that they are simply two different aspects of one inseparable idea, 
language.  
As we saw in Chapter 2.3.5. Organization, Nöe builds his organizational theory of art 
in contemporary society by distinguishing between levels of human activity, with the first 
division between unorganized and organized activities. Focusing on organized human 
activities, which is where we find the practice of art, Nöe further separates between first order 
and second order activities. To briefly illustrate this division once again, first order activities 
are things that we do naturally, and second order activities are things that we do to help think 
about or better understand first order activities. The best example that Nöe offers defines 
dance as a first order activity, and choreography as its second order activity. Dance is natural, 
and choreography is a way of organizing dance so that we can see and understand it in a 
different way. A second order activitiy can be thought of as an ideology, which Nöe describes 
as: “a way of thinking about an activity that so permeates the activity that we can no longer 
                                                
394 Nöe, Strange Tools, 40-41. 
395 Ibid. 
 204 
really differentiate them.”396 The relationship between first and second order activities is so 
symbiotic and influential that second order activities “loop back” to alter how first order 
activities are carried out. This modification of first order activities in return changes the 
second order activity, establishing a reflexive loop of action, thought and modification. Going 
back to speech, writing and language, Nöe proposes that we:  
think of the relation of the arts and philosophy (second-order practices) to their 
raw material (first-order activities) as analogous to the relation of writing to 
speech. Writing is invented by speakers to model how they speak, or to represent 
language to themselves. The availability of this very image of language serves to 
change and reorganize the way we speak in the first place.397  
 
With this feedback loop of influence established between first and second order organized 
activities, we can look back to unravel Nöe’s claim that art and philosophy are “bent on” 
writing. What he means is that as second order activities, both art and philosophy arise when 
first order activities are recognized as reflexive concerns, for themselves. “Which is to say 
when they fully become what they are, that is to say, organized activities that are governed by 
a self-conception of those activities themselves (i.e., by an ideology).”398 In terms of art, we 
can think of picture-making as a first order activity and art as a second order activity. There 
are a lot of different ways that we can make pictures, and there are a lot of different reasons 
for making pictures, but not all of these can be considered to be art. To be considered as art, a 
second order activity—in this case, picture-making—needs to function in a reflexive way so 
that the ideology of picture-making or picture-viewing becomes the subject of the picture-
making—the theme behind the picture’s creation—in order to see or understand the actions of 
picture-making and picture-viewing in a new way, differently or more clearly than before.399 
All pictures invite you to see something, but not all pictures invite you to contemplate their 
making. This is the realm of art as a second order human activity. 
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 The reflexive organizational theory of art presented by Nöe mirrors the operational 
conditions of autopoiesis very well. Just as we are organized reflexively as living organisms, 
so too is the practice of art. Considering the feedback loop structure of the different levels of 
organization, one is easily reminded of the separation between the molecular and molar levels 
of life, one operational and the other intentional and observational. In Nöe’ consideration of 
artistic practice, the molecular level of operation would be represented by the basic or natural 
ways in which we organize ourselves, and the molar operation would represent the ‘bigger 
picture’ exploration of our basic organizational lives. In relation to Rancière’s conception of 
aesthetic separation, Nöe’s theory offers a new way to understand how artists “induce 
alterations in the space of everyday life, generating new forms of relations.”400 If the true 
material of artworks is the realm of first-order activities, as opposed to physical materials like 
marble, acrylic paints or film, then the reflection of life in art becomes easy to see, and 
impossible to avoid.401 If the raw material of art is always the organizational nature of 
humanity, then the practice of art is forever bound in contiguity with life. Human life, after 
all, is an extension of the reflexive and organizational impetus at the foundation of autopoietic 
theory. Everything in life comes down to principles of conservation and adaptation and the 
order that they call forth. Furthermore, the reflexive feedback loop that Nöe illustrates—
where the second-order activities return to alter the first-order activities, which in sequence 
shift the second-order activities—offers us a model for understanding the relationship that 
artworks have with art in terms of tradition. While artworks are always created in relation to 
antecedent traditions of art, every artwork nonetheless changes the tradition by extending it 
further, which in turn influences a shift in traditions to come. The feedback loop model of 
artistic practice thus offers a mechanism for considering the aesthetic break that Rancière 
speaks of, where aesthetic thought caused an alteration in the tradition of artistic practice, 
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both its creation and appreciation. While artworks consist of many more facets of operation, 
the comparison between writing and language helps to situate the practice of art within the 
realm of human life and within the transformative progression of artistic tradition.  
4.2.5. Conclusion to Language 
 Not only is language a defining characteristic of human beings, but it is the 
methodology that we use to distinguish ourselves from other species. As a mechanism we 
employ to think with,402 language inevitably influences the practice of art and our conception 
of aesthetics. Furthermore, language provides models for the operation of aesthetic thought, 
where subjectivity, symbolism and significance combine in the practice of artistic creation 
and appreciation.403 Language provides us with the ability to name, which in turn endows us 
with the power to command and control, resulting in authority and authorship.404 Our capacity 
to respond demonstrates how language enables us to be political, by showing the essence of 
responsibility in response, and the duties, rights and obligations that this entails.405 Our 
specific political reality is comprised of two characteristics that relate with language: 
constitutive rules and the imposition of function.406 The political power of human beings 
implies the capacity for subjectivity, which language structurally provides by separating the 
grammatical subject from its action and object, and providing a sense of agency for the person 
who identifies as the subject. The source of political power lies in our ability to position 
ourselves and contest others through language,407 which demonstrates the important 
connection between language and politics. 
Exploring the lineage of philosophical influence that began with the famous cogito 
ergo sum of Descartes, we can see how contemporary notions of thought, reason, being and 
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the unconscious all rest upon the ability of a subject to think, and therefore, to exist.408 The 
separation of mind and body that is implicit in this dictum, however, foreshadows the fallacy 
at the root of our militancy to separate ourselves from other beings. Exploring the role of 
language in the practice of law, we can see how the inherent uncertainty at the root of legal 
issues requires lawyers to use language to make their case, while judges use language to judge 
the interpreted evidence.409 The result is a subjective judgement, which places equity between 
the creative, demonstrative and judgemental practice of law and the analogous practice of art. 
In either case, the subject is paramount, and exploring our ability to recognize ourselves as the 
subject of the signifier, we can begin to clarify our relation to the Other. This is most obvious 
in the imaginatively deceptive act of covering ones tracks, which demonstrates the human 
ability to pretend pretence.410 Exploring the deceptive root of this action, it becomes apparent 
how the recognition of significance in the marks one makes directly relates with the practice 
of writing and creating artworks. The mimetic nature of these symbolic acts embodies an 
inherent duplicity or trickery, which highlights the recognizably artificial and reflexive nature 
of art. Imitation, after all, is an implicit function of language, which emerges from the derived 
intentionality of a subject and extends through collective acceptance of society.  
As an indirect form of communication, writing provides us with the best example of 
how language establishes an infrastructure for the practice of art. As sign and symbol, writing 
demonstrates how meaning exists in represented form. Distinguishing meaning in physical 
form reveals how non-thought is always present in thought.411 This is partially because 
understanding can only be achieved in the moment in relation to pre-established thought, but 
it is also due to the fact that the affect that causes the thought is partially independent of both 
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subject and object.412 While suggesting the presence of the unconscious in artistic creation 
and interpretation, the simultaneity of thought and non-thought further demonstrates a 
paradox at the heart of aesthetic experience, where uncertainty of meaning is eternal when 
there is uncertainty of subjective truth. So much depends on the existence of the human 
subject, and language—which constitutes the subject—is also our best way to prove it. The 
practice of art, nonetheless, provides the opportunity to become aware of and reposition 
individual subjectivity, providing new ways of thinking and understanding the reflexive and 
organizational structure of human life. This structure is reflected in both language and 
artworks, which demonstrate two levels of operation that mutually influence and transform 
each other,413 much like autopoiesis. Revealing the way that human beings naturally organize 
themselves, artworks provide the opportunity to reconsider the ideology at the root of human 
organization.414 This helps to show how artworks inevitably utilize human life as their raw 
material, and also positions contemporary art practice within the transformative progression 
of artistic tradition. The mechanisms at the heart of artistic practice come into better view in 
relation to language, demonstrating how the operational structures that facilitate the practice 
of art are also restrictive to some extent. Language capacitates human life to become political 
life, and the practice of art is the illumination of the complex structures that both separate and 
connect us as political beings within society. The practice of art grounds our politics by 
combining materials of the world with human agency, leaving traces and marks for society to 
reflect on itself. 
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4.3. Technology 
4.3.1. Introduction to Technology 
Our use of technology is another principal characteristic that distinguishes human 
beings from other animals. While we aren’t the only species that uses technology, we are 
certainly the only animal that is never in its absence. From the day we are born to the day we 
die, our use of technology is constant. In the following chapters we will explore how 
technology defines us as a species, but more importantly, how technology relates to the 
practice of art. Just as language has been shown to capacitate our thought processes and 
expand the way that we act and relate, technology demonstrates a similar provision through 
our persistent consideration of use and function as we negotiate the world around us. As art is 
often defined in part through its subversion of functionality, the intentional purposelessness of 
artworks can be more clearly perceived in contrast to technology. Looking at the main 
concepts of orchestration, recursivity and function in the following chapters, we will get a 
clearer understanding of the key ideas that Rancière develops in his text “Aesthetic 
Separation, Aesthetic Community,” including our social condition of ‘being apart together’, 
the transformation of ‘sense to sense,’ and art’s distortion of function in ‘the aesthetic 
regime.’ After exploring a broad description of technology, the three following chapters will 
largely focus on the concept of ‘strange tools’ that Nöe has developed to position the practice 
of art in relation to technology. As explored in Chapters 2.3.5. Orgnaization and 4.2.4. 
Writing, Nöe contends that all art is about organizing, or rather, putting human organization 
on display. We have developed it over time as a species to learn, adapt and understand 
ourselves and our relation with the world. Having said that, there is a contradiction of placing 
a functionalism on the practice of art, which is defined in part by its uselessness. As such, 
exploring technological function in relation to art is an important endeavour to undertake. 
Let’s begin by looking at what technology is by exploring the mythological birth of 
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technology, which defines human beings in relation to lack, and then moving on to consider a 
definition of technology that extends beyond mere tools and mechanization. Understanding 
technology as a form of social organization will help us to understand how art operates 
socially as well, which will make the reflection of life in art much easier to contemplate.  
Reviewing one of the most ancient origin stories of technology in the Western world, 
which describes how humanity attained technology in the first place, is a perfect way to 
begin. Derrida points towards the myth of Prometheus to once again analyse the roots of 
human culture, and further explore the distinction between human and animal. A brief 
summary of the story is as follows. After creating humanity out of clay, Prometheus steals fire 
from the gods to bring to humanity, thus endowing humans with ars and techne, Latin 
synonyms for ‘art’ and ‘craft’ respectively.415 While Prometheus’ brother Epimetheus had 
previously provided all of the other animals with their necessities to survive, humanity was 
left naked. Derrida emphasizes this basic lack as the impetus for Prometheus’ endowment of 
fire to humanity, which he claims capacitates both language and technology.416  By 
cultivating these unique traits, culture became proper to humankind, which was thus able to 
demonstrate its superiority over the animal kingdom.  
[W]hat is proper to man, his subjugating superiority over the animal, his very 
becoming-subject, his historicity, his emergence out of nature, his sociality, his 
access to knowledge and technics, all that, everything (in a non-finite number of 
predicates) that is proper to man would derive from this originary fault, indeed, 
from this default in propriety, what is proper to man as default in propriety—and 
from the imperative necessity that finds in it its development and resilience.417  
 
This fault at the foundation of humanity is echoed in the thought of Agamben, who positions 
humans in a state of suspension between ‘the animal’ that is beneath us and ‘the gods’ who 
are above us. Describing the anthropological machine at the heart of humanism, Agamben 
proposes that our very being is one that embodies the distance between the terrestrial and the 
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celestial, and as such our being is: “always less and more than itself… The humanist 
discovery of man is the discovery that he lacks himself, the discovery of his irremediable lack 
of dignitas.”418 While we saw how Derrida attributes dignity to humanity through our ability, 
as subjects, to consider subjective life as an end in itself in Chapter 4.2.3. Subjects, the ideas 
of Derrida and Agamben aren’t necessary conflictive. If considered from another perspective, 
it suggests that we ascribe our lives with purpose because they are lacking it in essence to 
begin with. Whatever the case, this original lack in humankind, which we explored in relation 
to autopoiesis and art in Chapter 2.3.8. Lack, can be seen as our impetus for action in the 
world, where we encounter not only the elements we need to survive but also context and 
meaning. As we continue to explore the relation of art and technology the idea of lack is 
important to keep in mind, for not only does it found some basic principles of aesthetic 
thought, but it also influences our interaction with the world around us.   
Technology has become a far more complex and ambiguous concept than its 
etymological meaning of “the logic of craft” might suggest.419 The German philosopher 
Walter Benjamin denounces the traditional understanding of technology as the mastery of 
humanity over nature, opting instead to define it as: “the mastery of the relations between 
humanity and nature. [my italics]”420 Shifting the focus to the negotiation of humanity with 
the world around it, Benjamin is able to avoid a sharp separation of humankind from nature, 
which I believe is important. While it is easy to consider ourselves as isolated subjects, the 
coupling with the environment that autopoiesis implies makes Benjamin’s definition an ideal 
counterpart to Rancière’s conception of ‘being apart together.’ But what exactly are these 
relations that Benjamin speaks of? Along the same line of thought, W. Brian Arthur defines 
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technologies as: “an orchestration of phenomena to our use.”421 This general definition of 
technology easily supports the inclusion of tools and machinery, however it advances the 
understanding of technology by allowing tools to be either physical or conceptual in nature. 
As such, pedagogy and prayer can both be considered as technologies, since they are 
combinations of various elements that organize people, materials, space and time in order to 
achieve a goal.422 Jon Dron commends such a definition because it allows technology to be 
considered equally as process and product. Increasing the specificity of the relations between 
humans and nature that Benjamin’s definition of technology establishes, Arthur’s definition 
determines the concepts of orchestration, phenomena and purpose as key features of 
technology. An orchestration connotes the combination or coordination of different elements, 
with an implied conductor who performs the intended task. The term ‘phenomenon’ implies 
something that is observed as existing or happening in the natural world, something 
independent of humans and technology. In addition to the necessary act of observation for a 
phenomenon to exist, the act of orchestration also establishes a subjective source for the 
purpose or intentionality that points the technology in a certain direction towards a use or 
function. While these specific ideas will be further explored in the following chapters, it is 
important to note the connection to the autopoietic notions of organization and intentionality, 
which connect the use of technology to biological operation. 
To expand and illuminate a broader and more flexible conception of technology, it is 
now considered in terms of hardness or softness. If you think about computer hardware and 
software, you can begin to understand the characterization. In general, the degree to which a 
specific technology predetermines human involvement determines how hard or soft that 
technology is, with softer technologies requiring more human participation and harder 
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technologies offering less.423 The result is a sliding scale with purely hard or purely soft 
technologies being quite rare. As Dron describes: “[h]ard technologies provide efficiency, 
speed, accuracy and consistency. Soft technologies give flexibility, creativity, malleability 
and adaptability.”424 Aside from considering the nature of technical interaction with people, it 
is important to keep in mind is that all technology is context dependent. While a technology is 
obviously understood distinctly by different species, the same technological object can be 
used in a number of different ways. While a tool remains the same, the technology changes 
nonetheless when the use of the tool changes.425 Dron uses the example of a stone, which can 
be used to open a nut or to stop a door. While the same stone might be used to serve both 
functions, the technology differs as the purpose changes. Furthermore, the same technology 
may be hard for one user and soft for another, with the possibility of transformation over time 
as a user softens a technology with their increasing expertise. It all depends on the user’s 
perspective. Dron uses the example of a violin, which is a harder technology for a beginner 
and a softer one for an expert. “Each new trick that we learn or technique that we refine does 
not eliminate existing possibilities but adds new possibilities and increases the potential for 
further possibilities as a result.”426 Dron describes a ‘technique’ as a technology that is 
enacted by a person, stating that techniques—like all technologies—can never exist in 
isolation.427 Since softer technologies require more human thought to operate them, they 
require more decisions to be made by the user and, as such, are more difficult to use, 
according to Dron. Harder technologies, on the other hand, have less user input, fewer 
decisions to make, and are easier to use as a result. Coming from an educational background, 
Dron is interested in considering pedagogies as technologies in order to explore the distinct 
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operational perspectives that teachers and students have of the same educational 
methodology. Considering a parallel relationship between the distinct perspectives of creators 
and observers of artworks, the distinction between soft and hard technologies becomes a 
relevant method for understanding the difference between artistic creation and appreciation, 
and for the varying degrees of participation that artworks involve. As the separation of artistic 
production and enjoyment is an important aspect of the ‘aesthetic break’ as described by 
Rancière, we gain new methods of describing cultural transformation by considering a 
comparison between art and technology.  
As we continue in the following chapters, this comparison between technology and art 
will become more clearly appreciated. While we now have a basis for a comparison, we have 
yet to explore the distinction between the two. Nonetheless, with a broader understanding of 
technology we can begin to see many aspects that connect the two distinct practices. The 
etymology of the word “technology” and the Prometheus myth help us to determine the same 
origin for art and technology, as ars and techne were ‘endowed’ to humanity to compensate 
for their inherent lack. Positioned between other animals and gods, humans are naturally 
paradoxical in their reflexive self-conception of superiority and inferiority, always more than 
animals and less than gods. Once again, this conflictive self-perception destabilizes the 
foundation of the human subject, which calls forth technology and art to help sustain it. 
Understood as the mastery of relations between humanity and nature, technology should be 
understood more in terms of process than simply product. Arthur’s definition of technology as 
‘assemblies of orchestrated phenomena for a purpose’ helps us to understand the operations at 
the root of technology, while also connecting it to our biological function as autopoietic 
organisms. This positions technology in relation to assemblies and orchestration, which 
demonstrate the necessity of subjective intentionality and coordination in relation to purpose. 
Just as composition is requisite of artworks, so too is assemblage and orchestration requisite 
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of technology, both of which demonstrate an inherently subjective impetus. The terms hard 
and soft help us to identify a range of technological processes with varying degrees of user 
input, which expands our conception of technology to include more socially determined 
mechanisms of function. While this allows us to go so far as to consider language as a tool,428 
it helps us to perceive how the practice of art has fundamental parallels with our use of 
technology. By demonstrating a range of flexibility and expertise, the conception of 
technology as hard and soft also puts into perspective the varying positions that artists and 
spectators might have in relation to observational technique. Just like artworks, technologies 
can never exist in isolation, not only because of their reliance on people but because of their 
dependence on the artworks and technologies that came before them. As such, tradition 
contextualizes the connection of artworks and technology to society, which in turn helps us to 
appreciate the relationship between art and life.  
 
4.3.2. Reorganization 
Arthur’s conception of technology as an orchestration of phenomena for a purpose 
implies that separate components are organized in relation to each other at the service of a 
rationale. This sounds a lot like composition to me, and the easy association of an orchestra 
and its composer shouldn’t be taken lightly, for it implies that a symphony can be categorized 
as a technology. Should we be worried about this blurring of boundaries? While many people 
might be uncomfortable labelling a symphony as technological in nature, Arthur’s broad 
definition certainly allows it to be understood as such. While there are some definite 
functional similarities between art and technology, some distinctions must certainly remain 
nonetheless. In this chapter we are going to explore the process of the reorganization in 
relation to technology and the practice of art by looking at Nöe’s conception of artworks as 
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‘strange tools.’ As we explored the basic structure and functioning of Nöe’s organizational 
conception of art in Chapters 2.3.5. Organization, and 4.2.4. Writing, in this chapter we will 
expand upon it to examine the ways that technologies and artworks are organized, or 
reorganized, and the ways that people interact with art and technology, in addition to being 
affected by their use. Not only do we organize when we make artworks and technology, but 
artworks and technology in turn organize and reorganize us. This relates to the concept of 
recursivity, which concerns the ways that existing elements of technology or art are 
reincorporated to make new technologies or artworks. This points towards the ways that 
technology and art transform over time in reference to their antecedents, and this idea of 
reorganization helps us to appreciate how tradition inherently gives form to new art and new 
technologies. Furthermore, we will consider the ways in which technological and artistic 
processes of reorganization rely on context differently, which establishes one of our first 
distinctions between artworks as technologies. In the end, the concepts of orchestration and 
organization help us to understand how our use of technology is natural and how artworks can 
be considered as technological in nature.  
Our comparison of art and technology begins in relation to organizational processes, 
which Nöe considers in his book Strange Tools. He claims that technological practices 
presuppose art practices, which means that art wouldn’t or couldn’t exist without 
technology.429 That’s a bold claim to make, and yet his reasoning is quite clear. As we have 
seen, Nöe’s whole theory of art is based upon the idea of organization, something that we as 
humans do naturally. He considers technology broadly as something that we use to carry out 
organized activities, which can be anything from breast-feeding to drawing a picture to 
sending a text message. It is important to note the distinction between basic activities, which 
are simple things that we do naturally, and organized activities, which bring normal activities 
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into the realm of thought (see Chapter 2.3.5. Organization for a more thorough description). 
The idea of basic activities in relation to organized activities runs parallel with Arthur’s idea 
of natural phenomena in relation to orchestrated phenomena. Both conceptions involve two 
separate levels of function, much the same way that autopoiesis does with its molecular and 
molar conception. It also reflects Rancière’s description of artworks as simultaneous beings of 
natural earth and composed expression:  
the solid end-product of the activity that ‘twists’ the materials of sculpture or 
painting remains somewhere between the cry of the suffering and struggling 
people and the ‘earth’s song’, between a voice of human division and a melody of 
cosmic—inhuman—harmony.430  
 
An important caveat for Nöe is that second-order activities always bring first-order activities 
into thought.431 This observational position of a higher order to a lower one is a distinguishing 
factor that potentially transforms any organized activity into art, with thought infusing 
purpose into the organized activity and the natural activity upon which it is based. Pictures, in 
whatever form, are always a technology, and yet they aren’t always considered art. In order to 
be considered art, a picture (an organized activity) must demonstrate reflexivity by showing 
how we as people are organized by pictures (or said organized activity), which could mean 
how we are organized by the production or by the use of pictures (the organized activity).432 
A two-tiered operational structure where a second-order activity reflects back to the first-
order activity that founds it enables a reflexive opportunity to observe both the ways that we 
organize our lives and the ways that our lives are organized for us. Basing his theory of art on 
organization allows Nöe to relate it with both biological and technological principals, where 
distinct levels of organization implicitly provide opportunities of separation and coordination.  
As Arthur explores the nature and evolution of technology, he notes the important 
principle of ‘recursiveness’ in the orchestration of technologies. It is based upon the principle 
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of combination, which asserts that a technology is composed of component parts, systems or 
assemblies.433 From a functional standpoint, every technology can be divided from the overall 
(molar) technology to its main assemblies, sub-assemblies, and so on, down to its elemental 
parts. From this we can form a hierarchy of functional structures that demonstrate technology 
to consist of component parts that are also technologies in themselves, which consist of sub-
parts that are also technologies, and so on. The idea of recursivity is that technology is built 
from other technologies; that each separate assembly or sub-part is itself a technology. 
Thinking back to Nöe’s organizational theory of art, the first and second order organized 
activities also demonstrate recursivity. In terms of technology, Arthur points out that 
recursivity implies that technologies are rarely fixed, but rather they change and adapt quickly 
as purposes shift and elements are upgraded.434 “In the real world, technologies are highly 
reconfigurable; they are fluid things, never static, never finished, never perfect.”435 The idea 
of recursivity helps us to consider the ways in which contemporary art incorporates everyday 
life, not only in terms of organized activities but also component parts. One of the key formal 
novelties during the shift from the representative regime of art to the aesthetic regime was the 
incorporation of everyday objects into artworks. As Tanke states:  
Everyday objects, gestures, and forms of expression assumed a status previously 
reserved for historical, mythological, and religious subject matter. Thus, 
throughout what is customarily designated as “modernity,” quotidian objects and 
practices were imbued with complex layers of meaning, and the artist charged 
with the task of collecting, organizing, and deciphering its traces.436 
 
The concept of recursivity shows how the incorporation of elements of everyday life into 
artworks shifted the subject matter of art towards everyday life. Tanke claims that this 
practice of using quotidian materials in art helped to show that there were no longer any fixed 
rules for distinguishing art products from the products of everyday life. This distinction had to 
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be made individually, on a case-by-case scenario, which is the cornerstone of the aesthetic 
regime. Furthermore, recursivity allows us to appreciate the incorporation of external 
influence in artworks, where precedent techniques or elements from other artworks are copied 
or appropriated to create a new artwork. In this way, artworks can be seen to be feeding off of 
tradition in a process of furthering artistic tradition. Recursivity addresses contemporary art’s 
incorporation of non-art practices, which helps us to understand the seemingly complete 
dissolution of traditional art practices as art mutates into new forms. John Roberts, in his 
exploration of the Avant-Garde, lists several current artistic strategies that utilize non-art or 
anti-art systems in what he calls ‘deflationary art practices’: 
‘amateurism’ (general strategies of professional deskilling), the ‘trickster’ (the 
artist as creator of ruses or hoaxes), ‘imageless truth’ or the ‘post-visual’ (the 
dissolution of artistic form into forms of social praxis, into non-art practices), 
‘ventriloquism’ (the adoption of authorial surrogates) and ‘iatrogenesis’ 
(ideological co-adaptation  or exchange with non-art practices).437 
 
Several of these strategies necessitate that artists move from art institutions and out into the 
‘real’ world, where preconceived notions about how an artwork is supposed to function don’t 
exist. Escaping defined conceptions of what an artwork is, or a fixed understanding of how 
artworks function, allow artists to maintain an element of surprise and more easily 
demonstrate the essence of aesthetics, where an artwork must be evaluated in the moment as a 
singularity. It also demonstrates the recursive nature of art, where tradition evolves and 
progresses by feeding off of itself.   
As hubs of organization, art and technology not only demonstrate a recursive nature in 
terms of objects and elements, but also in terms of how their use reorganizes us and our 
behaviour. Describing the close connection between technologies and second-order activities, 
Nöe describes how that might work: “Technology is not mere stuff. It is the equipment with 
which we carry on our organized activities. Technologies organize us; properly understood, 
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they are evolving patterns of organization.”438 Considering the heightened interactivity of soft 
technologies, we can appreciate technology as an aspect of our behaviour, a technique we use 
to facilitate our cognition of the world around us. Our use of technology, after all, is a 
perfectly natural behaviour for us. One simply needs to observe a child with a smart phone to 
recognize how they instinctively know what they are doing. We use technology to relate with 
our environment differently, and in doing so technology changes how we relate with our 
environment.439 Technology changes our patterns of activity, our ways of being in the world, 
and this changes our understanding of the world. This is because technology not only allows 
us to do things we previously couldn’t, but it allows us to think differently as well.440 It can be 
used to help solve old problems, but it can also be used to define or discover new problems 
that we were unaware of beforehand.441 As we use technologies, they can help us to think new 
thoughts and understand new ideas. This is how technologies extend us both physically and in 
thought.442 Nöe relates these ideas back to art. Considering how our lives are inundated with 
technology and organization, he states that art and philosophy: “are practices for investigating 
the modes of our organization, or rather, the manner of our embedding in different modes of 
organization.”443 With human life being governed by organization, art becomes the realm for 
putting this organization on view—and escaping it. Art helps us to contextualize our position 
in relation to organization, whether it is how we organize ourselves or how we are organized 
by the world in which we live. Offering new perspectives for observing our organized 
activities, art changes how we think about them and, in turn, facilitates a reorganization of 
ourselves.444 As we explored in Chapter 2.3.4. Context, one of the ways in which art 
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accomplishes this shift of perspective is by changing the context—the embedding—in which 
we consider artworks or technologies. Technology is context dependent, and Nöe asserts that 
a tool only has significance as a technology in the context of its embedding. A tool out of 
context is useless in terms of its intended function, and without a purpose it stops being 
technological in principle. Nöe uses this dependence of significance on context to establish a 
key distinction between technology and art.445  
Art is interested in removing tools (in my extended sense) from their settings and 
thus in making them strange and, in making them strange, bringing out the ways 
and textures of the embedding that had been taken for granted. A work of art is a 
strange tool, an alien implement. We make strange tools to investigate 
ourselves.446   
 
Nöe asserts that the practice of self-investigation that both art and philosophy provide helps us 
to “make sense” of the ways in which we organize and are organized. This is a practice of 
contextualization and recontextualization that provides an understanding of how we fit into 
our embedding as people within the world. ‘Sense’ is at the foundation of this process of self-
awareness, according to Nöe, since it connects this form of reflective analysis to subjective 
feeling and emotion. Art puts people on display, unveiling our selves to ourselves, which is 
made possible through the reflective judgement that happens during the evaluation of 
artworks.447 We must rely on our own senses, experiences and knowledge in order to think 
about art, and this in turn provides an opportunity for us to experience ourselves in the 
moment. This is what Rancière uses to position the practice of art as a political activity, since 
it gives us the chance of being conscious of our subjective position in the organized world. 
Art examines and represents how we organize our world through the transformation of 
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materials and conventions, and how we organize ourselves through acts of production and 
experiencing.448  
Technology serves ends. Art questions those very ends. Art affords revelation, 
transformation, reorganization; art puts into question those values, rules, 
conventions, and assumptions that make the use of technology possible in the first 
place.449  
 
The insight that aesthetic experience offers is what makes art a legitimate field of 
investigation, in the same vein as philosophy.450 Art offers a recursive moment of self-
reflection where personal state and position can be contextualized in relation to how we 
organize and are organized.  
 Considering the organizational processes involved in art and technology, they are 
clearly related in their operational necessity of composition and orchestration. With a focus on 
the operation of combining natural activities or phenomena with a purpose in mind, we can 
understand Nöe’s claim that art presupposes technology. In his organizational theory of art, 
Nöe reflects the two-tiered system of autopoiesis and establishes a defining feature of 
artworks that is based on the reflexive reference of second-order to first-order activities. As a 
second-order activity is always an extension of the first-order activity, an artwork is defined 
by its capacity to bring first-order activities into the realm of thought, which exposes the 
underlying organization of both the activities that create the work and the people who observe 
it. In this way, the experience of art is reflective in terms of structure and thought. The 
recursive nature of technology is reflected in the practice of art, where existing elements or 
components are used in combination to create a new technology or artwork. This helps to 
demonstrate how everyday life began to be incorporated into the practice of art during the 
‘aesthetic realm,’ and how contemporary artworks today adopt the forms of non-art practices. 
More than anything, recursivity shows how the practice of art is dependent upon tradition, 
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which firmly establishes it as a social institution. Not only do art and technology transform in 
relation to themselves, but we also transform through our use of art and technology. The 
organization that artworks display helps us to see how we organize and are organized, which 
in turn enables us to be transformed through artistic practice. Technology changes us in a 
similar way through its use, demonstrating how technology is naturally incorporated into our 
human behaviour. It allows us to do different things and to think differently in the world. 
While the function, and thus value, of technology is related to its contextual embedding, 
artworks in opposition subvert contextual understanding in order to function. This enables an 
awareness of function in relation to organization that wouldn’t be possible otherwise, which 
enables artworks to show how we are organized as people.  
 
4.3.3. Progression 
 Technology, much like art, is produced and used for humans by humans. While it is 
easy to consider both technology and art as distinct from nature as a result of their artificiality, 
I would argue that the role that human beings play in creating and activating technology and 
art positions these practices within a bio-logical realm. Technology and art evolve alongside 
us, in a similar way that we evolve as a biological species. In this chapter we will look at the 
ways in which this transformation happens, focusing on the ways in which technological 
evolution informs the way that the practice of art transforms. We will begin by looking at the 
unstable boundary between human beings and technology by looking at the work of Adrian 
MacKenzie, who presents us with the process of information in order to better understand the 
continuous development of humans, and to appreciate a more nuanced conception of 
technological transformation beyond simple before-and-after procedural steps. This concept 
of information leads us to consider the state of indetermination that all humans, technologies 
and artworks must demonstrate. Assuming they are accessible, the degree of openness of a 
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technological or artistic system varies depending on its interface. These varying potentials of 
control show the distinct ways in which we use artworks and machines, and remind us that 
our ability to affect the world is proportional to our ability to be affected by it. This leads us to 
our final consideration of the chapter, which explores the internal mechanisms of 
technological and artistic evolution. Expanding upon the idea of recursivity that we explored 
in the last chapter, here we focus on the internal structure that permits art and technology to 
transform reflexively, which reflects autopoieitic systems operation. It demonstrates how 
artistic and technological systems change from within, which makes their evolution reflexive 
in nature. This provides insight into the transformation of traditions and cultures, but also the 
creative process in itself. As we look to find connections between art and life, and to 
understand the functioning of aesthetic separation, these considerations offer many fruitful 
ideas and comparisons. 
Positioning the use of technology within a bio-logic, Nöe states that the organization 
that results from our use of technology is so natural that it should be thought of as 
biological.451 Technology is dependent on biological systems, at the very least, as it is never 
entirely free of them. Bodies shape technologies and technologies in turn affect bodies, which 
is evident in the impact that agricultural and pharmaceutical technologies have had on human 
evolution,452 not to mention our impact as a species on the world. The philosopher Adrian 
MacKenzie takes a similar stance, promoting a conception of the human body as an open 
system that actively integrates both non-living and technical elements.  
Unless we assume that a body has pregiven limits (for example, that a body is 
always fully alive), there is always a potential contamination of the living by the 
non-living, of the natural by the technical, of the physis by techne. The inherently 
unstable and divergent advent of iteratively stabilized bodies cannot radically 
exclude the non-living. Distinctions between the corporeal and the non-corporeal, 
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between the technical and the non-technical, and between the living and the non-
living, cannot be exempt from this logic of interactive destabilization.453 
 
This perspective is perfectly in line with the autopoietic conception of the human being as a 
molecular organism that incorporates non-living molecules to facilitate its life. Addressing the 
fact that a variety of domains are involved in technological activity, MacKenzie describes the 
thresholds between the human and non-human as unstable, and purports that one of our main 
uses of technology is to provide an interactive stabilization of our concept of what it means to 
be human.454 One could suggest that the practice of art functions in a similar way. In order to 
properly acknowledge the many transformations that occur during the use of technology, 
MacKenzie avoids a simple binary understanding of these changes, where: “the human 
(collectively or individually) shapes or is shaped by technology.”455 Instead, he follows the 
work of Gilbert Simondon who deems this hylomorphic conception to be inadequate because 
of its limited scope of interactive considerations during technological formation, and its 
overreliance on an underdeveloped distinction between material and form. As we explore the 
notion of form more closely in relation to artworks and aesthetics in Chapter 5.2.6. Form, the 
relevance of this opposition will become more clearly distinguished. The alternative that 
Simondon presents is the process of in-form-ation, which reconceptualizes the opposition of 
form and matter by negating the static ‘before-and-after’ conception of inert, raw material and 
finished product.456 Much like the operational systems logic of autopoietis, this process of 
information acknowledges that technology is never complete. “Since living entities 
individuate continuously, rather than being formed once, they are information. They are 
continuous, variable processes of matter-taking-form.”457 The work of MacKenzie and 
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Simondon help us to understand how the limits that we establish between our bodies and the 
inert world, or our bodies and technology, are largely informed by our interaction with those 
elements, and as such, they are actively involved in forming our understanding of what it 
means to be a living, human body.458 This, of course, is a process, and it relates to Rancière’s 
conception of ‘non-thought in thought,’ which helps us to more fully appreciate the 
complexity of the influences that affect our understanding. In relation to the Deleuzian 
conception of becoming, the idea of human beings as information is perfectly in line as well, 
and our use of technology and artworks helps us to identify the processes of becoming and 
information that human life entails as a result of our biological interactions with the world.  
This isn’t the first time that we have seen the idea of information in this thesis. As we 
saw in Chapter 2.3.5. Observation, Luhmann uses the concepts of “information” and 
“utterance” to distinguish between the communicative modes of hetero-reference, which is 
external, and self-reference, which is internal. If we apply Luhmann’s idea of hetero-reference 
to MacKenzie’s process of information, we can appreciate how the process of being-in-
formed is necessarily in relation to external relations. Understanding technologies and humans 
as processes of information helps us appreciate the openness and responsiveness that enable 
our capacity to interact with the world around us. If a technology didn’t maintain some aspect 
of indetermination, it could never function as a technology. “A machine must articulate some 
degree of openness to a milieu in order to remain technological.”459 Spinoza suggests a 
similar indeterminatation within humanity, which we briefly explored in relation to the 
conatus in Chapter 2.2. Autopoiesis, stating that our capacity to affect the world around us is 
equal to our capacity for being affected. Spinoza proposes that our affective capacity as 
humans is directly related to our capacity to be affected by the world, equating our power for 
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external influence on our capacity to internalize and be influenced.460 The consideration of 
technology and our selves as processes of information could easily extend to the practice of 
art and the aesthetic experience of artworks. Artworks, just like technology, are always 
patiently waiting for people to activate them. MacKenzie identifies certain limitations, 
nonetheless, in the interface of technology, which establishes a set range of indeterminacy 
regardless of the sophistication of the machine.461 Artworks must also be open to being 
experienced through an interface, which could be understood as the way in which spectators 
access them. While technologies maintain strict boundaries that limit their use through their 
interfaces, artworks are more open in their perceptivity because they function within the realm 
of observation. There is no correct way or order to observe an artwork, aside perhaps from 
time-based artworks that operate in a progressive sequence. Nonetheless, within that sequence 
the observation is not controlled to facilitate artistic function. Artworks function as indirect 
communication, and in doing so they are liberated from the strict binary functionalism—
on/of, yes/no or 0/1—that structures technology.462 Artworks function by being totally open to 
interaction and interpretation, even if they are intentionally limiting in some formal way or 
another. While technology imposes limits at the service of its function, Luhmann states that: 
“a work qualifies as art only when it employs constraints for the sake of increasing the work’s 
freedom in disposing over further constraints.”463 Accessibility and openness, nonetheless, 
are requisite for interaction to take place amongst humans, artworks and technologies, and the 
destabilized boundaries that exist between these seemingly separate beings help us to 
understand how technology and art do function in relation to a bio-logic. 
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In a similar way that we are not exactly human without language,464 we aren’t exactly 
human without technology either. “Our mode of being—how our lives are organized—is 
constituted in part by technology. Take away the technology and you are left not with us, but 
with, at most, something like distant cousins of ourselves.”465 Technology defines us as a 
species because it is natural for us. It was technology, after all, in the form of social 
organization that had the biggest influence on how we transformed as a species around fifty 
thousand years ago.466 As I examined in Sweat, Feel, Think, Art, the evolution of human 
creativity can be largely attributed to the role of sexual selection in diversifying human 
personality. As the secondary mechanism of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, sexual selection 
connects the activities of display and attraction during mate selection to the development of 
expressive variation (including story-telling and humour) and perceptive acuity 
(distinguishing between strategic and revealing handicaps).467 Beyond mere survival concerns 
that focused on establishing protective procreative relationships, sexual selection—which is 
largely controlled by females—assured that personality features such as creativity and loyalty 
became just as attractive as big muscles and well-proportioned symmetry.468 As our human 
personalities developed over time, our use of mechanical and social technologies increased 
too, and our species transformed its relationship with the environment and within its 
communities. Thanks to the reciprocal transformative affect of organized activities on our 
behaviour, our use of technology transformed not only our biology but also how we think 
about our relationships with the world. It is important to note, however, that the impetus for 
reflexive reorganization is never external but comes from within an organized activity, 
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looping back to alter the first-order activity upon which the second-order activity is based.469 
To illustrate, Nöe describes how the prehistoric practice of picture-making has shaped how 
we as humans see.470 Pictures captivate us—or hold us captive—to this day, which is easy to 
consider in our contemporary lives of screen-filled spaces, rooms and pockets. On the other 
hand, Nöe contends that pictures always: “supply the resources we need to free ourselves of 
their control.”471 As humans we are born into a world of pictures and our culture of 
pictoriality is inevitable. Art, however, can liberate us from a fixed organization of pictures, 
allowing us to change the culture of picture-making from within.472 This cycle of re-
production evokes the chicken and egg paradox, as artistic acts become a precondition for the 
transformation of materials that is necessary for the construction of technologies.473 Is art 
dependent on technology, or is technology dependent on art? Whatever the case, Arthur 
positions technology as autopoietic in its self-producing operation since it: “builds itself piece 
by piece from the collective of existing technologies.”474 In terms of art, the internally 
reflexive nature of reorganization assures that the transformations it catalyzes are never 
immediate and always surrounded by conscious and critical thought within a community.475 
Art and technology are essentially cultural practices because they exist through community 
use, and their meaning is both established and challenged through this culture.476 The 
mechanisms of transformation within art and technology are integral to their productive 
communities, and while they operate in distinct ways, the essence of their evolutionary 
development is reflexive. 
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 To conclude, both technology and art can be considered as biological practices 
because of three things; their dependence on, their openness to, and their transformation by 
living organisms. The living organisms in question, of course, are human beings, and art and 
technology exist through our practice and use of them. As Donna Harraway considers the 
fluid boundaries of our bodies and our culture, she states: “The boundary is permeable 
between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations and 
historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, myth and 
tool mutually constitute each other.”477 Thus a relationship of interdependence exists between 
people, technology and art, and it becomes impossible to establish one of these concepts in 
isolation of the others. As we transform as people and as a species, technology and art evolve 
alongside us. MacKenzie’s process of information helps us to better appreciate the continuous 
development of human beings and technology beyond a simple before-and-after conception. 
In relation to Luhmann’s communicative conception of information, which connotes the 
hetero-reference with the world around us, the multitude of influences and states that are 
inherent in processes of information can be more easily located and appreciated. Furthermore, 
it helps to avoid simple binary conceptions, such as the hylomorphic opposition between 
material and form.478 The process of information reveals how material and form relate not 
only with technological and artistic production, but they also operate in conjunction with the 
material and form of the human beings that use them. This implies an inherent state of 
indetermination that all humans, technologies and artworks demonstrate. The degree of 
openness of a human, technological or artistic system varies depending on the system’s 
interface. While people employ consciousness, sensation and movement to openly interact 
with their environments, technology and artworks utilize structural and formal elements to 
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establish their indeterminate interactivity. While all three systems have inherent limitations to 
their interactivity, a human being’s power to affect the world is proportional to their ability to 
be affected by it. While artworks and machines must possess varying degrees of 
determination in order to function, they demonstrate this determination distinctly in relation to 
their differing modes of function, which will be explored more deeply in the following 
chapter. To briefly foreshadow, technology is determined in order to serve a function, while 
artworks are determined in order to negate further functional determination. This difference 
exists largely as a result of the observational and communicative nature of artworks, which 
are produced in relation to a tradition that obviates expediency. Nonetheless, the existence of 
tradition in relation to art, technology and humanity demonstrates how these systems evolve 
over time in relation to their relative antecedents. This evolution can never be escaped, and 
the transformative mechanisms at play within these three interconnected realms of art, 
technology and humanity shows how they transform themselves from within. While sexual 
selection motivates the perpetuation of endearing personality traits in humans, the concept of 
recursivity shows how art and technology reproduce by reflexively incorporating elements 
from their distinct practices and traditions. This is possible as a result of an internal structure 
that is inherent to art and technology that establishes two tiers of operation, where an 
advanced secondary level is built out of components of a more basic primary level. Not only 
have we witnessed a similar structure in the molecular and molar operation of autopoieitic 
systems, but also in the first-order and second-order observational theory of art proposed by 
Luhmann, who considers artworks to be ‘observations of observations.’ The separation 
between two levels of operation, as we have seen in Chapter 2.3.5. Organization, facilitates an 
interactivity in which both reflexivity and meaning are generated. As we have seen here, it 
also demonstrates how artistic and technological systems can transform their own systems 
from within, which makes their evolution autopoietic in nature. This provides insight into the 
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importance of tradition and culture in the creation of new artworks and technologies, but it 
also demonstrates how traditions and cultures transform over time through their reflexive use.  
 In relation to Rancière’s conception of aesthetic separation, this conception of artistic 
and technological evolution shows us how the transformation from the mimetic regime of art 
to the aesthetic regime happened in relation to the transformation of society at large. The 
practice of art transformed over time through the creation of artworks that were made in 
relation to the tradition of art. As artworks changed, people’s conception of art changed, 
which means that people inherently changed as well. Since artworks are created in order to be 
observed, they function in the realm of perception, which frees them from the pragmatism that 
controls technology. This helps us to consider the political efficacy of artworks, especially in 
light of the reflexive, internal processes of transformation that both art and technology 
demonstrate. Aesthetic experience demonstrates hetero-reference through a subject’s 
experience of an external artwork in concert with self-reference as the subject reflects upon 
the internal sensations that the hetero-reference has inspired. While potential changes of a 
subject from an external source are usually met with suspicion and resistance, potential 
transformation from within is more readily accepted thanks to the reflexive, and seemingly 
independent, source of impulse. Artworks thus offer the opportunity for subjects to change 
themselves from within by surreptitiously converting an external stimulus into an internal 
realization. This is the process of information, as subjects become informed by the world 
around them. Demonstrating how aesthetic experience is a process of information, where the 
boundaries between art, technology and humanity are permeable, we can better appreciate the 
political potential and functionality of art. 
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4.3.4. Function 
Nöe’s theory of art, which equates artworks to strange tools, asserts that the function 
of art is philosophical in nature; that we use it to develop and to learn about ourselves. “Art 
and philosophy share a common aim: self-transformation and the achievement of 
understanding.”479 The problem with associating art with an aim is that purpose is always 
governed by concept, and as Kant describes, aesthetic judgement is always without concept. 
As soon as you place the purpose of ‘changing people,’ or ‘better understanding your 
relationships with society and the world’ on art, its judgement changes from being reflexive to 
determinant. Instead of describing art using the word “beauty,” which is based on subjective 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure that are independent of a concept, we would have to use 
the word “good” or “bad” to describe it, as the judgement would be based on a purpose or 
concept. Good art, in line with Nöe’s philosophical purpose, would be art that changes people 
quickly or profoundly, or art that helps you understand yourself or capitalism more 
thoroughly. This is the kind of politically motivated artworks that Rancière describes in 
“Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community,” which are created to actively persuade the 
subjects who experience them to understand something differently. But here we are reasoning 
what art is, not judging it, and because of this Kant would probably disavow Nöe’s 
contemporary formulation that relates art with purpose. One important consideration, 
however, is that the practice and appreciation of art has certainly changed since Kant wrote 
The Critique of Judgement, and the art that Kant was looking at and considering at the time 
was very distinct from the artworks that Nöe uses to illustrate his contemporary notion that art 
presupposes technology. Rancière distinctly states that: “Art entails the employment of a set 
of concepts, while the beautiful possesses no concepts.”480 While beauty is still a familiar 
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adjective used to describe artworks, it certainly isn’t the only thing that artists strive to 
provoke. As Mick Wilson states in a recent Conceptual Art exhibition catalogue: 
In the most simple and everyday terms conceptual art has given rise to a new 
criterion in judgements on art. Encountering a work of art, instead of the question 
‘Is it beautiful?’ or ‘Is it moving?’ we now find ourselves more often than not, 
first asking ourselves, ‘Is it interesting?’481  
 
In defence of Nöe, he does preface his book by stating that, “the job of art, its true work, is 
philosophical.” This holds true to Rancière’s definition of aesthetics, and at the very least, 
Nöe positions the purpose of art within the reflexive tradition of human thought. Whether 
contemporary art is judged as beautiful, or reasoned as good or bad, its primary mode of 
experience is cognitive and reflexive, which is the essence of aesthetics. In this chapter we 
will continue to explore the functionality of aesthetic experience, using technology as a 
counterpoint to more fully understand what makes art a unique practice and field of study. We 
will begin by further exploring Nöe’s theory of strange tools, in particular by looking at how 
pictures can be understood in relation to models and samples. Utilizing the ideas of proxy and 
substitution to establish a basis of comparison between artworks and technology, the 
operative considerations of relation, intention and shared understanding will be explored in 
relation to artistic functionality. We will then move forward to explore Heidegger’s 
consideration of artworks in relation to equipment, and the basis of comparison he finds in 
their intermediate positions between matter and work. While Heidegger considers thinking in 
relation to purpose and use to be natural, he cautions about its preconceptions, which limit a 
more integral understanding of the true work that art does. In conclusion, the ‘unconcealment’ 
that Heidegger determines as the work of art is very much in line with the functionality that 
Nöe speaks of in his quote at the start of this paragraph. After exploring this more thoroughly 
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in the following paragraphs, we will conclude by seeing how this relates to Rancière 
understanding of the political efficacy of art. 
Nöe proposes that a picture functions in the same way as a model, which he defines as 
something we use to “stand in” for something else.482 If we call to mind all of the models we 
can think of—model cars, architectural models, fashion models, or even scientific models—
we can understand how they are used in order to imagine or study something else. Nöe uses 
the word “proxy” to define models, which is something that is used to represent something 
else. The effectiveness of a model lies both in how we make them and how we use them.483 A 
qualitative engagement with models helps us to think about the thing that they represent in 
ways that might otherwise be impossible. Nöe makes two important points to show how 
models are based on both relation and intention. In terms of relation, a model isn’t simply a 
model because of its size or composition.484 The fact that a house is small and made of balsa 
wood does not mean it is automatically a model, as it could be a toy dollhouse. This small, 
balsawood house becomes a model through use, by representing something that existed or 
might exist in the future. The second point Nöe makes is related, as it connects the relativity 
of what a model represents to an intention or purpose.485 As an example he uses is Watson 
and Crick’s DNA model, which helped to imagine how information could be stored 
biologically through a particular molecular pattern. There was a purpose to their model, and 
the double-helix would not have been a successful or useful model without this intended 
biological use. What both of these features of models demonstrate is that models are only 
models—effective representations of something else—within a context of shared 
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understanding.486 We need to know what models represent and the purpose of their 
representation in order for them to function as models.  
Similar to using models to explore art in relation to technology, Nelson Goodman 
explores the inherent symbolism in ‘samples,’ which are always a representation of some 
properties of a thing but never all properties.487 When you get a food sample in a grocery 
store, for example, it is a sample of the prepared ingredients and flavour but not a sample of 
the amount or shape. Nelson’s point is that a sample is understood in relation to its context, in 
which the properties that it exemplifies—and the ones that it doesn’t—are made obvious. 
When we see a fabric sample, we understand that it is a sample of the colour, pattern and 
texture but not the size or age. The understanding of a sample is relational, and Goodman 
compares it to the association of friendship, where friends are not distinguishable by any one 
characteristic but rather by having spent a period of time in a relationship as friends. This 
directly relates to the constitutive rules that Searle defines as the foundation for our ability to 
attribute conditional meaning, which we explored in Chapter 4.2.1. Introduction to Language. 
The conditional understanding of samples reflects the way that artworks do not simply 
possess properties but they exemplify them, which helps to show how all artworks function 
through symbolism.488 “Whoever looks for art without symbols, then, will find none—if all 
the ways that works symbolize are taken into account. Art without representation or 
expression or exemplification—yes; art without all three—no.”489 While this idea of ‘the 
sample’ reflects the contextual relativity and the intended purpose that inform our 
understanding of ‘the model,’ it expands Nöe’s representational notion of pictures by 
establishing the symbolic nature of the representation that all artworks inherently employ. 
While artworks are similar to models and samples in their relativity and dependence on 
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context, artworks differ from models and samples because the intention, purpose or usefulness 
behind their creation is either non-pragmatic or non-existent. As we have seen in Chapter 
2.3.5. Observation, the intentionality of the artist is never an innate part of the artwork. 
Ultimately, our shared understanding of the concepts of models, samples and art is established 
in light of their contextually dependent meaning. While the functionality of models and 
samples allows their understanding to be easily shared, this is not the case for art. The 
intrinsically subjective evaluation of artworks means that our shared understanding of their 
significance is difficult to attain, especially in the absence of a preconceived functionality.  
Pictures, nonetheless, can have a representational and intentional functionality within a 
shared context of understanding in a similar way as models and samples. According to Nöe, 
we use pictures collectively as a society through our practices of picture-making and picture-
sharing.490 A prime example that Nöe pulls from art history is that of religious icons, or 
images of sacred importance. As icons, pictures of Jesus on the cross have representational 
and intentional functionality within a shared context of understanding. The representation is 
that of a beaten man in his thirties being crucified, and the intention is to arouse the Christian 
values of sympathy and compassion, amongst other things. The shared context is the church, a 
place where religious faith is practiced collectively. While this example clearly demonstrates 
the comparison between pictures and models, Nöe asserts that all types of pictures function in 
a similar way thanks to one simple principle; substitution.491 Pictures are technologies for 
showing, and we use them as substitutes for what they represent.492 Different kinds of pictures 
operate in different ways depending on their conventions, practices, interests, settings or time, 
which in turn govern the ways their substitution functions. We use pictures to replace many 
things in many ways and for many reasons. An important point that Nöe makes, however, is 
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that pictures and art are not the same thing. A picture can be art, but it is not intrinsically art 
simply because it represents.  
Artists don’t make pictures (depictions) simply to take part in the pre-existing 
pictorial economy in which we are embedded. … The work of art happens 
precisely when that economy, that function, that rhetoric, that invisibly familiar 
practice, is disrupted.493  
 
This disruption assigns a functionality to artworks that runs counter to a collectively accepted 
intentionality associated with use value. Use value in artworks, as such, is achieved through 
their potential to subvert pragmatic understanding while utilizing the operational components 
of pragmatic technology. This implies using contextual relationships within a shared context 
of understanding to negate utility and escape usualness. 
 Heidegger considers the role of technology and function as he explores the true 
essence of artworks. He states that artworks are easily compared with pieces of equipment 
because they both share an intermediate position between matter and form, a perspective from 
which both artworks and tools can be understood in relation to substance and to work.494 
Heidegger warns, however, about the preconception of this equipmental relationship that has 
come to condition our universal perception of all beings.495 The problem is that this bias leads 
us to consider or judge things in terms of utility and reliability, which are mutually dependent 
on each other and catalyse the ‘becoming-usual’ of the being. This way of thought confines us 
to understand things, such as tools or artworks, fundamentally as equipment, which means 
that any aesthetic value we attribute to the being exists as an addition to the equipmental basis 
of the being.496 Heidegger refuses to accept this. For one, he states that this conception of 
artworks as equipment doesn’t fully consider the “thingly” element in the work—its matter, 
material, or earthly origin. Secondly, it implies the inclusion of a substructure and a 
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superstructure to explain the facets of the artwork that function beyond its equipmentality. 
More than anything, forcing a preconceived framework onto the understanding of an artwork 
denies our possibility of finding the true essence of the work of art, which is the work of the 
artwork.497 Heidegger determines that this labour is twofold, involving the setting up of a 
world, which is the creation of an artwork, and the setting forth of the world, which is the 
presentation of the artwork.498 The setting up and the setting forth of the world—the work of 
the artwork—positions the raw materials of the earth in relation with the observability of the 
world, which reflect back on each other to reveal the intermediate and indeterminate position 
of the work. It is important to remember that ‘earth’ represents the neutral material as it exists 
without human involvement as an ontologically objective phenomenon, while ‘world’ 
requires humans to create it and as such it is an ontologically subjective reality. This helps us 
to appreciate the relationship of material and form that artworks inherently embody, whereas 
with technology, the potential material consideration of the being is “used up” in its utility.  
Because it is determined through usefulness and serviceability, equipment takes 
that of which it consists into its service. In the manufacture of equipment—for 
example, an ax—the stone is used and used up. It disappears into usefulness. The 
less resistance the material puts up to being submerged in the equipmental being 
of the equipment the more suitable and the better it is.499 
 
In artworks, on the other hand, the relationship between materiality and form remains 
distinguishable, which allows us to appreciate the “strife” that exists in the opposition and 
conciliation of earth and world.500 It is through this strife that artworks vibrate, in part through 
their resistance to being taken for granted as usual in their usability. This is what Nöe refers to 
when he describes the ways in which art functions through subversion and disruption of the 
usual, or an expected use. It also alludes to the vibration that Rancière speaks of when he 
describes the artwork as a monument that exists between the melody of cosmic harmony—the 
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neutral earth—and the cry of human suffering—the form of the world. The important point 
that Heidegger makes is that by escaping the reliance of a technological framework for 
preconceiving works of art, we are able to better identify and appreciate the true nature of 
artworks, which is located in their power to “unconceal.”501 This operation at the heart of 
artistic practice reverberates in line with Nöe’s functionality of art in which artworks work to 
make us more aware of ourselves. As explored in Chapter 3.4.4. The Open, this relates with 
Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and the unconcealment that our special form of reflexive 
consciousness provides, which enables us to more fully appreciate the potential truth of art.  
 In conclusion, the functionality of ‘unconcealment’ that is inherent to the practice of 
art is a use that retains its indetermination, and as such it avoids confining artworks as 
determinant begins. It could in fact be understood as a phenomenon of artistic practice, 
something that is natural to it. As much as artists might try to use this phenomenon to their 
service, Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation helps to show how this is impossible:  
all forms of art can rework the frame of our perceptions and the dynamism of our 
affects. As such, they can open up new passages towards new forms of political 
subjectivation. But none of them can avoid the aesthetic cut that separates 
outcomes from intentions and precludes any direct path towards an ‘other side’ of 
words and images.502  
 
While artworks transform us and help us to become more self-aware, their indeterminate 
nature assures that this work of unconcealment can never be predetermined. This is due to the 
subjective nature of aesthetic experience, where material sense is transformed into cognitive 
sense as artworks are contextualized by individuals. Considering artworks in relation to 
models and samples reveals the ways in which artworks function in terms of representation, 
proxy or substitution. While the significance of models and samples is determined through 
use in relation to purpose within a shared context of understanding, artworks disrupt or 
subvert preconceived notions of use, purpose and context, assuring that shared notions of 
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understanding can only be determined posterior to the experience of an artwork. While we 
naturally encounter the world in relation to practical use, it is no surprise that artworks are 
conceived in relation to equipment, as both occupy positions as manufactured objects between 
inert material and potential work. Nonetheless, this ‘useful’ preconception of beings gradually 
eliminates the material consideration of the object because it is used up in the functionality of 
the object, where utility and reliability wear out potential meaning by making the object usual. 
As we saw in Chapter 2.3.7. Difference, if there is no distinction that marks something as 
different—as unusual—then it remains insignificant. Escaping functionality, or operating in a 
negative relation to practical functionality, allows artworks to demonstrate their true work, 
which is to manifest the relationship between earth and world that material and observation 
represent. Through this dualism an artwork works by representing the strife that is paramount 
to the ‘being apart together’ of the earth and the world, of matter and beings, and of 
individuals and society. Artworks work by unconcealing the separations that define us as 
people, which in turn helps us to become increasingly self-aware as people.  
 
4.3.5. Conclusion to Technology 
 As the Prometheus myth demonstrates, technology is a gift from the gods to 
compensate for our inherent lack as a species.503 We gain mastery over our relationship with 
nature thanks to technology,504 which can be defined as an orchestration of phenomena to our 
use.505 While the intentionality and organization inherent in this definition are shared by 
technologies and artworks, the fields of technology and art diverge on their handling of use 
and utility.506 Nonetheless, both technologies and artworks rely on human involvement, are 
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context dependent and demonstrate some relativity in terms of how they are understood.507 
Technologies can be categorized in terms of hardness and softness, which allows us to 
indicate the amount of user interaction and flexibility that they inherently display.508 While 
artworks don’t utilize this nomenclature, it could be relevant to help describe the increasing 
tendency of social art practices, which Rancière describes in his observation of artists wanting 
to induce alterations in the space of everyday life. The more interaction and input that 
spectators have with an artwork, the ‘softer’ it would become, which would imply more 
difficulty and nuance in terms of its effective interaction, understanding and use. The problem 
arises, though, as to define what exactly the effective interaction, understanding and use of an 
artwork is. While this categorization system may be useful in terms of indicating the levels of 
interaction of an artwork, it’s irrelevant in terms of measuring its understanding or use, which 
are completely subjective due the fact that an artwork’s purpose can never be predetermined.  
 Focusing in on the organizational processes involved in the creation of both artworks 
and technology, their inherent composition and orchestration make them opportune 
comparisons for studying the relation of matter and form. Nöe’s organizational theory of art 
reflects the two-tiered system of autopoiesis and defines artworks through the reflexive 
reference of separate levels of organized activities. As a second-order activity is always an 
extension of the first-order activity, an artwork is defined by its capacity to bring first-order 
activities into the realm of thought, which exposes the underlying organization of both the 
activities that create the work and the people who observe it.509 In this way, the experience of 
art is reflective in two ways, in terms of structure and thought. The recursive nature of 
technology can also be found in the practice of art, where existing elements or components 
are used in combination to create new technologies and artworks. This helps to show how 
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elements from everyday life began to be implemented into the practice of art during the 
aesthetic regime, and how contemporary artworks today are pushing the boundaries of artistic 
practice by incorporating non-art components and fields into their methodologies. 
Furthermore, recursivity demonstrates the dependence of both art and technology on tradition, 
which firmly establishes them as social institutions that function through the use of people. 
Not only do art and technology transform in relation to themselves, but people also transform 
individually and as a species through the use of art and technology.510 The organization that 
artworks display helps us to see how we organize and are organized, which facilitates our 
reflexive transformation through the practice of art. Technology changes us in a similar way 
through its use, allowing us to do more and to think differently in the world. While the 
functionality and value of technology is related to the shared understanding of its contextual 
embedding, artworks subvert contextual understanding to enable a new awareness of function 
in relation to organization and show how we are organized as people.511  
 A consideration of artistic and technological recursivity and evolution show us how 
the transformation from the mimetic regime of art to the aesthetic regime happened in relation 
to societal transformation in general. The practice of art transformed over time through the 
creation of artworks made in relation to tradition, and as artworks changed, people’s 
conception of art changed, which in turn changed people.512 Since artworks are created to be 
observed, they function in the realm of perception and are free from the pragmatism that 
defines technology.513 This positions experience and sensation as the priorities of art and 
helps us to consider the political efficacy of artworks, especially in light of the reflexively 
integrated processes of transformation that both art and technology display. Aesthetic 
experience unites external and internal sensation through the hetero-reference of a subject’s 
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external experience of an artwork in concert with their self-reference as they reflect upon the 
internal sensations that the artwork inspired. While subjective transformation from an external 
source is usually met with suspicion and resistance, transformation from within is more 
readily accepted as a result of the integral and independent source of change. Artworks thus 
offer subjects an opportunity for reflexive transformation by surreptitiously converting an 
external stimulus into an internal realization. As subjects become informed by artworks and 
the world around them, they demonstrate the process of being information.514 The political 
implications of this subjective transformation through the practice of art are an important 
aspect to consider in relation to art’s capacity to reflect life.  
Our technological tendencies as human beings facilitate the ways in which we relate to 
the world in terms of organization and function. We are technological by nature, and we use 
technology to define who we are as a species. This includes the practice of art, which can be 
understood as a subverted form of technology. While artworks display processes of 
organization, intentionality and relativity in much the same ways that technologies do, they 
remain indeterminate in terms of their functionality and use value.515 As a counterpoint to 
technological purpose, then, art vibrates in its resistance to predetermination, calling attention 
to itself in its avoidance of being usual and usable. Intentional subversion is how artworks 
work as they maintain their unique, undefined positions between matter and composed form. 
Artworks enhance their material significance by contrasting it with the formal composition 
that their creation makes evident. Standard technologies, on the other hand, emphasize utility 
and reliability and exhaust their material significance through their use.516 Furthermore, 
technologies rely on context and shared understanding to establish their utility and meaning, 
while artworks subvert the contextual relations that inform the meaning of beings. This is how 
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artworks achieve their special version of functionality, through the potential unconcealment of 
beings and organization that their consideration provides to its users.517 While technologies 
prioritize utility in context to achieve predetermined objectives, artworks challenge contextual 
and utilitarian understanding to achieve unique moments of aesthetic contemplation.  
 
4.4. Conclusion to Human Beings / Intention  
Life and Art 
The human capacities for language and technology use provide important ways to 
more thoroughly understand the functionality of aesthetics and the union of life in art. 
Language is the mechanism we largely use to think with,518 and as such it has great influence 
on the practice of art and our conception of aesthetics. If we consider the ways that language 
establishes and utilizes subjectivity, symbolism and significance, its influence is undeniable. 
Language is thus an essential tool to connect art to life through its role in human thought and 
the establishment of subjectivity. Furthermore, the practice of art provides the opportunity to 
become reflexively aware of one’s self and reposition individual subjectivity, providing new 
ways of thinking and understanding the organization of human life.519 This helps to 
demonstrate how artworks inevitably utilize human life as their raw conceptual material, and 
can influence personal change through their use.520 In relation to the physical nature of 
artworks, we gain mastery over our relationship with nature thanks to technology,521 which 
can be defined as an orchestration of phenomena to our use.522 Both technologies and 
artworks are unavoidably indeterminate and necessitate human involvement, which 
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effectively binds the practice of art with human life.523 Through their recursive development, 
art and technology transform in relation to themselves, and we in turn transform as people and 
as a species through our use of art and technology.524 The practice of art transforms over time 
through the creation of artworks made in relation to tradition, and as artworks change, 
people’s understanding of art changes, which in turn transforms the culture of people. The 
political implications of the potential subjective transformation of human beings through the 
practice of art demonstrate a definite and important connection between art and life. 
 
Separation 
Through an examination of language and technology, the concept of separation in 
relation to aesthetic experience is also expanded and clarified. Language helps to establish our 
conception of subjectivity, which allows us to see our selves as separate individuals from 
others.525 Our capacity to respond to others shows how language enables us to be political, by 
demonstrating the essential nature of response in responsibility, which is necessary to obtain 
the duties, rights and obligations that responsibility entails.526 Our source of political power 
lies in our ability to position ourselves and contest others through language, which endows us 
with the power to ideologically distinguish our selves. Nonetheless, language also shows how 
our impulse to separate should be done with caution. For example, the separation of mind and 
body that is implicit in Descartes’ dictum cogito ergo sum foreshadows a fallacy at the root of 
our militancy to separate ourselves as subjects from other beings.527 While distinctions can be 
made between body and mind, they are completely integrated in terms of function, as we saw 
in Chapter 3.2.2. Parallelism. Written language is also useful in demonstrating the relevance 
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of separation in aesthetic experience. Writing is an indirect form of communication that 
transmits information between two subjects who are physically separated, which provides us 
with the perfect example of how language establishes a symbolic infrastructure for the 
practice of art. As sign and symbol, writing demonstrates how meaning exists in represented 
form.528 Distinguishing meaning in physical forms demonstrates how non-thought is always 
present in thought,529 since understanding can only be achieved through pre-established 
structures of thought that provide context to observation, which combines the distinguished 
with the non-distinguished. This is Luhmann’s theory of second-order observation, which we 
explored in chapter 3.3.4. Observation. Another way that language and the practice of art 
demonstrate separation is the reflexive reorganization that naturally occurs through their 
practice. Similar to the two distinct levels of operation in autopoiesis, Nöe’s organizational 
theory of art demonstrates how human beings organize themselves, with artworks providing a 
chance to reconsider the ideology at the root of human organization.530 Nöe uses language to 
show how the practice of writing changes language itself, in the same way that artworks and 
people change through the practice of art. This recursive change is found in the use of 
technology, which transforms itself and its users through reflexive reference.531 As with the 
evolution of technology, the practice of art incorporates existing elements or components in 
combination to create new artworks. The recursive alteration inherent to language, technology 
and art demonstrates their potential for subjective and social transformation.  
 
Human Cognition / Aesthetic Thought 
Language, technology and art help to show how our form of cognition is unique to our 
species. As a basic structure of human thought, language provides ways in which subjective 
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and symbolic meaning can be expressed and recognized, which enables authority and 
authorship. The ability of subjects to think about themselves demonstrates the reflexive action 
that establishes existential meaning and dignity.532 This extends to the recognition of the 
subjectivity of the Other, upon which our social and political lives are based. Language 
capacitates human life to become political life, and the practice of art is the illumination of the 
complex structures that both separate and connect us as a society. As we have seen through 
Derrida’s exploration of Lacan, our ability to recognize ourselves as the ‘subject of the 
signifier’ is most obvious in the imaginatively deceptive act of covering ones tracks, which 
demonstrates the reflective human ability to pretend pretence.533 Distinguishing the meaning 
of physical forms, such as footprints, demonstrates an visionary projection of possibilities and 
consequences. The observation of distinction, which combines the simultaneity of thought 
and non-thought, demonstrates a paradox at the heart of aesthetic experience, where the 
possibility of meaning is eternal when there is uncertainty of subjective truth.534 Technology 
also demonstrates how human cognition facilitates the practice of art. While the 
organizational nature of autopoietic theory helps us to understand the foundation of our lives, 
our technological tendencies as human beings enable the ways in which we relate to the world 
in terms of organization. We are technological by nature, and we use technology to define 
who we are as a species. Intentionality and organization are inherent to technologies and 
artworks, both of which are context dependent, rely on human involvement, and demonstrate 
some relativity in terms of how they are understood.535 The fields of technology and art 
diverge, however, on their handling of use and utility, and technology provides a counterpoint 
that the practice of art subverts for its own creative purposes.536 As mentioned earlier, Nöe’s 
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two-tiered theory of art establishes a reflexive relationship between organized activities, 
which show second-order activities, such as artworks, bringing first-order activities into the 
realm of thought.537 This theory addresses the reflexive structure of artworks in combination 
with the potential subjective transformation through aesthetic experience. This positions 
experience and sensation as the priorities of art and helps us to consider the political efficacy 
of artworks, especially in light of the reflexively integral processes of transformation that both 
art and technology display.538 Aesthetic experience unites external and internal sensation, 
through the hetero-reference of a subject’s external experience of an artwork in concert with 
the self-reference of the internal sensations that the artwork inspired. Artworks thus offer 
subjects an opportunity for reflexive change by surreptitiously converting an external stimulus 
into an internal realization. This is how artworks achieve their special version of functionality, 
through the potential unconcealment of beings and organization. In these various ways, 
language and technology demonstrate the backdrop of human cognition against which 
aesthetic experience is compared and contrasted. 
Language and technology help to distinguish aesthetic thought from other forms of 
human thought by offering a common point of departure. Reiterating the importance of 
subjective and symbolic conceptualization, our exploration of legal judgements has shown a 
parallel use of language in the practice of art, where creative, demonstrative and judgmental 
functions are analogous.539 The deceptive capacity of pretending pretence, which we explored 
in reference to covering tracks and is made possible through the recognition of the 
subjectivity of the Other,540 alludes to the artificiality that all artworks inherently display. 
Artworks reflect our self-deception, and ironically point us towards subjective truth.541 This is 
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achieved through the expectation of artifice and our capacity to make judgements based on 
the evidence of composition during observation, which artworks incorporate in their inherent 
contrast of material and form. Similar to artworks, the inherent composition and orchestration 
of technologies make them ideal for studying the relation of matter to form. Unlike 
technology, however, artworks are undetermined in terms of use which enhances their 
material significance by contrasting it with the formal composition that their creation makes 
evident. Standard technologies, on the other hand, emphasize utility and reliability and 
exhaust their material significance in their use.542 Recognizing this difference is essential for 
the aesthetic judgement of artworks. While technologies prioritize utility in context to achieve 
predetermined objectives, artworks challenge contextual and utilitarian understanding to 
achieve unique moments of aesthetic contemplation. 
 
Artworks 
To determine artistic products from other human products, many of the ideas from the 
previous paragraph on cognition and aesthetic thought are relevant. As language and 
technology help to distinguish aesthetic thought from regular thought, so too do they assist in 
the distinction of artworks from other beings. Beginning with the condition of artificiality, the 
deceptive potential of human beings to pretend pretence grounds the man-made stipulation of 
artworks, which establishes a promise of intentionality and communication in the spectator. 
This relates the appreciation of artworks with actions of mimicry, as the observation of an 
observation reflects the creative acts inherent to the analytic processes of artistic creation. 
Creative imitation is an implicit aspect of language, which originates from the intentionality 
of a subject but functions through the collective acceptance of society. Artworks inherently 
demonstrate some form of human intervention, which establishes them as a specific example 
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of work.543 With an indeterminable yet undeniable communicative intention, the simultaneity 
of thought and non-thought in artistic creation demonstrates a paradox at the heart of artistic 
interpretation. This relates in part to the malleable inter-objective relationship of the spectator 
during aesthetic experience, but more importantly reflects the indeterminate functionality and 
use value of artworks. As a counterpoint to technological purpose, artworks vibrate in their 
resistance to predetermination, and call attention through their aversion of being usable and 
usual.544 This intentional subversion is how artworks maintain their unique, undefined 
positions between matter and composed form. While the functionality and value of 
technology is contingent on the shared understanding of its contextual embedding, artworks 
subvert context in order to enable a new awareness of function in relation to organization, 
which reveals how we are organized as people.545 Artworks are made to be observed, and as 
such they function in the realm of perception and are free from the pragmatism that defines 
technology.546 This highlights the importance of being able to recognize and contextualize 
compositional forms, which positions artworks within the realm of art in order to be evaluated 
appropriately. As points of comparison, language and technology are indispensible ways of 
isolating the symbolic, artificial and functionally subversive nature of artworks. 
 
Art, Society & Tradition 
In order to connect the practice of art to tradition, language and technology provide 
excellent methods for revealing art as a social practice in essence. Language catalyses our 
interpersonal social tendencies and establishes the foundation upon which we have become a 
political species, through collective intentionality and the acceptance of regulatory rules.547 
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As an indirect form of language, writing provides us with the best infrastructure for the 
practice of art through its symbolic mark-making, a common way in which we communicate 
meaning through organized forms. Language transforms human life into political life,548 and 
the practice of art elucidates the complex structures that found our society. The practice of art 
grounds our politics by combining materials of the world with human agency, leaving traces 
and marks for current and forthcoming societies to contemplate. Nöe’s organizational theory 
of art shows how artworks allow us to reconsider human organization, positioning 
contemporary art within the transformative progression of artistic tradition.549 Artworks, like 
technologies, are recursive in nature, which illustrates how elements from everyday life began 
to be implemented into the practice of art during the aesthetic realm, and how contemporary 
artworks today are pushing the boundaries of art by incorporating non-art components and 
practices into their methodologies.550 Furthermore, recursivity demonstrates the dependence 
of art and technology on tradition, and firmly establishes them as social institutions that 
function through the use of people. The evolution from the mimetic regime of art to the 
aesthetic regime happened in relation to societal transformation at large, which includes the 
development of our own self-conception. The practice of art transformed over time through 
the creation of artworks made in relation to tradition, and as artworks changed, people’s 
conception of art shifted. Language and technology are thus key models for the development 
of art through its use, and the transformation of people through its practice, which 
demonstrate the practice of art as a firmly established, inevitably malleable, social tradition. 
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CHAPTER 5. ARTWORKS / ART 
5.1. Introduction to Artworks / Art 
  Exploring the practice of art in relation to life, it is clear that the connection between 
the two exists through human activity and thought. Aesthetic thought is distinct from other 
kinds of thought while at the same time relying on them in order to differentiate itself. As the 
concept of separation has helped to clarify the biological and cognitive operations that inform 
aesthetic experience, which Rancière describes as the transformation of ‘sense to sense’, it is 
still somewhat unclear how artworks relate to society. The second aspect of aesthetic 
separation relates to the transformation of artistic tradition, which is a more abstract 
conception of how the practice of art evolves recursively over generations. But how exactly 
do physical artworks relate or connect with such abstract universal generalizations? In this 
chapter we will explore the way that artworks relate to art by looking at the concepts of the 
parergon and ‘the fragment,’ both of which focus on artworks in relation to context. A 
parergon is a supplementary framing device that was described by Kant in The Critique of 
Judgement and subsequently explored by Derrida as a way of deconstructing aesthetic theory. 
We will look at how the parergon helps to better understand aesthetic thought and the 
contextualization of artworks by examining how the concepts of order, position and form 
inform both artworks and our understanding of them. While the parergon frames artworks in 
relation to an immediate and ideological context, the concept of ‘the fragment’ helps us to 
conceive of artworks in relation to the tradition of art. Associating artworks with the 
philosophical tool known as ‘the fragment,’ Osborne demonstrates both the autonomy of 
artworks as unique receptacles of thought, and the autonomy of art in relation to other human 
practices and traditions. This is grounded in a historical conceptualization of artistic avant-
gardes and related to contemporary and postconceptual art practices, where the artistic 
employment of series and projects can be sees as reflections of the logic of ‘the fragment.’ 
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One condition of art’s autonomy, however, is the dependence of artworks and art on the social 
traditions that establish them, which unites the practice of art with an existential conception of 
life that can be conceived over the breadth of human history. 
 
5.2. The Parergon  
5.2.1. Introduction to The Parergon  
 As physical manifestations, all artworks—whether objects or events—exist through 
some material form, and at some point this material ends and the context within which the 
artwork exists begins. In his text The Parergon, Derrida explores this boundary between the 
artwork and its context through an analysis of Immanuel Kant’s The Critique of Judgement, 
which establishes the nature of aesthetic experience. The word parergon comes from the 
Greek language, with ergon translating to “work” and par meaning “accessory” or 
“supplement.”551 In The Critique of Judgement, Kant defines three kinds of parerga (plural) 
that he considers as secondary or adjunct to artworks; frames on paintings, drapery on statues, 
and columns on buildings (or architecture). Derrida fixates on these different ‘ornaments’ as a 
way of identifying the framing structure of The Critique of Judgement and the functioning of 
aesthetics in general. The idea of the parergon provides him with a philosophical tool to 
explore the opposition of interior/exterior in artworks, and to focus on the essence of aesthetic 
thought as defined by Kant. While the original three parerga defined by Kant are all physical 
accessories that relate to the traditional categorization of artworks by media, Derrida’s 
exploration demonstrates the continued significance of the concept of the parergon. Julianne 
Rebentish describes the importance of Derrida’s exploration in relation to contemporary art 
practices, where single artworks are increasingly diffuse and disperse in their nature: 
In a discussion of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Jacques Derrida has shown that 
the limits of an aesthetic object can be considered one of the central questions of 
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traditional aesthetics. According to Derrida, however, and I agree with this, it is 
precisely the impossibility of answering this question that must be regarded as a 
crucial structural feature of the aesthetic as such. The question as to what actually 
constitutes the artwork as opposed to whatever is merely externally ascribed to it 
or projected onto it remains constitutively open in any aesthetic experience.552 
 
For my purposes, the parergon highlights many key concepts that are useful for 
understanding the malleable boundaries of artworks and their consideration in relation to their 
non-art context and the tradition of art in general. In this chapter we will begin with a 
summary of Kant’s “Analytic of the Beautiful” from The Critique of Judgement in order to 
better engage with Derrida’s concept of the parergon. The concept of order helps us to see the 
recursivity of Kant’s writing, and to explore the internal lack that the use of a parergon 
implies. The concept of position helps us to identify the inherent instability and movement of 
the parergon, which exposes its inherent paradoxical simultaneity as visible/invisible. The 
concept of form helps to demonstrate the most important opposition of all within aesthetic 
thought—that of material and form—while providing the source of connection between an 
artwork and parergon. In conclusion, the parergon exposes the formal structure of aesthetic 
thought as supplementary to the experience of artworks, which helps to clarify the tradition of 
aesthetics that informs our current understanding of artworks and art. By helping to expose 
the ways that we frame artworks during our experience of them, we can see how our acts of 
contextualization place artworks within the scope of a more universal thought and tradition. 
 
5.2.2. Summary –The Critique of Judgement, Analytic of the Beautiful 
 Before summarizing the cognitive operation of aesthetic judgement, it is important to 
contextualize it in relation to the practice of art today. Over the past two hundred and twenty-
nine years, people have been adapting Kant’s influential theory of aesthetics in relation to the 
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concurrent transformations of society and artistic practice. One key idea as I explore aesthetic 
separation and the reflection of life in art is that aesthetics and art are not the same thing, and 
it is very important to differentiate between them. While Kantian aesthetics is a process that 
revolves around experience and thought in relation to beauty, pleasure and the unknown, art is 
a practice that involves the creation and appreciation of artworks, which implies aesthetic 
thought in their creative and appreciative operations. My favourite recent definition of 
aesthetics comes from Rancière, who writes: 
I do not consider aesthetics to be the name of the science or discipline that 
deals with art. In my view it designates a mode of thought that develops 
with respect to things of art and that is concerned to show them to be 
things of thought. More fundamentally, aesthetics is a particular historical 
regime of thinking about art and an idea of thought according to which 
things or art are things of thought.553  
 
This definition connects the practice of art to the practice of thinking, and thus, to philosophy. 
It also connects aesthetics to a tradition of art that is beyond our subjective selves that 
continues to transform around us through society. One principal difference between Kant’s 
aesthetics and its contemporary understanding is the role of concepts in predefining the object 
being judged. Rancière points out in “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community”: “Art 
entails the employment of a set of concepts, while the beautiful possesses no concepts.”554 
Osborne agrees and criticizes Kant for confusing the judgement of art as a purely aesthetic 
form of judgement, since art relies on concepts and is logically conditioned by the 
determinate concept of ‘art’ that its tradition denotes. This is not the case when judging 
something as ‘beautiful,’ as you will see in the coming paragraphs.  Osborne states: “There is 
thus a conceptual gap between art and aesthetic that cannot be adequately bridged within the 
terms of Kant’s thought.”555 Derrida uses the parergon to explore this gap, and to position 
aesthetic thought within the realm of its contemporary tradition. Osborne thinks that aesthetic 
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purity misses the point of art anyway, since art distinguishes itself from nature through its 
functioning in terms of theory, intellect, and political ideology.556 While art and aesthetics are 
not the same, our current understanding of art is certainly related to Kant’s aesthetics, which 
initiated the aesthetic regime of art in which we find ourselves today.  
As Kant explains in The Critique of Judgement, understanding and reason form the 
basis upon which we distinguish between concepts of nature and concepts of freedom, the 
former relating to objects as “intuitable” phenomena and the latter as objects that are not 
“intuitable.”557 It is important to note that for Kant, who wrote The Critique of Judgement in 
1790, ‘intuition’ meant the sense perceptions of particular objects at that time, and not the 
contemporary notion of ‘presentiment’ or ‘instinct.’558 Between these modes of thought, 
which help us to understand the external sensory concepts of nature and to reason the internal 
super-sensible concepts of free thought, there is a separation that Derrida defines as an 
abyss.559 While these two modes of thought are completely disjointed, they influence each 
other through judgement, which bridges understanding and reason together through the use of 
imagination and functions as a transition between these otherwise distinct modes of 
cognition.560 It is only through judgement that an experience becomes aesthetic.561  
But how? What does judgement have to do with determining aesthetic experience? As 
Kant explains, while understanding relates to the faculty of knowledge and reason relates to 
the faculty of desire, judgement relates to feelings of pleasure or displeasure.562 The cognitive 
mode of judgement, as such, relies on subjective feelings, which is where the word 
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“aesthetics” comes from. In ancient Greece, the word aesthetica was understood to mean 
“sensation,” or “a sensible element in knowledge.”563 Depending on whether a judgment is 
based on a universal concept or a particular example, the judgment is respectively categorized 
as determinant or reflective.564 A determinant judgement uses a universal concept to focus on 
a particular object, and a reflective judgement considers a particular object in the absence of a 
universal concept. There are two kinds of determinant judgements and Kant uses the 
adjectives good and agreeable to describe the differences between them; the word good is 
used to describe objects with a concept or purpose (i.e. this is a good pen), and agreeable 
describes objects that gratify the senses (i.e. this wine tastes great) or are constitutional for 
you (i.e. what fresh air).565 In both of these cases, determinant judgments are based on 
universal concepts. We know how a good pen should write, and we know how an agreeable 
wine should taste, both based on concepts achieved through memories of empirical 
experience. In relation to the pleasure or displeasure that an object stimulates in a reflective 
judgment, it is the reflection back onto the subject that makes the judgement aesthetic. There 
is no universal a priori standard upon which we can base our judgement, and while we use 
our memory of experience to relate reflective judgement with determinant judgement, 
reflective judgement is resolved in a present moment of subjective evaluation and feeling.566 
Reflective judgements are singular and cannot be proven by argument.567 For Kant, if an 
object is beautiful you are pleased in how its representation makes you feel, not in its 
existence.568 Aesthetic judgment is based on disinterested pleasure, which means that you are 
impartial or indifferent to the existence of the object that incited the pleasure in you (see 
Chapter 2.3.7. Difference for a more detailed exploration of indifference). If you think about 
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the importance of impartiality when judgements are made in the court of law, the same 
reasoning applies with aesthetic judgement. According to Kant, desire is based on pleasure 
related to a concept, and since aesthetic judgement can’t be based on determinant concepts, it 
can’t be based on desire either.569 Aesthetic pleasure is based on reflective subjective 
experience, when your awareness of feeling pleasure pleases yourself.570 
The purely subjective nature of aesthetic experience leads us to another relevant aspect 
of Kant’s description of aesthetics; that an aesthetic judgement of something specific as 
beautiful projects to the objective universal.571 Because aesthetic judgement is based on 
disinterested pleasure, or pleasure without desire, when you judge something as beautiful it 
automatically implies that everyone should think the same.572 This is not the case when we 
judge that something is good or agreeable, which are determinant judgments that something 
serves its purpose or gratifies our senses. If we determine that something is good, we use this 
word based on the universality of the concept attributed to it, not on our aesthetic judgment of 
it. In the case of describing something as agreeable, we would never assume that what 
gratifies one person’s senses would be the same for everyone. I prefer beer and you might 
prefer wine, but we can both argue as to why we like a specific wine or beer. With an 
aesthetic judgement this is different, as my lack of determinant concepts to predefine or desire 
the object of judgement allows me to assume that the pleasure I feel from the beautiful thing 
I’m experiencing will be the same for everyone. The fact that it isn’t always the same adds an 
element of practical reality to aesthetic theory, as we will explore more thoroughly through 
the notion of the parergon.  
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5.2.3. Description - the Parergon 
 The parergon is generally associated with ornamentation in relation to artworks, 
which calls into question the integrity of artworks in both physical and conceptual terms. 
Derrida’s general understanding is that every parergon denotes an inherent lack or deficiency 
in the artwork that it adorns.573 But just what is it that is implicitly lacking in a nude sculpture, 
an unframed painting or a building without columns? Before more thoroughly exploring the 
three examples of parerga that Kant establishes in The Critique of Judgement, it is important 
to examine the functionality of the parergon in terms of separation, lack and prosthesis. Once 
we have a better understanding of the relationship between artwork and parergon, Derrida’s 
exploration of aesthetic theory will more clearly demonstrate the ways in which artworks 
relate to contexts and traditions, and aesthetic theory functions in terms of paradox. 
Separation is at the heart of aesthetic thought, and Derrida uses the idea of the 
parergon to highlight how. It is not simply in his description of the abyss between reason and 
understanding, which is the impetus for judgement. Derrida emphasizes Kant’s positioning of 
the faculty of judgement as “detachable” from the faculties of reason and understanding.574 
Judgement, it seems, is something that can be added or subtracted as need be to our 
experience of the world. It’s not a standard mode of thought but one that comes or goes 
depending on the situation. We only need judgement when we do not have a determinant 
concept to identify or recognize the object we are judging. This transitory nature of judgement 
reflects the fluctuating nature of the parergon, which appear and disappear depending on the 
observational frame of reference. This relates with Luhmann’s systematic description of 
observation (Chapter 2.3.5. Observation) and will be further explored in relation to 
visibility/invisibility (Chapter 5.2.5. Position). For both judgement and the parergon, the 
potential for separation becomes an integral aspect of the cognitive movement that aesthetic 
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thought entails. If parergon can be separated from artworks, then they can also be added. 
According to Derrida, the very inclusion of the parergon implies that there is a lack in the 
artwork. If there were nothing inherently lacking in the artwork, then the parergon wouldn’t 
be there or be necessary.575 The question is, does every artwork inherently lack something, 
and if so, how does the parergon relate to it? As we examine the three examples of parerga 
that Kant describes in The Critique of Judgement we can more clearly evaluate the missing 
elements. A parergon, in the end, is a kind of prosthesis that attaches and detaches from an 
artwork.576 All prosthetics, as forms of technology, have utility and purpose that attribute 
determinant concepts to them. This allows them to be judged in terms of functionality—as 
good when they serve their purpose or bad when they do not—which distinguishes them from 
the artworks they adorn (see Chapter 4.3.4. Function). As they satiate a deficiency within an 
artwork, they also function as a mediator between the artwork and its context, which is most 
obvious for frames on paintings. A good mediator is able to appreciate both sides to every 
argument, and the parergon is no exception. Its formal qualities enable it to be perceived as 
part of the artwork, working as a counterpoint to help highlight compositional elements within 
the artwork while functioning as a means of supplementary expression. Nevertheless, the 
functional qualities of a parergon can never be fully discarded. They remain dormant, in 
hiding, while the subject is distracted by the pleasure provided in the moment of aesthetic 
experience. As an artwork’s prosthesis, a parergon functions theoretically and practically at 
the same time, reflecting the paradoxical nature of the aesthetic experience of artworks.  
 Thinking about frames on paintings, I’ll begin with some practical considerations. I 
worked in a frame shop for several, so I have practical experience of what framing pictures 
entails. The main purpose of putting a frame on a picture is to protect it. The inclusion of a 
protective glass barrier depends on the fragility of the medium, and the frame reinforces the 
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structure and provides security for the artwork. While most canvas paintings have stretchers 
to act as an internal support, the frame provides external protection and a hanging mechanism 
that alleviates any potential compromise of the internal support. While Kant doesn’t stipulate 
the representation of the painting in the same way that he did with sculpture (or rather, 
statues), there are important aesthetic features of frames as well. Frames frame paintings; they 
make them stand out from their environment. They provide a visual division between the 
represented image and the context of the painting, most commonly referencing the view 
through a window. The colour and design of a frame are commonly used to accentuate or 
influence elements within the painting, which is most often accomplished by matching the 
colours and textures of the frame and the painting. In practical terms, then, frames show us 
that paintings lack strength and durability, while they visually suppose a lack of unity, 
emphasis and attention to detail.  
Considering the drapery on statues, if we remove the parergon we are left with three-
dimensional representations of nude human beings. What, other than clothing, do naked 
people need? As a Canadian, my first answer would be that we lack warmth without clothing, 
which we use to protect ourselves from harsh environments. A more social answer is that we 
use clothing to hide our bodies, or specific parts of them. Our embarrassment to be seen 
without clothing suggests that we’re lacking confidence or self-esteem. Clothes also provide 
us with a manner to express our individuality, style and social standing, while situating us 
within an obvious historical timeline. Moving to more formal considerations, what is 
artistically lacking in a nude figure? Drapery adds a texture to a statue, not only through the 
fabric itself but through the lines and folds as the fabric clings to and hangs off the figure. The 
fabric also becomes a vehicle for motion as the creases of the drapery guide the observation of 
the artwork in ways that would not be possible without it. In this analysis, it seems that an 
unclothed human being lacks protection, self-confidence and expressive capacities, while a 
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statue of a human body without drapery lacks texture, expressive movement and associative 
historical indicators.  
 The final example that Kant provides of a parergon is the inclusion of columns on 
buildings or architecture. Columns are used to support buildings, which make it obvious that 
buildings without columns lack support. Instead of a colonnade an architect could simply use 
a wall, which demonstrates the other thing that columns provide a building; openness. 
Columns are usually located on the facades of building, proving space for both light and 
people to enter. Visually, columns add verticality and rhythm to buildings through their 
repetitive positioning as a group and the fluting on individual column shafts. They also offer a 
location for decoration, on the capital, and a sense of grandeur. From this we can determine 
that buildings without columns lack support, light and people in practical terms, and 
verticality, rhythm, ornamentation and importance in visual terms. 
 As briefly explored above, parerga demonstrate an affinity to separate and connect 
with artworks in a similar way as prostheses, exposing an inherent lack in artworks while 
functioning in an indeterminate and fluctuating manner. Examined as a whole, the parergon 
as defined by Kant demonstrates that artworks in general lack protection and support. As the 
parergon is located at the outer limit of the artwork—at its threshold—I can’t help but relate 
these transitory elements to the borders of countries, which are fortified with protective 
infrastructures such as boundary walls, surveillance mechanisms and access controls. It seems 
that the parergon works in a similar way at the threshold of an artwork and its context, at least 
on a practical level, demonstrating that artworks are inherently exposed and vulnerable. The 
aesthetic analysis suggests that artworks lack expressive elements, which parerga counter in 
their individual formal ways. Either that or the expressive nature of a parergon becomes 
contaminated by the artwork that it connects with, and methods of expression spread from 
artworks to their surrounding parergon. In any case, this idea of lack is a pertinent one that 
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was explored in relation to the systematic functioning of life in Chapter 2.3.8. Lack. As we 
continue to explore the functioning of aesthetic theory in contemporary art practices, the 
dissolution of media specificity begs the question of what a contemporary parergon might be. 
By reversing the logic of the parergon, we should look to the formal structures that protect 
and support artworks in contemporary society. As a postconceptual artist, I cannot think of a 
more protective or supportive parergon than the conceptual contextualizations that 
accompany artworks in the form of written texts nowadays. It seems that every artwork needs 
a verbal explanation or justification nowadays—either that, or a curator. Without these 
modern parerga, artworks seems destined to be disregarded as weak and irrelevant.  
  
5.2.4. Order 
 The use of order within The Critique of Judgment is contradictory, which reflects the 
opposition between the logic of reason and the subversive counter-logic of artworks. While 
musing on Kant’s use and definition of the parergon, Derrida questions the order in which the 
analytic of the beautiful should be read or examined.577  If The Critique were considered as an 
artwork, he proposes, then there would be no set beginning for its analysis. This is because 
the only artworks that condition a starting point are temporal, like a performance, or textual, 
like a book. For sculpture and painting you can start your analysis where you want. The 
question of order is not only about organization, then, but about sequence and time, which is 
vital to the functioning of aesthetic thought. Judging in general permits us to think of a 
specific thing in relation to a general principle. If a concept is provided beforehand, the 
judging process determines the particular thing being judged, and thus is a determinant 
judgement. The specific thing fits into the category of the general idea. If there is no prior 
concept with which to judge, meaning that we are unsure of what exactly we are judging, then 
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we start with the specific thing and more towards the general in an attempt to figure it out. 
This is a reflective judgement, where the example precedes the concept and is unknown.578 
One final way to consider ordering is in relation to imposing command—to give orders—and 
Derrida’s analysis of The Critique of Judgement uncovers where Kant forces a previously 
used structure on its internal logic. Derrida describes Kant’s recursive imposition as 
hypocritical in its confusion of logical and illogical subjects, which is ultimately parergonal 
in nature and exposes an implicit internal lack in Kant’s theory of aesthetics. 
There are two recursive structures that Kant uses in The Critique of Judgement. The original 
use of the word parergon is from in another text of Kant’s titled Religion within the Limits of 
Reason Alone. Here the parergon is applied to four aspects of religious observation: Works of 
Grace, Miracles, Mysteries and Means of Grace. The four respective parerga for these aspects 
of religious observation are: fanaticism, superstition, supposed understanding of the 
supernatural order, and thaumaturgy (or magic).579 Derrida notes that these parerga are 
neither internal nor external to religious observation, but that they effectively serve to frame 
and to square the work, and he relates them respectively to: damage, injury, deviation and 
seduction in relation to religious practice.580 An association can be made to the practice of art 
between the third observation, mystery, and its parergon, deviation, which we explored in 
Chapter 4.2.3.2. Subject of the Signifier, and will become relevant again as we explore the 
enigmatic quality of artworks in Chapter 5.3.3. Autonomy. More important, however, is the 
example of recursivity that Kant provides by incorporating this existing theoretical 
implement—the parergon—upon his new theoretical subject—aesthetics. This idea of a 
recursive imposition can be found yet again in the conceptual schema that Kant applies to the 
Analytic of the Beautiful. It presents four categories as in Religion, but this time the source of 
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his schema is the analytic of concepts from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.581 The judgement 
of taste is assessed according to the recursive four-part schema: 1. Quality, 2. Quantity, 3. 
Relation to ends, and 4. Modality. Kant’s analysis finds that a beautiful object is one that: 1. 
provides disinterested pleasure, 2. lacks concept and pleases universally, 3. is final but 
without an end, and 4. is understood as an object of necessary pleasure, despite lacking a 
concept.582 Kant addresses the idea of the parergon in the third category, relation to ends. 
Derrida points out the problem, or hypocrisy, of taking a logical structure from The 
Critique of Pure Reason and imposing it on an ‘illogical’ structure (i.e. without determinant 
concept), such as The Critique of Judgement.583 He claims that the resulting “violence” of 
forcing this framework limits the theory of aesthetics to a theory of beauty, the theory of 
beauty to a theory of taste, and a theory of taste to a theory of judgement, and scolds Kant for 
not justifying this imposition, the contents of which can’t help but exceed their forced 
containment. According to Derrida, the imposed structure in Kant’s Critique of Judgement is 
itself a parergon.584 Reiterating the function of the parergon, this points towards the internal 
lack in Kant’s Critique of Judgement, which requires supplementary support and 
ornamentation. The irony, according to Derrida, is that this ‘imposed’ and ‘unjustified’ 
structure is used to determine the formal process through which various oppositions of 
judgement exist; material and formal, pure and impure, inside and outside.585 As Derrida 
states: “The analytic determines the frame as parergon, that which simultaneously constitutes 
and destroys it.”586 This shifting between constitution and destruction affirms the unstable 
character of the parergon, and relates it to the adaptive nature of autopoietic operation. It also 
establishes opposition and paradox as integral aspects of aesthetic experience. 
                                                
581 Derrida, “The Parergon,” 29. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid., 30. 
584 Ibid., 34. 
585 Ibid. 
586 Ibid., 33. 
 267 
 Kant’s aesthetic theory thus demonstrates a contradictory nature in relation to order. 
While the importance of organization and succession is shown in the cognitive mechanics of 
aesthetic experience, a logical formal structure—one that uses determinant concepts—has 
been imposed upon an illogical subject—one that only functions in the absence of 
determinant concepts. Furthermore, The Critique of Judgement utilizes the recursive 
appropriation of two existing theoretical structures—the parergon and the four-by-three 
categorization by quality, quantity, relation to ends and modality—which deviates from the 
reason of their original use and is left unexplained by Kant. In the end, however, this illogical 
subversion of existing logic reflects the nature of artworks. This not only demonstrates the 
pareregonal nature of the structures that support The Critique of Judgement and the logic of 
aesthetic experience, but also the lack that is inherent to The Critique.  
 
5.2.5. Position 
 The unstable nature of parerga is important to its potential functioning as mediator 
between an artwork and the context within which it is aesthetically experienced. In this 
chapter we will examine this instability in relation to the limits, movement and visibility of 
the parergon, which help to demonstrate the importance of position and opposition in 
aesthetic theory. Aesthetic judgement is ultimately an act of framing, which implies the 
imposition of a parergon and establishes the position of the subject who makes the 
judgement. Just as the reflexive position of the subject is changeable, so too is the nature of 
the parergon. 
As its definition connotes, the parergon is a supplement to the artwork, whether it is 
drapery on statues, columns on buildings or frames on paintings. In exploring the example of 
parerga on paintings, Derrida points out that there are two limits that are defined by the frame 
that include the limit between the artwork and the frame, and the limit between the frame and 
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the exhibition space.587 Described as such, the parergon has a thickness and a surface, and its 
strength of connection to the artwork is dependent on the viewer’s focus. When focusing on 
the painting, the frame separates itself and becomes part of the context. If the focus shifts to 
the exhibition space, however, the limit between the frame and the painting dissipates and the 
parergon becomes part of the artwork. The ability to disappear is the nature of the parergon, 
according to Derrida.588 It connects to and separates from the artwork depending on the 
concentration of the viewer. It is seen as an accessory, as external, or it is not seen at all—as 
intrinsic to the artwork.589 It’s ability to shift between two positions highlights the inherent 
movement of aesthetic experience, and reflects the paradox of observation as explored in 
Chapter 2.3.5. Observation. 
Despite its position between the interior and exterior of an artwork, the idea of the 
parergon is far from being a simple binary threshold. Even if we imagine a simple line as a 
frame, a line too has a thickness, depending on how closely you look at it. In his book 
Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida writes about the daughter of Butades, a girl who created the 
“very first drawing” by tracing the shadow of a shepherd on a wall.590 The tracing of this 
line—the mythological first contour—created a limit between interior and exterior, yet it also 
paradoxically disappears in its formal creation of figure and ground. We can either see the 
line or perceive the form. As Derrida writes:  
The outline or tracing separates and separates itself; it retraces only borderlines, 
intervals, a spacing grid with no possible appropriation. The experience or 
experimenting of drawing (and experimenting, as its name indicates, always 
consists in journeying beyond limits) at once crosses and institutes these 
borders[.]591  
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This contour line is described with a remarkable affinity to the parergon. Derrida attributes 
surface to every parergon, which enables it to be distinguished from its milieu, just as a figure 
is from its ground.592 Despite having two limits, as mentioned earlier, the parergon appears or 
disappears into the context or the artwork depending on the focus of the viewing subject.593 
As opposed to artworks, which attract attention through their inherent difference, the 
parergon seems to function in parallel fashion as our consciousness (see Chapter 3.4.2. 
Consciousness), which is generally imperceptible in spite of its obvious presence. 
Even when the parergon is implemented as a supplementary theoretical structure, as 
in Kant’s repeated use of a four-by-three conceptual schemata, it follows this same pattern of 
appearing and disappearing, shifting focus to and from the content and its container.594 As 
Derrida comments on the imposed order of the recursive schemata, which places the 
mathematical categories of quantity and quality before the dynamic categories of relation and 
modality, the positioning of quality as the first category is what establishes all of the 
oppositions through which aesthetics functions; material and form, figure and ground, subject 
and object.595 Position and opposition are thus created through an act of framing in The 
Critique, and the act of judging itself becomes an act of positioning, especially due to 
reflexive acknowledgement.596 The requirement of a subjective voice automatically 
establishes a point of origin and identity to which each verdict must belong. The discursive 
nature of aesthetics assures that every point has its counterpoint, every position its opposition, 
and every observation its source.  
The intrinsic instability of the parergon demonstrates the necessary movement 
between position and opposition during aesthetic experience. While the parergon 
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demonstrates its own physical presence between the limit of the artwork it adorns and the 
limit of the context within which it functions, it also demonstrates its ability to disappear and 
become invisible, depending on the position of the viewer. This once again highlights the 
importance of subjectivity in aesthetic experience, and demonstrates how every judgement is 
a subjective positioning, as impermanent as it might be. The instability of position and 
visibility of the parergon reflects the subjective-objective opposition of human life and 
artworks, which helps to further align aesthetic functionality with the operation of life. 
 
5.2.6. Form 
The transformation of material to form is the essence of artistic creation, making form 
a definitive aspect of artworks. Art cannot exist without form, and the intellectual movement 
that results from the consideration of the material/form opposition is a cornerstone of 
aesthetic thought. As we will explore in this chapter, it is only through formal means that a 
parergon can connect with an artwork. While providing a clandestine justification for Kant’s 
use of recursive parergonal structures to organize The Critique of Judgement, this caveat also 
points towards the vital importance of the formal condition of artworks. As a formal theory 
itself, aesthetics must also be appreciated in its formality, which functions distinctly from the 
natural “material” that founds human thought—its molecular structure. Through this 
simultaneous separation and connection, which we establish in thought, form provides a way 
of considering art in relation to life. 
The opposition of material and form is firmly established in The Critique of 
Judgement as a key modality of aesthetic thought. It is in and through this opposition that we 
find the work of the artist, through the transformation from material to form in the production 
of an artwork. Form, however, never stops being material, which means that during the 
aesthetic experience of an artwork there is movement back and forth between the two 
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conceptions of matter. As Rebentisch states: “any object becomes aesthetic in a constant 
passage between these two poles: between form and content, or, more precisely, between 
material and meaning, or between thing and sign.”597 While Rebentisch is speaking in 
reference to postconceptual art—specifically the use of everyday objects for creating 
artworks—this transience between material conceptions of objects is equally relevant for 
traditional artworks too.  
Derrida uses the parergon to explore the vital importance of the relationship between 
material and form in aesthetic thought. According to Kant, the only way that a parergon can 
successfully unite with the artwork it adorns is through formal means. Derrida highlights the 
omnipresence of the material/form opposition throughout The Critique of Judgement, which 
he concedes as a fundamental “conceptual schema” for all art theory. This entails pairing the 
irrational and illogical with ‘material’—which is also considered in terms of nature, chaos and 
disorder—and coupling the rational and logical with ‘form’—which can also be thought in 
terms of artifice, orchestration and composition.598 Kant introduces the word parergon in his 
Critique when he distinguishes between material and formal judgements, but it is only the 
latter that can be associated with judgements of taste. Material judgments are not aesthetic. 
Formality is the only true space of aesthetics, and this is a constant throughout the history of 
art.599 Furthermore, Rancière contends that the experience of artworks is political in the ways 
that it affects the sensibilities of the viewer via form. As McCullagh notes: “his aesthetics is 
concerned with the conditions of sensibility insofar as sensibility is capable of being formed, 
unformed, and transformed together with the forms and works of art that activate changes in 
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sensible worlds.”600 This brings to mind the process of information that we looked at in 
Chapter 4.3.2. Reorganization, which highlights the malleable nature of our ongoing 
transformation as individuals. Form, nonetheless, becomes the vehicle through which 
anything can be considered in an aesthetic way. The constructed nature of Kant’s formal 
structure within the Critique of Judgement implies its own system of framing, which is both 
imposed and provisional, just like a parergon.  
Artistic creation is the work of transforming material into form, and the aesthetic 
appreciation of artworks is the recognition and evaluation of this transformation in relation to 
reason and sensation. The material/form opposition is paradoxical because it can appear or 
disappear like a parergon. They are not true opposites and can exist simultaneously in 
harmony, and yet the condition of work within an artwork—of human intervention—implies 
that they can always be separated in terms of form. This is how the indefiniteness remains an 
essential aspect of both artworks and the tradition of art. As paradoxical beings, artworks are 
definite in form while being indefinite in terms of use and significance. The tradition of art—
which incorporates aesthetic thought—is indefinite in its continued evolution through 
practice. The opposition of material and form demonstrates the cornerstone of this tradition, 
connecting the tradition of art to its contemporary practice. In its association of matter and 
meaning, material and form also connect the practice of art with autopoiesis and our 
understanding of life in terms of biological functioning and existential experience.  
 
5.2.7. Conclusion to The Parergon  
 Aside from being an excellent revision of the functioning of aesthetic judgement as 
initially defined by Kant in The Critique of Judgment, Derrida’s article “The Parergon” 
highlights the inherent paradoxes that help to make Kant’s aesthetic theory so intriguing and 
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influential. While the purpose of a parergon is to supplement or decorate an artwork, 
Derrida’s exploration demonstrates its protective role that reveals the inherent vulnerabilities 
of artworks. As an adjunct to an artwork, a parergon inherently demonstrates separation, and 
its detachability defines its function as ornament while reflecting the separability of the 
faculty of judgement from other forms of thought, namely reason and understanding.601 Using 
the concept of order to examine Kant’s aesthetic theory and the parergon, Derrida shows how 
its versatility as a concept to denote organization, sequence and command demonstrates 
hypocrisy within The Critique of Judgement between logical theoretical structures and 
illogical subject matter.602 This duplicity is further accentuated by the recursive adoption of 
the logical forms from previous theoretical texts, which are used to frame aesthetic theory in 
relation to quality, quantity, relation to ends, and modality.603 As an imposed theoretical 
structure, Kant’s reused schema becomes a parergon itself and suggests an internal lack at the 
heart of The Critique of Judgement.604 Exploring the parergon in terms of position, its 
instability in reference to context and content reflects the implicit cognitive movement during 
aesthetic experience. Paralleling Lumann’s paradoxical form of observation, the parergon 
fluctuates between visibility and invisibility depending on the focus of the observer, 
appearing as part of the environment when focusing on the integrity of the artwork, but part of 
the artwork when focusing on the space in which the artwork is exhibited.605 This 
demonstrates the nature of the parergon as a frame, which functions as a contour line that 
separates figure from ground. This nature is repeated in Kant’s aesthetic theory, shifting focus 
between the content of the analysis and the theoretical frames that constrain it.606 As a result, 
every aesthetic judgement can be understood as an act of framing that establishes the position 
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of the subject in relation to the oppositions that facilitate aesthetic thought.607 The most 
important of these oppositions is between material and form, which establishes the entire 
tradition of art on the conflict between the presence and lack of logic.608 This distinction, 
which composes and conditions all artworks, is the same division that constitutes and defines 
ourselves as living beings—as subjects and objects. Just as autopoietic operation on the 
molecular level functions in the absence of meaning, so too does the material component of 
artworks as experienced by other beings. It is the observational powers of the molar levels of 
cognitive functioning that enables the capacity of differentiation that produces meaning in 
human beings, which allows us to identify the form of a composed material and associate 
significance to it. This separation of material and form further parallels our existential 
condition of ‘being apart together,’ a society of inter-objective individuals. The operation of 
aesthetic experience allows us to see this paradoxical condition of simultaneity, which is 
reflected in the indefinite artwork and the unstable parergon that adorns it. 
 
5.3. ‘The Fragment’ 
5.3.1. Introduction to ‘The Fragment’ 
 To understand how artworks relate with their context is to move well beyond their 
immediate physical environment and to consider their situation in relation to society and 
history. These immense fields of study contain endless concepts that subjects navigate and 
refer to when viewing artworks, just as artists do when making them. Contemporary artworks 
are full of cultural references and whether they are recognized or not by a viewer is 
consequential. The possibility of social and historical ideas being contained in objects and 
then accessed by a viewing public is far more important, especially from the perspective of 
artistic creation. It is one of the ways artworks can be conceived of as indefinite in spite of 
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their finite form. It is one of the great mysteries of artworks as they are accessed over 
generations, a question of how meaning is generated by and through things in relation to 
people and context. It is also a question of art’s autonomy and self-sustaining existence as 
separate yet connected to other fields and practices. But how does this autonomy work? 
  Separation is a key concept that can be used to better understand the ontology of the 
artwork—the set of concepts and categories that help to explain its inherent properties and 
relations. In his book Anywhere or Not at All, Osborne finds some remarkable affinities 
between artworks and ‘the fragment,’ an organizational tool developed by a group of German 
philosophers known as the Jena Romantics.609 ‘The fragment,’ as you can well imagine, is 
understood as a separate part in relation to a whole. Freidrich Schlegel, who was working in 
the late 18th and early 19th Century as part of this philosophic group, developed ‘the fragment’ 
in response to perceived philosophical limitations at the time.610 Osborne uses the formal and 
conceptual properties of ‘the fragment’ to explore both post-Kantian aesthetic philosophy and 
the ontological structure of contemporary art. In this chapter we will explore ‘the fragment’ in 
relation to aesthetic separation, which can be understood as the division between external and 
internal in aesthetic experience—the transformation of ‘sense to sense’—and the separation of 
artworks from the tradition of art from whence they came. After briefly describing the 
philosophical origin of ‘the fragment,’ we will examine its role in establishing the autonomy 
of artworks and the autonomy of art in general. The cost of said autonomy is a series of 
conditions that must be met, which in general relate the practice of art with other social 
practices, such as economics. Once we explore the historical example of the Russian avant-
garde known as the Constructivists, we will move on to explore contemporary art practices, 
which Osborne considers in a postconceptual light. Finally we will look at two common 
methodologies of contemporary art practices—the series and the project—that accentuate the 
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potential of ‘the fragment.’ In the end, ‘the fragment’ can be seen to provide a theoretical 
framework that helps to clarify how artworks function autonomously in relation to their 
historical and social contexts, which will undeniably assist us in revealing how life is 
reflected in art.  
 
5.3.2. Description – ‘The Fragment’ 
A fragment, as its name suggests, is a part in relation to a whole. In this chapter we will 
explore its history as a philosophical tool that is paradoxically complete and incomplete at the 
same time. While it resolved existing philosophical problems at the time of its creation—nine 
years after the publication of Kant’s The Critique of Judgement—the theoretical structure of 
‘the fragment’ makes it a perfect model for exploring the philosophical functioning of 
artworks. After examining the origin of ‘the fragment’ it becomes clear how its association as 
a work of art in itself facilitates a better understanding of the relationship between aesthetics, 
art and society. 
‘The fragment’ was used by the early, Romantic philosophers as a motif in their attempt 
to develop a new way of expressing philosophical ideas, in order to resolve or avoid existing 
theoretical obstacles at that time. According to Osborne, the problem with the traditional 
philosophical model was its requirement of an impossible theoretical procedure in which the 
world could be known in truth as a whole.611 Friedrich Schlegel’s use of fragments in his 
magazine Athaneum was a way of implementing an anti-system, a way to orient towards a 
potential infinite while recognizing the incomplete nature of individual fragments within a 
collection.612 As Osborne puts it: “the fragment acquired its philosophical meaning by being 
posited as the medium of reflection of this apparent contradiction between the finite and 
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infinite aspects of an absolute knowledge.”613 A fragment displays limitation while also 
demonstrating self-sufficiency. It has a negative relation to the system with its autonomous 
nature as a singularity, and carries the idea of totality within itself negatively (in relation to 
the group), positively (in relation to itself) and as a concept (a recognized idea).614  
One of the problems that Schlegel tackled by developing the fragment was the idea of 
infinite regress, which occurs when the subject (“I”) attempts to know itself.  
The specific contradiction inherent to the principle of the I as a first principle of 
philosophical knowledge is that each time the I posits itself as the object of its 
own knowledge it separates itself qua object from itself qua subject of that 
knowledge, thereby knowing itself only incompletely.615  
 
The regress moves to infinity when the subject tries to understand itself again in this subject-
object duality, and it separates itself from its knowledge once again. In opposition to the 
accepted thought of the time, Schlegel held that this ‘obstacle’ of infinite regress simply is the 
structure of the subject.616 After exploring the role of language in creating the subject in 
Chapter 4.2.3. Subjects, and the generation of self in Chapter 3.2.4. The Self, we can see how 
inter-objectivity is rather taken for granted nowadays. Schlegel’s early acceptance of this 
volatility shifts the problem of knowing the world as a whole from a fundamental 
philosophical question to a problem that is inherent in the reflexive form of infinite 
reflection.617 Using both the artwork and ‘the fragment’ to demonstrate the form of this 
infinite reflexivity, Schlegel transformed the commonly understood form of the infinite 
regress—a straight line—into the infinite form of a self-enclosed, self-limiting circle.618 
Adorno later explored this structure, which he called ‘parataxis,’ in Aesthetic Theory. “It is 
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this transformation of a straight line into a circle that redefines the infinite as itself absolute—
that is, beyond its own opposition to the finite.”619  
The comparison of ‘the fragment’ to a work of art is not conjecture, since an example 
from the ‘Atheneum’ Fragments clearly states it. “A fragment, like a miniature work of art, 
has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a 
hedgehog. [AF 206]” 620 According to Osborne, the image of a ‘hedgehog’ in this self-
reflexive fragment helps to provide a burst of recognition that is typical of romantic 
epistemology. The independence that Schlegel places as a condition of ‘the fragment’ is what 
founds its autonomy. Osborne uses this specific fragment to establish a “dialectics of 
completion-incompletion” within the philosophical structure of ‘the fragment’ that works on 
three levels. The first is internal to each fragment, the second is at the level of a collection of 
fragments, and the third is the speculative level of the totality of all possible additional 
fragments.621 In relation to Rancière’s conception of being apart together, there is remarkable 
affinity in terms of structure and relations, while the speculative level of additional fragments 
serves to propel this paradoxical state into perpetuity. As we explored in Chapter 4.2.3. 
Progression, this state of indetermination is a defining characteristic of artworks, especially in 
relation to function and interpretation. Osborne further states that by becoming a fragment, 
anything can become a possible object of philosophical interpretation, which he describes as a 
possible object of the experience of truth that would necessarily combine the partiality of its 
content and the completeness of its form. By equating ‘the fragment’ with the work of art, 
Osborne claims that the practice of art becomes a philosophical practice. While the 
paradoxical conditions of aesthetics make it difficult to fully understand, they also make 
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Osborne’s proposition easy to accept. Nöe certainly agrees: “The job of art, its true work, is 
philosophical.”622 
Offering a solution to the philosophical problem of infinite regress, ‘the fragment’ is a 
perfect model for the paradoxical integrity of artworks that demonstrate limitation and self-
sufficiency concurrently. Similar to the functioning of the parergon, the state of ‘the 
fragment’ or artwork depends on the position of its subjective observation, which can 
interpret it as positive or negative in relation to the grouping, or simply as a concept. In any 
case, its reflexive form as an infinite circle also makes it a model for subjective instability, 
which equally possesses inherent limitation and autonomy. As an anti-system, ‘the fragment’ 
accepts the imperfection that founds the formal world, including the structure of aesthetic 
thought. As with the parergon, the vulnerability that this demonstrates aligns it with the 
subversive functionality of artworks, which in turn allows us to extrapolate the autonomic 
operation of artworks and art in relation to other aspects of human society. This includes the 
contemplation of artworks in relation to the tradition of art and the aesthetic regime of art, in 
which we currently find ourselves. As we continue our exploration of ‘the fragment,’ the 
relationship between aesthetics, art and society will become increasingly apparent. 
 
5.3.3. Autonomy 
 One of the most important consequences of the introduction of aesthetic theory into 
the tradition of art was the autonomy of artistic practice that accompanied it. This newly 
acquired independence, however, was not achieved without the conditioning of art’s 
functionality in relation to society at large, which positioned its practice in terms of 
heteronomy. Many of the resulting conditions of artworks have been explored in previous 
chapters, but here we will focus on them and highlight how they are integral to our current 
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definition of artistic practice, which is defined in relation with other fields of practice and 
thought. One association that is explored for the first time in this thesis is an artwork’s 
autonomy in relation to economics, which relates the ideas of commodity and use-value into 
our understanding of artworks. While relating to previously examined notions of counter-
functionality that we explored in Chapter 4.3. Technology, these ideas be developed in 
relation to economics using the art historical example of the Constructivist movement of the 
Russian avant-garde. In their attempt to create an art for the people by the people, they have 
indelibly affected our current understanding of art’s autonomy in relation to collective 
intentionality and the economy. While the movement has long passed, the idea of the avant-
garde nonetheless lives on strongly in contemporary art practice, and provides a historical 
example of the operational relationships of art, society and tradition.  
With their conception of ‘the fragment,’ the Jena Romantics determined that every 
artwork is ontologically autonomous: “a distinct form of presentation of truth.”623 They did 
this by determining the capacity of objects—specifically art-objects—to produce meaning, 
which Novalis described as a “presentation of the unpresentable,” and Jean-Francois Lyotard 
defined as “the infinite finitely displayed.”624 To define an artwork as ontologically 
autonomous, however, there are contextual conditions that must be met, specifically regarding 
the relationships that objects of art have with time and to society.625 Osborne notes that the 
heart of the Jena Romantics’ contribution to the field of aesthetics was to determine the 
ongoing mediation that artworks have with temporal and social practice, which ironically 
allow artworks to gain their own independent ontology.626 While the aesthetic judgement of 
beauty may be considered in a purely Kantian way, the aesthetic judgement of artworks is 
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condemned to being dependent on its contextual relations.627 With the introduction of 
aesthetic thought, the definition of art began to become dependent on the relationship between 
art and society, and established a counterpoint in which difference—and thus significance—
could be recognized in the practice of art. As Tanke explains:  
The aesthetic regime posits that art is the occasion for an experience that disrupts 
the results of domination in everyday life. …[A]rt  is not and never was 
autonomous from other aspects of existence. Aesthetics defines an identity of art 
in which art’s power is contained in its difference from the everyday, not its 
identification with it.628 
 
 As explored in relation to autopoiesis in Chapter 2.3.7. Difference, significance is 
generated through the observation of difference. Osborne states that artworks themselves 
mark their autonomy ontologically through their individuality, which in turn constitutes them 
as indeterminate—as enigmas.629 A work of art’s autonomy results from its distinct 
production of meaning, through which it acts like a subject, according to Osborne. This stems, 
in part, from the communicative intentionality that every artwork assumes, as described by 
Luhmann in Chapter 2.3.5. Observation, which equates the experience of artworks to the 
observation of observations. Furthermore, it relates to the absurdity of artworks, which act 
like puzzles that cause perpetually doubt, no matter how many times they are solved or 
answered.630 As an enigmatic object that acts like a subject, the obscurity of an artwork’s 
subjectivity is persistent, and its intentionality is never clear. With this duplicity of ipseity, 
Osborne claims that every artwork calls attention to the fact that a human subject is an object 
as well, highlighting the illusory nature of the subject—the misunderstanding that the subject 
is not an object. “That dialectical transformation of the object into a subject that is the work of 
the artwork is matched, epistemologically, by a dialectical reversal of the human subject into 
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an object, which renders subjectivity, in itself, opaque.”631 In this way, the aesthetic 
experience of artworks—which functions in relation to their beautiful, pleasurable and 
unknown qualitites—reflects the subject-object instability of the observer and the artwork 
being observed. Once again, Rancière’s state of ‘being apart together’ is a perfect metaphor 
for this paradox, which parallels the hermeneutics of both the parergon and ‘the fragment.’  
 In his exploration of the avant-garde, John Roberts defends the importance of art’s 
autonomy. In his reading of Luhmann and the autopoietic nature of art, Roberts determines 
that autonomy is produced through acts of negation, much the same way that an autopoietic 
organism identifies itself as autonomous through its negative relation with its environment.632 
“Autonomy is a space of differentiation and distinction, where the dominant conditions of 
heteronomy are tested, discarded and worked through.”633 He stresses two interrelated caveats 
as he examines the autonomy of art in relation to reflexivity, adisciplinary research, and 
situatedness. The first is that art’s autonomy is necessarily a social relation that is connected 
to the practice of art, and as such it is established through the malleable relationships that art 
has with materials, thought and politics.634 This supports Osborne’s equivalent assertion that 
we explored in the previous paragraph. Roberts’ second stipulation is that the autonomy of art 
must exist through form (material or immaterial), although it need not be determined by any 
specificity of media. This condition reflects the findings of Derrida that we explored in 
Chapter 5.2.6. Form in relation to the parergon. Both of these conditions that Roberts places 
on the autonomy of art are largely determined through the capitalist commodity status of 
artworks, which can’t be recognized as pure commodities with a standard function of 
exchange-value, but neither are they free of said function and purely autonomous.635 This 
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simultaneous positive/negative relation that artworks have with the commodity form results 
from their adherence to production for a private market while maintaining sovereignty from 
instrumental (i.e. functional) use. As such, art’s critique of exchange-value becomes fixed to 
its process of commodification.636 As Roberts states: “As socialized, non-coercive labour (or 
purposeless purposiveness in the language of Kant), the artwork’s fabricated uselessness is 
able to recall for the spectator the freely human and non-instrumental content of labour.”637 
The social caveat that Roberts determines as a condition of art’s autonomy can be understood 
in relation technology, which provides artworks with a counterpoint against which they can 
express their negative functionality and their resistance to being usual or usable (see Chapter 
4.3.4. Function). In relation to economics, however, art’s subversion of functionality attains 
new meaning. 
Roberts utilizes the work of Adorno to expand upon these ideas, demonstrating that 
the significance of art’s autonomy comes largely from its illusory independence from 
exchange-value.  This deceptive freedom from heteronomy creates a space for reflecting upon 
the separation between art and the commodity form, which in turn demonstrates how art is 
dependent upon the heteronomy of standard economic practices to act as a counterpoint for 
generating its autonomy.638 The same can be said in terms of art’s adverse relation to 
technological functionality. Guy Debord reflects the same idea in his conception of ‘the 
spectacle,’ which is dominated by ideas of separation that relate aesthetic and economic 
theories. He states: 
The spectacle originates in the loss of the unity of the world, and the gigantic 
expansion of the modern spectacle expresses the totality of this loss: the 
abstraction of all specific labor [sic] and the general abstraction of the entirety of 
production are perfectly rendered in the spectacle, whose mode of being concrete 
is precisely abstraction. In the spectacle, one part of the world represents itself to 
the world and is superior to it. The spectacle is nothing more than the common 
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language of this separation. What binds the spectators together is no more than an 
irreversible relation at the very center which maintains their isolation. The 
spectacle reunites the separate, but reunites it as separate.639 
 
Separation places emphasis on the irremovable boundary at the heart of artistic practice. 
Adorno’s assertion of a determinate concept of art that presupposes aesthetic experience 
stresses the importance of the mediation of autonomous strategies through every artwork, 
which becomes: “the mediator of the shifting symbolic relations of art’s internal and external 
divisions.”640 In this way, Roberts contends that the avant-garde is not something that exists 
historically in singular artworks or epochs, but rather something that functions while art’s 
potential reverberates throughout society.  
[T]he autonomy of the art object/event is something that is produced out of the 
social relations that constitute the institution of art itself. … This means that 
autonomy is not the formal outcome of semblance, but the always practical and 
theoretical outcome of the contradiction between the artwork’s exchange-value 
(its approbation as a sign or token of market and academy) and its use-value (its 
circulation as knowledge, its reception as Bildung). In other words, because of the 
perpetual threat of the loss of its use-value, art is continually compelled to find 
strategies (relations and non-relations) which resist or obviate this process of 
critical and artistic dissolution – the history of the ‘new’ in modernism deriving 
precisely from art’s resistance to its exchange-value. But, at the same time, art 
generates its social identity and value from this process.641 
 
The paradoxical generative-destructive nature of artistic practice has various implications. On 
an existential level, Roberts claims that the unresolvable nature of an artwork’s interpretation 
reflects a subject’s unresolvable understanding of themselves in the world. It is through this 
reflection that Rancière rightfully associates artistic creation and intentionality towards ‘a 
people which is still lacking.’ On the level of production, artworks must continually renew 
themselves by challenging and resisting the tradition and context from whence they came, 
which are also used to identify and define them. Artistic autonomy thus depends on 
persistently crossing boundaries, and this is where the practice of art extends itself into non-
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art and anti-art realms to assure its survival and independence. Through its dissonant relation 
with standard economics, an artwork’s autonomy also rests on the condition of its 
originality—its distinguished difference and singularity from other commodities. 
An important exemplification of economic influence on artistic autonomy is the avant-
garde movement of Russian Constructivism. The various factions involved in Constructivism 
were interested in making artistic practice socially relevant, described as part of a process of 
societal rationalization at the turn of the twentieth century.642 Artworks, especially under 
communism, should be made by the people for the people. As Osborne notes, however, the 
process of ‘rationalizing art’ was imbued with two important contradictions that have left a 
permanent mark on our current tradition of art. The first reflects an conflict between political 
and formal concerns, and the second an opposition between processes of production and 
expression.643 In relation to the former conflict, an encouraged freedom of artistic 
experimentation during post World War One Constructivism contradicted the inherent social 
isolation of artistic enjoyment, which was limited both by the locational accessibility of 
artistic display and the educational accessibility that was determined by social upbringing and 
class. Aside from logistical impossibilities of making artworks accessible to everyone, an ‘art 
for the people in general,’ it stands to reason, is never experimental in nature. In relation to 
the latter conflict between production and expression, the materials used to make artworks 
were conditioned to reflect the social ideals of communism, which lead to the adoption of 
purely utilitarian supplies (i.e. construction materials).644 While Constructivist creativity 
flourished for some time, these contradictions began to erode the intended social unity of the 
movement. Combined with economic insufficiency—especially in relation with material 
requirements—Constructivism eventually drifted back to operate as an independent faction of 
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society, according to Osborne. In its return to its autonomous domain, however, he contends 
that artistic production would never be the same. As though ashamed of its unsuccessful 
attempt at social rationalization, Osborne believes that artworks henceforth confront this 
failure reflexively within their own structure, and that their social impracticality is necessarily 
reflected in their construction and compounded in their autonomy as artworks.  
Art had to become ‘critical’ once it had failed to become universally actual, if it 
was to continue to be associated with both the freedom and the social possibilities 
for critically significant expression that it had acquired in the formalist/aestheticist 
critique of tradition. From that point on, critical artistic meaning became 
inextricably but problematically tied to the question of the relationship of the 
individual artwork to the rationality (and irrationality) of social forms. This 
problematic relationship is manifest internally, within the work in the dialectic of 
construction and expression. It appears externally, at the level of cultural form in 
the contradictory character of the social space of art. 645 
 
The retreat of this intended social integration of art practices echoes Rancière’s description of 
the aesthetic break and how artworks become disconnected from a particular place or function 
that attributes meaning—the transformation of tradition that defines the second aspect of 
aesthetic separation. Subversion of functionality assures that artworks inherently acknowledge 
their autonomy while generating it. In this way, artworks are defined by their intentional 
‘functionlessness’646 which was explored in relation to equipmental understanding in Chapter 
4.3.4. Function. Constructivism helps to demonstrate this by showing how a revolution to 
integrate art into society returned full circle—albeit altered—to its exceptional peripheral 
position. It also shows how the practice of art is inescapably constructed through social 
relations and the differentiation of artistic practice through subversive and integral means. In 
an attempt to coordinate an art for everyone, the rebellious nature of artworks became a 
recognized convention of its socially defined tradition.  
 ‘The fragment’ helps to establish the autonomy of art by demonstrating the importance 
of negative association in self-determination; defining what something is by determining what 
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it is not. In this way, the definition of art is made in contradistinction to other social practices, 
which is most notable in comparison with the functionality of technology and economics. 
While the Jena Romantics determine artworks as ontologically autonomous through their 
unique existence, this autonomy is conditioned by contextual conditions of a temporal and 
social nature. An artwork’s singular production of meaning and truth enables it to be 
recognized as a subject, which in turn reflects the inter-objectivity of the observer. The formal 
condition of artworks positions them in relation to the commodity relations of economics 
under capitalism, which demonstrates art’s inherent subversion of use-value in relation to 
exchange-value. This reflects the perpetually indeterminate position of artworks in relation to 
the intentionality of function and use. While creating a space for reflection as a result of its 
illusory separation from logical economic functioning, the subverted use-value of artworks is 
short-lived and originality becomes a condition of artistic significance. The provision of 
novelty is what fuels art’s avant-garde drive, which in turn feeds off of its social relations in 
order to adapt and secure innovation. Tanke states: 
[A]rt’s leap outside of mimesis is not only the origin of art’s autonomy (as the 
narrative of modernism would have us believe), it is the historical pre-condition 
for strategies associated with the autonomy of art—abstraction in painting, silence 
in literature—as well as the source of art’s heteronomy—the exchanges between 
the various arts and the blurring of the distinction between art and life. 647 
 
The Russian Constructivists failed attempt at extensively integrating artistic practice into 
society and everyday life resulted in yet another condition for art’s autonomy. The social 
impracticality of artworks must be reflected in their formal construction. This impracticality 
becomes the defining feature of artworks, highlighted in contrast to the practicality that 
dominates our daily lives. It also demonstrates the deviant and rebellious nature of art, which 
creatively appropriates society in order to become something new. This reflects our own 
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unresolved impracticality as subject-objects, and our own illusory autonomy as we live our 
lives ‘together apart.’ 
 
5.3.4. Contemporary / Postconceptual Art 
 Artworks are necessarily identified in relation to a precedent conception of art, which 
positions the significance of artworks in relation to a subjectively understood precedent 
tradition of art. The necessity of artworks to be unique assures that this tradition of art is 
constantly evolving, which implies that as new art movements begin, existing traditions begin 
to fade away. The aesthetic regime of art is an example of this transition of practice and 
tradition, as it slowly replaced the mimetic regime of art that came before it. We are still 
within the aesthetic regime of art, and this chapter focuses on the contextualization of 
contemporary art practices in relation to the larger artistic tradition of the aesthetic regime, 
which can be visualized in Appendix 2. Timeline of Referenced Periods and Source Material. 
We will explore historical notions of art before moving on to examine the nature of 
postconceptual art practices, a movement that Osborne defines in relation to the continued 
influence of conceptual art on contemporary practice, and in distinction to purely Kantian 
aesthetic conception of Modernist art history. Postconceptual art practices will be explored in 
relation to their increased focus on conceptualization, which relies on social relationships, and 
the increasingly expansive nature of artworks’ formal constitution and multiplicity. While 
being distinct from the traditions that precede it, postconceptual art continues to reflect the 
society it collaborates with to define its original significance. 
In order to identify an artwork as art, the concept of art must already exist in the 
subject who is performing the process of identification. This precedent necessity of the 
concept of art is one way in which artworks connect with society and tradition, which provide 
a general understanding of what an artwork is and what the practice of art entails, as vague as 
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this might be. The ongoing transformation of art and the tradition that defines it assures that it 
remains indeterminate. When it is determined, it is always in the moment in relation to a 
subject within a context, which are also in motion, and thus the determination is fleeting. 
Osborne refers to the writing of Adorno to emphasize that the: “ongoing retrospective and 
reflective totalization [of the concept of art] is necessarily open, fractured, incomplete and 
therefore inherently speculative.”648 There is nothing wrong with trying to determine the 
nature of art, but to properly do so means taking into account art’s indeterminate and 
provisional nature, and knowing the historical and practical tradition of art certainly helps this 
endeavour. In order to conceive of the nature of contemporary art practices in relation to 
philosophy, Osborne provides a historical analysis of aesthetics that amplifies the 
philosophical map upon which the concept of contemporary art can be positioned and 
examined, while helping to navigate the myriad relations that establish its ontological 
significance. He praises the work of Adorno, who states: “Art acquires its specificity by 
separating itself from what it developed out of; its law of movement is its law of form.”649 
 As explored in Chapter 4.2.2.1. To Name, Osborne has a problem with the label 
“contemporary art,” which is admittedly confusing in its temporal and categorical ambiguity. 
He defines the idea of contemporary as: “a temporal unity in disjunction, or a disjunctive 
unity of present times.”650 Projecting a “single historical time of the present,” he considers the 
term “contemporary” to be an operative fiction that regulates the division between the past 
and the present, occurring exclusively within the present. (For a more thorough exploration of 
the fiction of time, see Chapter 2.3.6. Time). This union of different conceptions of time 
within the present, along with the social relations and spaces that generate these constructions, 
become the two main pillars that support Osborne’s historical notion of contemporary art as 
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postconceptual art.651 As the ontology of the artwork has transformed over time in association 
with the social operation of artistic practice in context, Osborne thinks that contemporary 
artistic practice must be conceived in relation to its general economic and communicational 
grounding. As explored in Chapter 5.3.3. Autonomy, the conditions of art are established 
through communicative (i.e. formal) and economic relations that help to define and establish 
its autonomy. This provisional and socially determined conception of contemporary art results 
in a dissolution of two historical paradigms: the traditional conception of the arts as specific 
mediums (in favour of multidisciplinarity), and national social conceptions of art space (in 
favour of globalized perspectives).652  
Rancière’s conception of the mimetic (or representational) regime of art, which 
preceded the aesthetic regime, finds little room for the subjective interpretation of artworks.  
[T]he representative regime corresponds roughly with French “classicisme,” and 
the heavily regimented forms of cultural production known as the belles lettres 
and the beaux arts. … A crucial feature of the art of the representative regime is 
that the question about the relationship between art and life is settled in advance 
by the idea that art is a representation.653  
 
By demonstrating how artworks are singular expressions of ontological truth, the Jena 
Romantics helped to break artworks out of a purely representative meaning and into a practice 
of hermeneutics that privileges subjective interpretation. The theory of aesthetics influenced 
novel ways in which the practice of art could move more freely into the social and political 
spheres. The result was the development and acceptance of distinctive new art practices, the 
expansion of what could be considered an artwork, and a renegotiation of political efficacy 
through artistic practice.  
Aesthetics, with its central categories of experience and reflection, emerged with 
the recognition that there were no longer any preordained rules for distinguishing 
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in advance the objects of art from the products of everyday life, and that each 
experience had to be evaluated in its irreducible singularity.654  
 
The aesthetic break reconnected the practice of art with the same instability that defined the 
lives of the subjects who produced and appreciated it. 
Two hundred years later—many transitions, artistic movements and ideologies later—
we arrive to what is popularly known as the period of contemporary art. One of Osborne’s 
criticisms with recent art theories that establish an opposition between the Modern and Post-
modern periods is that he doesn’t consider Modernism to be finished. He recognizes the 
postconceptual period as a continuation of the Modern epoch of art, and a more appropriate 
name to describe the ontology of contemporary art. This is primarily because it recognizes the 
important influence that conceptual art practices of the late 1960’s and early 70’s had and 
continue to have on contemporary art practices.655 One of the reasons this was overlooked 
during the time of Post-modern critique was the powerful and ubiquitous position of aesthetic 
discourse during Modernism, where media specificity and purity became the motor for artistic 
inspiration and innovation. Artists who implemented conceptual strategies for making art 
were moving in the opposite direction, and not simply in a reactionary way against the 
practice of abstraction within High Modernism. They were pushing the boundaries of what art 
was and could be, on a conceptual level obviously, but also in formal ways. In fact, it was 
conceptual art’s failure that Osborne concedes as its biggest contribution to our conception of 
art.656 He states that in their attempt to create a purely conceptual art, an art of pure theory, 
conceptual artists were unable to eradicate the aesthetic element of artworks. As ephemeral as 
a conceptual artwork might be, there is always a formal trace through which artistic 
significance is transmitted. In this ‘disappointment,’ however, Osborne asserts that they found 
a necessary limit for all art: its inescapable aesthetic dimension, or art’s condition of form. 
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Every artwork has an aesthetic or formal quality, even the most purely conceptual artwork. 
Inadvertently finding this formal condition of art in its failure of conceptual purity, its inverse 
also became apparent; that every artwork has an inevitable conceptual component too.657  
While conceptualization is key to understanding contemporary art—or as Osborne 
prefers, postconceptual art—there are two concurrent yet overlapping philosophical 
approaches with which it can be considered: ‘art as aesthetic’ and ‘art as (historical) 
ontology’.658 These discourses are founded in the work of Kant and Jena Romanticism 
respectively. The problem Osborne has with the former, which represents the hegemonic 
power of High Modernism, is that it fails to properly account for the influential contribution 
of conceptual art practices. By neglecting conceptual art, he states that the ‘art as aesthetic’ 
line of criticism: “fails to provide a theoretical basis on which we might specify the 
ontological distinctiveness of contemporary art.”659 An alternative sequential categorization of 
movements—from formalist modernism to conceptual art to postconceptual art—provides a 
more adequate way of thinking the cultural logic and lineage of modernism as a whole, which 
includes conceptual and postconceptual art.660 Keeping in mind the various relationships that 
artworks must acknowledge, Osborne defines six conditions of possibility for postconceptual 
artworks.661 They are: 
1. Art’s necessary conceptuality. (Art is constituted by concepts, their relations 
and their instantiation in practices of discrimination: art/non-art.) 
2. Art’s ineliminable—but radically insufficient—aesthetic dimension. (All art 
requires some form of materialization; that is to say, aesthetic—felt, spatio-
temporal—presentations.) 
3. The critical necessity of an anti-aestheticist use of aesthetic materials. (This is 
a critical consequence of art’s necessary conceptuality.) 
4. An expansion to infinity of the possible material forms of art. 
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5. A radically distributive—that is, irreducibly relational—unity of the individual 
artwork across the totality of its multiple material instantiations, at any particular 
time. 
6. A historical malleability of the borders of this unity.662 
 
These conditions enable broad and innovative ways with which to evaluate and understand 
individual artworks. By infinitely expanding the possible materials that can be used to make 
art, conceptual art practices disregard the importance that media-specificity once had in the 
‘art as aesthetic’ tradition.663 Not only that, but the conceptual practices that align with ‘art as 
(historical) ontology’ have exploded the notion that an artwork must exists as a self-contained 
entity. Similar to the way that autopoiesis defines the operation of life through systemic 
organizational relationships, Osborne suggests that artworks have moved beyond the 
limitation of a purely physical determination and now exist in potentially unlimited (albeit 
conceptually defined) ways and forms while still being considered the same artwork. 
Compounding this physical liberation is a temporal one, according to Osborne, as the 
significance of the artwork transforms over time and is endowed with a historical, “retroactive 
ontology.” This problematizes a cohesive conception of the borders of the artwork, shifting it 
from a question of external boundary to a logic of integral unity of the work.664 As artworks 
move out into the world of everyday life, eschewing conventional settings of artistic 
experience, they rely more and more on the organizational conventions that define artistic 
practice in terms of methodology. This leads to contemporary art’s increasing approach to 
urbanism, which Rancière describes as artists’ desire to: “get out of the museum and induce 
alterations in the space of everyday life.”665 Conceptual art has certainly made social 
intervention a common creative strategy, and thus a new convention through which the 
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concept of art can be defined, despite the inevitable formal conditions that bind these 
conceptual practices to aesthetic tradition. 
 Roberts thinks that the shift of artistic practice towards the conceptualization of art is 
reminiscent of the intellectual study of the Renaissance studiolo, but this time the artist is 
acting more like a technician or operator conducting an exploration of art’s formal and 
cognitive possibilities.666 One of the most effective ways to establish art as a concept has been 
to eliminate the expressive touch of the artist, which helps to shift the productive and 
sensorial focus from emotion to meaning when experiencing an artwork. Roberts contends 
that the result of this shift is a turn towards artistic determinations that are more social, 
procedural and theoretical. Roberts lists seven axioms to help illustrate this transition towards 
art’s conceptualization: 
1. Art is not a thing or set of discrete things, but an eventual process in which 
objects may or may not play a part, and, therefore, ultimately do not fix the 
possible meanings, strategies or outcomes of art. 
2. Art as an evental process is determined by its social and political conditions of 
emergence and possibility. 
3. Art as an evental process, determined by its social and political conditions of 
emergence and possibility, is theoretically driven, insofar as making sense of 
these conditions means that practice and theory are coextensive. 
4. As a theoretically driven set of practices necessarily embedded in the conflicts 
and divisions of the social world, art produces transformative effects and affects 
in the world. 
5. As a theoretically driven set of socially transformative practices, art is at all 
times a collective or group enterprise, insofar as artists participate with other 
artists, technicians, workers and non-artists directly or indirectly in the social 
division of labour; this, in turn, presupposes art’s dissolution into general social 
technique. 
6. The function of the artist and the concept of artistic skill are the specific 
outcome of this process of general social technique; authorship is first and 
foremost interdisciplinary and processual. 
7. Art, as a theoretically driven set of transformative practices, sets itself the 
historical and critical task of incorporating its speculative strategies and practices 
into the advanced scientific and technological forms of general social technique; 
art participates in the advanced relations of production.667 
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Through this description, Roberts demonstrates how the practice of art today relates more to 
divisions of labour (social relations) than to stylistic concerns (formal relations). Nonetheless, 
the conditions that define artworks remain the same. The observer of formal relations within 
conceptual artworks simply needs to adjust their conception of the materials that are being 
formed (or transformed) to create artworks. Instead of traditional materials, a postconceptual 
artist forms concepts and relations—in addition to materials and existent beings—that make 
up our everyday lives. These immaterial materials still need to be manipulated, however, and 
they still need to function subversively in relation to function and use-value. Being able to 
identify the formal manipulations of concepts and relations is perhaps more difficult than 
recognizing material evidence, but there must always be material evidence that displays the 
‘work’ that comprises the ‘art.’ 
 Lovers of art history are well aware of the dramatic shifts in artistic movements and 
ideologies as society changes and the practice of art transforms with it. Understanding how art 
develops out of the tradition that begets it is easy if you consider your understanding of the 
world in relation to the generation that brought you up. Your view of the world is similar and 
yet distinct from your parents’ perspectives. Some things remain the same, but lots of things 
are quite different too. The same is true of artistic practice, and as some traditions fade, others 
gain acceptance. Looking at the larger epoch of the aesthetic regime, and the transition from 
the mimetic regime beforehand, we can see how aesthetic thought liberated art in terms of 
creation and interpretation while fixing it to the social relations within which it operates. 
These include historical and economic considerations, which connect the intentionally 
distorted functionality of art to the recognizable concepts that we use to organize our lives. In 
relation to contemporary art practices, the ‘postconceptual’ label follows the ontology of the 
Jena Romantics more closely than Kant’s aestheticism, prioritizing the social relations of art 
instead of its formal conditions. While eliminating the confusing ambiguity of the 
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categorization ‘contemporary art,’ postconceptual art properly acknowledges the significant 
influence of the conceptual artists of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s—an influence that is 
still very relevant in the current practice of art in 2019. As artistic practices move towards an 
increased focus on conceptualization, art becomes increasingly defined in terms of processes, 
systems and relations, as opposed to media, style and emotion. The processual nature of 
postconceptual artworks enables them to engage with existing systems and social constructs, 
embracing instability while establishing novel relations that create new ways to experience 
art. While this allows artworks to be diaphanous and disperse in composition, or stretched in 
temporal extension, artworks nonetheless must adhere to the concept and tradition of art that 
establishes them. While the concept of art is malleable, the conditions of art are quite durable.  
 
5.3.5. Series and Projects 
 Two of the most common mediating principles of postconceptual art—the series and 
the project—clearly reflect the ontology of ‘the fragment.’ The simultaneous state of being 
incomplete while being complete allows artworks in the form of series and projects to expose 
the internal and external relations that inform their existence as art. In relation to series, its 
content and form relate to the concept of information, which is marked by its instant 
verifiability and self-sufficiency. The series also helps to illustrate the distinction between the 
two historical pillars of contemporary art criticism, which tend to align either towards the 
aesthetic tradition of Kant or the ontological tradition of the Jena Romantics. As a formal 
structure, the relationship between subjective and objective control during artistic creation 
makes the series applicable to both critical lineages. Projects, on the other hand, focus more 
on relationships and networks that emphasize the processual nature of artworks. ‘The 
fragment’ once again acts as model for this media in its perpetual indeterminateness. While 
reflecting the temporal and transcendental principals that define Kant’s aesthetic theory, the 
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project also aligns with Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, which renders the subject-object 
opposition obsolete and likens artistic creation as projective in nature. As the possibility of 
possibility, the art project is comprised of an ideal—which is always more than it is—and 
potential—which is forever incomplete. In this way, the art project represents freedom, and 
demonstrates why ‘the fragment’ is such an important model for considering the 
contemporary practice of art. Aside from their creative promise, the series and the project 
offer ideal ways to relate the practice of art with social tradition and the reflection of life. 
In his effort to situate contemporary art within the modernist tradition, Osborne 
explores major transformations that have taken place since mid-eighteenth century Classicism 
in terms of mediating forms, as we saw in Chapter 4.2.2.1. To Name. While acknowledging 
the common practice of using of isms to categorize individual artworks within universal 
groupings of art, a more fundamental mediating principle is identified within postconceptual 
practice: the use of series.668 Reflecting the complete/incomplete relationship that ‘the 
fragment’ embodies, an individual artwork within a series relates even further to parallel the 
subjective/objective situation of human individuals within social communities, which defines 
the ‘together apart’ paradox that founds Rancière’s concept of aesthetic separation. Osborne 
points out the work of Jean Paul Sartre and his attempt to contemplate the relationship of a 
human being within society, using it as a model for understanding how the internal-external 
relations might function for artworks. While Osborne isn’t convinced that Sartre’s theory of 
serialization is suitable to people, he does acknowledge its utility in relation to artworks.669 
The structure of a series establishes a relational framework of commonality that allows an 
artwork to maintain its individuality and highlight its uniqueness.  
Under conditions of tendentially increasing aesthetic nominalism, each work must 
create the mediating conditions of its own intelligibility. In the absence of new, 
unalienated social forms of universality, the series is the most common formal 
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mode for the construction of such conditions. It is here that the structural 
libertarianism of contemporary art resides. As subjects of exchange in capitalist 
societies, we live ‘within and against’ the series as a social form of relations 
between individuals. The work of art reflects and re-presents this form, in the 
form of a wish. 670 
 
The self-sufficiency of ‘the fragment’ as it exists apart from (yet in relation to) its 
grouping can be used to compare the series with information. As we saw in Chapter 2.3.5. 
Observation, Luhmann uses the term information to describe the external hetero-reference of 
artistic communication that serves as an starting point for further communication, whether 
artistic or oral, and functions in difference to utterance, which indicates internal self-
reference. We have also explored information as a process of transformation in Chapter 4.2.3. 
Progression. MacKenzie’s use of information as a verb helps us to appreciate a more nuanced 
conception of material transformation beyond simple before-and-after productive steps, while 
leading us to consider the state of indetermination that all technologies, artworks and humans 
inherently demonstrate. Using the idea of information to describe the nature of artistic series, 
Osborne uses the example of Sol Lewitt’s Sentences On Contemporary Art671 to show how 
each individual sentence becomes a fragment when reduced to a unit of information.672 To 
explore the essence of information, Osborne turns to the philosophy of Benjamin, which 
defines the two main features of ‘information’ as instant verifiability, and understandability in 
itself (or semantic self-sufficiency). Benjamin fixes the complete value of information to the 
now, which Osborne uses to emphasize the ‘contemporaneity’ of contemporary art and to 
explain the decline of narrative in art. Osborne claims that Lewitt’s use of information in a 
series demonstrates its semantic self-sufficiency while giving it new meaning by 
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demonstrating information in its pure form.673 Inevitably, Friedrich’s Athenaeum Fragments 
and Lewitt’s Sentences can be connected structurally through their use of series, despite their 
obvious differences. As a series is a ‘mode of unity’ of a work of art, Osborne claims that 
both of these examples of series are associated with the human subject. As we consider our 
self, our identity as an individual person, over the course of our lives, we can easily recognize 
our self as a distinct yet continuous being information.  
 The series as a formal principle helps to demonstrate yet another aspect of inter-
objective operation, which is a vital founding concept for aesthetic experience. The series 
helps to demonstrate the two ideas of exactness within Kant’s philosophy that describe the 
state of indefiniteness.674 The first is the transcendental, which is the “condition of 
possibility” of some particular form of experience, and the second is that the totality of the 
series of conditions cannot be known by sensuous finite beings such as ourselves.675 “[T]here 
is always another condition of possibility to be known.”676 While adopting these Kantian 
ideas, the Jena Romantics developed them further by adapting the concept of infinite regress 
(by changing the line into the circle—see Chapter 5.3.2. Description – ‘The Fragment’) to 
reflect, firstly, the self-reflective structure of the subject, and secondly, the internal dynamics 
of the work of art. This converts the artwork into a quasi-subject, an “epistemologically 
privileged site” of infinite reflection.677 Using Lewitt’s Sentences as an example, Osborne 
notes the important counterpoint in a series between the subjectivity of the starting point (the 
establishment of a rule) and the objectivity of its process as the work is carried out (its 
mechanical necessity).678 In this sense, Osborne states that a conceptual artwork, which is 
determined by an idea, demonstrates a withdrawal of subjectivity during the production of the 
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actual work. This in turn reveals a combination of formal necessity and chance. He points out 
that: “the rationality of any series is compromised by the arbitrariness of its beginning (its 
rule) and (if it is in principle infinite) the point at which its pursuit is terminated.”679 As such, 
the relational format of conceptual artworks demonstrates a particular tension between the 
subjective and objective, a point where the infinite is grasped in the finite.680 The closest 
connection between the Jena Romantics and Lewitt is their priority of process over result, 
which results from the ontological prioritization of the idea of the work.681 While focusing on 
the concepts helps to define artworks through their objective relationships, artworks in series 
nonetheless exemplify subjectivity through their uniqueness and aesthetic interpretation.  
 Another mediating form that is ubiquitous to contemporary art is the project, which 
Schlegel defines as: “articulated combinations of ideas and modes of actualization.”682 While 
a work of art commonly connotes a distinguishable individual entity, an art project is more 
diaphanous in nature, extended in terms of procedure, materialization and time. Osborne 
points towards the increasing occurrence of ‘the project space’ as a marker of the project’s 
established significance for the presentation of contemporary art.683 This act of artistic 
presentation is far from traditional, according to Osborne, since it incorporates the widest 
possible range of art objects and actions with more socially engaged interactions that form a 
nexus for networks and relationships. The architectural space itself declines in importance as 
art projects focus less on material results and more on the strategies, processes and 
communication of artistic practices in motion.684 This, in the end, is one of the leading reasons 
why artist's projects are evading the institutional contexts that project spaces imply. With the 
newfound importance of relationships, procedures and interaction for artistic projects, artists 
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are finding more opportunities and taking more risks by implementing their projects within 
the realm of everyday life. 
As with ‘the fragment,’ the ontological conception of ‘the project’ took place within 
Jena Romanticism, through their idea of art as being: “forever becoming, never 
completed.”685 This notion originates from Schlegel’s description in one of his Athenaeum 
Fragments, in which he defines ‘the project’ in terms of both temporal and transcendental 
notions, equating projects to “fragments of the future.”686 Of specific interest to Schlegel was 
the inherent nature of the project to both idealize and realize its object simultaneously, which 
Osborne contends establishes it as theoretical and practical concurrently. Through this 
embodied connection (and disconnection) of the ideal and the real, Osborne states that a 
project is transcendental in nature, and its processual nature makes it a perfect mediating 
concept for postconceptual art.687 The necessary incompletion of the project endows it with a 
perpetual inertia towards the future, yet this thrust forward can never fulfil its end. At the 
same time, Osborne claims that the necessary conception of an ideal conclusion of a project 
during the process of its realization endows it with a permanent sense of incompletion, of 
“forever becoming.” As organized expressions of conceptual and procedural realization, 
projects are trapped in a paradoxical state between partially realized and ideally complete.688 
As process is inevitably questioned and emphasized during negotiations between practice and 
theory, the project is a perfect media for highlighting the operational nature of artistic 
practice. Through the succession and movement of artistic operation—its creation and 
reception—and the incompleteness of the art project, Osborne conceives of art projects as 
living beings. In contradistinction to this idea, one of the biggest problems that he identifies 
with our understanding of non-contemporary artworks is our tendency to think of them as 
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complete.689 By doing so, we overlook the disconnection between the real and the ideal that 
all artworks inherently embody, and this separation is essential for understanding the 
transcendental potential of the work, which in turn relates art with life. 
Osborne further strengthens the connection of art and life by exploring ‘the project’ in 
relation to the idea of Dasein, which he claims was developed by Heidegger by associating 
the artistic concept of the project with the human being as “Being-in-the-world.”690 As we 
explored in Chapter 3.4.4. The Open, the concept helps to render the traditional subject-object 
opposition obsolete by denying the possibility of separation of a human being from its world. 
Under these conditions, Heidegger considers the creation of art to be a projective structure of 
human existence, while conceiving of Dasein itself as a “thrown projection.”691 The result is 
possibility as possibility, something that is always more than it is (ideally) and yet forever 
incomplete (potentially).692 As Osborne states: “Projecting projects possibilities as 
possibilities. And the being of possibility is freedom.”693 The movement implied in this 
operation is undeniable, as an artwork—as a projection—is projected into the unknown and, 
in doing so, makes the unknown attainable. The implied potentiality of the artwork in this 
projective conception associates artistic practice with the promise of the future. The 
conception of Dasein as an existential project of possibility and freedom allows us begin to 
fathom new possibilities for understanding life beyond the subject-object opposition. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates how artworks make the impossible possible and the invisible 
visible, connecting potential with reality. “The existential and social structure of the project 
itself becomes the carrier of artistic reflection.”694 With the blurring of the boundary between 
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art and life, the inherent potential of states of indetermination becomes apparent and 
applicable to both the practice of art and the life every human being. 
Through their reflection of the ontology of ‘the fragment,’ the media formats of both 
the series and the project reflect the philosophical foundation of postconceptual art practices. 
This is based on the indetermination of ‘the fragment,’ which displays the simultaneity of 
being incomplete and complete, and allows series and projects to expose the internal and 
external relations that inform their existence as artworks. Since series contain a multiplicity of 
unique yet related units, they formally relate to the concept of information, which is marked 
by its intelligible immediacy and self-sufficiency. This relates series to processes of both 
communication and development, as the process of being information eliminates binary 
readings of before and after and places importance on the complexity of transformation and 
influence in the moment. Through subjective and objective associations, the series helps to 
demonstrate the ontology of the artwork in relation to ‘the fragment,’ which Osborne uses to 
define the relational conception of postconceptual art in distinction from the more aesthetic 
line of contemporary criticism that adopts a more purely Kantian aesthetic tradition. Despite 
the breadth of critical positions, the series and the project help us to consider the 
contemporary practice of art in terms of integrity and relationships, which echo the 
internal/external division that marks human life and aesthetic experience. Projects help to 
bring focus to the procedural nature of artistic practice by highlighting the indeterminate 
nature of artworks and individual subjects, with ‘the fragment’ as the perfect example of 
complete incompleteness. This reflects the fluctuating movement from subject to object—or 
particular to universal—that defines Kant’s aesthetic theory, which acknowledges the 
temporal and transcendental nature of artistic practice. Relating art to Heidegger’s concept of 
Dasein, which denies the possibility of subjective separation from the world, creation in 
general is a projective act. The art project, as such, is all about movement and potential. Like 
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‘the fragment,’ it is forever incomplete and simultaneously represents the potential of the 
artwork in movement towards its ideal. The art project demonstrates the possibility of 
possibility, and the inherent freedom of indetermination. Through their manifest potential, art 
projects can be conceived as living beings, as they parallel and reflect the indeterminate and 
relational nature of our existence, and provide a perfect connection between the practice of art 
and our conception of life in motion.  
 
5.3.6. Conclusion to ‘The Fragment’ 
 ‘The fragment’ is a philosophical idea developed by the Jena Romantics that provides 
an ontological model to more thoroughly understand the paradoxical nature of subjectivity 
and artworks. The logic rests on the coincident completeness and incompleteness of the 
formal structure of ‘the fragment,’ which is a part in relation to its grouping, but an 
independent part nonetheless in its unique unity.695 This model establishes a clear union 
between integral structure and exterior relations, both of which define ‘the fragment’ and 
make it a useful analogy for connecting the natural functioning of artworks and individual 
people. It facilitates this comparison by resolving the subjective conundrum of ‘infinite 
regress,’ where the possibility of a human subject to reflexively know themself as a subject is 
put into question through the necessary objectification of the subject during the process.696 
The Jena Romantics changed the assumed linear form of infinite regress into a circle, which 
created a unity in which the infinite became finite.697 The human subject exemplifies this 
duality of limitation and potential, as does the artwork.698 With a finite form that is infinitely 
interpretive, both artwork and subject reflect the paradox of ‘the fragment.’  
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 The autonomy of artworks is established through the opposition of internal/external 
relations that ‘the fragment’ represents. The integrity of an artwork—its ontological 
autonomy—is determined by its contextual conditions, which are established in relation to 
temporal and social factors at the moment of the aesthetic evaluation of the artwork.699 This is 
illustrated by the requisite concept of art to recognize artworks, which places some form of 
personal history or tradition as precedent to the examination of the artwork. The integrity of 
an artwork is determined by its originality, which is a condition that influences an artwork’s 
capacity to produce meaning.700 The uniqueness of an artwork also results in its 
indetermination, assuring that its interpretation is perpetually open, especially in consideration 
of potential future evaluation. The significance that is produced by an artwork effectively 
transforms art objects into subjects. 701 This capacity of subject-object duality in artworks 
establishes them as true reflections of human limitation and agency, and connects aesthetic 
experience with self-knowledge. The social relations that externally condition artworks are 
coupled with the formal condition of art, which positions artworks under the same commodity 
logic of capitalist economics.702 While every artwork is a form of labour, however, artworks 
have a negative relation to use-value because of their indeterminate intentionality.703 This 
subversive economic functionality ensures that a critique of exchange-value—a deliberate 
uselessness—is fixed to the formal condition of artworks. The illusory independence from 
exchange-value provides a space for reflection on the nature of valuation, while establishing 
economic practice as a necessary social counterpoint for artistic significance.704 Threat of the 
loss of this unique artistic use-value, which would result in a paralysis of meaning production, 
assures that artistic practice is continually refreshing itself, with perpetual novelty as another 
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condition of contemporary art.705 The cycle of invention and entropy that results assures that 
avant-garde art practices continue to attempt the unknown while challenging the established 
tradition. An example of this can be found in Modern art history with the Russian 
Constructivists, who were part of a process of social rationalization in which art and society 
intended to become one for all.706 An art for all of the people by some of the people is 
naturally contradictory, which was demonstrated in the dissonance between political intention 
and formal achievement, and the incongruence between the ideals of production an realities of 
expression.707 One consequence of the failed Constructivist experiment is that the societal 
impracticality of artworks be reflected in their construction and unique autonomy, providing 
an origin story for the stipulation of the deliberate uselessness of artworks.708  
 As artworks are defined in relation to their social context,709 it is important to 
contextualize the present moment of artistic practice in relation to the aesthetic regime that 
establishes the historical scope of this thesis. ‘The fragment’ has helped to determine that all 
artworks are defined in relation to a precedent concept of art, which is subjectively 
understood through the personal experience and social education of the observer. As new 
artworks are made in relation and reaction to tradition, we can understand the motion from 
one movement to the next as historical paradigms dissipate and new ones establish collective 
acceptance. As the aesthetic regime replaced the representational regime, the traditions of 
media specificity and national importance began to disappear, making way for new 
methodologies in which multidisciplinary artworks and global conceptions of art developed. 
With new focus on subjective interpretation of artistic meaning, aesthetic thought liberated 
the practice of art in terms of both its production and reception, opening it up to the social 
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relations of everyday life. This has become ubiquitous in contemporary art practices, where 
social relations have tremendous importance on artistic significance. A multiplicity of 
possible influences now inform the practice of art, and Osborne denotes two specific lineages 
based on the aesthetics of Kant and the historical ontology of the Jena Romantics.710 The logic 
of ‘the fragment’ applies to the latter, which aligns itself with conceptual art practices that 
emphasize the importance of the artistic idea as opposed to the form. While the failure of a 
pure conceptual art demonstrated that both idea and form are essential elements of every 
artwork,711 there is a growing trend towards conceptualization within current artistic culture, 
which is evident in the procedural and relational emphasis of contemporary artworks. To 
acknowledge the importance of conceptual art, Osborne establishes the term ‘postconceptual 
art’ to propose a reconceptualization of historical nomenclature. Aside from eliminating the 
ambiguous term ‘contemporary art,’ the new historical lineage replaces the Modern/Post-
Modern opposition by affirming that the Modern epoch of art is still developing.712 The 
indeterminate nature of postconceptual artworks enables them to engage with existing 
systems and social constructs, embracing instability while establishing new external relations 
that generate innovative modalities for aesthetic experience. While this liberates artworks in 
terms of composition and temporal extension, artworks must still adhere to artistic tradition. 
While art movements come and go, the concept of art that grounds them is pervasive.  
 The series and the project are two familiar media formats of postconceptual art. 
Reflecting the indetermination of the ontology of ‘the fragment,’ the series allows artworks to 
be complete and yet incomplete,713 while the project focuses on the process and potential of 
artistic creation.714 In either case, series and projects expose the internal and external relations 
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that inform their beings as artworks. Series formally relate to the concept of information 
through their multiplicity of unique yet related units that must be immediately intelligible and 
intelligibly independent. Relating to communication, information connotes the external 
hetero-reference that instigates or maintains an interaction. Relating to development, the 
process of being information eradicates simple binary interpretations by placing importance 
on the innumerable relations and transformations in the moment.715 Both of these relations 
align information with states of indetermination, which associates them back to ‘the 
fragment.’ Furthermore, the series helps to demonstrate the nature of contemporary artworks 
in relation to their subjective and objective associations. Osborne uses this to determine the 
relational priority of postconceptual art in difference to a more aesthetic line of criticism that 
is founded in the tradition of Kant. The series and the project highlight the importance of 
integrity and relationships in the practice of contemporary art, which echo the 
internal/external separation that defines human life and aesthetic experience.716 Focusing on 
the procedural aspects of artistic practice, the project emphasizes the ways in which artworks 
and individuals are indeterminate.717 This is reflected in Kant’s aesthetic theory and the 
fluctuating movement from particular to universal, or subject to object, and the transcendental 
and temporal essence of artistic practice. In order to escape the trap of subject-world 
separation, Dasein provides us with a conception of life where being-in-the-world is 
implicitly unified.718 This allows us to conceive of artistic creation as a projection in terms of 
movement and potential.719 An art project is forever incomplete, demonstrating the inherent 
freedom of indetermination, and possibility as possibility.720 Their movement and inherent 
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potential allows projects to be conceived as living beings,721 as indeterminate and relational as 
our own individual lives. Life and art connect through the ontology of ‘the fragment,’ which 
unites artworks to the social tradition of art that defines them. 
 
5.4. Conclusion to Artworks / Art 
Life and Art 
 The parergon and ‘the fragment’ provide many interesting insights into how the 
practice of art and life are connected. Derrida’s exploration of the parergon highlights the 
inherent paradoxes that help to make Kant’s aesthetic theory so influential and intriguing. The 
opposition between material and form, which the parergon helps to isolate,722 establishes the 
entire tradition of artistic practice on the difference between natura and ars, the natural and 
the composed, or ontological objectivity and subjectivity. This distinction, which defines all 
artworks, is the same division that constitutes and determines our inter-objective situation as 
living human beings; natural bodies and active agents. Just as autopoietic operation on the 
molecular level functions in the absence of meaning, so too does the material component of 
artworks as experienced by other animals. The separation of subjective and objective 
perspectives parallels our existential condition of ‘being apart together’ as we identify our 
integral self in relation to society and the world around us. This clear relationship between 
exterior relations and integral structure reflects the nature of ‘the fragment,’ which makes it a 
useful analogy to connect the ontological functioning of artworks and the reflexive self-
conception of individual people.723 The logic rests on the coincident completeness and 
incompleteness of the formal structure of ‘the fragment,’ which is a part in relation to a group, 
but independent nonetheless in its singularity. The indeterminate nature of an artwork is a 
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result of its individuality, which assures that its interpretation is perpetually open,724 
especially in consideration of potential future evaluation. The ability to produce significance 
effectively transforms artworks into subjects.725 This subject-object duality in artworks 
establishes them as true reflections of human inter-objectivity, which provides aesthetic 
experience with an inherent potential for the revelation of self-knowledge. Through the 
concurrent limitation and agency of artworks, which can be conceived of finite form with 
infinite interpretability, our own limits and potentials are revealed. The complete/incomplete 
nature of ‘the fragment’ recognizes that all artworks are defined in relation to a precedent 
concept of art,726 which is subjectively understood through the personal experience and social 
education of the observer, and establishes a subjective understanding of tradition. Artworks 
connect to life through human thought and the conceptualization of art as a universal idea that 
is recursively passed down through generations. Considering the current culture of 
contemporary art, ‘the fragment’ reflects postconceptual practices by highlighting the 
combined importance of internal integrity and social relationships when evaluating 
artworks,727 which echoes the internal/external separation that defines human life and 
aesthetic experience. By focusing on the procedural aspects of artistic practice, art projects 
emphasize the perpetually indeterminate nature of both artworks and individuals.728 Dasein 
shows how the movement and inherent potential of projects allows them to be conceived as 
living beings that are just as incomplete and relational as our own lives.729 The concept of 
Dasein provides us with a conception of life where being-in-the-world is naturally unified, as 
opposed to the Kantian tradition where the subjects, objects and environments are separate.730 
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Exploring aesthetics in relation to the parergon and ‘the fragment’ helps us to appreciate how 
life and art are connected through the appreciation of artworks the social practice and tradition 
that defines them. 
 
Separation 
 The parergon and ‘the fragment’ make the separations of artistic practice evident 
through the contradictions, oppositions and paradoxes that are inherent to the current 
functionality of artistic creation and aesthetic experience. As an adjunct to an artwork, the 
parergon inherently demonstrates separation, and its “detachability” defines its function as 
supplement and ornament while reflecting the sporadic necessity of the faculty of judgement 
in relation to more common forms of thought, namely reason and understanding.731 Exploring 
the parergon in terms of position, its instability in reference to context and content reflects the 
implicit cognitive movement during aesthetic experience. Paralleling Lumann’s paradoxical 
form of observation, the parergon fluctuates between visibility and invisibility depending on 
the focus of the observer, appearing as part of the environment when focusing on the integrity 
of the artwork, but part of the artwork when focusing on the space in which the artwork is 
exhibited.732 This demonstrates the nature of the parergon, which functions like a contour line 
that separates figure from ground, or artwork from context. It is at once divisive and elusive, 
much like our consciousness. This nature is repeated in Kant’s aesthetic theory, which shifts 
focus between the content of the analysis and the theoretical frames that constrain it.733 It 
establishes an associative connection between the separate influences of external relations and 
integral identity as we compare ‘the fragment’ with artworks and self-knowledge. 
Considering the autonomy of artworks, negation is the methodology in which art separates 
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itself from other practices,734 which is usually accomplished through the subversion of 
collectively accepted social norms. The intentional perversion of use-value that artworks 
demonstrate ensures their distinction from other commodities, while constraining them to a 
condition of perpetual innovation in order to maintain their singularity and the meaning that it 
promises.735 Attempts to eradicate the separation between the practice of art and society at 
large have resulted in discord between political and artistic intention, and conflict between 
rational and expressive ideologies,736 which helps to establish the counter-cultural nature of 
artistic practice, which seems to necessitate distinction. This is evident in Osborne’s revision 
of Modernist taxonomy to found two interrelated lineages of artistic practice; an aesthetic 
focus based on the formal theories of Kant, and a conceptual focus founded on the historical 
ontology of the Jena Romantics.737 The logic of ‘the fragment’ applies to the latter, which 
aligns itself with conceptual art practices that place importance on the artistic idea as opposed 
to the form. The distinction of material and form is the separation that founds all art theory,738 
and connects the essence of art with life by reflecting our condition of being apart together. 
The parergon and ‘the fragment’ have helped to identify the fundamental separations through 
which artistic practice operates, such as material/form, subject/object, logical/illogical, 
visible/invisible, complete/incomplete, finite/infinite, content/container and figure/ground.  
 
Human Cognition / Aesthetic Thought 
 One of the most important contributions of Derrida’s article The Parergon is its 
revision and deconstruction of Kant’s aesthetic theory. Through an examination of The 
Critique of Judgement using the parergon, Derrida finds that Kant’s ordering (in terms of 
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organization, sequence and command) demonstrates hypocrisy within The Critique of 
Judgement between the use of logical theoretical structures for illogical (i.e. without concept) 
subject matter.739 This duplicity is further accentuated by the recursive adoption of the logical 
forms from previous theoretical texts, which are used to frame aesthetic theory.740 As an 
imposed theoretical structure, Kant’s reused schema becomes a parergon itself and suggests 
an internal lack at the heart of The Critique of Judgement.741 Highlighting the subjective 
position of the observer as imperative to determining the visibility and functionality of the 
parergon,742 we can appreciate how every aesthetic judgement is an act of framing that 
establishes the subject in relation to the artwork and the oppositions of aesthetic thought. ‘The 
fragment’ expands aesthetic theory by providing an ontological model to more thoroughly 
understand the paradoxical nature of artworks and subjectivity.743 It does so by resolving the 
problem of infinite regress, in which subjective knowledge is muddled by the inherent inter-
objectivity of the process of knowing oneself.744 By changing the supposed linear form of 
infinite regress into a circle, the Jena Romantics created a unity in which the infinite is 
finite,745 with the human subject reflected in the duality of corporal limitation and potential 
freedom. ‘The fragment’ also demonstrates how the integrity of an artwork is determined by 
its contextual conditions, which are established in relation to temporal and social factors at the 
moment of aesthetic evaluation.746 Art’s illusory independence from intentional functionality 
provides a space for reflection on the nature of valuation, establishing society as a 
counterpoint to artistic independence.747 With a new focus on subjective interpretation of 
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artistic meaning, aesthetic thought liberates art both in terms of its production and reception, 
while opening it up to the social relations of everyday life. The indeterminate nature of 
postconceptual artworks enables them to engage with existing social constructs and establish 
external relations that generate innovative modalities for aesthetic experience. The 
indeterminate nature of postconceptual artworks are reflected in the predominant use of the 
series, which demonstrates the ontology of the artwork through its inherent hetero- and self-
reference,748 and the project, which focuses on the procedural and relational aspects of artistic 
practice.749 The inherent movement implied in these media reflect the inter-objectivity of 
Kant’s aesthetic theory and the temporal essence of artistic practice, demonstrating how the 
parergon and ‘the fragment’ accentuate our understanding of aesthetic experience. 
 
Artworks 
 Our understanding of artworks is also broadened by the parergon and ‘the fragment,’ 
which directly relate them with the concept, practice and tradition of art. While the purpose of 
the parergon is to supplement or decorate an artwork, Derrida’s exploration of it shows how 
its supportive nature resolves an inherent lack and vulnerability of artworks.750 More than 
anything, parerga provide support and expressive possibilities to artworks, and while their 
structural nature is important, it is only by way of form that a parergon can become part of 
the artwork it adorns.751 Derrida highlights the omnipresence of the material/form opposition 
throughout The Critique of Judgement, which he concedes as a fundamental “conceptual 
schema” for all art theory. This entails pairing the irrational and illogical with the material—
which can also considered in terms of nature, chaos and disorder—and coupling the rational 
and logical with form—which can also be thought in terms of artifice, composition and 
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order.752 As we have seen, the transformation of material into form is coupled with the 
intentional subversion of functionality that an artwork embodies. This can be considered as a 
deceptive condition of artworks, which is evident in terms of their intentional uselessness but 
is compounded in terms of use-value and economics.753 The social relations that condition 
artworks externally are coupled with the formal condition of art, which positions artworks 
under the same commodity logic of capitalist economics.754 While every artwork is a form of 
labour, however, artworks have a negative relation to use-value because of their indeterminate 
intentionality.755 This subversive economic functionality ensures that a critique of exchange-
value—a deliberate uselessness—is fixed to the formal condition of artworks.756 Threat of the 
loss of this unique artistic use-value, which would result in the paralysis of meaning 
production, assures that artistic practice is continually refreshing itself, with perpetual novelty 
as yet another condition of contemporary art.757 The cycle of generation and destruction that 
results assures that avant-garde creative practices stimulate subjective uncertainty while 
challenging the established tradition. An artwork’s autonomy is determined by its singularity, 
which is a condition that influences an artwork’s capacity to produce meaning.758 Since the 
subjective base of aesthetic experience assures that its interpretation is perpetually open, the 
nature of an artwork is indeterminate as a result of its individuality, especially in light of 
potential future evaluation. In this way, the artwork is equated to ‘the fragment’ through its 
finite form but infinite possible interpretations.759 While both idea and form are essential 
elements of every artwork,760 there is a growing trend towards conceptualization within 
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758 Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, 85. 
759 Ibid., 60. 
760 Ibid., 49. 
 316 
artistic creation, which is evident in the procedural and relational emphasis of contemporary 
artworks. This is evident in the predominant use of the series and the project, two media 
formats that have become conventions of postconceptual art. In either case, series and projects 
expose the internal and external relations that inform their identity as artworks. Series 
formally relate to the concept of information through their multiplicity of unique yet related 
units that must be immediately intelligible and intelligibly independent.761 Osborne 
determines the relational priority of postconceptual art in difference to a more aesthetic line of 
criticism this is founded in the aesthetic tradition of Kant,762 and the series and the project 
both highlight the importance of contextual relationships in the generation of integral 
meaning. Dasein allows us to conceive of artistic creation as a projection in terms of 
movement and potential,763 and escape the inherent separation of subject, object and 
environment that Kant’s aesthetics implies. As a projection, an art project is forever 
incomplete like ‘the fragment’, demonstrating indetermination and the potential of 
possibility.764 Artworks are beings of promise, and the parergon and ‘the fragment’ help us to 
appreciate the paradoxes and conditions that make the impossible possible through the 
practice of art. 
 
Art, Society & Tradition 
 One of the most important functions of ‘the fragment’ is its ability to demonstrate the 
social relations that make the practice of art operate and the tradition of art possible. As we 
have seen, the integrity of an artwork is determined by its contextual conditions, which are 
established through temporal and social influences at the moment of aesthetic judgement.765 
                                                
761 Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, 62. 
762 Ibid., 48. 
763 Ibid., 171. 
764 Ibid., 173. 
765 Ibid., 44. 
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This is illustrated by the necessity of the concept of art to recognize artworks,766 which is 
established through experience and education and places some form of tradition as precedent 
to the examination of the artwork. As artworks are defined in relation to their social context, it 
is important to contextualize the present moment of artistic practice in relation to the aesthetic 
regime that founds the historical scope of this thesis. As new artworks are made in relation 
(and reaction) to tradition, we can understand the motion from one movement to the next as 
historical paradigms dissipate and new ones establish collective acceptance. As the aesthetic 
regime replaced the representational regime, the traditions of media specificity and national 
social importance began to disappear, making way for new practical methodologies in which 
the creation and experience of artworks developed.767 With the new focus on subjective 
interpretation of artistic meaning, aesthetic thought liberated art both in terms of its 
production and reception, while opening it up to the social relations of everyday life that 
informed it.768 This has become ubiquitous in contemporary art practices, where social 
relations have gained tremendous importance in establishing artistic significance. In order to 
acknowledge the important influence of conceptual art practices of the twentieth century, 
Osborne establishes the term ‘postconceptual art’ to reconfigure the historical nomenclature 
of Moderism. In addition to eliminating the temporally ambiguous confusion of the term 
‘contemporary art,’ the new historical lineage replaces the Modern/Post-Modern opposition 
by affirming that postconceptual art is still within the Modernist epoch.769 While 
postconceptual artworks are more liberated in terms of their material and temporal extension, 
they must still adhere to the tradition of art through the use of conventions. Focusing on the 
social relations that inform artistic meaning, postconceptual artworks blur the lines of what an 
autonomous art being might be. Nonetheless, they rely on the concept of art and the tradition 
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that is associated with it, which is used to distinguish an artwork from the context within 
which it exists. For the moment, the tradition of contemporary art is founded upon the 
transformation of material and the subversion of functionality, which provide artworks with a 
unique use-value that counterpoints society at large. The practice of art embodies and exposes 
the society from whence it came, reflecting the volatile potential of the lives it fills.  
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CHAPTER 6. PRACTICAL RESEARCH 
6.1. Introduction to Practical Research  
 This chapter considers two art projects of mine as forms of practical research into 
aesthetic separation and the reflection of life in art. The first artwork, “uncover RECOVER,’ is 
an ongoing project that began in 2011 and was recently exhibited as part of the group 
exhibition “OROI: Queda mucho pasado por delante”770 in Artium Museum in Vitoria-
Gasteiz, Spain. It involves the cultivation of medicinal plants using soil obtained from mass 
graves from the Franco dictatorship of Spain. While the artwork originated before I began my 
doctorate, it provides a relevant contextualization of current artistic strategies in relation to 
Rancière’s conception of aesthetic separation and Osborne’s conception a postconceptual 
ontology for artworks. The chapter itself is an article that will be published in the upcoming 
book titled Toward an Eco-social Transition: Transatlantic Environmental Humanities / 
Hacia una Transición Eco-social: Humanidades Medioambientales desde una 
perspectiva Transatlántica.771 Aside from exploring the political and social angles of 
Rancière and Nöe’s writing, the article offers insight into my creative process and acts as a 
counterpoint to the second artwork I will examine as practical research.  
 Cover Your Tracks was developed especially for this research project as a case study 
that would serve to investigate and experiment the theoretical research of the four previous 
chapters of my thesis. It involved the creation of Japanese dry garden installations within the 
Jardí Botànic de Barcelona (Botanical Gardens of Barcelona) that provoked an interaction for 
visitors to make and cover their footprints. While the artwork was inspired by my research—
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specifically the work of Derrida and Lacan as explored in Chapter 4.2.3.3. Subject of the 
Signifier—it is a logical extension my professional artistic career, and demonstrates numerous 
paths of potential artistic creation and criticism in relation to my research into aesthetic 
separation and the reflection of life in art.  
 
6.2. Changing Matter, Changing Minds 
6.2.1. The Transformative Potential of Art 
It’s a tricky task to reveal how an artwork might provoke a person to change, and there 
are many ways to explore how this transformation might function. As an artist, I focus on the 
manipulation of common materials in an effort to connect with people aesthetically and 
conceptually. I hope that somehow my innovative transformation of known materials will be 
recognized and felt, resulting in some kind of echo of alteration, promise of possibility or 
lasting impression. Rancière positions contemporary art in relation to everyday life by 
asserting that artists: “weave together a new sensory fabric by wresting percepts and affects 
from the perceptions and affections that make up the fabric of ordinary experience.”772 
Whether it’s Teresa Margolles creating a memento mori moment by blowing bubbles with 
water that had previously cleansed cadavers (In the Air, 2003)773, or Simon Starling 
cultivating live mussels on a Henry Moore sculpture to comment on colonialism (Infestation 
Piece, 2006-08)774, there is no shortage of contemporary artists mixing conceptually charged 
materials and life processes for politico-artistic purposes. But just how does this newly 
created sensory fabric affect people to change their minds and subsequent actions? 
Furthermore, if artworks are capable of inciting change, how can we as artists be assured to 
                                                
772 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 56. 
773 Teresa Margolles, In the Air, 2003. Art installation (water used to clean cadavers, soap, 
bubble machine). 
774 Simon Starling, Infestation Piece, 2006-08. Sculpture (steel replica of Henry Moore’s 
Warrior with Shield (1953-54) and zebra mussels), 157.5 x 73.7 x 83.8 cm.  
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provoke the changes we desire through the results of our creativity? To address these 
questions I will look to my own artistic practice and, in particular, a project called uncover 
RECOVER. I will employ contemporary art theory to help think through the mechanisms of 
this social art project and illustrate the transformative potential and limitations of artworks. 
Influencing through art is a pertinent capacity for the environmental humanities to command. 
My artistic practice is multidisciplinary in nature and focuses on the transformation of 
materials, ideas and people. I often work with a collage-inspired methodology of 
appropriating, manipulating, organizing and presenting. When I started making collages 
twenty years ago, I liked to think like a chef or a deejay: the better my ingredients or samples 
were, the better the final result would be. Over the years my practice has shifted from a 
formal, structural focus to incorporate the transformation of ideas or meaning that materials 
are capable of having. While I try not to limit myself in terms of media, my practice follows 
various lines of investigation related to the human body as it lives in terms of desire, conflict 
and freedom. An example of this material focus is one of my first ecologically based series 
titled Getting Back to Nature. Originally exhibited at pm Gallery in Toronto, the series depicts 
a feral giant investigating a highway service centre. The giant is naked and crawling on all 
fours as he manoeuvres around his environment. He leans down to smell the buildings amidst 
the bustling traffic and then lifts his leg to ‘mark his territory’ before running into the woods 
in the distance.  
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Image 1: Robert Waters, Getting Back to Nature 3. 2005, drawing with urine, balsamic 
vinegar and motor oil on paper, 28 x 76 cm. Private collection. 
 
When I made this series, I was concerned about the idea of nature being something that we 
had to drive to and I wanted to eliminate the perceived separation between humanity, our 
culture and nature. While the political message is obvious through what this series represents 
visually, it is fortified by a second layer of meaning that is hidden within its materials; urine, 
balsamic vinegar and motor oil. I wanted to reference the expression “piss and vinegar” with 
these unconventional materials, to connote an aggressive or rebellious energy.775 Combined 
with the motor oil, I sought to stimulate an added jolt of disgust, humour and understanding to 
anyone who was curious enough to read the information tag hanging next to the series. I 
wanted to provide the opportunity for viewers to look again at the images with a new 
understanding, one that was different from their first impression. While the traditional nature 
of my images makes them visually accessible, the conceptual leanings of my projects rely on 
knowledge that a viewer might or might not have, which largely depends on their personal 
context. While the expression “piss and vinegar” is quite common to English speakers, this 
reference would certainly be lost on Spanish speakers. As such, it is an artistic gamble to refer 
                                                
775 Miriam-Webster, “Piss And Vinegar | Definition of Piss And Vinegar by Merriam-
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(accessed September 6, 2019). 
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to the potential knowledge of a viewer in an artwork. Nonetheless, it is something I have 
explored in a variety of ways in my practice, enabling the potential for conceptual recognition 
to add or skew an initial reading of an artwork. The manipulation of known culture—using 
the knowledge of individuals as an artistic medium to play with—is something that continues 
to motivate me as an artist. 
 
6.2.2. Uncover RECOVER 
After moving from Canada to Spain nine years ago I began formulating a project that 
employed a similar strategy, using material that was charged with meaning to create an 
artwork. I was invited to participate in the “Praxis” exhibition series at Artium, the Basque 
museum of contemporary art in Vitoria-Gasteiz. In the short time I had been living in Spain I 
became intrigued by the Spanish Civil War and its ongoing aftermath as it related to ideas of 
‘political amnesty’ and ‘historical memory.’ I began attending lectures and exhibitions on the 
subject, which brought me in contact with Aranzadi, the scientific society that was helping to 
facilitate the exhumation process of mass graves across Spain. I was not familiar with the 
subject, which was and continues to be very divisive. It was noteworthy how most people 
with personal connections to the Spanish Civil War evaded speaking about the subject. Some 
think that the atrocities of the Franco dictatorship should be left buried in the past, while 
others believe that the exhumation process is a way of providing closure and restoring dignity 
for the families involved. As a foreigner my attention was drawn to the resistance to speak 
about this polarized subject. I was intrigued and disturbed by the stories of families torn apart 
by the Civil War and the lives cut short for having the “wrong” political opinion in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. I decided that I wanted to create a project that would offer a safe 
atmosphere for dialogue on the subject while providing me with a way of learning more about 
it directly from the community. I decided to use the soil from one of the mass graves of the 
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Spanish Civil War to cultivate medicinal herbs for the Spanish people. 
After explaining my project to Aranzadi I was invited to an exhumation site that was 
located in the outskirts of a village near Pamplona. It was there on a cold winter morning that 
I collected soil being removed with spades and brushes from the skeletons of bodies that had 
been buried in this unmarked grave roughly seventy years earlier.  
Image 2: Robert Waters, collecting soil from the mass grave at Oteiza de Berrioplano, 
Navarra, Spain. December 10, 2010. 
 
The team of Aranzadi scientists and archaeologists, which was largely comprised of students 
and volunteers, had heard about this grave from an elder in the village. As most of the 
locations of the graves were only known by elders it was important to act quickly before this 
knowledge was lost in the passing of a generation. In this case it wasn’t really a mass grave. 
There were only the remains of two bodies, which I later learned were two men supposedly 
related with the infamous ‘San Cristobal’ prison in Pamplona. After speaking with the crew I 
filled a bag with the soil that less than a century earlier had been living human flesh and I 
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returned to Vitoria-Gasteiz to begin the second phase of my project. 
In Artium, a week before the exhibition began, I prepared the soil in planters and 
germinated thirty-six varieties of medicinal plant seeds. I determined my list of plants by 
cross-referencing the Spanish book Plantas Medicinales776 and the seed product list from a 
local garden shop. As an important aim of the project was to memorialize the recuperation 
process after the war, I added ginkgo biloba to the list of autochthonous plants, since it has 
been proven to strengthen memory.777 I collected these seeds myself below the ginkgo tree in 
Santa Barbara Plaza in Vitoria-Gasteiz. Next to each planter in the makeshift museum 
greenhouse, I displayed information about the growing plants and how they could be used to 
heal people from a variety of ailments. To accentuate the appearance of a healing 
environment I set-up a waiting room in front of the greenhouse space where visitors could sit 
down and read texts about the recent exhumations and the work of the Association for the 
Recovery of Historic Memory. A ticking clock was prominently placed in this provisional 
waiting room to remind observers of the importance of time in processes of healing. At the far 
end of the greenhouse space, hanging above my gardening workstation, was a map with a pin 
that marked the location of the grave where I had obtained the soil. A map, soil, and flesh. 
Three different yet interconnected ways to define a nation.  
While the dark soil was the protagonist of the project at the beginning, the fresh green 
plants took over as they grew in variety and form over the course of the month, a shift of 
focus from death back to life. One of the founding concepts of the “Praxis” exhibition series 
was to showcase artists working in the museum space, and so I went there daily to water and 
care for the plants.  
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Image 3: Robert Waters, watering the medicinal plants at Artium, Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain. 
January 16, 2011. 
 
As implied by the title of the “Praxis” exhibition series, my active presence provided me the 
opportunity to speak with museum visitors as they entered the space, somewhat curious to 
find a functional greenhouse being cared for by a foreigner. I learned a great deal through 
various personal discussions, not only about the Spanish Civil War but also about the 
lingering pain that accompanies wilful silence and resultant feelings of ignorance, isolation 
and uncertainty. The final part of my project involved returning the plants back to the 
community, which was facilitated through an adoption process. In the waiting room there was 
a list for visitors to sign up if they were interested in taking care of the plants when the 
exhibition ended.  
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Image 4: Robert Waters, distributing the medicinal plants to their adoptive parents at Artium, 
Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain. March 30, 2011. 
 
This way, the soil and plants would be returned to the context from which they originated and 
could be used and enjoyed as their new caretakers saw fit. One of the most rewarding aspects 
of the project was receiving images of the plants growing in the homes and gardens of their 
adoptive parents, grounded once again in personal lives of the community.  
This full circle journey of transformation is the essence of uncover RECOVER. A 
human body, whose life was cut short by the violence of war, decayed and transformed into 
the soil of a country that continues to define itself. Into that soil I planted seeds, and with 
water and care the soil transformed into a provisional garden of medicinal plants. These 
plants, with distinct and innate healing properties, were gifted back to the community, 
providing an ancestral communion of sorts where lost lives were extended to help remedy the 
living. The ginkgo biloba, my favourite example, demonstrates the transformation of death 
back into life to help the living remember. It reflects the double meaning of the title uncover 
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RECOVER, which can be understood literally as removing and replacing a cover, but it also 
means discovering something new and healing as a result of it. This was my intention. To 
create a cyclical narrative that provided people with the space and opportunity to participate, 
share and heal. Art largely exists through the generation and reception of narratives, which 
stimulate people to reflect, to change and to grow. 
 
6.2.3. Artworks and Politics  
  Uncover RECOVER is not political simply because its inspiration and subject matter 
revolve around the Spanish Civil War. It can be argued that all artworks are inherently 
political thanks to their conception as artworks within society. I would like to use uncover 
RECOVER to explore some of the conditions that Rancière uses to connect artworks with 
political transformation, which ultimately relies on the ability of artworks to stimulate change 
on a personal level. Essentially, art is inherently political because it exists within people and 
through social relations, incorporating and questioning ideas of social norms and structures. 
Let’s look at how artworks work within people and society before exploring the capacity of 
artworks to transform individuals. 
 Despite our natural tendency towards separation, there are many things that we share 
as we live together within society. Rancière bases the relationship between aesthetics and 
politics on our shared sensation of the world around us, which includes both that which can 
and cannot be sensed. This inevitably depends on our context or situation in the world and 
how the things we sense are distributed and organized around us. There are ways in which we 
perceive the world in similar ways based on our needs and desires as human beings, but other 
ways in which our specific cultures ensure specialized perception and understanding within 
communities, or different levels of accessibility depending on position. In any case, Rancière 
insists that the political nature of art must be discussed and understood on the level of a 
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shared sensory fabric, which includes the shared perceptive capacities of a community and 
the ways in which its perception is understood and is structured.778 Politics, after all, exists in 
and through people in similar ways that art does.  
What is common is ‘sensation’. Human beings are tied together by a certain 
sensory fabric, a certain distribution of the sensible, which defines their way of 
being together; and politics is about the transformation of the sensory fabric of 
‘being together.’779  
 
When thinking specifically about uncover RECOVER, I was very conscious of the 
community as I developed the artwork. The Spanish Civil War is a perfect example of a 
polarized understanding of a shared experience, where a political opinion communicated in 
public could have easily resulted in murder. The silence that resulted from the vindictive 
violence of the war can still be felt to this day, a perfect example of how a lack of sensation 
can also register as being shared. As my intention was to shift the focus from conflict to 
healing, in developing my artwork I wanted to concentrate on things that united the 
community, to take a step back and show a bigger picture of what was common amongst 
those affected by the war. From the distant perspective of an uninformed Canadian, it was the 
precarity, suffering and death of all involved that became the common thread for my project. 
As a foreigner I could avoid the necessity of taking a political side and more easily lift the 
conversation to a level of neutrality, which would certainly be more difficult for a Spaniard. 
An artistic context also helped to consolidate a space of neutrality, as sensations or opinions 
are commonly considered and discussed in art spaces without incident due to the subjective 
nature of the conversations. 
The basis of Rancière’s logic that unites aesthetics with politics lies in our paradoxical 
state of being connected and separated simultaneously. We easily understand ourselves as 
individuals, yet at the same time could never exist entirely as such. Rancière defines this 
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situation as ‘being apart together’ and claims that the tensions that result from such a state 
extend into the practice of art, specifically in the distinction between the production and the 
enjoyment of an artwork.780 At the root of artistic practice (creation and appreciation) there is 
a disconnection between artist and spectator, which is paralleled in an incoherence of 
intention that defines our current understanding of art. Alva Nöe notes one result of this 
absence of purpose by shifting art from a thing to a practice. “Art isn’t a phenomenon to be 
explained. It is, rather, a mode or activity of trying to explain.”781 Nowadays, artworks 
contingently possess an incoherence of purpose as their original significance in religious, 
festive, aristocratic and decorative history has long disappeared.782 This lack of purpose in art 
echoes Kant’s negation of using determinant judgements during aesthetic experience, since 
universal concepts of purpose cannot be used to judge beauty nor art.783 The result of this 
condition of disconnection between artwork and context, and artwork and purpose, is a form 
of artistic freedom where subjective judgements made by individuals are the only valid type 
of aesthetic evaluation. Nöe helps to clarify while corroborating Rancière’s ideas:  
Art investigates or exposes by destabilizing. Art, I have urged, is a 
philosophical practice. One upshot of this approach is that anything can be art, 
but nothing, at least by virtue of its intrinsic nature, is guaranteed to be. Art is 
always relational and contextual.784 
 
For uncover RECOVER I wanted to take aspects from the context of everyday life and 
transform them into an artwork, but not necessarily one that exists physically. For me it was 
more interesting to create an artwork that would exist through and amongst people and 
relations. The “Praxis” exhibition series was intended to (re)connect spectators with the 
creative processes of artists, and as such I was conscious of making the project accessible 
from the start. I started gathering my “materials” by researching ideas, concepts and meanings 
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from my new surroundings, and I began playing with how I might transform them into an 
artwork that would at once stimulate and shift the focus of the discussion about the war. One 
important contextual disjunction of note is the time that had passed since Franco’s death and 
Spain’s transition to democracy, which began roughly thirty-five years ago, providing a 
much-needed cushion to broach such an incendiary topic. While there were many distinct 
professional fields involved in my project (anthropology, history, medicine, and botany), it 
was their novel combination and contextual disjunction that resulted in artistic affect. As 
isolated fields with specific contexts and purposes there is little ‘art’ to be found, but by 
extending and blending the fields their meanings become subverted through the poetry of 
imagination. As Rancière has described: “Many contemporary artists no longer set out to 
create works of art. Instead, they want to get out of the museum and induce alterations in the 
space of everyday life, generating new forms of relations.”785 In my case, I brought various 
non-art practices into the museum and organized them in such a way that their individual 
dispositions generated new significance by relating and functioning collectively. 
 While matter was obviously transformed on a physical level during my project, it is 
the conceptual restructuring of matter through various disciplines that catalyzes my artwork 
within the imagination of an audience. The series of transformations of everyday life (from 
dead bodies to soil to medicinal plants to living people) is a means through which freedom 
can be experienced in the imagination of the spectator. While this process happens on an 
individual basis, it can be imagined as being similar for everyone. Amplifying the aperture of 
the project from one specific field or topic to a more generalized view of various 
interrelationships positioned it as being both elevatory and alleviatory in nature, despite being 
based on such harsh realities. Instead of focusing on the inherent political divisions of war, 
uncover RECOVER offered a coherent joint perspective of the situation from a distance. Here 
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the decontextualization of the elements involved can be seen as a strategy for both disarming 
the strong negative emotions that are associated with the Spanish Civil War, and leading 
towards reflection and personal transformation within spectators. Aligning personal 
transformation with the political potential of art, Rancière states:  
Aesthetic experience has a political effect to the extent that the loss of 
destination it presupposes disrupts the way in which bodies fit their functions 
and destination. … It is a multiplication of connections and disconnections that 
reframe the relation between bodies, the world they live in and the way in 
which they are ‘equipped’ to adapt to it. It is a multiplicity of folds and gaps in 
the fabric of common experience that change the cartography of the 
perceptible, the thinkable and the feasible.786  
 
By composing various elements related to war and peace, trauma and healing, and death and 
life, uncover RECOVER enabled the audience to perceive the Spanish Civil War in a different 
way, one that hadn’t been considered before. By empowering a novel perspective, or by 
offering a new—albeit imagined—position, we can begin to understand how art is inherently 
political. Artworks allow us to see the world differently and thus organize ourselves 
distinctly, creating the possibility for potential new community relations to emerge.  
Despite the capacity of artworks to shift the common experience of political life, there 
is an underlying limitation to art’s political effect. The inherent disjunctions of art, be they 
contextual or functional, imply that an artwork can never guarantee a specific political result 
since there is no direct relationship between cause and effect.787 The desires of the artist, 
political or otherwise, have little influence on how an artwork is experienced and understood 
by an individual, especially in the absence of the artist. People think what they want about 
artworks despite artistic intention. Furthermore, intentionally politicizing artworks is 
tantamount to giving them a purpose, which endows them with a determinant concept against 
which they can be judged. This not only undermines the possibility of judging them 
aesthetically, but it also infringes upon their inherent freedom as artworks. As such, the 
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creation or use of art as a political tool with specific goals should be carefully considered 
since the results can neither be guaranteed nor measured.788  
This doesn’t mean that artworks cannot be used towards educating or promoting the 
environmental humanities and a more ecological conception of the world. It simply means 
that in order to do so, it is important to consider how artworks affect and transform people. 
Nöe places the practice of art alongside the practice of philosophy: “Art aims at the disclosure 
of ourselves to ourselves and so it aims at giving us opportunities to catch ourselves in the act 
of achieving perceptual consciousness—including aesthetic consciousness—of the world 
around us.”789 He believes that artworks allow people to transform by providing them with 
unknown situations in which they can reflexively see and understand themselves, providing 
unique opportunities which otherwise wouldn’t be possible.790 In effect, artworks are 
inherently political because they give us the opportunity to encounter ourselves in unfamiliar 
thought and reflection, which provokes a reflexive repositioning.  
We start out not seeing what is there. But by looking and interrogating and 
challenging, we come to see it. The work challenges us to reorganize our 
seeing, our expectations, and our thinking. The work of art, like that of 
philosophy, is the reorganization of ourselves. And this reorganization, this 
work, aims also at understanding.791  
 
Uncover RECOVER demonstrated the transformative potential of art physically and 
conceptually through the transformation of material and its meaning. By providing an 
alternative ending for victims of fascism I aimed to inspire the living and rouse conversation 
on a difficult yet significant topic. Instead of having a specific political goal, my project 
aimed to create a novel space for imagination and dialogue, which in turn might stimulate a 
reformation of the political. Transforming the sensory fabric means disconnecting people 
from the ordinary relations that structure their lives and proposing alternative visions that re-
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establish understanding in extraordinary ways. By shifting our standard experience of context 
and purpose, artworks catalyse free thought and help to unlock impossible futures. While the 
novelty and uncertainty that artworks transmit facilitate an awareness and potential 
reassessment of self, the political efficacy of artworks is never certain. Nevertheless, if war 
has taught us anything it’s that people loathe being manipulated or told what to do from 
external sources. An artist’s true work, then—if they have political aspirations—is to plant 
seeds of change that will take root and blossom from within.  
 
6.3. Cover Your Tracks 
6.3.1. Introduction to Cover Your Tracks 
 This chapter describes and explores the art project Cover Your Tracks, which was 
developed in relation to the theoretical research of this thesis into aesthetic separation and the 
reflection of life in art. The chapter begins with a description of the artwork, which involved 
the installation of three Japanese karesansui dry gardens within the Jardí Botànic de 
Barcelona (Botanical Gardens of Barcelona). The description is followed by a theoretical 
contextualization of the project in relation to my research, and is divided to reflect the four 
main chapters of this thesis; Life / Context; Thought / Self; Human Beings / Intention; and, 
Artworks / Art. A final evaluation will examine the project and propose ways in which it 
might be transformed or extended for future exhibition. In conclusion, Cover Your Tracks is 
found to be an art project that successfully engaged with participants and demonstrated the 
importance of context in establishing artistic significance. 
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6.3.2. Project Description 
6.3.2.1. Physical and Ideological Summary 
Cover Your Tracks began development in 2017 and was exhibited in the autumn of 
2018 in the Jardí Botànic de Barcelona (Botanical Gardens of Barcelona). The art project was 
comprised of three Japanese dry gardens located on walking paths throughout the grounds. 
The framed, shallow dry gardens blocked the visitors’ intended paths, inviting them to 
traverse the raked surface of the dry garden and participate in the creation and erasure of 
marks, before continuing with their garden visit. In addition to the natural elements that 
composed the dry gardens (wood and sand), the artwork employed language and technology 
in their engagement with the public, which was intended to exemplify the inherent 
functionality of artworks (mimetic, social and symbolic) while highlighting the cognitive 
capacities that distinguish human beings from other animals. As an artificial construction 
within a botanical setting, the project provided an important counterpoint between natural and 
artificial elements, a condition that every artwork must inherently display. Furthermore, 
through the irrational placement of dry gardens within a botanical garden, Cover Your Tracks 
demonstrated the importance of context—both physical and conceptual—in facilitating the 
generation of artistic meaning, while also alluding to the inherent subversion of artworks. 
Although simple in composition, Cover Your Tracks is a reverential examination of the 
relationships and processes that make artworks function as art, highlighting the experiential 
process and reflective thought that make the practice of art truly sensational.  
 
6.3.2.2. Formal Description 
 The artwork Cover Your Tracks was encountered by visitors to the Jardí Botànic de 
Barcelona (The Botanical Gardens of Barcelona) during November and December of 2018. It 
was located in three distinct locations within the garden, situated on the winding geometric 
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paths that visitors use to navigate their visit. Each installation consisted of a Japanese 
‘karesansui’ dry mountain garden that was built using a low wooden frame that was filled 
with sand and completely covered one section of the cement pathway. To the side of each 
installation there was a sign that contained the silhouette image of a person raking and a text 
that read, “Cover Your Tracks” in Catalan, Spanish and English. There was a wooden 
karesansui rake next to each installation as well, which is distinguishable by its triangular 
teeth that leave ripple patterns when raking a dry garden. The installations were situated on 
secondary pathways in three separate climate zones of the Jardí Botànic, and were filled with 
different colours of sand to reflect their respective temperate locations and the botany that 
flourished around them. In the entrance to the Jardí Botànic there was a pamphlet about the 
project that explained its basic physical and conceptual components. At the end of the 
exhibition, all of the installation materials were reused by the Jardí Botànic for their regular 
horticultural responsibilities. 
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Image 5: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Installation 1), 2018, Jardí Botànic de 
Barcelona, Spain. 
  
 
Image 6: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Installation 1, Group Visit), 2018, Jardí Botànic 
de Barcelona, Spain. 
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Image 7: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Installation 2), 2018, Jardí Botànic de 
Barcelona, Spain. 
 
 
Image 8: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Installation 2, Visitor Raking), 2018, Jardí 
Botànic de Barcelona, Spain. 
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Image 9: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Installation 3), 2018, Jardí Botànic de 
Barcelona, Spain. 
 
 
Image 10: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Installation 3, Visitor Walking), 2018, Jardí 
Botànic de Barcelona, Spain. 
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Image 11: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Installation Map), 2018, Jardí Botànic de 
Barcelona, Spain. 
 
 
Image 12: Robert Waters, Cover Your Tracks (Pamphlets), 2018, Jardí Botànic de Barcelona, 
Spain. 
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6.3.2.3. Experiential Description 
Visitors are confronted with a decision when they encounter the three Cover Your 
Tracks dry garden installations, which completely cover and block the walking path they are 
situated on. Do visitors turn around and go a different way in order to continue, do they leave 
the path—which is forbidden according to the Jardí Botànic de Barcelona—and walk around 
the installation, or do they traverse the dry garden in front of them? If they decide to walk 
across it, disrupting the undulating wave pattern in the sand and marking it with their 
footprints, they are confronted with yet another decision once they are across; do they obey 
the sign and cover their tracks, or do they leave them there for the next visitor to find? If they 
decide to cover their tracks, even more decisions confront them; do they use the rake provided 
to cover their tracks, and if so, how do they rake the garden? Do they follow the existing 
pattern that they encountered, or do they make a new pattern by raking in different directions? 
These physical and contemplative elements form the basis of the site-specific installation 
Cover Your Tracks, and while it is quite simple in its formation there are many considerations 
and associations that result from its contemplation. 
The installation functions as a social artwork by subverting an important institutional 
convention that controls visitor interaction within public garden settings. Similar to the 
common rule that artworks are not to be touched in a gallery setting, it is understood that 
visitors to a public garden are not supposed to touch the plants or stray from the path unless 
granted permission by a figure of authority. In the case of both the gallery and the garden, a 
good visitor is an observer who makes as little impact on the exhibition content as possible, 
and this is best accomplished by maintaining visitors separate from artworks and plant life. 
This is the reason why paths are clearly marked, little fences are installed, or in the case of a 
gallery, lines are marked on the floor. With Cover Your Tracks, however, visitors are 
encouraged to ‘break the rules’ and interact with both artwork and garden in an unusual way. 
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This invitation to deviate from the norm—to actively participate with the work by walking 
across and raking the dry garden—is intended to make visitors feel self-conscious. Am I 
being watched? Is someone watching me? This question no doubt influences the visitor’s 
decision to avoid or interact with the installation, and returns the act of external observation 
back to the subject who is doing the observing. The state of being observed and followed is 
the main impetus for covering your tracks in the first place. It’s a simple act that is intended to 
deceive a pursuant and return the subject to a relaxed state of neutrality, without being 
observed or pursued. Successfully covering your tracks in the installation means that the 
evidence of a visitor breaking the rules is erased, liberating the visitor from any regulatory 
repercussions and restoring their sensation of freedom. All that remains is the brief 
recollection of making marks and covering them—a brief moment of attention in which 
situations were evaluated, decisions were made, and interactions were emphasized—in the 
memory of the visitor.  
 
6.3.3. Theoretical Contextualization 
6.3.3.1. Life / Context 
 There are many ways in which the artwork Cover Your Tracks reflects the theoretical 
topics explored in Chapter 2. Life / Context, in which I contextualize autopoiesis in relation to 
art and the key concepts that Rancière applies to define aesthetic separation. Let’s quickly 
review these topics, which include processes (transformation, organization), capacities 
(observation, contextualization) and distinctions (time, difference, lack), to critically engage 
with the artwork Cover Your Tracks and to try to clarify the concept of aesthetic separation 
and the reflection of life in art. The theory of autopoiesis provides a clear distinction between 
the molecular functioning of biological life and the existential perception of individual lives. 
The distinction and connection between the physical and the epistemological conceptions of 
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human life are taken into account in relation to the material and formal considerations that 
inform the significance of artworks. The result is a broad exploration that highlights the 
subjective conception of Cover Your Tracks in relation to an objective understanding of the 
functioning of life and the experience of art.  
 Cover Your Tracks demonstrates various moments of transformation that parallel the 
processes of life as defined by autopoiesis. To begin with, the project was conceived, installed 
and removed in a way that mirrors the cycle of life. Materials were transformed in order to 
construct the installations that comprised the artwork, and transformed once again after the 
exhibition into non-artistic materials that the garden reused. The concept of the karesansui 
garden and its contemplative tradition was also transformed by making it a participative and 
interactive garden, which is not usually the case.792 The experience of the project by 
individual visitors also demonstrates the processual nature of life, with marked steps that 
provide the encounter with a beginning, middle and end. The transformation of sense 
(sensation) to sense (reason) was also evoked in potential participants since the situation 
needed to be interpreted and assessed before the project was engaged with. The change in 
sensation from walking on the cement path to walking on the sand provided a chance of 
reflectivity, where the objective nature of the body that left the marks could be felt in tune 
with the subjective self that sensed the sand shifting beneath the body. There was a double 
transformation of marks as footprints were pressed into the sand and then covered with the 
pull of the rake, leaving the surface in a similar yet distinct state. This reflects the 
transformation of individuals who participated in the project, who are similar yet unique after 
their experience of this singular event. While the setting, materials and even the dry garden 
may have been known beforehand, the specific situation and provocation that Cover Your 
Tracks presented provided an inevitable shift in thought and consciousness. As minimal and 
                                                
792 Sophie Walker, The Japanese Garden, (London, U.K.: Phaidon Press, 2017), 182. 
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fleeting as these alterations may be, the experience is subjectively transformative for the lives 
of the visitors who left and covered their tracks in the sand. 
 Cover Your Tracks utilized and highlighted acts of organization that position it in line 
with the organizational acts of life. On a material level, the installations are organized to 
mimic Japanese dry gardens, utilizing cut wood that is joined to create a frame which is filled 
with sand. Both the wood and sand that form the dry garden are transformed from their 
natural states, with the wood being cut and positioned in line with the cement pathways and 
the sand being prepared with the special karesansui rake. The project was organized to fit in 
with the botanical gardens by mimicking institutional conventions, with a professionally 
composed information panel installed beside the dry garden, next to a custom-made rake. 
Considering Nöe’s organizational theory of art (see Chapter 2.3.5. Organization), Cover Your 
Tracks demonstrates the ways in which we as humans organize and are organized. Gardening 
is a basic human activity, as we care for the environments in which we live and tend to the 
natural spaces around us. As a second-order organized activity, we create gardens and garden 
pathways in order to arrange the natural world to our liking, and Cover Your Tracks uses this 
practice to reflect back on our organizational nature of nature. In relation to social 
organization, the artwork highlights the ways in which we are organized in institutional 
settings, with unwritten social rules that condition our behaviour. It the forest you wouldn’t be 
concerned about stepping off the trail or pulling a leaf from a tree, but this is not the case in a 
botanical garden. By tempting visitors to break collectively accepted rules, Cover Your Tracks 
calls attention to the ways in which we are organized socially and institutionally.  
 The institutional context of the botanical garden is the perfect location to explore the 
relationship between art and life. Although the project doesn’t incorporate any living 
beings—aside from the human beings who participate in its creation—the context of the 
garden provides the perfect counterpoint in which non-living and living, unorganized and 
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organized, can be compared. As an artwork that exists outside of a traditional artistic context, 
Cover Your Tracks fits the categorization of contemporary artworks that Rancière was 
speaking of when he wrote “Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community.” As a 
postconceptual artwork, the socially-engaged nature of Cover Your Tracks uses a lot of 
institutional conventions that connect it with artistic practice nonetheless. This was primarily 
facilitated by the information pamphlet that was available at the entrance to the botanical 
gardens—the parergon of the project—as well as the inclusion of the project in the 
programming of a conference on Japanese gardens. While mimicking the conventions of 
instituional signage, the project functioned as an artwork by being out of context, as explored 
in relation to the work of Nöe in Chapter 4.3.4. Function. Not only are the Japanese dry 
gardens that comprise the installations out of context nationally, but the location of the 
installations on garden paths is also out of place. As part of a contemplative tradition,793 
karesansui gardens are tended to by professionals before and after the public has access to 
them, which makes the human interaction of Cover Your Tracks another way in which 
convention is subverted in the name of art. By being out of context, Cover Your Tracks helps 
visitors to contexualize themselves in the midst of nature and artifice, and as an active agent 
in the creation of nature and artifice. As a man-made space with living elements, the botanical 
gardens is a logical place to find a karesansui garden, which helps to negate a preconception 
of its artistic intention and create a sense of uncertainty regarding its placement and use. In a 
different context this might not be the case because it would more obviously call attention to 
its illogical placement. This helps to demonstrate how acts of contextualization of artworks in 
relation to their environment plays an important role in establishing the significance of the 
work. Installing Cover Your Tracks in a gallery setting would change it most profoundly by 
eliminating the uncertainty and subversive invitation that the context of the botanical gardens 
                                                
793 Walker, The Japanese Garden, 184. 
 346 
activates, combining natural and artificial elements as gracefully as an artwork combines 
material and form. 
 In both botanical gardens and art galleries, observation is the principal intention and 
activity of visitors. As described in autopoietic theory, observation occurs on the molar level 
of biological functionality where cognition enables an organism to engage with its 
environment as a whole entity. In the case of human beings, that entity is conceived of as the 
self. While biological processes occur in the absence of meaning on the molecular level of 
life, the consciousness we have at the molar level of life provides our interactions in the world 
with significance, which is a main intention and consequence of visiting gardens and 
museums. Institutionally speaking, exhibitions follow a logic of intentionality that allows 
visitors to more clearly understand and enjoy their visit. While Cover Your Tracks 
incorporates the existing tradition of karesansui gardens, the intentionality of their location is 
called into question when visitors find them blocking their intended passage through the 
gardens, a simple subversion that moves them into the realm of art. As an artwork that briefly 
transformed materials and lasted very little time, the artistic intentionality of Cover Your 
Tracks can also easily be called into question. As described earlier, my intention in 
developing Cover Your Tracks was to create a simple participative artwork that explored the 
thresholds of art and allowed me to practically explore my theoretical research. As autopoiesis 
has taught us, intentionality is a way of attributing significance to our interactions in the 
world, and the significance of Cover Your Tracks is largely unfolding as this academic thesis 
progresses. Nonetheless, we have already explored how the intentionality of artworks as 
described by the artist is never definitive and needs to be scrutinized. Moving from the topic 
of intentionality back to observation, Cover Your Tracks helps to illustrate art as a system of 
communication. Every artwork is produced to be observed, according to Luhmann, which 
makes them a form of indirect communication and their aesthetic experience the “observation 
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of an observation” (see Chapter 2.3.5. Observation). This is unlike the direct observation of 
natural phenomenon, such as the vegetative and geological contents of a botanical garden, 
which lack communicative capabilities on their own. It is through the observation of formal 
composition that indicates whether an object is produced by humans or not, and has the 
potential for communicative meaning. Through the recognition of artificiality we distinguish 
works of art, which exist in an intermediate and fluctuating position between material and 
form. Cover Your Tracks both displays and questions this interstitial position and our ability 
to recognize and distinguish between what is natural and what is not. The context of the 
botanical gardens, which is a man-made ordering of plant species for the use of humans, is a 
perfect reflection of the combination of natural material and artificial form that artworks 
inherently display. The act of distinction itself separates the observer from the thing being 
observed, and this divisive act is something I wanted to highlight by having the active 
participation of visitors as an integral element of my artwork. Luhmann’s conception of 
observation in relation to distinction further confounds the appraisal of artworks by 
connecting it with paradox, since the distinction of anything automatically connects it to 
everything that isn’t included in the distinction. For example, as you are distinguishing Cover 
Your Tracks you are not focusing on the plants around it and yet they are connected as an 
invisible negative reference to the distinction of the artwork. The repeated act of making 
tracks and covering tracks is a way of making the visibility/invisibility opposition that 
informs artworks tangible. This is consolidated by the contemplative nature of the karesansui 
garden tradition, which confounds any singular conception of scale or temporality of the 
garden.794 What can be seen or known by one person at any one time is limited, and the 
Japanese dry garden landscape helps to make this observational limitation manifest.795 Cover 
Your Tracks demonstrates the nature of observational limitation by fluctuating between being 
                                                
794 Walker, The Japanese Garden, 184. 
795 Ibid. 
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a garden or an artwork depending on your perception of it. In either case, the observation 
must be made. It is not a passive event, and through its activation the subjectivity and life of 
the observer becomes manifest.   
 Cover Your Tracks reflects our temporal conception of life through its experiential 
nature. Shifting from absence to presence to absence, the process of encountering the dry 
garden, making tracks in it and then erasing them is an extremely reduced reflection of birth, 
life and death. The frame of the dry garden marks the beginning and the end of the artistic 
experience, from the first step on the sand to the last pull of the rake. While experiencing 
Cover Your Tracks, attention is inevitably focused on the present moment; on the feeling of 
the sand as it presses beneath our feet, on the sound of the rake as it scrapes across the dry 
garden surface. When initially confronted with the installation, visitors evaluate the situation 
using memory that helps to identify the Japanese dry garden, perhaps associating it with 
sandboxes that we used to play with in our childhood. When making decisions about 
interacting with the installation, visitors anticipate the potential consequences of their actions, 
imagining possible futures. In relation to the horizon of expectation, Cover Your Tracks 
demonstrates the paradox of limitless potential within a limited form. As a blank canvas of 
sorts, the dry garden can be manipulated by the visitor in an unlimited number of ways, 
providing an indefinite amount of possibility. As a visitor, however, endurance places limits 
on the amount of time that can be spent engaging with the artwork, not to mention the time 
restrictions of the botanical gardens and the limited existence of the artwork. Attention on 
interacting with Cover Your Tracks is inescapably distracted at some point in time and the 
viewer moves on to focus their attention once again on their garden visit. The installation is 
left behind them as a memory, awaiting future visitors and future instantiations. 
 The acts of differentiation that separate life from non-life and subjects from the world 
around them are reflected in the artwork Cover Your Tracks. Using karesansui dry gardens as 
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a principal inspiration and manifestation of the project, the inert materials that compose the 
installation form a drastic contrast to the living plant life that form the Jardí Botànic. The once 
living wood elements of the dry garden, which include the garden frame and the karesansui 
rake, help to further contrast the connection between living and dead materials. The dry 
gardens come to life thanks to human intervention, which places the focus on the traces of 
organization and participation that the installations hide out of principle. The frame, signage 
and rake are the most obvious elements that differentiate the artwork from nature, and yet 
they all follow the institutional conventions of gardening and thus easily dissolve into the 
organizational infrastructure of the botanical gardens. The raked sand within the garden 
frames both demonstrates and hides human interaction, mimicking the undulating waves of 
water or the patterns of dunes while covering the tracks of the people who created them. Upon 
encountering the installation with the sand neatly raked, one is left with the impression that 
they are the first person to find it. As this is the same sensation for everyone, the installation 
aptly conveys the feeling of ‘being apart together’ that Rancière uses to found his theory of 
aesthetic separation. Visitors interact with the artwork individually, and yet they form an 
unknown collective through their shared experience of it. In relation to autopoiesis, the state 
of individuals being together apart as they couple with their environment is also emphasized 
by Cover Your Tracks, which shifts the external focus of the garden visit to the internal 
sensations that the interaction creates. This differentiation between objective and subjective 
focus helps to bring the internal/external division of personal identity into consciousness for 
participants with the artwork. This act of separation is something that we actively do as living 
beings, and our identity as people is created as we become conscious of this divide. As 
visitors interact with Cover Your Tracks, their subjectivity and objectivity collide as reflexive 
thoughts are externalized through physical action, and vice versa. For a brief moment, acts of 
differentiation are suspended and we become one with nature and art.  
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 Life, from an autopoietic perspective, is a persistent state of lack that motivates 
intentionality and interaction. Rancière states that artworks are made in view of a people who 
are lacking, which implies a people yet to come but also an incomplete people. Cover Your 
Tracks not only waits for people to arrive but it also helps to complete them, to fill them up 
with something that they are missing. Emotions of surprise or uncertainty, thoughts of 
engagement and anticipation, sensations of earth giving way and muscles tensing, and 
feelings of pleasure and satisfaction. As a means of emphasizing subjectivity, the installation 
provides a reflexive moment of connection with the self as visitors actively experience the 
artwork. This provides a counterpoint in which all of the main topics of this chapter have the 
potential to become manifest, connecting the individual life of one person to the underlying 
functionality of life in general. Transforming and being transformed, organizing and being 
organized, observing and contextualizing, differentiating and coordinating, and appreciating 
the inevitable influence of time and lack on our lives. Through our experience of their unique 
existence, artworks allow us to see to feel ourselves in ways that would otherwise not be 
possible. As if reflecting our human existence, artworks themselves are inherently lacking. As 
mentioned, Cover Your Tracks demonstrated lack in its patient anticipation of visitors to 
encounter and engage with it. While the installation is encountered in a state of apparent 
termination, the act of walking across the dry garden returns it once again to an indeterminate 
state, until it is raked and returned to the state of peaceful tranquillity in which it was first 
encountered. The opposite, however, is the actual case, as the perfectly raked garden waits in 
indetermination until it is determined by being walked upon. Leaving tracks in the sand is 
tantamount to leaving a fingerprint which identifies a singularity, which runs counter to the 
deceptive neutrality of the intended first impression of a perfectly raked garden surface. The 
image of the perfectly raked karesansui garden is the recognizable concept upon which the 
first impression of Cover Your Tracks is based. While Kant stipulates that reflective thought 
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must lack concepts in order to be judged aesthetically, I would argue that the artistic 
functioning of Cover Your Tracks is not based on the recognition of the garden but rather the 
pleasure that is felt as visitors interact with it. The sensation of an unexpected encounter, sand 
underfoot and evidence erased. The other element of lack that Kant obliges for an experience 
to become aesthetic is the indifference towards the objective source of the sensations, which 
Cover Your Tracks facilitates through its basic materials and simple existence, little for 
anyone to desire. Through indifference towards the artwork, the sensations that are felt 
through its experience move to become subjectively universal, once again evoking the state of 
‘being together apart’ and collapsing the distinction between the subject/object opposition. In 
this way, Cover Your Tracks provides a brief moment of communion that settles the 
disconnection we generate as we navigate our supposedly isolated lives.  
 In conclusion, the processes, capacities and distinctions that are inherent to the 
functioning of life as defined by autopoiesis provide a thorough structure to evaluate the 
aesthetic experience of the art project Cover Your Tracks. The operation of transformation is 
obvious in the construction of the artwork, which uses basic materials to create a series of 
contextually misplaced karesansui dry gardens. Transformation is also an active part of the 
experience of the installation, which provokes the creation and erasure of footprints, and a 
shift in consciousness and awareness of self as the interaction with the dry garden in the 
context of the Jardí Botànic de Barcelona occurs. The act of organization is relevant to a 
critique of Cover Your Tracks, which demonstrates the ways in which we organize and are 
organized by the world around us, connoting our existence as both subjects and objects. As a 
composition of organized materials and concepts, the dry garden installations draw attention 
to the activity of ordering the natural world to our liking. Furthermore, its location within an 
institutional setting and provocation to act against the norm calls attention to the ways in 
which we are socially organized. The context of Cover Your Tracks helps to highlight the 
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conventions that make art function differently from other practices, especially through the 
oppositions of nature and art, and material and form. Positioning the installations to block the 
natural progression of garden visitors makes the artwork function ‘out of context,’ provoking 
visitors to interact with the garden in ways that break with the karesansui tradition and the 
moral expectations of regular garden visits. Cover Your Tracks demonstrates the active nature 
of observation that functions to separate the observer from the observed, and the observed 
from the not-observed. The subtle nature of the artwork makes its distinction as art difficult, 
but when observed as an observation, the communicative play of Cover Your Tracks becomes 
clear, especially in comparison with the uncertain distinction between nature and artifice that 
botanical gardens inherently display. As an artwork that exists through repeatedly creating 
and covering tracks, it further demonstrates the opposition of visibility and invisibility that are 
simultaneously present in the observation of artworks, which always have more to offer 
despite their definitive constraints. As a sequence of events, Cover Your Tracks also evokes 
the temporal nature of life through the evocation of past memories and future anticipation 
while assessing the artwork, and a brief moment of attention and presence during the 
interaction with the work. Providing an ever-expanding potential for exploration, the artwork 
is limited only by the time of the visitor, demonstrating the paradox of the horizon of 
expectation that every artwork inherently displays. The state of difference, which generates 
significance for observers, is also an integral aspect of Cover Your Tracks. It is evident in the 
intentionally irrational location of the installations, as well as the intentionally distinct actions 
and sensations that the artwork provokes by doing things you would not normally do and 
feeling things that are uncommon to everyday experience. The differentiation of self from 
nature is also called into question through the interactions and sensations that Cover Your 
Tracks evokes, providing a dry garden in which the subjective can meet with the objective, 
the ‘I’ with the ‘me.’ Finally, the state of lack is exemplified by the indefinite nature of the 
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installation, which waits for visitors to activate it and return it to its default mode. While the 
artwork was made for a people to come, it helps to demonstrate and nourish the lack that 
people inherently have. In the case of Cover Your Tracks, the satiated lack is sensory and 
psychological, providing a moment of communion between visitors and life that helps to 
demonstrate the ways in which we cognitively separate ourselves from nature. In all of these 
ways, the functioning of life is reflected in the aesthetic experience of Cover Your Tracks, 
which brings the connection of art and life to public consciousness. 
 
6.3.3.2. Thought / Self 
 While subtle in nature, the art project Cover Your Tracks demonstrates the many ways 
in which human thought, experience and consciousness operate during the aesthetic 
experience of artworks. In this chapter we will begin by exploring how the installation 
demonstrates ideas of parallelism, where body and mind function in tandem to establish self 
in relation to context. Internal and external sensations combine to generate an experience that 
is temporally distinguished and inherently marked with emotion, a combination that is based 
on reflexive thought and founds aesthetic experience. Our conception of self further allows us 
to operate in the world on a symbolic level, which brings Cover Your Tracks into semiotic 
functionality. Understanding that footprints carry potential meaning is obvious to us, but this 
capacity to recognize meaning in footprints is impossible in other animal species. This will be 
explored in relation to the umwelt and Dasein, which examine the functioning of the art 
project in relation to carriers of significance. The result is a wealth of cognitive analogies and 
analyses that examine Cover Your Tracks from the perspective of human thought. 
The combination of psychic and physical interaction with the Cover Your Tracks 
installations exemplifies the interconnectedness of body and mind that both parallelism and 
embodiment defend. These approaches to perception support the understanding that every 
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physical event is necessarily a cognitive event, and vice versa.796 Our ability to distinguish 
inner and outer stimuli reinforces our self-identity through the reflexive conception of 
ourselves as both subjects and object. The marks that were made as participants walked across 
the dry gardens made this paradoxical union of inter-objectivity obvious through the passivity 
and agency of the actions and consequences of the interaction. As a participant walks across 
the garden, the felt changes in texture, pressure, stability, and sound make their body obvious 
to themselves in a distinct way, while the footprints left behind confirm their physical, 
objective presence. At the same time, the subjective agency of the participant is prescient 
through the decision to cross the garden, but more importantly through the raking of the 
garden afterwards. While this once again fills the participant with corporal sensations, the 
erasure of the tracks allows the subject to metaphorically take control back from their 
objective self. Now on the firm ground of the cement path on the other side of the dry garden, 
the participant is changed through their altercation of reflexive differentiation.  
 Cover Your Tracks helped to demonstrate how perception is an active process of 
coupling with our environment. Perception is a twofold process where both external and 
internal sensations are combined with the emotional body state at the time of interaction. The 
feeling of emotion in conjunction with the (re)cognition of the stimuli becomes a frame of 
reference for the perception of the event.797 The concrete paths of the botanical gardens offer 
very little resistance to visitors and make it easy for them to focus externally on the 
remarkable plants that inhabit the grounds. Interaction with the installation Cover Your Tracks 
provides a change in emotional grounding, and combines with the sensations of the 
interactions to mark the experience as distinct. The frame of the karesansui garden provides 
both a beginning and end to the experience, and with the imbued emotional quality of the 
interaction the aesthetic experience is separated from ubiquity.  
                                                
796 Nöe, Strange Tools, 95. 
797 Dewey, Art as Experience, 38. 
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 Cover Your Tracks relates to semiotic theory in terms of its use of symbolism and 
significance. As mentioned previously, the impetus for the installation was to experiment with 
the proposal that only human beings intentionally cover their tracks. The theory of umwelt 
helps to unravel this supposition by demonstrating how all species relate distinctly with the 
carriers of significance in their environment.798 For any human being who is trying to escape 
or avoid being caught, the significance of their footprints are easily recognized. They show 
presence and demonstrate direction of travel, to begin with, but they can also carry meaning 
associated with the time of the impression and the condition of the fleeing person. These are 
more specialized skills that professional trackers learn over time, but footprints can indicate 
the height and weight of the person, as well as their state in terms of fatigue or injury. Our 
ability to comprehend such associative meaning is based on our ability to objectify the 
footprint, which is only possible through reflexive thought. Other animals are unable to do 
that, so far as we are currently aware, and Cover Your Tracks is intended to highlight our 
specialized perceptive capacities. We can easily distinguish if something has been 
manipulated by another person, and we inherently question the significance of what this 
manipulation might mean, which is the foundation of artistic practice. Our propensity for self-
reference makes us experts as recognizing others, and our cognitive abilities not only 
distinguish us from other species, but we actively use them as subjects to distinguish 
ourselves reflexively. While other animal species are captivated in their environments, we are 
able to separate ourselves and see the elements of our world as unconcealed beings.799 Our 
consciousness allows for the world to be open to us for revelation, and Cover Your Tracks 
allowed this unique capacity of ours to be revealed.  
 Cover Your Tracks demonstrates how human thought and consciousness determine the 
aesthetic experience of art. These two processes incorporate mind and body together in 
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relation to the environment to establish a concept of self based on a relation of internal and 
external sensations. The installation reflects that by provoking a cerebral and sensory 
experience, where decisions and impressions are actively created and combined. The result is 
a refreshed awareness of self that results from the reflexive thoughts of our inter-objectivity. 
Furthermore, the installation functions at the symbolic level of thought in order to examine 
the symbolism we are capable of creating and recognizing, which separates us from other 
species. The semiotic functionality of Cover Your Tracks is one of its principal purposes, and 
one of the main ways we distinguish ourselves from other animals. Understanding that 
footprints or artworks have potential meaning is obvious to us, thanks to our capacity to 
identify them as carriers of significance. They are revealed to us as such thanks to the 
reflexive powers of our consciousness. Despite the brief and subdued nature of the 
interaction, Cover Your Tracks provides a focussed look at the significant cognitive powers 
that facilitate artistic practice.  
 
6.3.3.3. Human Beings / Intention 
 As both language and technology define human beings as a unique species of life, 
their consideration in relation to the practice of art is important. Art, after all, is also a practice 
that is unique and definitive to humanity, and it functions in relation to language and 
technology to establish its distinct value and autonomy in our society. The art project Cover 
Your Tracks formally incorporates both language and technology into its composition, 
engaging with visitors to the botanical gardens in a recognizable way that mimics the 
institutional operation and authority of the Jardí Botànic de Barcelona. Furthermore, the 
theme of the artwork—covering one’s tracks—is inspired by the human ability to recognize 
the significance of marks left by oneself or others, which is based upon our capacity to be a 
subject, which is largely established through language. As subjects learn to master their 
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relation with nature, we move into the realm of technology, which demonstrates 
reorganization, recursivity and functionality in similar ways that artworks do. As we proceed 
to relate Cover Your Tracks with the themes of language and technology, the unique 
connection of art to human life becomes clear. 
 The sign that visitors encounter when they arrive at each Cover Your Tracks 
installation contains the artwork title in Catalan, Spanish and English. It is an imperative 
phrase that connotes an order while granted a sense of permission for the visitors to interact 
with the karesansui garden that was blocking their path. Next to the sentences was an image 
of a man raking, which was meant to symbolize and fortify the message of the sign and 
provide an obvious methodology for fulfilling the task with the use of a rake, which was 
located next to the sign. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the mimicry of institutional 
conventions provided the art project with a sense of authority and showed that it was intended 
to be there, despite its illogical placement as an impediment. Furthermore, the sign recognized 
and confirmed the subjectivity of the visitors who encountered it, helping them to accept the 
situation as organized and safe. The permission that the sign granted to walk across the dry 
garden installation, however, opposed the ubiquitous message that public gardens use to 
forbid visitors to leave the path or touch the plants. In this way, the specificity of the 
installation was contrary to the usual universal understanding of acceptable behaviour within 
public garden settings. Using this potential knowledge of the visitors as a component of the 
artwork is one way in which Cover Your Tracks can be considered as a conceptual artwork, 
although its incorporation of aesthetic elements and institutional infiltration further align it 
with postconceptual art practices. The active involvement of visitors, as well, positions the 
project within a more social tradition of art, where the agency of the observer is called upon to 
activate the artwork in a participatory way. This once again reflects the communicative nature 
of the installation—and the practice of art in general—which provokes a response from the 
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participant. This not only acknowledges the subjectivity of the audience but extends authority 
and authorship to the active participant who makes and erases their footprints in the dry 
gardens. By responding to the artistic provocation, the active subject in turn acknowledges 
their responsibility, and the duties and obligations that this entails. This is why participants 
probably think twice before complying with the invitation to participate, worried that 
breaking the preconceived rule about trespassing and transforming the garden could have 
negative consequences. The implied uncertainty and stress of the interaction, however, is 
slight and momentary, lasting as long as it takes to cross the dry garden and rake away the 
evidence. Once gone, with the visitor safely on the other side of the installation, the moment 
of subjective awareness dissipates as the garden visit resumes as originally planned. 
 With subjective awareness at the root of artistic intentionality, the installation Cover 
Your Tracks could be considered as a test of visitors’ humanity. Human beings, as the 
evidence suggests, are the only species that are capable of erasing their tracks in the wild in 
order to deceive other beings.800 I wanted to put this assumption to the test and use art to 
explore the creative and cognitive implications of such a statement. As Derrida notes in the 
work of Lacan, the inability to recognize the potential significance of your tracks shows an 
inability for symbolic recognition—something that we as humans do naturally—but also an 
inability to be the “subject of the signifier,” which implies reflexively recognizing yourself as 
a subject, and recognizing another being as the Other.801 What is lacking in other animal 
species is reflexive thought, upon which our tradition of aesthetic experience is based. The 
potential deceit that is implied in the act of covering your tracks connects the aesthetic 
experience of Cover Your Tracks to a more generalized refection about the practice of art. If 
we think about the artificial necessity of artworks, or the ‘natural’ setting of botanical 
gardens, we can appreciate how our ability to recognize deception—or to turn a blind eye to 
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it—underlies the functioning of artistic practice. While other animals might be able to 
pretend, Lacan purports that humans are the only species that can pretend to pretend, which 
demonstrates yet another reflexive separation of thought.802 Cover Your Tracks further shows 
the mimetic tradition that informs our understanding of art, which can in turn be associated to 
a sense of falseness or trickery. As in the theatre, the recognition of art is simultaneously an 
acceptance of deceptive intentionality. The source of deceit can be attributed to the artwork 
that represents a puzzle to be solved, or the artist who created it, but it is also found in 
observers of the artwork who willingly deceive themselves.  
Through their use and acknowledgement of deceit, artworks point us towards the truth 
of our self-deception. Derrida posits that this stems from our accepted belief in our own 
subjectivity,803 which autopoiesis demonstrates is a mask of sorts provided by our cognitive 
and observational abilities. The indetermination of artistic significance is perpetual when 
there is uncertainty of subjective truth,804 as Rancière posits, one of several paradoxes related 
to the aesthetic experience of artworks. This is because the distinction of meaning in physical 
forms, such as footprints or artworks, can only be established by separating the distinguished 
from the non-distinguished, which unavoidably connects non-thought to thought. This relates 
the unconscious of the observing subject to their conscious assessment of the artistic 
interaction, but it also points towards the objective nature of participants and the non-
conscious matter that structures their lives on the molecular level. This is the real point of 
connection between the garden and the visitor, and the artwork and the observer. The 
repetitive creation and elimination of marks that Cover Your Tracks involves is meant to 
reflect the various states of presence and absence, or disconnection and connection, that our 
subjective consciousness is capable of. It is also meant to acknowledge our facility for self-
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deception. The erasure of our footprints is simply the creation of distinct marks with the rake, 
yet another track that can be distinguished and have meaning. Nothing is truly erased, despite 
our acceptance that it is. If anything, our self-deception is revealed, but only for those who 
look closely. Becoming aware of our subjective agency not only allows us to see ourselves 
but also to reposition ourselves as subjects, which makes the aesthetic experience of artworks 
political in nature.805 Cover Your Tracks shows how we as subjects organize the world around 
us, but also how we as objects are organized by the world, which helps to unconceal the 
subject-object duality of our existence and provide an opportunity to reconsider our 
understanding of lives and our selves.  
 The artificial nature of the botanical gardens was the perfect backdrop to explore the 
opposition of nature and artifice that artworks obligingly represent. As technology has been 
defined as the mastery over our relationship with nature, it becomes a fitting tool to further 
explore the artistic functioning of Cover Your Tracks. While the installation parallels the 
functionality of technology by demonstrating the intentionality and organization of human 
agency, the project distinguishes itself from technology by lacking any obvious use or utility. 
The location of the installations as impediments accentuates this by complicating normal 
movement and potentially confusing visitors. This helps to demonstrate how context informs 
our understanding of artworks and technology, both of which are dependent on functioning in 
relation to their environment. With Cover Your Tracks, the context can be understood on 
various scales; as installations on paths, as an intervention within a botanical garden, or as a 
karesansui Japanese garden in Barcelona, Spain. All of these distinct contextualizations 
influence the perceived significance of the work and establish the dry garden installation as as 
art by functioning out of context, which helps to generate the uncertainty and enigmaticalness 
that is necessary for aesthetic judgement to occur. Cover Your Tracks reflects the functioning 
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of technology through its recursivity, and how it incorporates existing elements or concepts in 
its manifestation. While new technologies are almost always progressions of existing ones, 
artworks also follow the lead of their precursors. If we compare Cover Your Tracks with 
uncover RECOVER, various similarities and progressions can be observed. Aside from the 
recursion of the word “cover” in their titles, both artworks involve the manipulation of soil in 
relation to social interaction and traditional understanding, albeit in very distinct ways. In 
relation to intentionality, both artworks offer subjects an opportunity for reflective 
transformation by converting an external demonstration of change into an internal realization 
of ipseity. Examining the principal material of the two projects—soil—we can establish yet 
another way in which the artworks relate with technology. Heidegger describes the creative 
process as a transformation of “earth to world,” which parallels the usual aesthetic 
transformation of material to form.806 Something natural is composed through human agency 
to become composition, which we as humans can recognize as being manipulated. While 
artworks enhance their material significance by contrasting it with the formal composition 
that their creation makes evident, technologies emphasize utility and exhaust their material 
significance in their use.807 If we consider the rake in Cover Your Tracks, the wood that it is 
made of is only considered in terms of its efficacy in relation to purpose. Wood is lighter than 
metal, and is thus easier to use. These ‘equipmental’ considerations of the tool don’t take into 
account the potential sensations that the material transmits. In artworks, on the other hand, the 
relationship between materiality and form remains distinguishable, which allows us to 
appreciate the “strife” that exists in the opposition and conciliation of earth and world.808 It is 
through this strife that artworks vibrate, in part through their resistance to being taken for 
granted as usual in their usability. By being unusual, and by avoiding any determined 
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usefulness, Cover Your Tracks highlights the conflict at the heart of its artistic essence, which 
is established through the material it is composed of, but functions more obviously through its 
disruption of integrated concepts and contexts. This is how Cover Your Tracks challenges a 
utilitarian understanding and provides a unique opportunity for aesthetic contemplation. 
 Cover Your Tracks incorporates both language and technology in its formal structure 
and uses them as counterpoints to demonstrate the unique functionality of art. Furthermore, it 
emphasizes the capacities that distinguish us as human beings, and our ability to be the 
‘subject of the signifier.’ The project’s use of language and symbolic communication helps to 
emphasize the importance of subjective awareness, while pointing towards the mimesis and 
deception that our self-conception entails. The project’s incorporation of technology helps to 
highlight the material transformation at the heart of both art and technology, while 
distinguishing the subversion of use and context that are integral to the unique functionality of 
artworks. It assures that the recognition of composition leads towards an aesthetic experience 
of Cover Your Tracks, which uses common materials and concepts to provide a valuable 
moment of subjective awareness. It also helps to demonstrate how art connects to life through 
the unique cognitive capacities that make us distinct as human beings.  
 
6.3.3.4. Artworks / Art 
 Cover Your Tracks was developed to function as a reflexive art project by exploring 
the features that make it art. Here we will consider the installation in relation to the parergon 
and ‘the fragment,’ two concepts that were used in Chapter 5. Artworks / Art to explore the 
nature of aesthetic theory, and the boundaries and relations of artworks in context. Cover Your 
Tracks illustrates the various components and conditions that make artworks distinct from 
other human products, as we have explored in previous chapters. Here the project will be 
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further contextualized in relation to postconceptual art practice, which is largely defined by an 
artwork’s indeterminate nature and emphasis on social relations. 
 One of the most important implications of the inclusion of a parerga on an artwork is 
that the artwork is inherently lacking something that warrants its attachment. As supplement 
or ornamentation, Derrida found that the parergon functions like a prosthesis in order to 
support the artwork it complements.809 While the original three parerga defined by Kant were 
drapery on sculptures, frames on paintings and columns on buildings, we will have to develop 
a new idea of the parergon for site-specific installations, or multi-disciplinary art projects in 
general. While my karesansui dry gardens were composed of wooden frames to contain sand, 
the frames I used didn’t function in the same way would for pictures, as a source of 
protection. They do, however, function visually to contain one aspect of the installation, 
which more than anything provided a precise beginning and ending to the aesthetic interaction 
with Cover Your Tracks. This is not to say that nothing was lacking from the artwork. Indeed, 
as we will see in the coming paragraphs, the indeterminate state of the installations was an 
important aspect of their artistic functionality. What they lacked, more than anything, was 
some form of theoretical contextualization—something to position them ideologically to 
assuage the uncertainty that they intentionally evoked. While this lack purposefully created 
doubt and curiosity in prospective participants, many influences and associations of the 
project were undoubtedly lost on the participants who left their footprints and the raked them 
during their garden visit. One postconceptual parergon for the project, then, was the 
information brochure that was available at the entrance of the Jardí Botànic de Barcelona. 
While it contained a concise amount of information that I felt was relevant, it is not important 
to me that participants do not know all of the information. As suggested earlier, the project 
was designed on purpose on the threshold between artistic production and non-artistic 
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production as a way of exploring this indistinct area of perceptibility. As we continue, please 
keep this in mind. 
 Using a garden within a garden for my art project was a way to reference reflexivity, 
while at the same time generating some form of instability in terms of context and content. 
Cover Your Tracks functions as a parergon itself in various ways, beginning with its 
prosthetic nature as it was added to the Jardí Botànic and then removed. In addition, the 
installation generated cognitive instability in the way that it conformed as a garden within a 
garden, but not in a completely logical way. As with most parerga, Cover Your Tracks 
fluctuated between being visibly distinct and then disappearing within the botanical garden 
experience, depending on the focus and perspective of the participants. While the interaction 
with the dry garden installations stole visitors’ attention from the ‘legitimate’ content of the 
Jardí Botànic—the gorgeous plants—the experience of concentration within the dry garden 
installation provided a shift in context that accentuated the regular garden visit through 
contrast. While the botanical garden is full of life, no living beings aside from humans are 
present in the karesansui dry gardens. From the opposite perspective, Cover Your Tracks 
provided insight into what the Jardí Botànic is lacking; physical interaction with the content 
of the garden. This makes sense, of course, for it would be unwise to permit visitors to 
pretend to be gardeners in such an institutional space. Nonetheless, it does emphasize the 
controlled nature of the institutional functioning of the garden, which gives the illusion of 
being natural while being contrived and controlled. This internal conflict that both the Jardí 
Botànic de Barcelona and Cover Your Tracks demonstrate is the opposition of material and 
form that all artworks inherently possess. It is the paradox of uniting the logical with the 
illogical, which alludes to the human condition of being natural and cultural at once.  
 The indeterminate nature of Cover Your Tracks is another aspect that associates it with 
the individuals who interact with it. The ontological structure of ‘the fragment,’ which is 
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simultaneously complete and incomplete, is the foundation of this logic. It provides us with a 
clear union between the internal and external relations that determine identity, and reflects the 
way that artworks and people are defined in part through our vital being and in part through 
our association with the world. For example, Cover Your Tracks functions as an artwork in 
part through the external reference of the conceptualization of its context and elements, and in 
part through the internal self-reference of the sensorial, subjective and subversive source of 
interaction. The indeterminate nature of artworks establishes infinite possibility within finite 
form, and this could be seen in the myriad ways in which visitors could have used the 
installation and interpreted their experience of it, all the while being confined to a basic form 
and functionality, for a limited time at that. This paradox of confined infinity philosophically 
reflects the human subject, whose potential for freedom is unlimited and yet only possible by 
being tethered to a finite life.  
 The opposition of internal and external relations that characterize Cover Your Tracks 
is what establishes its autonomy as an artwork. Its integrity—its ontological autonomy—was 
defined by its contextual conditions, which were established through temporal and social 
factors at the time of its interaction and evaluation. The most important social factor in this 
determination of sovereignty was the concept of art that the participant possessed prior to the 
interaction with the artwork. Based on this prior understanding of art, the observer either 
recognized the installation as art or not, based exclusively on the formal analysis of the 
artwork. The integrity of Cover Your Tracks as an artwork was also based on its originality, 
its distinction as a unique being, which is what empowers all artworks to generate meaning. 
By being unusual, which implies not having a determinant concept with which to ascertain a 
definite use or categorization, an artwork maintains its indeterminate nature and assures 
infinite potential interpretations. As mentioned earlier, the strange positioning of the dry 
gardens and their unusual invitation for interaction are what made Cover Your Tracks a 
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singular experience. Even if people didn’t recognize it as an artwork, its recognition as an 
‘unknown’ is enough to impede a determinate association that would negate the aesthetic 
experience. Possessing some unidentifiable aspect assures that the door to aesthetic judgement 
is always open. As artworks become usual, or common, with repeated interactions, they 
inevitably lose their ability to stimulate difference by being taken for granted, despite the fact 
that there is always another unknown interpretation waiting to be made. The originality of 
Cover Your Tracks—as subtle as it might be—relates to the condition of novelty that assures 
artistic innovation. Since the use-value of artworks is based on their capacity to induce a 
subversive shift from normality or balance in their participants, it is important that every 
artwork offer something new. That is, if generating meaning through the creation of 
difference is your intention. While Cover Your Tracks is a logical next step after my project 
uncover RECOVER, they are both somewhat subtle in their manipulation of materials and 
production of difference.  
 To contextualize Cover Your Tracks with the philosophical concept of ‘the fragment’ 
is to position it as a postconceptual artwork. This new periodization of contemporary art 
history was created by Osborne in an attempt to eliminate the confusing ambiguity of the 
word contemporary, and to establish an alternative lineage within the Modernist tradition in 
which conceptual and relational concerns are prioritized over aesthetic concerns in the 
production of artworks. As important as visual details are my artworks, Cover Your Tracks 
easily falls under the postconceptual label thanks to its reliance on the socially determined 
concepts of observers. Furthermore, the project attempts to engage participants in innovate 
conceptual ways, as aesthetic and sensory an experience as they might have. It is important to 
emphasize that these two conceptual and aesthetic lineages are not at all exclusive, but rather 
provide an interpretive scale that helps to define the mechanisms and relations that compose 
every artwork. Cover Your Tracks is quite basic aesthetically, and is obviously receptive to 
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external relations in its artistic function. As an indeterminate work, it focuses on the process 
and potential of artistic creation. It relates to the concept of information by being independent 
and instantly accessible, and by demonstrating the state of being information. Cover Your 
Tracks is a procedural artwork that relies on the interaction and action of people. It fluctuates 
in terms of its physical state and induces an oscillation of inter-objective awareness in its 
participants, who exercise their reflexive duality as subject and object during interaction with 
the project. By demonstrating the inherent freedom and openness of indetermination, Cover 
Your Tracks represented the possibility of possibility. Its indeterminate and relational essence 
reflected the movement and inherent potential of the lives of the people who activated it. For 
a non-living entity, Cover Your Tracks certainly had a brief yet sensational life. 
As a reflexive artwork, Cover Your Tracks demonstrated the illusion of self-awareness 
in its dependence and openness to participants and external relations. The parergon and ‘the 
fragment’ both help to examine the nature of the installation in relation to aesthetic theory and 
the contemporary conceptualization of artworks. Cover Your Tracks illustrated a variety of 
factors and conditions that make artworks distinct from other commodities, and the project 
can be clearly positioned in relation to postconceptual art practices through its innate 
indetermination and abundance of social relativity. The examination as a specific artwork in 
relation to the tradition of art helps to show how the aesthetic experience of artworks depends 
upon a precedent conceptualization of art. Recognition of artifice opens the relational and 
communicative thought processes that permit artworks to play freely in the imagination, in 
combination with the emotions that their experience inevitably evoke. 
 
6.3.4. Conclusion to Cover Your Tracks 
 My project Cover Your Tracks provides an excellent practical example for the 
exploration of my theoretical research into aesthetic separation and the reflection of life in art. 
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In relation to aesthetic separation, Cover Your Tracks demonstrated a distinct aesthetic 
experience for each participant, while functioning within an area of uncertainty in relation to 
institutional context and artistic determination. The aesthetic experience provided by Cover 
Your Tracks focused on shifts in cognitive awareness that highlighted the participant’s 
reflexive modality of subject-object, while also accentuating the context of the botanical 
garden through a contrast of sensations. The theoretical evaluation demonstrates various 
conditions of artworks, most notably the relation of material and form, the subversion of 
function, and indetermination. The project also alludes to the social relations inherent in the 
practice of art by emphasizing the act of covering tracks, in which the presence of someone 
else is implied and yet absent. Finally, the dry garden installations that composed the artwork 
questioned the work’s autonomy by fading into the infrastructure of the institution of the 
botanical garden, which in turn identified the elements that made it part of an artistic tradition. 
In these various ways, Cover Your Tracks addresses the research questions that found this 
thesis, including the relations of art and life, aesthetic thought, the nature of artworks, their 
connection with society and tradition, and the sovereignty of art in relation to other practices. 
 
6.4. Evaluation of Practical Research 
 I consider both uncover RECOVER and Cover Your Tracks to be successful art 
projects in their unique ways. Part of their success is a consequence of my intentional lack of 
defining a strict goal or purpose for them. While I had an idea and key concepts at the start of 
each art project, I was flexible and adaptable when developing the projects with the various 
collaborators and institutions that assisted me in their production. My formal goals for both 
projects revolved around making the transformation of materials visible and sensible, and 
both projects involved a level of poetry that made the formal transformation of these materials 
significant in relation to pre-existing concepts. While I consider these art projects to be 
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conceptually driven, the material aspect of them is of vital importance. This interactivity 
between aesthetic and conceptual aspects is a key methodology of my artistic practice, and 
one of the various ways in which these projects can be categorized as postconceptual art. 
Engaging the public also situates my projects within the postconceptual tradition, and 
their functionality in terms of social interaction has been positive. This, however, is more of 
an impression than an empirical evaluation. While uncover RECOVER allowed me to 
converse with participants, I was largely absent from the functioning of Cover Your Track, 
and as such relied on the testimonials of people I know to objectively evaluate the aesthetic 
experience and overall impressions. Including a post-interaction survey is one way to more 
academically register objective evaluations, but this would have negated the uncertainty of the 
project, which was vital to its artistic functioning.  
 While both projects include living and non-living beings within their formal and 
relational compositions, I don’t think that this is a necessary contrast to employ in order to 
address the relations of life and art in an artistic manner. Interaction from public participants 
was essential to both of my projects, and it was through the thought and participation of 
people that I the connection of life and art was most effectively explored. The plant life that 
formed part of my projects was both an example and a symbol of life, and was an important 
counterpoint to the subjective lives of individuals, which is what interested me most.  
Locating my projects outside of traditional art institution contexts and involving non-
art practices re other ways in which my projects demonstrate postconceptual conventions. 
Social praxis formed an integral aspect of each project, which demonstrates my interest in 
exploring new contexts as a creative element of my artworks. Their functionality in relation to 
botany—as well as history, amongst other things—positions them as in relation to 
‘iatrogenesis,’ which Roberts identifies as the ideological co-adaptation with non-art 
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practices.810 This demonstrates an active movement towards the activity of everyday life, 
which is becoming a sign of the times in terms of conceptually based art practices. While 
increasing the opportunity for originality, exploration outside of art institutions is a way to 
introduce risk and uncertainty into the development of work, which has the potential to 
generate unforeseen new results. More than anything, though, using unfamiliar contexts for 
artworks helps to eliminate preconceived notions that participants might have about the being 
they are about to engage with, which increases the potential novelty of the experience. 
 
6.5. Conclusion to Artworks / Art 
 The two artworks presented in this chapter demonstrate the reliance of artistic 
meaning on contextual, social and traditional sources of reference. While the artworks involve 
some aspect of life, or living beings, within their composition or contextualization, uncover 
RECOVER and Cover Your Tracks also show that you don’t need to use life as a subject 
matter in order for artworks to make manifest the connections between art and life. In a very 
similar way, the subject matter of an artwork does not need to be political in order for an 
artwork to be political, as Rancière has demonstrated through his concept of aesthetic 
separation.811 In both of these cases, artworks function by engaging with human beings and 
thought in ways that implicitly activate living and political potential. In relation to art’s 
relations with life, it must be understood on a conceptual and experiential level at this point, 
which relates to a physical, living beings, and not in terms of artistic functionality or value. 
Nonetheless, these two projects provided an excellent means of exploring my theoretical 
research, and have demonstrated how separation is a useful concept for defining the 
functioning and significance of artworks.  
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 These artworks also provide examples of the extensively social methodologies that 
postconceptual art projects utilize, focusing on external relations to help determine the value 
of the artworks. In both cases, procedure and social relations form the foundation of the 
conceptual composition of the works, which incorporate personal interaction to activate 
external social meaning in relations to individuals and the collective. Uncover RECOVER and 
Cover Your Tracks also show how ordinary materials can be incorporated by artworks to 
generate artistic significance while maintaining their original value, which demonstrates the 
strength of the material/form separation that defines artistic tradition. Despite the shift to more 
conceptual emphasis, postconceptual artworks most certainly rely on material manifestations 
in order to function as art. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. Discussion 
7.1.1. Key Findings 
 Operational and cognitive aspects of life are easily reflected in the practice of art, 
which has a particular functionality that ensures the generation of artistic significance. The 
results of my research indicate that separation is an effective concept to define the 
functionality of artistic practice, and that art and life are ultimately united through human 
thought and practice. My analysis demonstrates a correlation between the separations inherent 
to human life and to artworks, most notably an integral separation between object and subject 
(or material and form), and a separation between internal and external, which establishes a 
distinction of the individual from the group (or a particular and the universal). The study 
confirms that aesthetic experience is facilitated by human cognition, which implies the 
interaction of a human being with their environment and the use of reflexive and symbolic 
thought to process artistic significance, which is accomplished through internal and external 
reference. The research has shown that artistic significance is determined through an 
evaluation of integral formal composition and external conceptual relations, which include 
reference to artistic conventions as determined by artistic tradition, and the subjective 
conceptualization of art that exists prior to the aesthetic experience of the artwork. My 
findings demonstrate how artworks function congruently and antagonistically with the society 
and tradition that define them in order to demonstrate innovation and originality, which 
generates a distinct use-value for artworks and helps to establish the autonomy of art. 
 
7.1.2. Interpretations 
 The comparative analysis of human cognition and aesthetic theory has identified two 
inherent separations that define human life and aesthetic experience. The first is an integral 
 374 
division that can be represented by the object and subject in the human being, and material 
and form in an artwork. In both cases, the separations reveal a physical, natural element and a 
composed, meaningful element. A second separation of internal and external, or particular 
and universal (i.e. self/society and artwork/art) have been found to be essential to the 
operation of life, the understanding of self and the functionality of artworks. Artworks reflect 
human lives in many intriguing ways, which is undoubtedly why artworks captivate 
humanity. One unexpected encounter of my research was the correlation of vulnerability and 
fallibility between human cognition and artworks. Human perception is incomplete and 
supplemented by our consciousness, which itself functions transparently and thus evades 
demonstrating its supportive manipulations. Artworks demonstrate lack through their reliance 
on people and parerga, which provide protection and aesthetic assistance to the artwork. This 
correspondence between human and artistic weakness could demonstrate an empathetic 
connection during the aesthetic experience of artworks, which would further support the 
evidence that artworks function as proxies for subjects. It also reflects the self-deception that 
is implicit in ‘the mask of subjectivity’ that we self-impose, which implicitly creates an 
illusion of separation of our being from our environment. 
 The results of my research have exceeded my expectations and support my hypothesis, 
which is that acts and observations of separation can be used to define the practice of art, and 
to relate the practice of art to life. The observation and comparison of separation was more 
easily done in relation to an existential conception of human life, in which an artwork is 
compared with a subjective self. When we move to more biological conceptions and 
operations of life, it is more difficult to make effectual comparisons based on my research. 
While the theoretical conception of autopoietic life allowed me to make comparisons based 
on the systemic operation of life, where the molecular level of function is separate from the 
molar level of observation, more focused biological research would be necessary to directly 
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correlate art and life. Nonetheless, the division between the two levels of autopoietic function 
accurately defines a limitation of artistic jurisdiction. The practice of art is perceptual in 
nature,812 and thus has no logical connection with biological operation, aside from metaphoric 
correlations. This is one of the reasons why neuroaesthetic research is limited in its ability to 
provide useful conclusions for artistic research. The realm of neuroaesthetic research is 
psychology and anatomy, and its implications on the social and conceptual relations that 
inform artistic practice are slight, especially in light of the subversive functionality of art.  
 One of my interests in exploring aesthetic separation related to the paradox of 
artworks being concurrently finite and infinite, which I originally defined in terms of being 
limited in convention and function but unlimited in terms of material and content. I found that 
the ability to determine an object or event as an artwork depends upon the concept and 
tradition of art, which must limit the artwork in some way in order for the definition to 
maintain its meaning. The material or content of an artwork is unlimited, although I found 
that artworks must have a material form that has to embody some artistic convention to be 
recognized as an artwork. One aspect of the finite/infinite paradox of art that I hadn’t 
considered was the infinite interpretability that an artwork has in spite of its fixed form, which 
relates the aesthetic experience of artworks to social and traditional transitions over time. 
 In relation to my previous research, this thesis is more focused on the philosophical 
and theoretical study of artistic practice and aesthetics. While my earlier research more 
specifically explored the definition of art and the conventions through which artworks connect 
to artistic tradition—the limits of art—this research has focused more on the conceptual and 
social relations that influence the identification of artworks and the attribution of artistic 
meaning. This research employs distinct fields of study to achieve a different perspective on 
the exterior relationships that define artistic practice, two of the most relevant being language 
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and technology, which were concurrently informative in researching human cognition. What 
is missing from this study is a more thorough exploration of the economic relations that are 
implicit to artistic practice. Developing a holistic research model that was capable of 
identifying the subject of art from different perspectives required me to limit my research in 
many ways due to the vast amount of possible directions for the research. Nonetheless, I 
anticipated this shortcoming and determined my initial aim as a general overview in 
anticipation of future research.  
 
7.1.3. Implications 
 The results of my research are in line with previous research, although they extend the 
idea of aesthetic separation towards a more fundamentally biological and cognitive 
foundation. While Rancière developed part of the concept of aesthetic separation in relation to 
the transformation of ‘sense to sense,’ which in general refers to aesthetic experience, his 
exploration of aesthetic separation stopped after establishing the division between external 
sensory data and subjective interpretation of meaning. By demonstrating and emphasizing this 
disconnection, Rancière shows how artistic intentionality can never be guaranteed to be 
understood in the observer as intended by the artist, thus eliminating the political efficacy of 
art. My intention to extend his notion of aesthetic separation—this gap between material and 
meaning—with the use of autopoietic theory was to investigate different hypotheses that 
might more directly connect the practice of art with human biology. One hypothesis I had was 
that the division between external sensation and internal meaning was based on the separation 
of our molecular and molar modes of being, simultaneously object and subject, or body and 
mind. This, in the end, is not the case, since I have found that the division between external 
sensation and internal meaning was more accurately determined by the particular subjective 
development of human individuals in relation to the social context of their upbringing. This is 
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more about what influences interpretation and association, and not how interpretation is 
defined biologically. Another hypothesis was that this same personal inter-objectivity—the 
subject-object reflexivity that also informs aesthetic theory—was associated to the 
relationship of material and form that defines artworks. This correlation I find much more 
promising, and while the connection is not directly biological, it is definitely psychological in 
the realization that inter-objectivity is a catalyst for reflexive thought, which is a requisite for 
aesthetic experience. It also shows a possible relation between empathy and aesthetic 
judgement, and if there is a practical implication of this thesis, this would be it.  
 A further practical application of this study could be to use it as a framework to 
evaluate, appreciate and criticize artworks. The simple establishment of basic separations that 
we as human beings share with artworks in real and metaphorical ways provides an effective 
means to compare and contrast the material and formal nature of artworks in relation to 
internal and external relations. As demonstrated with my theoretical interpretation of Cover 
Your Tracks in Chapter 6.2. Cover Your Tracks, these separations provide relevant 
associations between the artwork being evaluated and person undertaking the evaluation. This 
study has also found that faults are an important aspect of every artwork, which enables a 
highly critical perspective towards artworks that is equally more reverent than deprecating. 
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7.2. Conclusions 
7.2.1. Answers to the Main Research Questions 
Life and Art 
Art and life connect through human practice and thought. The idea of art is established 
in individual people through their experiences of creating and appreciating artworks, and 
through a conception of artistic tradition that results from the accumulation of said 
experiences. The determinant concept ‘art’ is used to recognize artworks813 by employing the 
cognitive abilities of reflexive and symbolic thought, which are predominant to human beings. 
The concept of ‘life’ is biological and philosophical, defined as both a general condition for 
living as opposed to non-living beings, and the experiential understanding of an individual’s 
existence. As concepts, both ‘art’ and ‘life’ exist in comparative contemplation in our thought.  
As a practice, art connects to life through the creation, appreciation and organization 
of artworks. Artworks are extensions of human life that are activated through interaction. 
Artworks are similar to technologies since they are both human products that involve the 
intentional organization of materials in a recursive system of production that positions new 
products in relation with existing products and tradition. Art and technology are ubiquitous 
practices that define human culture, although they differ in relation to their functionality and 
use value. Artworks subvert determined applicability and thus open a space for their 
contemplation and interpretation. The subversive functionality of artworks is specific to their 
creation and interpretation, while their organization within society (i.e. exhibitions, education, 
exchange) follows standard patterns of functionality that are shared with other fields.  
Artworks reflect human lives physically and meaningfully. Artworks and people can 
both be considered in terms of the hylomorphic distinction between material and form, or 
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natura and ars.814 For artworks, the concept of ‘material’ refers to their neutral substance 
prior to artistic intervention, while the concept of ‘form’ refers to the manipulated 
composition that results in the substance after artistic transformation. For people, the concepts 
of nature and culture (or ‘nature and nurture’) are preferred to distinguish the natural 
(inherited, biological) disposition and the societal (familiar, educational) influences that 
inform human lives. In both human beings and artworks, the opposition of material and form 
is used to contrast the simultaneous absence and presence of intention, logic and organization.  
This contrast is evident in people and artworks through the modality of inter-
objectivity. Human beings are passive bodies (objects) and active agents (subjects), which is 
reflected in the distinct levels of autopoietic theory. While the molecular level demonstrates 
our structure and operation in the absence of meaning, the molar level produces an abundance 
of meaning through the capacities of observation and thought.815 Artworks—whether objects 
or events—become proxies for subjects as a result of their originality,816 which capacitates 
them with the inter-objective modality that humans naturally embody through their reflexive 
subjectivity. Artworks distinguish themselves through their individuality, which is the source 
of their potential meaning production.817 Artworks demonstrate their originality in their 
composition, and establish themselves as artworks through the incorporation of artistic 
conventions in their form. Artworks as such exist in reference to tradition, which is instituted 
through artistic conventions. Nonetheless, artworks also depend upon their context, which 
provides a counterpoint for special meaning. In a similar way, people identify themselves in 
relation to society. For people, the reflexive recognition of self differentiates the individual 
from their society. This same reflexive thought is requisite in subjective judgements about 
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artworks. Through the establishment of identity in relation to internal and external influence, 
the lives of people and artworks are clearly reflected. 
People and artworks are indeterminate by nature. They are whole, but they are never 
complete. The human self is the constant against which an individual’s life is reflexively 
measured, full of possibility, change and development. An artwork is determined as complete 
in terms of its fixed composition, whether physical or relational, and yet it is incomplete in 
terms of its heuristic potential, forever offering new meaning as it awaits future interaction 
within transforming social contexts. This shared state of indetermination reflects how 
artworks and people are lacking and adaptable. People are in a persistent state of lack in terms 
of their physiological and psychological being, while artworks are in a constant state of lack 
in terms of their impracticality and dependence on human interaction. The impetus for the 
majority of our actions in the world is to satiate an instance of lack or resolve some fault, 
which has influenced our cognitive evolution as a species.818 Increasing the scope and 
command of our interactions with the world has increased our ability to survive. Artworks are 
peripheral to functional necessity due to their subversive relationship with use-value,819 
however their eschewal of practicality provides a reflective opportunity for people that serves 
psychological ends. The indeterminate meaning of artworks establishes a novel space for the 
contemplation of their significance, where their singular presence and paradoxical autonomy 
reflect the lives of the people who appreciate them.  
 
Separation 
 A variety of related separations have been identified in this research into aesthetic 
experience, human cognition, and the practice of art, and many of these separations are shared 
by people and artworks alike. They include internal and external divisions, active and passive 
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separations, distinctions of level or modality, and paradoxical simultaneity of difference. The 
concept of aesthetic separation, which is a combination of divisions related with aesthetic 
experience and the social tradition of artworks, will be further addressed in the following 
sections on aesthetic thought and artistic tradition respectively. Nonetheless, the following 
separations are undoubtedly relevant to those conclusions. 
People and artworks are defined in principle by an internal division and an external 
separation. In relation to the former division, people are integrally characterized in terms of 
nature and culture (or genetics and upbringing), while artworks are determined in terms of 
material and form (or media and composition). These divisions in human beings and 
artworks, which can be traced to Aristotle’s theory of hylomorphism, imply a distinction 
between a neutral (or natural) element and a developed (or influenced) state. This division is 
repeated in several relevant oppositions; natura and ars,820 earth and world,821 non-human and 
human, non-logical and logical, unorganized and organized, insignificant and significant.  
Autopoietic theory describes the internal division of human beings by distinguishing 
between two levels of operation within all living beings; the molecular level of structure and 
function, and the molar level of individuality and observation. Human consciousness operates 
on the molar level, which is where meaning is cognitively produced and recognized. The 
distinction between meaningless and meaningful reflects this autopoietic division, since 
meaning does not exist on the molecular level, where the components and products of all 
interactions are equal.822 The distinction of meaning is based on the observation of 
difference,823 which implies that the concept of indifference can be associated to a lack of 
meaning. In Kantian aesthetics, indifference towards the object being judged in the absence of 
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determinant concepts is what allows the judgement of beauty to move from a subjective 
statement to objective truth.824 
People and artworks are further defined by an integral separation of object and 
subject, which reflects the physiological and psychological, or physical and thoughtful, 
aspects of being. Our reflexive consciousness of being both a subject (“I”) and an object 
(“me”) is what enables us to identify ourselves individually as a self.825 The process of 
establishing selfhood is facilitated through the use of language, which attributes symbolic 
meaning to beings and implies the capacity to differentiate between self and other, which 
permits the formation and recognition of position and opposition. Artworks are easily 
considered as objects through their formal constitution, but they act like subjects through their 
individual capacity to produce meaning for people.826 In this way, people and artworks 
demonstrate the modality of inter-objectivity. 
The external separation of a human being from its environment happens naturally in 
two ways; through autopoietic operations that follow the law of adaptation in order to 
systematically distinguish an organism from its environment on the molecular level—the 
living from non-living—and through the conscious thought that results from the reflexive 
identification of self on the molar level. Artworks are defined by an internal/external 
separation between their integral composition—whether material or organizational—and the 
context in which they are displayed and evaluated. While the composition of artworks is 
determined through an assessment of material and formal qualities, they are defined 
externally in terms of temporal, locational, and social relationships. The most important of 
these is an artwork’s relation to the tradition and/or concept of art that is associated to them 
during their evaluation, and the artistic conventions that this tradition or concept entails.  
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The separation between an individual person and society reflects the distinction 
between subjective and objective determinations. This is paralleled in the relationship of the 
particular and the universal, which has an important bearing on aesthetic judgements. A 
determinant judgement uses a universal concept to focus on a particular object, while a 
reflective judgement considers a particular object in the absence of a universal concept.827 
The latter is the case when judging beauty and the unknown, which are common to artworks. 
The movement of a singular to a general conception defines the cognitive process of 
generalization, where a particular is categorized with other similar particulars to become a 
universal categorization based upon the shared attribute. This process of abstraction is how an 
individual artwork is connected with other artworks to establish the concept of art.  
Another division that informs aesthetic experience is the paradoxical relationship 
between the invisible and the visible. This relates in part to the semiotics of observation, 
which connects the non-distinguished to the distinguished,828 and further associates the 
presence of non-thought in thought.829 An artistic example of this paradox is the use of a 
contour line to create the illusion of figure and ground. If you focus on the line, the figure 
and ground disappear, but if you focus on the figure or the ground, the line disappears. This 
can be further related with the paradox of perceptual transparency, which occurs when 
research into cognition and consciousness must utilize their elusive objects of study to 
reflexively examine themselves.830  
 One final paradox that informs both people and artworks is the simultaneous state of 
being complete and incomplete, or finite and infinite, which has largely been referred to in 
this research as the state of indetermination. People are complete in their individuality, which 
is established through the continuity of self, and incomplete through the potential 
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development of self over time. Artworks are finite in form and yet infinite in their possible 
interpretation, especially considering pending future evaluation. While artworks are limited 
by their creators in terms of structure and identity—they must have some physical form and 
follow conventions to be identified as art—they are unlimited in terms of their subject matter 
and content,831 as well as the materials and relations that are used to create them.832 
 Considering the aforementioned variety of oppositions, separation can be clearly 
understood as a condition of human life that is reflected in the practice of art. Both the 
observation and the act of separation in people relate to processes of distinction and 
communication that inform artistic creation and aesthetic experience. Separation provides 
instability, dynamism of movement and multiple perspectives that infuse the practice of art 
with vital energy, while establishing the opportunity for coordination and communion. States 
of disconnection motivate the action that facilitates life and the perception that founds artistic 
practice, which makes separation a valuable concept to study the reflection of life in art. 
 
Human Cognition / Aesthetic Thought 
 Human cognition is the foundation of aesthetic thought. When we experience the 
unknown, artworks and beauty, the process of judgement is activated in order to establish 
meaning by associating internal and external references in specific ways and in relation to 
prior knowledge. Aesthetic experience involves a variety of processes, from the biological 
basis of autopoietic cognition to the psychological formation of self, and the observation of 
difference to the attribution of significance. Aesthetic thought ultimately involves the 
reflexive recognition of feeling yourself feeling, and the result is a subjective judgement that 
situates the self in a sovereign position of authority. 
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Autopoietic theory establishes two modalities of biological operation in living beings; 
the molecular level, which establishes biological structure and function, and the molar level, 
which enables observation and conscious thought.833 Cognition at the molecular level is the 
interaction of the organism with its environment, molecules against molecules. Molar 
cognition is the same interaction but from an observed perspective, considered by the 
organism as a singular being.834 This is the process that we usually associate with cognition, 
which is frequently used as a synonym for conscious thought. The identification of self 
happens in human beings through the interconnected functioning of body and mind, working 
together to enable people to reflexively distinguish themselves from their environment.835  
Communication within human is achieved bodies through the cooperation of the 
endocrine and nervous systems, which work in tandem using hormones and neurons to 
facilitate the cognition of our external world.836 The intercommunicated architecture of the 
human brain enables the creation and recognition of neural representations; neural pathways 
that exist as mental images that can be called forth and manipulated in thought.837 They are 
created to form new thoughts and reused to generate recognition and association, which are 
vital processes in the formation of memory.838 Thoughts combine a variety of neural images 
simultaneously, from internal and external sources of stimulation, with neural representations 
often being shared amongst distinct senses.839 Despite the fallacy of human memory, it 
provides a consistent perspective that enables learning and the formation of individual 
identity.840 Our conception of self is strengthened by our ability to reflexively recognize 
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ourselves as both subjects and objects at the same time, which is reinforced in language.841 
The neural images that form self provide a persistent backdrop against which we compare our 
current body state in relation to internal/external and past/present associations.842 The 
relational nature of our individual development as people demonstrates the self as an 
indeterminate process in relation to context, where our changing bodies and minds continually 
inform our self-conception as we interact within the world.  
Perception enables us to engage and experience the world in a variety of ways, which 
includes the internal perception we have of our own bodies. Perception is achieved through 
active engagement with the world combined with internal feelings as the brain receives 
signals from multiple sources concurrently.843 Perception thus involves processes of action 
and reception that are inextricably combined when internal feelings are associated with 
external stimuli.844 Emotion thus becomes a frame of reference through which all perception 
is considered. As we perceive, we construct specific experiences by separating them from the 
flow of general experience and marking them with a felt emotion or quality.845 Perception 
thus intrinsically imbues experience with a sense of meaning, and an experience stands out by 
being easily differentiated or distinguished by a strongly associated emotion. 
 Aesthetic thought is based upon the reflexive experience of self, and differs from other 
kinds of thought through its reliance on subjective judgement. Our capacity to think provides 
us with reason, understanding and judgement, and we use these faculties of thought to relate 
with our selves and our environment.846 While understanding helps us to think about things of 
the world in terms of knowledge, and reason helps us to think about ideas in terms of desire, 
judgement helps us to think about the unknown in relation to our feelings of pleasure or 
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displeasure.847 Our judgement depends on whether the object of judgment is known or not. A 
determinant judgement uses a universal concept to determine a particular object, and a 
reflective judgement considers a particular object in the absence of a universal concept.848 As 
mentioned previously, we make reflective judgements when we discern beauty, the unknown 
and artworks, which are ascertained according to the pleasure or displeasure that we 
reflexively feel as a result of the experience. Since aesthetic judgements cannot be based on 
determinant concepts, and desire is based on pleasure related to a concept, the thing being 
judged cannot be desired.849 For a reflective judgement to become an aesthetic judgement, the 
judging subject must be indifferent to the object or event being judged.850 Aesthetic 
judgement is based on reflective subjective experience, when your awareness of feeling 
pleasure as a result of sensory interaction pleases yourself.851 Since aesthetic judgement is 
based on disinterested pleasure, when you judge something as beautiful it implies that 
everyone will agree.852 This moves the subjective aesthetic judgement into a position of 
objectivity, as a particular opinion is projected as a generalized universal truth.853 In these 
various ways, aesthetic thought can be understood as a system of distinguished relationships 
between internal and external sense, and particular and universal concepts.  
 The separate processes that comprise aesthetic judgement are described by Rancière as 
the transformation from ‘sense to sense,’ which is the first aspect of his conception of 
aesthetic separation. Aesthetic experience involves an array of interconnected cognitive 
capacities that determine our subjective position in relation to a particular or an unknown. The 
modality between subject and object, which enables a reflexive conception of self, forms the 
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basis upon which aesthetic judgements are made. The capacity to combine external and 
internal reference in relation to emotion is also a key factor in determining a subjective 
decision. In the absence of determinant concepts and desire for the object being judged, the 
subject must rely on their own cognitive powers to independently determine their verdict. The 
result is an aesthetic judgement, which positions the self unequivocally in relation to truth. 
 
Artworks 
 Artworks are singular human products that are defined in terms of formal integrity and 
contextual relationships. As specific manifestations that represent the concept of art, artworks 
are indelibly associated with the tradition of art that informs their production and 
interpretation. Artworks are identified as art through their embodiment of artistic conventions, 
which constitute their internal formal structure and inform their external associations. 
Functioning in contrast with societal norms, artworks establish a unique use-value that 
generates a sovereign space for the practice of art within human culture, where the generation 
of sensations and meaning are absolute. 
Artworks are recognized through their association with the concept of art, which 
places artworks in perpetual relation with tradition.854 This tradition is infused in artworks 
during their creation, which can be summarized as a transformation of material to form. 
Artworks are recognized through their incorporation or use of artistic conventions, which 
adhere to the tradition of art. These conventions are varied and relate to the qualities of the 
artwork, the process of its creation, the conditions of its exhibition, and/or its effect on the 
participant.855 Artworks are differentiated from other human products through formal 
appraisals that reveal their unique intentionality, functionality, and use-value. As such, the 
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evaluation of artworks involves aesthetic and conceptual considerations, and demonstrates the 
influence of external contextual reference on the meaning associated to an integral form.  
The conventions, traditions, and concept of art inherently transform in relation to 
practical and societal change. Artworks strive to be innovative in order to function more 
effectively as beings of truth. Novelty establishes the singular individuality of an artwork and 
enables it to produce meaning,856 which is generated through the recognition of difference. 
The distinction of an artwork as a particular being allows it to become a proxy for a subject—
an Other—and opens the door for communicative interpretations of intentionality to begin.857 
Furthermore, an artwork’s capacity to produce meaning ensures the contemplative use-value 
that is associated with it. The perpetual innovation of artistic creation inevitably transforms 
the concept of art, which is established through subjective and collective processes of 
generalization. As a result, artistic experimentation inevitably moves the practice of art into 
non-art realms by crossing boundaries, surpassing limits, and engaging with the unknown.  
The reflexive transformation of artistic practice over time reflects the inherent 
distortion that defines artifice. This is obvious in the ways that representational and symbolic 
practices of art embody deceptive acts of mimicry, while conceptual and relational traditions 
of art involve the subversion of established societal norms. This is most obvious in art’s 
resistance to practical functionality, which stands out in contrast to the purposefulness of all 
other technological production.858 Artworks are impractical and negate determined use. While 
they are most certainly used by people, their unusual nature assures that their usability is a 
matter of interpretation.859 Art’s dissent is also evident in comparison with standard economic 
practices. Unlike other commodities, the use-value of artworks cannot be directly associated 
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with their exchange-value.860 By subverting established societal norms, artworks generate a 
contemplative space where common sense (i.e. logic) is brought into focus and openly 
questioned through the formal integrity of the artworks.861 This ironically determines a unique 
functionality and use-value for artworks, and establishes the foundation for art’s autonomy as 
a social practice. Artworks function by being ‘out of context,’ which accentuates their 
singularity while differentiating them from the usual and the usable.862 
The practice of art in general is a tradition of creating meaning by establishing 
difference. Through formal and contextual relations, artworks represent the principles of 
artistic tradition through the use of conventions. These standards of art call attention to the 
compositional singularity of the artwork while positioning it in contrast to the society from 
which it came and in which it is evaluated. The sovereignty of art is established through the 
difference that every artwork must inherently generate, which inevitably exists in contrast to a 
common sense of intentionality and functionality that dominates human society. Combined 
with their interpretive indetermination, artworks represent an indisputable source of freedom. 
 
Art, Society & Tradition 
 Since artworks are identified in relation to the concept of art, the tradition that defines 
artistic practice is a vital aspect of art’s conceptual nature. Tradition unites the transformative 
concept of art and provides it with continuity over time. While art exists as a generalization 
beyond any particular manifestation of artwork, it also exists within artworks as a generally 
recognizable attribute. The relationship of artworks to art thus reflects the distinction of an 
individual to society, demonstrating a counterpoint between specificity and universality. An 
artwork is art in itself, but also in relation to other artworks and to tradition, just like 
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individuals identify themselves in relation to society. A generalization is an abstract grouping 
of particular examples, and the tradition of art is organized by categorizing specific examples 
according to their integral compositional qualities and their association to temporal and social 
relations. Current practices of art evince this act of distinction through their consideration of 
aesthetic and conceptual concerns. The contemporary tradition of art is based upon principles 
of integrity and insurgency, where core ideology is supported and challenged from within 
through practice in relation to external social relations. Just as art changes in relation to 
society, so too does society change in relation to art. The transformative nature of aesthetic 
experience stimulates societal change through the practice of art. The potential of artworks to 
transform individuals is what makes art such a loved and powerful cultural tradition.  
To speak about the tradition of art is to move from the particular to the universal—
from the artwork to art, and the subject to society. This movement of cognitive generalization 
establishes art as a concept that exists within individuals, and beyond individuality within 
collective social recognition. While the aesthetic experience of artworks can always be 
connected to subjectivity, the tradition of art surpasses this condition temporally and 
relationally. In this way, the tradition of art is as unstable and indeterminate as the artworks 
and individuals that comprise it. While its evidence can be traced through collective memory 
and historical record, art perpetually points towards the future as a promise for generations to 
come. The drift of old traditions to new ones, and the contextual shift that this implies as 
artworks are experienced in distinct times from their creation, is the second separation that 
Rancière uses to define his concept of aesthetic separation. The impending reception of art’s 
future can never be ascertained given the inevitable social change that precedes and informs 
it. The tradition of art to come depends on the immanent revelations of those who continue to 
practice it, and art’s unique autonomy as a valued source of meaning for human society.  
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 There are as many traditions of art as there are societies, despite the general 
acceptance of dominant traditions as all encompassing. Our current tradition of art falls under 
the aesthetic regime, which is fundamentally informed by Kant’s aesthetic theory. In the 
mimetic regime that came before it, artworks were understood as purely representative in 
nature. 863 In the aesthetic regime, however, every artwork is seen as a singularity of truth, and 
every subject is positioned as its sole interpreter. Within the aesthetic regime, the Modernist 
epoch defines the past century of tradition. Modernism has demonstrated an explosion of 
creativity that has expanded the tradition of art in remarkable ways, through the bravery of 
artists to take risks and innovate in their practices, which have established a renewed 
autonomy and tradition of art within society. Within the Modernist epoch, a growing 
awareness of the conceptual ontology of artworks has created an apparent duality of artistic 
traditions, which is based upon the internal/external division that determines every artwork as 
an integrally composed form within a distinct yet influential context. The aesthetic lineage of 
art focuses on the formal aspect of artworks—their sensual material composition—while the 
conceptual lineage emphasizes the contextual relations that also determine artworks—their 
interaction and association with society.864 Despite the ruptured tradition, every artwork 
inherently demonstrates aesthetic and conceptual qualities, both of which evoke sensations 
that lead to aesthetic significance.865 The current focus of art practices on more conceptual 
and socially engaged methodologies can be defined as postconceptual art, an ontology that 
calls attention to the procedural and relational experience of artworks.866 Two examples of 
this are the art projects presented as practical research for this thesis—uncover RECOVER, 
and Cover Your Tracks—both of which explore material transformation in relation to 
conceptual significance and social interaction. Postconceptual artworks adopt and expose the 
                                                
863 Tanke, “What is the Aesthetic Regime?”, 73. 
864 Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, 47-49. 
865 Ibid., 49. 
866 Ibid., 85. 
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inherent connections between the practice of art and the society within which it functions and 
attains its significance for the aesthetic enjoyment of its participants.  
 Art is political because it transforms the people who practice it—the individuals who 
create artworks and the community that appreciates art. Interacting with artworks is an 
exercise in observation that prioritizes reflexive thought and subjective awareness. The 
distinctions that an observer makes during the aesthetic experience of artworks have the 
potential to be reflexively destabilizing.867 As singularities, artworks inevitably incorporate 
some aspect of the unknown, and the cognitive movement that is necessary to reveal their 
enigma and uncover their truth is potentially infinite.868 This is compounded with the 
indeterminate functionality and the paradoxical nature of artworks, which provide the illusion 
of intentionality in the form of an impossible subject that is an object. The artwork 
communicates its lack, its need and its vulnerability, and reflects the observer back to their 
own eyes.869 The observing subject disconnects for an aesthetic moment to become with the 
object in front of it, the self released and undone in inter-objective exploration. As the 
moment passes, the self is restored with new knowledge of a singular experience and the 
associated reflexive emotion that this aesthetic encounter evoked. The freshly felt subjective 
awareness and sensibility enables the observer to understand and position their self anew.870 
The potential difference that results from the reflexive disconnection of aesthetic experience 
is how the practice of art changes people. Through its latent power to affect social 
transformation, the practice of art is a political and life-changing experience.  
 Tradition is much larger than individuals, and the tradition of art entails creation as 
much as transformation. While tradition is much bigger than any one person or artwork, every 
artist and artwork informs the meaning that artistic tradition has within society. The tradition 
                                                
867 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 72. 
868 Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, 173. 
869 Ibid., 85. 
870 Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator, 72. 
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of aesthetics is based upon the differentiation between particulars and universals, and the 
movement from subjective opinion to objective truth in aesthetic judgement is one of the 
mystical communal aspects of aesthetic experience. Through specific instances of feeling and 
thought, individuals become reflexively aware of their position in relation to themselves and 
society by momentarily liberating their subjectivity and disrupting the certainty of self. The 
shared experience of art allows us yet another opportunity to consider and nurture our selves 
collectively; a social becoming that is reflected in the practice of art. The tradition of art is 
evidence of the incessant search for self-knowledge and meaning that defines our being 
human, and the pleasure that we share in connecting with others through sensation.  
  
7.2.2. Recommendations for Future Research 
 To correlate the practice of art with biological operation, further research is needed 
into the organizational principles that form the foundation of both. Discovering how 
biological order functions at the molecular level and tracing it to higher levels of operation 
and understanding would be necessary to properly connect our organizational tendencies at 
the molar level to some biological imperative. Nöe’s organizational theory of art could be 
used as a template to explore the artistic and social relations of order. Nonetheless, future 
studies need to take into account art’s dependence on social factors to define itself, which 
suggests that a purely biological understanding of art is not feasible. There is a lot of potential 
that could result from extended research into this broad overview of aesthetic experience in 
relation to human cognition and contextual influence. While autopoiesis has provided 
numerous insightful ways to connect the practice of art with the functioning of life, further 
studies into the source and operation of intentionality would be useful in exploring the 
dissonant relationship that art has with purpose and use. Another autopoietic idea to be further 
explored is the relationship of difference and significance, which would further develop 
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understanding of the functioning of observation, and expand the methodologies of artistic 
practice to create significance through difference.  
While we still lack a detailed understanding of how our molecular bodies inform our 
molar perception, it is our basic conception of human consciousness that is the biggest 
obstacle for research into how human thought and notions of self influence aesthetic 
experience. An exploration of the inherent lack or incompleteness that correlates human 
beings and artworks would be very promising to research, especially in relation to the 
potential for empathy between living and non-living beings. Focusing on the fallacy of 
perception and the supplementary ways that consciousness creates a smooth and continuous 
sense of human reality would be a perfect psychological starting point, which would also be 
useful for connecting our self-deceptive nature to the practice of art. I suspect there are 
interesting correlations between our fraudulent belief in self-control and absolute reality, and 
the artificial underpinnings of artistic tradition through its ubiquitous use of mimesis, 
representation and subversion.  
Future research into language would strengthen the role of semiotics in this thesis, and 
inform our understanding of systems theory, observation and ‘carriers of significance.’ 
Research into technology could clarify the subversive relationship that artistic practice has 
with purpose and functionality, while further exploring how the ontology of the model, or 
sample, could be related to the capacity of artworks to act as subjects. Understanding how 
artworks function as proxies for subjects should focus on exploring the source of agency of 
artworks, which would strengthen the empathetic line of research suggested earlier.  
Further research into the limits of artworks and the thresholds of art would be 
beneficial to understanding the recognition and subversion of artistic conventions. To what 
extent must artworks conform in order to be considered art? This is an inevitable product of 
any future artistic research in the form of artworks, which create new knowledge naturally 
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through their unique existence. Moving completely outside of artistic institutions is one way 
to more fully appreciate the scope of the two projects that I have presented in this thesis, 
which would undoubtedly highlight the question of accessibility and dissemination that most 
artists struggle to resolve. Nonetheless, escaping artistic contexts would increase the surprise 
and incredulity for participants, while providing a distinct assessment of the affect of 
contextual relations on the aesthetic experience on participants. 
 
7.2.3. New Contributions of Knowledge 
This thesis finds that the concept of separation is a valuable way to define and 
consider the practice of art in relation to human life, cognition and experience. Two key 
separations inform artworks and people; an internal division between matter and form, and an 
external division that defines individuality in relation to a group. Artworks are integrally 
defined by a distinction between material and form, and extrinsically in terms of the context 
in which they are evaluated. Artworks are inevitably related to the tradition and/or concept of 
art that is applied to them during their evaluation, and the artistic conventions that this 
tradition or concept entails. People, on the other hand, are defined in relation to nature and 
culture, which reflect their neutral, material physiology and their formed, composite 
psychology. The separation between an individual person and the society in which they live 
reflects the distinction between subjective and objective determinations. These two divisions 
establish connections through which artworks can be evaluated in relation with human nature, 
and correlations can be made between the practice of art and the meaning associated to life.  
A confirmation of knowledge of this thesis is the clarification of the separation 
between artistic cause and biological effect, which eliminates the possibility of a biological 
determinism for artistic practice and the aesthetic experience of artworks. The social and 
conceptual factors that inform artistic significance cannot be quantified or reduced to levels of 
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cellular (i.e. neuronal) operation without losing their relevance to the artistic conception or 
social tradition they relate to. The practice of art is perceptual, which means that it functions 
on the level of human individuals who are capable of relating contextual and conceptual 
information through conscious thought in conjunction with internal feelings related to their 
experience. Exploring aesthetic processes at the neurological level is moving out of the 
jurisdiction of art, and as such, has minimal repercussions on the practice of art at the 
beginning of the 21st Century. The practice of art reflexively distinguishes its unique tradition 
and autonomic function on its own terms.   
A practical contribution to knowledge that was developed for this thesis is the art 
project Cover Your Tracks, which provided a unique aesthetic experience for participants and 
a practical means of exploring my theoretical research, specifically regarding the influence of 
social engagement and contextual relations on artistic significance. Cover Your Tracks 
focused on shifts in cognitive awareness that highlighted participants’ reflexive modalities of 
inter-objectivity, while accentuating the sensations aroused by the experience within the 
botanical garden. The project alluded to the clandestine social relations inherent in the 
practice of art by emphasizing the act of covering tracks, where the presence of an Other is 
surmised and yet absent, which reflects Rancière’s notion of ‘being apart together.’ 
Furthermore, the dry garden installations that comprised the project questioned the recogntion 
and autonomy of the artwork by fading into the institutional infrastructure of the botanical 
garden, which in turn helped to establish the unfamiliar and subversive elements that aligned 
it with artistic tradition, as subtle as they were.  
Perhaps the most affecting contribution to knowledge that this thesis has found is how 
artworks reflect who we are, acting as paradoxical mirrors that reveal ourselves to ourselves 
through transformations, sensations and relations. One example of this reflection is the 
vulnerability that both people and artworks demonstrate through their inherent states of lack 
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and incompleteness. Our individual survival depends on being cared for, and learning to care 
for our self and others. We accomplish this through our cognition and interaction with the 
world, which involves both integration and extension. These actions of internalization and 
externalization reflect physiological and psychological needs that are as relevant to artworks 
as they are to human beings. Artworks need to be cared for and validated by human beings, 
which they achieve through the production of significance that their singularity evokes. 
Artworks reveal their lack in part through their reliance on parerga, which supplement them 
structurally and aesthetically. Apart from our physical inadequacies, which illness and time 
make perfectly apparent, human perception is also incomplete and buttressed by our 
consciousness, which functions transparently and disguises its supplementary manoeuvring. 
The correspondence between the inadequacies and weaknesses of people and artworks 
supports the existence of an empathic connection during aesthetic experience, and 
consolidates the claim that artworks function as subjects. The artificial nature of artworks 
demonstrates our acknowledgement and pleasure in self-duplicity, which is experienced in the 
inter-objective movement between subject and object that artistic encounters imply. As we 
alternate between our reflexive masks, we subject artworks to do the same. Through the 
engagement and recognition of our volatile selfhood during aesthetic experience, artworks 
provide us with moments of reflexive clarity and truth. Forcing us to question our isolated and 
binary conceptions of self in relation to our society and world, artworks help to demonstrate 
the vital role of external relations in establishing and nurturing our integral identity.  
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APPENDIX 1. 
Resumen Breve en castellano – Separación estética y el reflejo de la vida en el arte 
Esta tesis tiene como objetivo definir la práctica del arte, que se entiende entendida 
como la creación y apreciación de las obras de arte, en términos de separación. Además, 
intenta determinar cómo se puede usar el concepto de separación para relacionar los aspectos 
biológicos y cognitivos de la vida humana con la experiencia estética y la comprensión de las 
obras de arte. Propone establecer correlaciones directas entre la funcionalidad biológica y 
artística, mientras demuestra cómo la separación inherente en la práctica artística limita una 
concepción puramente biológica. La investigación teórica se centra en importantes teorías 
estéticas de los últimos doscientos años y en estudios recientes sobre la cognición humana. La 
investigación práctica incorpora dos proyectos de arte social postconceptual que implican la 
investigación teórica. Los resultados muestran dos tipos de separaciones principales que las 
cuales definen las obras de arte y las personas en relación con la tradición y la sociedad, 
respectivamente. La primera implica una división interna de objeto y sujeto, o material y 
forma. La segunda distingue el interior del exterior, lo integral de lo relacional, o lo individual 
del grupo. Las oposiciones que generan estas divisiones desempeñan papeles vitales en la 
identificación reflexiva del yo—la base de la teoría estética—y el reconocimiento de los 
productos humanos como obras de arte. No obstante, esta tesis encuentra que las distintas 
fuentes de significado interno y externo durante la experiencia estética impiden una 
correlación directa entre la causa artística y el efecto biológico, y viceversa. Las obras de arte 
reflejan la vida humana, pero su capacidad para producir significado está influenciada por las 
relaciones sociales y conceptuales que escapan al determinismo biológico. La práctica del arte 
distingue su autonomía y tradición en sus propios términos.  
 
Palabras llave: estética; arte; obra; biología; cognición; vida; postconceptual; separación; 
tradición. 
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Resumen ampliado en castellano – La separación estética y el reflejo de la vida en el arte 
Tema e intenciones de la tesis 
El tema principal de esta tesis es la experiencia estética de las obras de arte, que es 
posible gracias a las habilidades cognitivas y experienciales de los seres humanos dentro de 
un contexto de tradición social. Si bien un enfoque biológico para comprender la práctica del 
arte se basa en los requisitos sensoriales y cognitivos para reconocer y apreciar las obras de 
arte, las tradiciones sociales y culturales en las que basamos nuestro concepto de arte escapan 
al alcance de la validez biológica. Uno de los objetivos de esta tesis es apreciar mejor cómo 
los campos de la ciencia y la filosofía influyen en la práctica del arte. Si bien la biología se 
entiende como el estudio científico de la vida, nuestra comprensión filosófica de la vida en 
términos existenciales es igualmente esencial para determinar el verdadero significado de la 
práctica artística. Esta tesis pretende demostrar que la práctica del arte es importante para 
comprender y apreciar la vida al proporcionar a las personas oportunidades y perspectivas 
únicas para darse cuenta de las condiciones y contradicciones que constituyen inherentemente 
sus vidas. 
Esta investigación sobre la experiencia estética se centra en el estado y el acto de 
separación como tema principal. Como un concepto que es aplicable a los ámbitos de 
pensamiento científico, filosófico y artístico, mi intención es utilizar el concepto de  
separación para definir la práctica artística en asociación y distinción de la ciencia y la 
filosofía. Como un campo autónomo que utiliza verdades científicas y filosóficas para 
funcionar, la autonomía del arte se reflejará aún más en la autonomía de la obra de arte, que 
debe distinguirse de otros seres para funcionar como arte. La separación se convierte así en un 
concepto clave para ayudar a establecer la naturaleza de las obras de arte y la naturaleza de 
nuestra observación, las cuales están constituidas en términos de forma. El concepto de 
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Rancière de "separación estética" plantea dos ejemplos de división en el seno de las prácticas 
artísticas contemporáneas. Una es la división cognitiva entre la sensación física y el 
significado conceptual o metafórico que evoca. Otra es la división entre las obras de arte y la 
tradición social que las establecen. Estas dos separaciones distintas, una basada en la 
experiencia estética subjetiva y la otra basada en concepciones sociales objetivas, unifican 
esta tesis a medida que se explora la práctica del arte en relación con la vida. 
Con esta investigación teórica en mente, un objetivo final de esta tesis es explorar 
cómo la creación de obras de arte contemporáneas puede ayudar a identificar los límites 
ontológicos y operativos que definen la experiencia estética. Rancière se desarrolló su 
concepto de "separación estética" en relación con las ambiciones políticas de los artistas de 
principios del siglo XXI que escapan cada vez más de los contextos institucionales y operan 
dentro de las prácticas no artísticas, utilizando la "vida cotidiana" como contexto y materia 
prima para sus obras de arte. Como artista que se ajusta a esta descripción metodológica, mi 
investigación práctica para esta tesis se centra en el desarrollo de un proyecto de arte 
socialmente comprometido. Tanto el tema del proyecto como su procedimiento reflejan la 
investigación teórica sobre el concepto de separación estética y el reflejo de la vida en el arte. 
 
Interrogantes de la investigación 
Las preguntas que estoy abordando con esta tesis son las siguientes: 
1. ¿Cómo se conecta la práctica del arte con la vida, y se puede determinar biológicamente la 
práctica del arte? La vida en esta pregunta debe entenderse como la condición general que 
distingue a los seres vivos de la materia no viva, y la existencia específica de un ser vivo 
individual.  
2. ¿Cómo influye la separación en la funcionalidad de la vida, la cognición, la experiencia 
estética y las obras de arte? ¿Puede el concepto de separación demostrar las formas en que el 
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arte refleja la vida? Quiero saber si la separación que es inherente al funcionamiento de la 
vida biológica y cognitiva puede entenderse como una base para las distinciones que el arte 
emplea para funcionar. 
3. ¿Cómo facilita el pensamiento humano el pensamiento estético, y cómo es distinto de otro 
pensamiento? ¿Por qué los seres humanos son la única especie animal que practica el arte? 
Me gustaría explorar cómo las capacidades cognitivas que nos hacen únicos influyen en el 
funcionamiento de la práctica artística. Este es el tema de la estética, y esta tesis es en gran 
parte una exploración del funcionamiento del pensamiento humano en relación con la práctica 
del arte. 
4. ¿Qué es una obra de arte? ¿ En qué se diferencian las obras de arte de otros productos 
humanos? La respuesta a esta pregunta se basa en gran medida en los resultados de la 
pregunta anterior, aunque introduce la existencia del objeto de arte físico como un problema 
en relación con la función, el valor de uso y la intencionalidad del autor. 
5. ¿Cuál es la existencia de las obras de arte en relación con el concepto y la tradición del 
arte? ¿Cuán autónomas son las obras de arte respecto a la tradición del arte? Esta pregunta nos 
devuelve a la teoría estética y las capacidades de los seres humanos para transformar el 
pensamiento particular en pensamiento universal, y relacionar el pensamiento subjetivo con el 
pensamiento objetivo. Además, coloca las obras de arte dentro de una lógica temporal de 
práctica y tradición social, y plantea preguntas sobre la importancia de la contextualización y 
la accesibilidad de las obras de arte. 
 
Hipótesis 
Mi hipótesis es que la práctica del arte se puede definir en términos de separación, lo 
que relaciona directamente el arte con la vida humana en términos de función biológica y 
concepción existencial. Los componentes necesarios que definen la práctica del arte (obras de 
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arte, personas y contextos) demuestran separaciones inherentes que se pueden rastrear hasta la 
acción y el pensamiento humanos, que están sujetos a las condiciones de vida. No obstante, 
anticipo que las separaciones inherentes a la práctica del arte niegan su posibilidad de ser 
determinadas de manera puramente biológica debido a la importante influencia de los factores 
sociales en la función y el significado de la práctica artística. 
 
Hallazgos principales 
 Esta tesis sostiene que el concepto de separación es una forma valiosa de definir y 
considerar la práctica del arte en relación con la cognición y la experiencia humana. Dos 
separaciones claves informan tanto a las obras de arte como a los seres humanos; una división 
interna (entre objeto/sujeto o materia/forma), y una separación externa que define la 
individualidad en relación con un grupo. Las obras de arte se definen por una distinción entre 
material y forma en términos de su composición fundamental y el contexto en el que se 
evalúan. Además, las obras de arte están inevitablemente relacionadas con la tradición y el 
concepto de arte que se les aplica durante su evaluación, y las convenciones artísticas que 
conlleva esta tradición o concepto. Las personas, por otro lado, se definen en relación con la 
naturaleza y la cultura. La separación entre una persona individual y la sociedad refleja la 
distinción entre determinaciones subjetivas y objetivas. Hay muchas otras separaciones que 
influyen en la experiencia estética, pero estas dos divisiones establecen la base sobre la cual 
se pueden hacer correlaciones entre arte, filosofía y ciencia. 
Mis hallazgos más importantes en relación con las obras de arte se relacionan con la 
influencia vital de las relaciones contextuales externas. Las obras de arte se reconocen a 
través de una asociación externa con el concepto de arte, que coloca las obras de arte en 
relación perpetua con la tradición del arte. Las obras de arte se reconocen a través de su 
incorporación o uso de convenciones artísticas, que se adhieren a esa tradición a la vez que la 
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desafían. Las obras de arte se diferencian de otros productos humanos por medio de 
evaluaciones formales de intencionalidad, funcionalidad y valor de uso. Las obras de arte 
subvierten la aplicabilidad determinada y, por lo tanto, abren un espacio para su 
contemplación e interpretación. Como tal, la evaluación de las obras de arte implica 
consideraciones estéticas y conceptuales, lo que demuestra la influencia de la referencia 
contextual externa sobre el significado asociado a la forma integral que encarna una obra de 
arte. 
Otro hallazgo importante se relaciona con la motivación para la originalidad artística. 
La novedad no solo establece la individualidad de una obra de arte, sino que también le 
permite producir significado, que se genera a través del reconocimiento de la diferencia. La 
distinción de una obra de arte como un ser particular le permite convertirse en un 
representante de un sujeto, el Otro, y abre la puerta a la interpretación estética. Como tal, la 
originalidad artística asegura el valor de uso contemplativo asociado con la práctica artística. 
La innovación perpetua de la creación artística, sin embargo, transforma inevitablemente la 
práctica y la concepción del arte. La experimentación artística se traslada a campos no 
artísticos cruzando límites, superando barreras e interactuando con lo desconocido en un 
esfuerzo incansable para mantener la capacidad de producir significado. 
Un hallazgo final es la vulnerabilidad que las obras de arte reflejan a través de sus 
estados inherentes de falta e incompletitud, lo que refleja nuestra condición humana. Nuestra 
supervivencia individual depende en gran medida de nuestras capacidades para integrar el 
mundo y contribuir a la sociedad, que son acciones que involucran necesidades internas y 
externas que son tan relevantes para las obras de arte como lo son para los humanos. Las 
obras de arte necesitan seres humanos para validarlas, lo que logran a través de la producción 
de significado que evocan a través de su singularidad. La percepción humana es incompleta y 
está respaldada por nuestra conciencia, que en sí misma funciona de manera transparente y 
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evita mostrar sus manipulaciones complementarias. Las obras de arte demuestran su 
incompletitud a través de su dependencia de parerga, que las complementan estructuralmente 
y estéticamente. La correspondencia entre la debilidad humana y artística respalda la 
existencia de una conexión empática durante la experiencia estética, lo que consolida la 
noción de que las obras de arte funcionan como sujetos. 
 
Diseño de tesis 
La organización de esta tesis se basa en un dibujo simple que hice en un intento de 
separar los diversos elementos esenciales de la experiencia estética; contexto, obra de arte, 
sujeto, pensamiento y arte (ver apéndice 3). El resultado son cuatro capítulos que exploran las 
formas en que los contextos, las personas, el pensamiento y las obras de arte funcionan en 
relación con la experiencia estética con la intención de comprender mejor la noción de 
separación estética y la práctica del arte a principios del siglo XXI. Estos capítulos teóricos 
van acompañados de un capítulo de investigación práctica que explora dos proyectos de arte 
en relación con las condiciones de la experiencia estética. 
El Capítulo 2. Vida / Contexto se centra en la teoría de la autopoiesis y las formas en 
que los organismos vivos se separan fundamentalmente de la materia no orgánica para poder 
vivir. Una separación secundaria de la autopoiesis implica la distinción entre el nivel 
molecular de la función estructural de los organismos vivos y el nivel molar—el nivel de un 
ser entero—de la observación e intención de un ser vivo dentro de su entorno. Estas dos 
separaciones informan la intencionalidad de los seres vivos y las capacidades de observación 
que permiten la experiencia estética en los humanos. Se comparan con las nociones de 
Rancière de “estar separados juntos” y “separación estética” para describir el funcionamiento 
básico de la experiencia estética y establecer un punto de conexión entre la práctica del arte y 
el funcionamiento de la vida humana. 
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El Capítulo 3. Pensamiento / Yo examina las diversas funciones cognitivas que 
facilitan la experiencia estética. Comienza demostrando cómo el cuerpo y la mente trabajan 
juntos para determinar la concepción del yo en los sujetos humanos gracias al pensamiento 
reflexivo, antes de pasar a examinar las formas en que nuestra percepción y acción habilitan 
nuestra capacidad de realizar el mundo. Esto es seguido por una exploración de la conciencia 
humana y las formas en que nuestra comprensión distintiva configura la realidad. Todas estas 
ideas están relacionadas con la teoría de la autopoiesis para explorar cómo nuestra separación 
percibida de lo externo y lo interno determina los procesos de pensamiento que facilitan la 
experiencia estética. 
El Capítulo 4. El Humano / Intención explora los temas del lenguaje y la tecnología 
como las dos características y métodos principales que usamos para separarnos a nosotros 
mismos y nuestra especie de otros animales. Tanto el lenguaje como la tecnología se exploran 
en relación con la construcción del pensamiento humano, la sociedad y la práctica del arte. Si 
bien el lenguaje se examina en términos de establecer nuestra capacidad de pensamiento 
reflexivo y simbólico, que son esenciales para la experiencia estética, la tecnología se explora 
en términos de función e intencionalidad para proporcionar un contrapunto a la 
indeterminación especial de las obras de arte. 
El Capítulo 5. Obras de arte / El arte se centra en dos conceptos que informan el 
proceso de contextualización de las obras de arte. El parergon es un concepto que Derrida 
aísla de la teoría estética de Kant para explorar los límites entre una obra de arte y su 
contexto, al tiempo que deconstruye la imposición formal de la teoría estética sobre la 
experiencia de las obras de arte. La segunda idea, “el fragmento,” es una forma filosófica que 
Osborne localiza en el trabajo de Friedrich Schlegel y los filósofos románticos de Jena, 
utilizándola para explorar la experiencia estética y la ontología de las prácticas artísticas 
postconceptuales. El “fragmento” ayuda a considerar las obras de arte como seres autónomos 
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en relación con la tradición artística, que posiciona las obras de arte en relación con los 
contextos históricos y sociales. 
El Capítulo 6. Investigación práctica presenta mi práctica artística a través de dos 
proyectos de arte; uncover RECOVER [destapar RECUPERAR], y Cover Your Tracks [borra 
tus huellas]. El primer proyecto se basa en el cultivo de plantas medicinales usando tierra 
extraída de una fosa común de la guerra civil española. Se explora en relación con el concepto 
de ‘separación estética’ propuesto por Rancière y la teoría organizacional del arte propuesta 
por Nöe. Además de mostrar las diversas formas en que desarrollo mis proyectos de arte en 
relación con los materiales, el significado, las personas y la transformación, el subcapítulo 
(que es un artículo pendiente de publicación)871 proporciona una introducción práctica al 
trabajo de Rancière y, en particular, a su afirmación del potencial político del experimentar 
obras de arte. El proyecto Cover Your Tracks se desarrolló en relación con mi investigación 
teórica sobre la separación estética y el reflejo de la vida en el arte. El proyecto comenzó a 
desarrollarse en 2017 y se exhibió en 2018 en el Jardín Botánico de Barcelona. La obra de 
arte estaba compuesta por tres jardines japoneses de karesansui (montaña seca) ubicados en 
senderos a lo largo de los terrenos. Los visitantes fueron invitados a participar en la creación y 
el borrado de marcas simbólicas, proporcionando un encuentro inesperado que ponía de 
relieve las capacidades cognitivas que distinguen a los seres humanos de otros animales.  
El Capítulo 7. Conclusión cierra la tesis observando las respuestas a mis principales 
preguntas de investigación, recomendaciones para futuras investigaciones y dando cuenta del 
nuevo conocimiento que he aportado. 
                                                
871 Instituto Franklin-UAH, Toward an Eco-social Transition: Transatlantic Environmental 
Humanities / Hacia una Transición Eco-social: Humanidades Medioambientales desde 
una perspectiva Transatlántica, (Alcalá, España: Colección CLYMA, Biblioteca 
Benjamin Franklin, publicación pendiente 2019/2020).  
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APPENDIX 3 
Aesthetic Separation Collage 
Image 13: Robert Waters, The Essential Elements of Aesthetic Experience, 2019, digitally 
manipulated paper collage (detail), 29.7 x 21 cm. 
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